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Abstract
The primary purposes of my dissertation are, first, to motivate Russellian theories
of propositional attitudes and propositional attitude ascriptions by criticizing Fregean
theories, and second, to defend Russellian theories from the arguments and problems
posed by the phenomenon of opacity. A theory of propositional attitudes and
propositional attitude ascriptions is Russellian just in case it respects both the Principle of
Direct Reference, and the Principle of Semantic Innocence, The Principle of Direct
Reference states, roughly, that the sole contribution a referring term makes toward the
content expressed by a sentence in which the term appears is the referent of the term, and
not a Fregean sense or a "way of thinking of the referent of the term." And the Principle
of Semantic Innocence states, roughly, that a term has the same referent or designation
regardless of whether the tennrm occurs inside or outside of the that-clause of an attitude
ascription. Fregean theories, on the other hand, are theories based upon Frege's theory of
sense and reference, and thus Fregean theories respect neither the Principle of Direct
Reference, nor the Principle of Semantic Innocence. Fregean theories are often alleged to
be superior to Russellian theories, however, on the grounds that Fregean theories can
avoid the arguments and problems posed by the phenomenon of opacity.
In Chapter 1 I1, first, motivate Russellian theories by reviewing Kripke's and
Putnam's arguments in support of the Principle of Direct Reference and Davidson's
arguments in support of the Principle of Semantic Innocence, and second I proffer a
detailed explication of the arguments and problems posed for Russellian theories by the
phenomenon of opacity, i,e. the phenomenon whereby a normal, understanding subject,
say Odile, might assent to a sentence such as
(I) Twain is a great author,
yet dissent from a sentence such as
(2) Clemens is a great author.
The phenomenon of opacity poses three problems for Russellian theories: First, there are
epistemnological arguments from opacity; these arguments conclude that Russellian
theories must be rejected because they lead to the contradictory result that Odile both
holds and not hold the attitude of belief toward one and the same content. Second, there
is the problem of the cognitive significance of occurrences; i.e. how can a Russellian
theory explain why Oscar assents to (I), yet dissents from (2)? And finally, third, there
are semantic arguments from opacity; these arguments conclude that a Russellian theory
cannot provide an adequate account of the truth conditions of attitude ascriptions such as
'Oscar believes that Clemens is a great author.'
In Chapter 2 1 argue that the Fregean strategy for avoiding the problems posed by
the phenomenon of opacity faces a fundamental difficulty. The Fregean strategy involves
positing cognitive values--"senses," "modes of apprehension," or some such entities--to
serve as contents--the objects of propositional attitudes--and as the semantic values of
terms occurring inside the that-clauses of attitude ascriptions. Contrary to what is
commonly supposed, however, theories which utilize the Fregean strategy are not immune
to arguments based upon the phenomenon of opacity, and furthermore, in attempting to
avoid these arguments, Fregean theories are forced to individuate cognitive values
extremely finely. This is problematic for two reasons: (i) since cognitive values are the
objects of propositional attitudes, the publicity of our beliefs, desires etc. is undermined;
(ii) since cognitive values are also the semantic values of terms occurring the that-clauses
of attitude ascriptions, the legitimacy of our ordinary propositional attitude ascribing
practices is undermined. Given this fundamental difficulty, I suggest that Russellian
theories, and the arguments which allegedly refute them, deserve careful reconsideration.
In Chapter 3 I examine the Russellian theories proposed by Salmon, Richard, and
Crimmins and Perry. In attempting to avoid the problems posed by the phenomenon of
opacity all of these theories invoke versions of the Fregean strategy. Each of these
theories analyzes propositional attitudes as ternary relations which have subjects,
Russellian propositions, and some kind of mediator as relata. The mediators posited by
these theories play a role very similar to the role played by the Fregean theorists' cognitive
values, and as a result each of these Russellian theories run afoul of a difficulty similar to
the fundamental difficulty facing the Fregean strategy.
Finally, in Chapter 4 I illustrate how Russellian theories can avoid the arguments
and problems posed by the phenomenon of opacity, yet also steer clear of the difficulties
discussed in Chapter 3. I defend Russellian theories from the epistemological arguments
from opacity by showing that these arguments are unsound. My rejection of these
arguments relies heavily on Burge's externalist account of self-knowledge. Concerning
the problem of cognitive significance I argue that, contrary to what is often claimed,
Russellian theories are not worse off with regard to this problem than are Fregean
theories. And lastly, I illustrate how a version of Kamp's "Discourse Representation
Theory" can be utilized to defend Russellian theories from the semantic arguments from
opacity.
Thesis Supervisor: Dr. Sylvain Bromberger, Professor of Philosophy
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Dear Colleague,
0 . . Concerning sense and denotation, I see nothing but difficulties which I cannot
overcome .... I believe that in spite of all its snow fields Mount Blanc itself is a
component part of what is actually asserted [by the sentence] 'Mount Blanc is more
than 4,000 metres high'. We do not assert the thought, for this is a private
psychological matter: we assert the object of the thought, and this is, to my mind, a
certain complex (an objective proposition, one might say) in which Mount Blanc is
itself a component part. If we do not admit this, then we get the conclusion that
we know nothing at all about Mount Blanc. This is why for me the denotation of a
[sentence] is not the true, but a certain complex which (in the given case) is true.
In tile case of a simple proper name like 'Socrates', I cannot distinguish between
sense and denotation; I see only the idea, which is psychological, and the object.
Or better: I do not admit the sense at all, but only the idea and the denotation. ..
Yours sincerely
Bertrand Russell 1
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Introduction: The Russellian and Fregean Approaches to Propositional Attitudes
and Propositional Attitude Ascriptions.
The Russellian approach to propositional attitudes and propositional attitude
ascriptions is enjoying a resurgence. Writers such as Kaplan, Salmon, Soames, Fodor,
Richard, Perry and Crimmins have espoused theories at the core of which is the thesis that
Russellian propositions are the semantic values of declarative sentences and the objects of
propositional attitudes. (Russellian propositions are propositions which may contain
physical objects as constituents. 2) The primary virtue of the Russellian approach--and the
reason for its resurgence--is that it respects both the Principle of Direct Reference and the
Principle of Semantic Innocence. The Principle of Direct Reference states, roughly, that
the sole contribution a referring term makes toward the content expressed by a sentence in
which the term appears is not a Fregean sense or a "way of thinking of the referent of the
term," but instead simply is the referent of the term. (The content expressed by an
occurrence of declarative sentence is what one who believes what is expressed by the
sentence holds the attitude of belief toward.) And the Principle of Semantic Innocence
states, roughly, that a term has the same referent or designation regardless of whether the
term occurs inside or outside the that-clause of an attitude ascription. Russellian theorists
maintain, correctly on my view, that an adequate account of propositional attitudes and
propositional attitude ascriptions must respect these two principles. 3
It is often alleged, however, that Russellian theories, theories which respect the
principles of direct reference and semantic innocence, can be refuted by arguments based
upon the phenomenon of opacity. For example, suppose that a normal understanding
siubject, Odile, assents to an occurrence of
(1) Twain is a great author.
yet dissents from an occurrence of
10
(2) Clemens is a great author.
It follows from Odile's behavior that
(3) Odile believes that Twain is a great author.
is true, while
(4) Odile believes that Clemens is a great author.
is false. It seems that a Russellian theory, however, is forced to maintain that (3) and (4)
have the same truth conditions: It follows from the Principle of Direct Reference (and a
standard principle of compositionality) that (1) and (2) express the same Russellian
proposition--they express the same content. Consequently, it follows from the Principle
of Semantic Innocence that the that-clauses of (3) and (4) express the same Russellian
proposition. Therefore (again assuming a standard principle of compositionality) (3) and
(4) must present the same Russellian proposition, and thus they must have the same truth
conditions. These results are deemed to be unacceptable. If Odile assents to an
occurrence of (1), yet dissents from an occurrence of (2), then these occurrences must
express distinct contents, and furthermore it follows from Odile's behavior that she
believes that Twain is a great author, but does not believe that Clemens is a great author.
Consequently, the argument concludes, the Russellian approach to propositional attitudes
and propositional attitude ascriptions must be rejected.
Arguments such as the above serve as the primary motivation for the Fregean
approach to propositional attitudes and propositional attitude ascriptions; Fregean
theories--theories which are based upon Frege's theory of sense and reference--are
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specifically designed to solve the problems and preclude the arguments which are posed
by the phenomenon of opacity. Fregean theories maintain that the objects of propositional
attitudes are not Russellian propositions composed of referents and properties, but rather
are (something like) Fregean thoughts, which are composed of (something like) Fregean
senses. Thus, contrary to the Principle of Direct Reference, under the Fregean approach
the content expressed by an occurrence of a referring term is not the referent of the term,
but rather is the sense expressed by the term, where a sense is something like a "mode of
presentation," or a "way of thinking of the referent." Assuming that 'Twain' and 'Clemens'
express distinct senses, the Fregean approach is thus able to distinguish the contents, or
thoughts, expressed by (I) and (2). Furthermore, contrary to the Principle of Semantic
Innocence, under the Fregean approach a referring term has distinct referents depending
upon whether the term occurs inside or outside the that-clause of an attitude ascription;
under the Fregean approach a term occurring inside the that-clause of an attitude
ascription does not refer to its "ordinary referent," but instead refers to its sense, or its
"oblique referent." Because the Fregean approach violates the Principle of Semantic
Innocence in this way, Fregean theories are seemingly able to distinguish the truth
conditions of (3) and (4): Under the Fregean approach (3) states that Odile holds the
attitude of belief toward a thought which contains as a constituent one "way of thinking"
of Twain, while (4) states that Odile holds the attitude of belief toward a distinct thought
which contains as a constituent another "way of thinking" of Twain. Thus the Fregean
approach is seemingly able to solve the problems and preclude the arguments posed by the
phenomenon of opacity, but only at the cost of the principles of direct reference and
semantic innocence.
The primary purposes of this dissertation are, first, to motivate the Russellian
approach to propositional attitudes and propositional attitude ascriptions by criticizing the
Fregean approach, and second, to sketch a Russellian Theory which avoids the arguments
and problems posed by the phenomenon of opacity. The dissertation proceeds as follows.
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In Chapter 1 I first motivate the Russellian approach by reviewing some of the arguments
in support of the principles of direct reference and semantic innocence, and then I
explicate the arguments and problems posed by the phenomenon of opacity in some detail.
In Chapter 2 I further motivate the Russellian approach by showing that what I call the
Fregean strategy for precluding the arguments from opacity faces a fundamental
difficulty. That is, in Chapter 2 1 set aside the Russellian arguments in support of the
principles of direct reference and semantic innocence, and argue that there is an
independent reason for rejecting the Fregean approach; even if one ignores the fact that
Fregean theories come at the cost of the principles of direct reference and semantic
innocence, there is a compelling reason for rejecting such theories. In Chapter 3 1 turn to
the Russellian approach and examine the Russellian theories recently proposed by
Salmon, Richard, and Crimmins and Perry. Each of these Russellian theories reverts to
employing aspects of the Fregean strategy in attempting to avoid the arguments and
problems posed by the phenomenon of opacity, and as a result each of the these theories
encounters the difficulty with the Fregean approach discussed in Chapter 2. Finally, in
Chapter 4 I sketch a Russellian theory which avoids the arguments and problems posed by
the phenomenon of opacity, and yet also steers clear of the pitfalls encountered by the
Fregean strategy.
1.0 Direct Reference, Semantic Innocence, and the Arguments and Problems Posed
by the Phenomenon of Opacity.
In this chapter I will discuss what I take to be the central arguments for and against
the Russellian approach to propositional attitudes and propositional attitude ascriptions.
In sections 1.1I and 1.2 I motivate the Russellian approach by reviewing some of the
arguments in support of the principles of semantic innocence and direct reference. In
section 1.3 I introduce what I call The Naive Russellian Theory, and I explicate the
13
arguments and problems posed by the phenomenon of' opacity in terms of this Russellian
theory,
1.1 The Principle of Direct Reference.
The notion of Direct Reference is due to Kaplan. Kaplan explains that a term is
directly referential just in case "the relation between the [term] and the referent is not
mediated by the corresponding propositional component, the content of what is said .,,.
The directly referential term goes directly to its referent, directly in that it does not first
pass through the proposition." 4 Note that to say that a term is directly referential is not to
claim that there is nothing which determines, orfixes, the referent of the term5; indeed the
Principle of Direct Reference is closely associated and often confused with just such a
view; viz. the causal theory (or picture) of reference. 6 Rather to say of a term that it is
directly referential is to say that the content expressed by an occurrence of the term is its
referent and not whatever it is that determines its referent. (Again, I use 'content' as a
theory neutral term designating the objects, or relata, of propositional attitudes and--what
I take to be the same thing--that which is expressed by occurrences of declarative
sentences. Hence Fregean thoughts and Russellian propositions are two kinds of content.
Moreover, the content expressed by an occurrence of a term is the contribution the term
makes toward the content expressed by an occurrence of a sentence containing the term.)
If there are directly referential terms, these terms serve as counterexamples to the
Fregean conception of reference and content. According to this conception, the content
expressed by an occurrence of a referring term is a sense where, again, a sense is a "way
of thinking" of the referent, or a "mode of presentation" of the referent, etc. I will call
such "ways of thinking" cognitive values.7 (Thus as I use 'cognitive value', senses are a
kind of cognitive value.) Under the Fregean conception of reference and content, the
cognitive value of a referring term serves two primary functions; (i) it determines the
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referent of the term (if the term has a referent), and (ii) it serves as the content expressed
by occurrences of the term (when the term does not occur within the that-clause of a
propositional attitude ascription). Theories which claim that some terms are directly
referential, however, deny that all occurrences of referring terms express cognitive values
which serve these two functions; rather such theories maintain that the content expressed
by an occurrence of a directly referring term is the referent of the occurrence (if it has
one), and not whatever it is that determines the referent. Thus theories which maintain
that some terms are directly referential are incompatible with the Fregean conception of
reference and content.,
Russellian theories maintain not only that some referring terms are directly
referential, but that all referring terms are directly referential. 8 That is, Russellian
theories maintain the following principle:
The Principle of Direct Reference: The content expressed by an
occurrence of a proper name, a deictic pronoun, or a demonstrative is the
referent of the occurrence, if it has a referent. 9
(For the sake of simplicity I will focus on cases involving proper names, though I intend
the views proposed here to be applied to all referring terms.) The rejection of the Fregean
conception of reference in favor of views which respect the above principle has been to a
large degree motivated by, first, Kripke's arguments in Naming and Necessity, and second
Putnam's famous thought experiment in "The Meaning of 'Meaning'." 10 Both of these
works provide convincing arguments against the Fregean conception of reference and
content by attacking the Fregean dictum that "sense determines referent," or more
generally that "cognitive value determines referent"; these works present arguments
showing that the Fregean conception is incorrect in identifying the referent determining
mechanism of an occurrence of a term with the content expressed by the occurrence. As
the Principle of Direct Reference represents the most plausible alternative to the Fregean
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conception of reference and content, these arguments against the Fregean conception
constitute compelling arguments in favor of the Principle of Direct Reference.
Kripke's arguments are directed against "descriptivist" theories of reference and
content for proper names. According to such theories, proper names function as
"abbreviations" for definite descriptions. Thus, according to a descriptivist, cognitive
values are certain descriptions (where descriptions are the contents expressed by definite
descriptions); i.e. a subject's "way of thinking" of the referent of a term (when he uses the
term) is the content of a certain definite description which denotes the referent of the term.
(Frege certainly encouraged this identification, at least in the case of proper names. 1)
Thus according to the descriptivist, referring terms present descriptions, and these
descriptions serve both of the functions called for by the Fregean conception of reference
and content: descriptions serve as (i) that which determines the referent of referring terms
(the referent is the object denoted by the description presented by the term), and (ii) the
content expressed by occurrences of referring terms. Kripke argues, however, that such
descriptions can serve neither of these functions: descriptions cannot adequately determine
the referents of occurrences of referring terms, nor can they serve as the contents
expressed by occurrences of the terms. 12
A description cannot serve to determine the referent of an occurrence of a referring
term because a subject can use a term to refer to an entity even if he does not, in using the
term, utilize a description which denotes the entity--even if he does not think of the entity
via a description which denotes the entity. And, conversely, a subject might fail to refer
to an entity by using a term even if he does, in using the term, utilize a description which
denotes the entity--even if he does think of the entity via a description which denotes the
entity. For example, a subject might, in using 'Gddel', refer to Gbdel, even though
(almost) everything he thinks about Gidel is false. Suppose that our subject utilizes the
description the guy who discovered the incompleteness of arithmetic in using the name
'Gddel'--he thinks of the referent of 'Gadel' as the guy who discovered the incompleteness
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of arithmetic. Further suppose that, contrary to what we all assume, Gijdel had not
actually discovered the incompleteness proof, but rather had copied the proof from
Schmidt. In this situation the description the guy who discovered the incompleteness of
arithmetic would not denote GOdel. Nonetheless, if our subject were to utter the sentence
'Go"del was a logician', he would be talking about, and referring to, GOdel, not Schmidt; in
uttering this sentence, our subject would refer to GOdel, even though he would not, in
using 'GOdel', utilize a description which denotes G6del. Therefore a subject's utilizing a
description which denotes an entity is not necessary for using a term to refer to the entity.
The same example illustrates that the converse is also true; i.e. in using a referring
term a subject's utilizing a description which denotes an entity is not sufficient for the
subject's using the term to refer to the denoted entity. In the above example, the
description the guy who discovered the incompleteness of arithmetic denotes Schmidt, yet
despite this our subject would refer to GOdel, not Schmidt, were he to utter an occurrence
of 'Godel was a logician.' Examples such as this illustrate that the descriptions utilized by
subjects in using referring terms cannot serve as the mechanism which determines the
referents of those terms.
Kripke also argues that the content of a definite description cannot serve as the
content expressed by an occurrence of a referring term; i.e. where referring term p
allegedly "abbreviates" definite description 8, the content of 6 cannot serve as the content
of p. Kripke, borrowing from Frege's example concerning 'Aristotle', writes that
if 'Aristotle' meant the man who taught Alexander the Great, then saying
'Aristotle was a teacher of Alexander the Great' would be a mere tautology.
But surely it isn't; it expresses the fact that Aristotle taught Alexander the
Great, something we could discover to be false. So, being the teacher of
Alexander the great cannot be part of [the sense of] the name. 13
Similarly, if the content of 'Aristotle' were the description the man who taught Alexander
the Great, an occurrence of 'Aristotle did not teach Alexander the Great' would express
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some kind of contradiction; an understanding subject would know a priori of an
occurrence of this sentence that it was false, But an understanding subject could not know
a priori of an occurrence of this sentence that it was false. Thus Kripke's arguments show
that the content of a definite description which a referring term allegedly "abbreviates"
can serve neither as the mechanism determining the referent of the term, nor as the
content of the term. This conclusion provides support for the Principle of Direct
Reference because such descriptions are the most plausible candidates for the role of
cognitive values. What else could plausibly both determine the referLnt of the term and
also serve as the content presented by the term? How else are we to understand the oft
repeated, but seldom explained, claim that the sense, or a cognitive value, presented by a
term is a "way of thinking" of the referent of the term?
Putnam's objection to the Fregean conception of reference and content is more
broad in scope than Kripke's objection. Putnam's thought experiment shows that the
narrow, or internal, psychological state of a speaker does not determine the referent of a
term uttered by the speaker; two subject's in the same narrow psychological state can refer
to distinct entities, 14 Consequently, if--as surely must be the case--the cognitive value
"grasped" by a speaker must be somehow represented psychologically (i.e. if two subjects
cannot grasp distinct cognitive values while being in the same narrow psychological
state), then cognitive value does not determine referent. Putnam initially employed his
thought experiment to show that the narrow psychological state of a subject who
understands and uses a natural kind term does not determine the referent of the term, but
the experiment can be mooified to apply to any kind of referring term: Imagine that
somewhere in the universe there is a planet, Twin-Earth, which is a molecule for molecule
match of Earth. Now imagine that both an Earthling and his Twin-Earth doppelglinger
utter 'Clinton has won.' By assumption, both subjects are in identical narrow
psychological states--their brains are molecule for molecule matches with molecule for
molecule matching histories. Nonetheless the subject on Earth refers to Clinton with his
18
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utterance of 'Clinton', and the subject on Twin-Earth refers to Clinton's Twin-Earth
doppelglinger with his utterance of 'Clinton'. Thus despite being in identical states, the
two subjects refer to different entities. Consequently, if it is assumed that the narrow
psychological state of a subject determines the cognitive value grasped by a subject, it
follows that the Fregean conception of reference and content must be rejected.
Putnam's argument assumes that narrow psychological state determines "grasped"
cognitive value--no two subjects in the same narrow psychological state can be grasping
distinct cognitive values. If this assumption is rejected, then Putnam's argument against
the Fregean conception of reference and content is undermined, Of course if cognitive
values are identified with some kind of narrow psychological states, e.g. "cognitive roles,"
then Putnam's assumption is trivial: if cognitive values are identified with psychological
states, then it is of course true that two subjects in the same narrow psychological state
must be grasping (or utilizing) the same cognitive value. But if cognitive values are
identified with Platonic entities, such as Fregean senses, then the assumption is not trivial.
As I will attempt to illustrate, however, rejecting the assumption that narrow
psychological state determines grasped cognitive value is tantamount to abandoning the
Fregean conception of reference and content.
The Fregean conception of reference and content maintains that complexes of
cognitive values, or thoughts, serve as the relata of propositional attitudes; e.g. for Odile
and Oscar to have different beliefs is for them to stand in the believes relation to distinct
cognitive value complexes. Therefore, if a defender of the Fregean conception denies that
narrow psychological state determines grasped cognitive value, then he must hold that it is
possible for two subjects to have different beliefs, and yet be in the same narrow
psychological state. But in holding this the defender of the Fregean conception
undermines his own arguments in favor of positing cognitive values over and above
semantic values (i.e. referents and designations). As will be explained in greater detail in
section 1.3, cognitive values are posited in the first place to account for our judgments and
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behavior with regard to occurrences of sentences; more specifically, cognitive values are
posited to explain the cognitive significance of occurrences, and thereby account for the
phenomenon of opacity. 15 If the defender of the Fregean conception rejects the
assumption that narrow psychological state determines grasped cognitive value, he
undermines the Fregean conception's account of the phenomenon of opacity.
For example, suppose an understanding subject, say Odile, assents to an
occurrence of
(1) Twain is a great author.
yet dissents from an occurrence of
(2) Clemens is a great author.
(Hereafter I will use '(01)' to refer to the particular occurrence of (1) to which Odile
assents, and '(02)' to refer to the particular occurrence of (2) from which Odile dissents.)
The Fregean conception of reference and content accounts for Odile's judgments and
behavior by holding that 'Twain' and 'Clemens', as they appear in these occurrences,
present distinct cognitive values (for Odile); Odile judges and behaves as she does because
these occurrences of 'Twain' and 'Clemens' present distinct cognitive values. Cognitive
values are supposed to be in some sense "smack up against Odile's mind" and it is this
mental difference which allegedly accounts for the difference in cognitive significance
between (O1) and (02). (Others might call the cognitive significance of an occurrence the
intuitive meaning of the occurrence. I prefer to characterize the cognitive significance of
an occurrence, relative to an understanding subject, as the causal effects the perception of
the occurrence has on the subsequent mental states and behavior of the subject.) But if
cognitive values are to account for the cognitive significance of occurrences and thus
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feature in such explanations of judgment and behavior, then--assuming that the causal
mechanisms responsible for our judgments and behavior must be physical mechanisms--
cognitive values must be represented psychologically; two subjects grasping distinct
cognitive values cannot be in the same narrow psychological state. In denying that
narrow psychological state determines grasped cognitive value, the defender of the
Fregean conception would be granting that the contents of a subject's beliefs, desires, etc.
are not relevant for explaining his judgments and behavior, and thus the defender of the
Fregean conception would then have to claim that it is the mental states required for
holding propositional attitudes--not the contents of those attitudes--which are directly
relevant to the explanation of judgments and behavior. But if the defender of the Fregean
conception is willing to grant this, if he is willing to grant that the content presented by an
occurrence does not itself determine the cognitive significance of the occurrence, then
why posit cognitive values at all? Why not claim, as do Russellian theorists, that the
content of a subject's propositional attitude is not itself directly relevant to the explanation
of a subject's judgment and behavior, though the actual brain state of a subject holding an
attitude is directly relevant? Why vitiate our ontology with entities that do no explanatory
work? If the defender of the Fregean conception denies that narrow psychological state
determines grasped cognitive value, then he undermines his own arguments in support of
the Fregean conception. Thus Putnam is correct in imputing to the Fregean conception of
reference and content the view that narrow psychological state determines grasped
cognitive value, and his arguments against this conception are sound. 16
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1.2 The Principle of Semantic Innocence.
The notion of semantic innocence derives from this famous passage from
Davidson:
What is strange is ... that ordinary words for people planets, people,
tables, and hippopotami in indirect discourse may give up these pedestrian
references for the exotica. If we could recover our pre-Fregean semantic
innocence, I think it would seem to us plainly incredible that the words
'The Earth moves', uttered after the words 'Galileo said that', mean
anything different, or refer to anything else, than is their wont when they
come in other environments... .Language is the instrument it is because
the same expression, with semantic features (meaning) unchanged, can
serve countless purposes. 17
In this passage Davidson is criticizing the Fregean analysis of propositional attitude
ascriptions, according to which the terms occurring in the that-clause of an attitude
ascription do not refer to their ordinary referents, but rather refer to their cognitive values.
Let us call the relation that obtains between expressions (tokens and types) and their
semantic values (i.e.their referents and designations) the presents relation; according to
the Fregean conception of reference and content a referring term expresses its sense or
cognitive value, and presents its referent, or semantic value, and similarly a simple
declarative sentence expresses a thought, and presents a proposition. 18 (Note that the
Russellian approach has no need for both of these relations, as Russellian theories identify
the content expressed by an occurrence with the proposition presented by the occurrence.)
Thus according to the Fregean analysis of attitude ascriptions a sentence occurring in a
that-clause of an attitude ascription does not present its ordinary semantic value, but
instead has the thought it ordinarily expresses as its semantic value; the Fregean analysis
maintains that an occurrence of a sentence inside the that-clause of an attitude ascription
presents what it ordinarily expresses. The Principle of Semantic Innocence, however,
denies that such shifts in semantic value occur:
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The Principle of Semantic Innocence: A declarative sentence occurring
inside a that-clause of an occurrence of a propositional attitude ascription
presents the same proposition it would have presented if it had occurred on
its own, outside of such a that-clause. 19
Consequently any theory which endorses the Principle of Semantic Innocence is
incompatible with the Fregean analysis of attitude ascriptions.
In the passage cited above, Davidson intimates two arguments against the Fregean
analysis of attitude ascriptions, and in support of the Principle of Semantic Innocence.
First, Davidson suggests that the Fregean analysis is simply counterintuitive: according to
the Fregean analysis, referring terms occurring inside the that-clauses of attitude
ascriptions refer to their cognitive values rather than their ordinary referents, but
intuitively this is not so. It seems that even if it occurs in the that-clause of an attitude
ascription, 'Twain' refers to Twain, and not to some "way of thinking of Twain."
Examples such as the following make this point abundantly clear:
(a) John: Odile believes that Twain is a great author.
Mary: Well, he has a sharp wit anyway.
(b) Odile believes that Twain is a great author, but he isn't.
(c) As Odile believes, Twain is a great author.
(d) 1. Odile believes that Twain is a great author.
2. Twain exists.
Therefore,
3. There is somebody whk ( Odile believes to be a great author.
Concerning example (a), it is clear that the pronoun 'he', as it occurs in Mary's utterance is
intended to be coreferential with the occurrence of 'Twain' in John's utterance. According
to the Fregean analysis, however, 'Twain' as it occurs in John's utterance refers to a
cognitive value--a "way of thinking of Twain," and thus 'he' as it occurs in Mary's
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utterance must also refer to a cognitive value. But under this interpretation Mary's
utterance is nonsense: Mary is not asserting that some (male?) "way of thinking" has a
sharp wit. 20 A similar argument applies to example (b). Concerning example (c),
someone who utters an occurrence of (c) asserts both that Twain is a great author, and that
Odile believes this. In order to assert that Twain is a great author, one must refer to
Twain. Thus the occurrence of 'Twain' in (c) must refer to Twain. On the other hand, if
one is to ascribe a belief about Twain to Odile, then, according to the Fregean analysis,
one must specify some "way of thinking of Twain." Consequently, 'Twain' as it appears
in an occurrence of (c) must refer to a cognitive value. But surely this one occurrence of
'Twain' does not refer to both Twain and a cognitive value. 2 1 And finally, the
"exportation" argument presented in example (d) is intuitively valid, but how can its
validity be accounted for if 'Twain' as it appears in premise I refers to a "way of thinking
of Twain" and not to Twain? If premise I does not present a proposition concerning the
man Twain, how can premise 3, which does present a proposition concerning the man
Twain, follow from premises I and 2? Examples such as these weigh heavily against the
Fregean analysis of attitude ascriptions and in favor of the Principle of Semantic
Innocence.
The second argument intimated in the above citation from Davidson concerns the
productivitl of language and thought. Despite our limited cognitive capacities, human
beings have the ability to think any one of a huge number of thoughts, and,
correspondingly, the ability to understand, or determine the proposition presented by, any
one of an enormous number of sentences. For example, it is unlikely that the reader has
encountered the sentence, 'Clinton has a pet armadillo' before now, but even so you can
undestand this sentence; you know what proposition an occurrence of this sentence would
present, and you know what the truth conditions of an occurrence of this sentence would
be. It is widely thought, and correctly so on my view, that this ability of normal speakers
can be explained only if language is compositional; you can determine the proposition
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presented by an occurrence of 'Clinton has a pet armadillo' because you (tacitly) know the
semantic values of each of the terms appearing in the sentence, and from your perception
of the token of this sentence you can determine the syntactic structure of the sentence, and
finally you know (tacitly) compositional rules for determining the proposition expressed
from the basic semantic values and the syntactic structure. If this kind of account of the
productivity of language and thought is correct, there must be substantial limits on the
amount of basic knowledge that speakers have. That is, this explanation is plausible only
in so far as it attributes to ordinary speakers knowledge of a finite number of
compositional rules and knowledge of the semantic values of a finite number of terms.
The difficulty with the Fregean analysis of attitude ascriptions is that it requires that
ordinary speakers have an immense store of such basic knowledge.
Davidson has argued, and conclusively so in my opinion, that if the Fregean
analysis of attitude ascriptions is understood as asserting that each referring term is
infinitely ambiguous, then the Fregean analysis will be unable to account for the
learnability of natural languages. 22 Consider for example 'Portland'. This one inscription
type corresponds with two distinct words: there is the word 'Portland*' which refers to
Portland Maine, and there is the word 'Portland**' which refers to Portland Oregon. The
fact that 'Portland*' and 'Portland**' are homonyms with the same spelling is something of
an accident. If 'Twain' is similar to 'Portland' in that there are really distinct words,
'Twain*' which refers to Twain, and 'Twain**' which refers to a cognitive value, then
English would contain infinitely many primitive words and therefore would be
unlearnable. The problem arises from iterated attitude ascriptions. It is an empirical fact
that if a competent speaker can understand an occurrence of
(3) Odile believes that Twain is a great author.
then he can also understand an occurrence of
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(3') Odile believes that she believes that Twain is a great author,
To what would 'Twain' in an occurrence of (3') refer? Since an occurrence of (3') states
that Odile holds the attitude of belief toward a thought which is itself about a thought
which is about Twain, it seems that 'Twain' in an occurrence of (3') must refer to a "way
of thinking of a way of thinking of Twain," or what Frege called a "secondary sense." 23
(This is also the analysis offered by Church, whom Davidson is criticizing. 24) The
problem is of course that attitude ascriptions can be embedded indefinitely, and any
competent speaker who understands (3') can also understand further embeddings. Hence
if 'Twain' is ambiguous in the way that 'Portland' is ambiguous, ordinary speakers will be
required to know that 'Twain*' refers to Twain, that 'Twain**' refers to a "way of
thinking" of Twain, that 'Twain***' refers to a "way of thinking of a way of thinking of a
way of thinking" of Twain, etc. The same considerations apply, of course, to all terms.
Consequently, if the Fregean analysis is understood as attributing genuine ambiguity to all
terms, then the Fregean analysis of attitude ascriptions is committed to ordinary speakers
having far too much basic knowledge.
As Davidson points out, however, the Fregean analysis of attitude ascriptions need
not be understood in this way. The Fregean analysis can be understood as claiming not
that all referring terms are ambiguous in the way that 'Portland' is ambiguous, but rather
as claiming that all referring terms are systematically ambiguous. That is, the Fregean
theorist can avoid the result that speakers must have basic knowledge of the semantic
values of an infinite (or at least very large number) of primitive terms by claiming that all
terms are in a way indexical. That is, the Fregean analysis can be understood as
maintaining that the semantic value of an occurrence of a referring term depends in part
upon where the term appears in the sentence. Understood in this way 'Twain', for
example, is not "infinitely ambiguous" anymore than 'you' is infinitely ambiguous.
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Normal speakers manage to learn how to speak and understand English even though 'you'
can be used to refer to an infinite number of things. So perhaps 'Twain', though not
ambiguous, is protean, and thus occurrences of it can have any one of a large number of
semantic values, Perhaps what ordinary speakers who understand occurrences of (3), (3')
etc. know is not the semantic values of a huge number of primitive terms, but rather one
general rule for determining the semantic value of 'Twain' relative to different sentential
environments.
Though this interpretation of the Fregean analysis is not objectionable on the
grounds that it is committed to their being too many primitive terms, it is nonetheless
objectionable on the grounds that it is committed to an ordinary speaker's having (tacit)
knowledge of too many primitive semantic values.25 According to the Fregean analysis
of attitude ascriptions the semantic value of a term, relative to a context of utterance,
varies depending upon whether the term occurs inside a that-clause, or outside a that-
clause: outside of a that-clause a term refers to its ordinary referent, yet inside a that-
clause a term refers to its cognitive value, and inside an embedded that-clause a term
refers to a secondary cognitive value which determines a primary cognitive value, etc.
Recall, however, that the cognitive value presented by a referring term is something like a
"way of thinking" of the term's referent. Consequently, since there are, I assume, many
different "ways of thinking about Twain," there is no unique cognitive value presented by
an occurrence of 'Twain'. Rather, the cognitive value presented by even a single
occurrence of 'Twain', varies intersubjectively: the same occurrence of a referring term
will present distinct cognitive values for different subjects. 26 (I argue in support of this
assumption in section 2.2.) As a result, the Fregean analysis is committed to the claim
that the semantic values of referring terms which appear inside of that-clauses can only be
determined relative to particular subjects (or even particular subjects at particular times.)
Thus, under the Fregean analysis, a given occurrence of a referring term may refer to the
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referent itself, to any one of a huge number of "ways of thinking of its referent," or to
"ways of thinking of ways of thinking of the referent," etc.
Of the many potential semantic values of an occurrences of a referring term, how
is it determined which one is expressed by a term occurring in the that-clause of an
ascription? What, for example, is the semantic value expressed by 'Twain' as it appears in
an occurrence of (3)? Since cognitive values serve as the contents of propositional
attitudes, and (3) states that Odile holds the attitude of belief toward a particular thought,
an occurrence of (3) is true only if 'Twain', as it appears in (3), refers to a "way of
thinking of Twain" which is a constituent of a content toward which Odile holds the
attitude of belief. But this is problematic: any competent speaker of English who has
mastered the meanings of 'Twain' and 'Odile'--whatever this amounts to--can understand
an occurrence of (3), and therefore know what it would be for an occurrence of (3) to be
true. But do all such competent speakers know anything at all about the "way in which
Odile thinks of Twain"? Is it at all plausible to suppose that these speakers know (tacitly)
that the semantic value of 'Twain' as it appears in an occurrence of (3) is W where W is a
particular "way in which Odile thinks of Twain"?
Once a speaker masters the meaning of 'Twain' he is able to produce myriad
thoughts and sentences about Twain; he would be able to sit in the philosopher's armchair
and produce, and understand, myriad sentences containing 'Twain'. Among the myriad
sentences our subject would be capable of producing and understanding would be many
attitude ascriptions. For example, if our subject, a normal speaker of English, has
mastered the meaning of the relevant terms, he would be able to produce, and understand,
occurrences of the following sentences:
(5) Nixon believed that Twain was a quarterback.
(6) Bush believed that Aristotle was identical to Twain.
(7) Nixon believed that Dostoevsky believed that Twain played quarterback.
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Our subject can understand, or know what proposition is presented by, occurrences of
these sentences only if he knows (tacitly) what semantic values are presented by 'Twain'
as it appears in these occurrences, and the Fregean analysis of attitude ascriptions
maintains that the semantic values presented by these appearances of 'Twain' are various
"ways of thinking of Twain": 'Twain' as it appears in an occurrence of (5) has W' as its
semantic value, where W' is some particular "way in which Nixon thought of Twain";
'Twain' as it appears in an occurrence of (6) has W" as its semantic value, where W" is a
particular "way in which Bush thinks of Twain"; and finally 'Twain' as it appears in an
occurrence of (7) must have W'" as its semantic value, where W'" is a particular "way in
which Nixon thinks of a particular way in which Dostoevsky thinks of Twain." All of
these analyses, however, are implausible. Surely in mastering the meaning of 'Twain' and
thereby acquiring the ability to formulate and understand myriad sentences containing
'Twain', our subject does not acquire the ability to refer to such exotic entities as W', W"
and W"'. Surely a speaker can understand an occurrence of (6) even if he has no idea at
all as to "the way in which Bush thinks of Aristotle." What if, as would seem to be likely,
Bush thinks of Aristotle in many different "ways"? Which one of them is referred to by a
given occurrence of (6), and, more importantly, how does a speaker who knows nothing
about Bush's Aristotle thoughts determine that this, rather than that, "way of thinking" is
the referent of 'Aristotle'? Moreover, since our subject can, in principle, iterate 'believes
that' ad infinitum, it seems that the Fregean analysis of iterated attitude ascriptions can
account for our ability to understand occurrences of such ascriptions only if we have
(tacit) knowledge of, and therefore the ability to refer to, an indefinitely large number of
these exotic entities. But to attribute to a normal speaker who has only just mastered the
meaning of 'Twain' such knowledge and ability is to attribute to him (tacit) knowledge of
far too many primitive semantic values. The problem here is not that there are too many
primitive terms, but rather that there are too many referents.
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Another problem with the Fregean analysis of attitude ascriptions, which is related
to the problem discussed above, is that in many cases the semantic values required by the
Fregean analysis could not exist. For example, a normal speaker of English who has
mastery of the relevant terms is able to formulate the following sentences, and know what
propositions occurrences of them would present:
(8n) Aristotle did not believe that Twain was a great author.
(9) Nobody believes that Twain played quarterback.
According to the Fregean analysis, however, in order for our subject to know the truth
conditions of an occurrence of (5n), our subject would have to know that 'Twain' as it
appears in the occurrence refers to "Aristotle's way of thinking of Twain." This is
problematic because, of course, Aristotle did not think of Twain in any "way" at all and
thus the Fregean analysis seems to incorrectly predict that an occurrence of (8n) would be
meaningless, or lack a truth value, since it would suffer from reference failure.
Concerning occurrences of (9), the Fregean analysis of attitude ascriptions maintains that
in order to know the truth conditions of an occurrence of (9), our subject would have to
know that 'Twain' in (9) referred to W"", where W"" is "the way nobody thinks of Twain,"
but this is nonsense. (Also, there is no straightforward way in which (9) can be analyzed
as involving "hidden" quantification over cognitive values.27)
These consequences run counter to known facts. Once one knows that 'Twain'
refers to Twain (whatever possessing this knowledge might amount to), one can formulate
myriad sentences such as (5)-(9), and, given an appropriate store of abilities and basic
knowledge, one can know the propositions presented by, and therefore the truth conditions
of, occurrences of these sentences. To maintain that in order know the truth conditions of
occurrences of (5)-(9) a subject must know that 'Twain' refers to this or that "way of
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thinking of Twain", or this or that "way of thinking of this or that way of thinking of
Twain," is to attribute to ordinary speakers basic knowledge of far too many primitive
semantic values. Consequently the Fregean analysis of attitude ascriptions cannot account
for, and is incompatible with, the productivity of language and thought.
1.3 The Achilles' Heal of the Russellian Approach: The Arguments and Problems
Posed by the Phenomenon of Opacity.
The resurgence of Russellian theories is due to the arguments presented above (or
very similar arguments) in support of the Principle of Direct Reference and the Principle
of Semantic Innocence. Though none of these arguments is conclusive, I find these
arguments compelling, and thus I too am motivated to formulate and defend a Russellian
theory. The central difficulty facing Russellian theories is accounting for the phenomenon
of opacity. As was remarked above, Frege's theory of sense and reference was developed
specifically to account for this phenomenon, and thus it is not surprising that Russellian
theories, which by definition deny several fundamental tenets of Frege's theory, encounter
some difficulty in accounting for this phenomenon.
The arguments and problems posed by the phenomenon of opacity are perhaps
best introduced as objections to what I will call The Naive Russellian Theory. In addition
to the principles of direct reference and semantic innocence, the Naive Russellian Theory
maintains the following two principles:
The Principle of Full Articulation: The proposition presented by an
occurrence of a declarative sentence is wholly determined by (a) the
semantic values--the referents and designations--of the phonetically or
orthographically realized terms occurring in the sentence, (b) the syntactic
structure of the sentence. 2 8
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The Principle of Propositional Truth: The truth conditions of an
occurrence of a declarative sentence are identical to, and determined by,
the truth conditions of the proposition presented by the occurrence; i.e. no
two occurrences which present the same proposition can have distinct truth
conditions. (Note that as I use 'proposition', it is not definitive of a
proposition p that p determine the truth value of an occurrence which
presents p. That is, the Principle of Propositional Truth is not entailed by
my account of propositions. See note 2.)
And finally, the Naive Russellian Theory endorses a binary analysis of propositional
attitudes and propositional attitude verbs: propositional attitudes--the actual mental
phenomena--are binary relations between agents and Russellian propositions and,
furthermore, occurrences of propositional attitude verbs designate these binary
relations. 29
Before explicating how the arguments and problems posed by the phenomenon can
be invoked against the Naive Russellian Theory, a few remarks of clarification concerning
the Principle of Propositional Truth are in order. The above statement of the Principle of
Propositional Truth presupposes that occurrenzces--tokens in contexts--and propositions
both have truth conditions. The presumption that propositions have truth conditions is, I
assume, unproblematic. (At least it is familiar,) But what does it mean to say of an
occurrence that it is true, or false? Suppose that an ordinary English speaker, Odile,
perceives an occurrence of
(1) Twain is a great author,
Under certain conditions Odile will, as a result of her perception of the occurrence, be led
to make a judgment concerning truth value. That is, upon hearing, seeing, or feeling the
occurrence she might utter "That's true," or "That's false," or even "That's neither true nor
false." Whatever judgment concerning truth value Odile might make, I assume that her
judgment is either correct or incorrect; i.e. I assume that if Odile utters an occurrence of
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'That's true', then that utterance has a determinate truth value, What determines whether
or not Odile's utterance of 'that's true' is true? The traditional answer to this question,
which is encapsulated in the Principle of Propositional Truth, is that Odile's utterance of
"That's true" is true just in case the proposition presented by the occurrence of (I) is true.
Thus, according to the traditional view, the demonstrative 'that' appearing in Odile's
utterance of 'That's true' refers to the proposition presented by the occurrence of (I).
What I am attempting to draw the reader's attention to is that the traditional view
encapsulated in the Principle of Propositional Truth is a theory concerning the truth
conditions of the judgments ordinary speaker's make in response to their perception of
occurrences of declarative sentences. It is not a datum that the correctness of a judgment
of truth value in response to an occurrence is determined by (i) the syntactic structure of
the sentence, and (ii) the semantic values--the referents and designations--of the terms
appearing in the occurrence. That is, it is not a datum that an intuitive judgment of truth
value made in response to an occurrence is about the proposition the occurrence presents
only. It is well known that an occurrence typically conveys--in part via pragmatic
mechanisms--much more information than it semantically encodes or presents, There is
no pre theoretic reason to follow the traditional view in assuming that this additional
information which is conveyed via pragmatic mechanisms, rather than semantically
encoded, plays no d5art in determining the correctness of the judgments of truth value
speakers make in response to occurrences, In taking pains to point this out, I am of course
tipping my hand: In the end I will reject the Principle of Propositional Truth. That said,
let us return to the problems and arguments posed by the phenomenon of opacity.
Though it is often alleged that the Naive Russellian Theory is refuted by
arguments which are based upon the phenomenon of opacity, it is rarely noticed that there
are two kinds of arguments from opacity: there are epistemological arguments from
opacity and there are semantic arguments from opacity. Epistemological arguments from
opacity are concerned with the epistemological component of the Naive Russellian
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Theory; they are directed against the Naive Theory's claim that Russellian propositions are
the contents of propositional attitudes, The seimanttic arguments from opacity, on the other
hand, are concerned with the semantic component of the Naive Russellian theory; they are
designed to show that the Naive Russellian Theory makes incorrect predictions
concerning the truth conditions of occurrences of propositional attitude ascriptions.
Drawing this distinction between the two kinds of arguments is crucial to my defense of
the Russellian approach, as I maintain that the epistemological arguments from opacity
against the Naive Russellian theory are unsound, while the semantic arguments from
opacity force the Russellian theorist to abandon the Naive Russellian Theory. (More
specifically, I maintain that the semantic arguments from opacity force Russellian
theorists to reject the Principle of Propositional Truth.)
I begin by explicating an example of an epistemological argument from opacity.
Suppose that a sincere, normal, understanding subject, say Odile, assents to an occurrence
of
(1) Twain is a great author.
yet dissents from an occurrence of
(2) Clemens is a great author.
(I will continue to call these occurrences '(OI)' and '(02)', respectively.) Because the
Naive Russellian Theory endorses the Principle of Direct Reference, it must maintain that
the relevant tokens of 'Twain' and 'Clemens' present the same content, viz. Twain, the
man. Consequently, since (01) and (02) contain (tokens of) the same predicate and have
(or are instances of) the same syntactic structure, The Naive Russellian Theory dictates
that (O1) and (02) express the same content, viz. the Russellian proposition containing
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Twain, the man, and the property of being a great author as constituents. Let us call this
Russellian proposition, 'P'. The epistemological arguments assume that it follows from
Odile's assent to (OI) that she holds the attitude of belief toward the content expressed by
this occurrence, and that it follows from Odile's dissent from (02) that she does not hold
the attitude of belief toward the content expressed by this occurrence. More generally, the
epistemological arguments from opacity assume the following two principles:
The Epistemological Principle of Assent: If, at time t, a normal, sincere,
understanding subject assents to an occurrence of a declarative sentence 1,
then he holds the attitude of belief toward the content expressed by that
occurrence of E, at time t.
The Epistemological Principle of Dissent: If, at time t, a normal, sincere,
understanding subject dissents from an occurrence of a declarative sentence
E, then he does not hold the attitude of belief toward the content expressed
by that occurrence of E, at time t. (Note that dissenting from an occurrence
of a sentence is to be distinguished from assenting to the negation of an
occurrence of a sentence.)
It follows from the Principle of Assent that at the time of her assent Odile holds the
attitude of belief toward the content expressed by (O1); or more formally, it follows fron,
Odile's assent to (O1) at t that
(A) Believes <Odile, P> at t.30
Furthermore, it follows from the Principle of Dissent that at the time of her dissent Odile
does not hold the attitude of belief toward the content expressed by (02); or more
formally, it follows from Odile's dissent from (02) at t' that
(B) -(Believes <Odile, P> at t').
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Assuming that Odile does not "change her mind" concerning (Ol1) during the interval
between t and t', it also follows that
(A') Believes <Odile, P> at t.
But (A') and (B) are contradictories; Odile cannot both hold the attitude of belief toward P
at t', and not hold the attitude of belief toward P at t'. Thus the Naive Russellian Theory,
coupled with some plausible assumptions concerning what follows from Odile's assenting
and dissenting, leads us to a contradiction. Therefore, the argument concludes, at least
one of the tenets of the Naive Russellian Theory must be rejected.
Another problem for the Naive Russellian Theory, which is closely associated with
the epistemological arguments from opacity, concerns the cognitive significance of
occurrences. As was touched upon in section 1.1,, the Fregean conception of reference
and content maintains that Odile assents to (01), yet dissents from (02) because these
occurrences express distinct contents, and they express distinct contents because 'Twain'
as it appears in (01), and 'Clemens' as it appears in (02), express distinct cognitive values.
Thus, according to the Fregean conception of reference and content, Odile's behavior with
regard to (01) and (02) is caused by, or can at least be explained by appeal to, the
contents expressed by (01) and (02). The Naive Russellian Theory, however, cannot
avail itself to this sort of account of the cognitive significance of occurrences because it
maintains that two occurrences which have distinct cognitive significance may present the
same content--(Ol) and (02) are examples of such occurrences. But surely, the objection
continues, it is the content expressed by an occurrence which is responsible for the
cognitive significance of the occurrence? Surely Odile assents to (Oi) because she holds
the attitude of belief toward the content expressed by this occurrence, and surely she
dissents from (02) because she does not hold the attitude of belief toward the content
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expressed by this occurrence. Therefore, it seems that The Naive Russellian Theory
cannot account for the cognitive significance of occurrences.
I now turn to explicating the semantic arguments from opacity against The Naive
Russellian Theory. The central difference between the epistemological arguments and the
semantic arguments concerns what follows from the subject's assenting to and dissenting
from the relevant occurrences. Where the epistemological arguments presuppose the
above epistemological principles of assent and dissent, the semantic arguments from
opacity presuppose the following semantic principles of assent and dissent:
The Semantic Principle of Assent: If a normal, sincere, understanding
subject assents to an occurrence of a declarative sentence E in a context c,
then an occurrence of rN believes that tl, where N refers to the subject, is
true in any context c', where c' is semantically similar to c with regard to £
and rN believes that VE. (A context c is semantically similar to a context c'
with regard to sentences X and I' iff for every term t appearing in Z or Y',
x presents the same semantic value relative to both c and c'. 3 1)
The Semantic Principle of Dissent: If a normal, sincere, understanding
subject dissents from an occurrence of a declarative sentence X in a context
c, then an occurrence of WN does not believe that 1, where N refers to the
subject, is true in any context c' where c' is semantically similar to c with
regard to £ and rN does not believe that Vf. (Again note that dissenting
from an occurrence of a sentence is to be sharply distinguished from
assenting to the negation of an occurrence of a sentence.)
Assuming these principles, it follows from Odile's assent to (01) in c that an occurrence
of
(3) Odile believes that Twain is a great author.
is true in some semantically similar context c'. Furthermore, it follows from Odile's
dissent from (02) in c that an occurrence of
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(4n) Odile does not believe that Clemens is a great author.
is also true in c'. (For the sake of clarity I am making a few simplifying assumptions here;
a similar argument could be formulated without the benefit of these assumptions.) The
Naive Russellian Theory dictates, however, that for any context in which an occurrence of
(3) is true, an occurrence of
(4) Odile believes that Clemens is a great author.
is also true. (If (3) expresses proposition P in c, then, by the principles of direct reference,
semantic innocence, and full articulation, (4) must also express P in c, and thus, by the
Principle of Propositional Truth, occurrences of (3) and (4) in c must have the same truth
conditions. 32) Consequently, since (3) is true in c', it follows that (4) is true in c'. But (4)
is simply the negation of (4n), and it was previously determined that (4n) is true in c'. But
a sentence and its negation cannot both be true relative to the same context, and
consequently, the argument concludes, the Naive Russellian Theory must be rejected.
Yet another problem for The Naive Russellian Theory, which is related to the
semantic arguments from opacity and the problem of cognitive significance, concerns
preserving our untutored intuitions concerning the truth conditions of common
beliefldesire explanations of behavior. "Folk psychology" dictates that a subject's
judgments and behavior is determined by, or at least can be explained by, what he
believes, desires, fears, etc. For example, our untutored intuitions dictate that, in many
contexts c, an occurrence of
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(10a) Odile desires that Twain come to the party
and
(10b) she believes that if wine is served, then Twain will come to the party,
and that's why
(10c) Odile is going to serve wine,
is true in c, while an occurrence of
(10a) Odile desires that Twain come to the party.
and
(10b') she believes that if wine is served, then Clemens will come to the Party,
and that's why
(10c) Odile is going to serve wine.
is false in c. The difficulty presented by such folk explanations is not merely that of
accounting for why the occurrences of the sentential constituents (10b) and (10b') can
have distinct truth conditions--that is just the problem posed by the semantic arguments
from opacity. Rather the problem presented by such folk explanations is to account for
why what is conveyed by occurrences of (10a) and (10b) might serve as an explanation of
what is conveyed by (10c), while what is conveyed by occurrences of (10a) and (10b')
might not serve as an explanation of what is conveyed by (10c). The problem is not
accounting for the truth conditions of the sentential constituents of occurrences of (lOa-b-
c) and (10a-b'-c), rather the problem is accounting for the truth conditions of occurrences
of (10Oa-b-c) and (10a-b'-c) as whole sentences.
Theories which utilize the Fregean conception of referenced and content and the
Fregean analysis of attitude ascriptions can, it seems, preserve our untutored intuitions
concerning the truth conditions of such folk explanations of behavior. Such theories
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maintain that content determines cognitive significance, i.e. to the extent that the
judgments and behavior of a subject can be explained by the propositional attitudes of the
subject, it is the contents of the subject's propositional attitudes which are explanatorily
relevant. Thus theories which utilize the Fregean conception of reference and content and
the Fregean analysis of attitude ascriptions can account for the explanatory relation which
holds between what is conveyed by occurrences of (O1a-b) and what is conveyed by
occurrences of (10c), yet does not hold between what is conveyed by occurrences of (O10a-
b') and what is conveyed by occurrences of (10c). More precisely, Fregean theories can
account for truth of (1Oa-b-c) on the grounds that this occurrence presents something of
the following form:
(a) X desires content C
(b) X believes (CV(E occurs) -- C is realized)
Therefore,
(c) X acts so as to make E occur.
('X' in the above formula is a schematic letter open for replacement by names for subjects;
'C' is a schematic letter open for replacement by terms referring to Fregean thoughts; 'E' is
a schematic letter open for replacement by expressions designating potential events.
'CV( )' denotes a function from semantic values to cognitive values; i.e. from propositions
to the thoughts which determine them. I here overlook the fact that there could be no such
function--for every proposition there are many thoughts which determine it.) An
occurrence of (10a-b-c) presents something of this form because, according to the Fregean
analysis, the that-clause of an occurrence of (I0a) presents the same content as the
consequent in the that-clause of an occurrence of (10b). An occurrence of (10a-b'-c),
however, does not present something which is of the above form: according to the
Fregean analysis of attitude ascriptions, the that-clause of an occurrence of (10a) and the
consequent in the that-clause of an occurrence of (10b') present distinct contents. Thus
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theories which utilize the Fregean conception of reference and content and the Fregean
analysis of attitude ascriptions can account for the truth of occurrences of (10a-b-c), and
falsity of occurrences of (10a-b'-c): Occurrences of (10a-b-c) present something of the
appropriate form, while, because occurrences of (lO0b) and (10b') present distinct
propositions, occurrences of (10a-b'-c) do not present something of the appropriate form.
The Naive Russellian Theory, however, is unable to distinguish the truth
conditions of common beliefldesire explanations such as (10a-b-c) and (10a-b'-c). The
Naive Russellian Theory endorses the Principle of Semantic Innocence, and thus denies
that the that-clauses of occurrences of (10b) and (10b') present distinct contents; rather,
the Naive Russellian Theory maintains that the that-clauses of occurrences of (10b) and
(10b') have the same Russellian proposition as semantic value. Therefore, since it
endorses the Principle of Propositional Truth, The Naive Russellian Theory cannot
distinguish the truth conditions of occurrences of (10a-b-c) and (10a-b'-c). Moreover,
according to the Naive Russellian Theory occurrences of the that-clause of (10a) and the
consequent of occurrences of the that-clause of (10b') express (and present) the same
content, and thus occurrences of (10a-b-c) and (10a-b'-c) both express (and present)
something of the appropriate form. Consequently, the Naive Russellian theorist cannot
account for our untutored intuitions concerning the truth values of occurrences of ( 10a-b-
c) and (10a-b'-c) by claiming that occurrences of (10a-b-c) present something of the
appropriate form, while occurrences of (10a-b'-c) do not present something of this form.
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Introduction and Chapter 1 Notes
1 Excerpt from Russell's letter to Frege, December 12th, 1904. Excerpts of Frege and
Russell's correspondence are printed in Salmon, Soames (eds.) 1988.
2 As I use 'proposition', the identity of a proposition presented by an occurrence of a
declarative sentence is wholly determined by (i) the logical form of the sentence, and (ii)
the serr mntic values presented by the occurrence, i.e. the entities referred to or designated
by the terms appearing in the occurrence. Russellian propositions are thus structured
abstract objects which "bear" the properties of truth and falsity. More specifically,
propositions can be identified with interpreted phrase structure markers (syntactic trees) at
the level of logical form (LF). (Both syntactic trees and interpreted syntactic trees are
abstract objects.) An interpreted tree is obtained from a syntactic tree by "replacing" the
lexical items appearing in the lowermost nodes of the syntactic tree with the semantic
values of those lexical items. (The semantic values of context sensitive terms can only be
assigned relative to an assignment function, which I assume is supplied by the context of
utterance.) For example, the syntactic tree at the level of LF for the sentence 'Twain
smokes' is represented by the following diagram:
Svntartic Tree 1
SNP VP
,'rnohk e
An interpreted tree is now obtained by "replacing" 'Twain' on p2 with Twain and 'smokes'
on p4 with the property of being a smoker. This interpreted syntactic tree I is
picturesquely depicted in the following diagram:
Interpreted Tree 1.
z kpi
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Note that Interpreted Tree I would also be derived from the Syntactic Tree
corresponding to 'Clemens smokes'; this is because both 'Twain' and 'Clemens' will be
"replaced' by Twain, the man. Moreover the syntactic trees corresponding to 'Odile
believes that Twain smokes' and 'Odile believes that Clemens smokes' also determine the
same interpreted syntactic tree, (What exactly is it to "replace" 'Twain', an abstract object
which serves as a kind of constituent of the syntactic tree, with Twain, a now dead man, in
a syntactic tree? Syntactic trees can be defined in set theoretic terms; every "fork" in a
syntactic tree at the level of logical form is identified with an ordered pair, where the "left
prong of the fork" is identified with the "left member" of the ordered pair, etc. Thus the
syntactic tree for the sentence 'every man smokes' can be identified with the set, <'every'
<'man', 'smokes'>>, and the syntactic tree represented by the above diagram can be
identified with the ordered set <'Twain', 'Smokes'>. To "replace" the lexical items in the
lowermost nodes of a syntactic tree with the semantic values of those lexical items is
simply to obtain from an ordered set which has lexical items as its basic elements another
set with the same structure which has as basic elements the semantic values of the original
basic elements. But what is it for Twain, a man long dead, to be an element of such a set?
Indeed, what exactly is a property? I will not delve into such metaphysical questions here.
Suffice it to say that whatever it is that we, in 1993, refer to when using 'Twain' and
designate when using 'smokes', these are the elements of interpreted syntactic tree I.)
The above illustrates that the Russellian approach to propositions is a species of,
and not an alternative to, the so called "Interpreted Logical Form" view of propositions.
(See Higginbotham, 1991.) In order to avoid the problems associated with opacity,
Higginbotham maintains that an occurrence of a that-clause refers to itself, or its syntactic
tree, where the semantic values of the syntactic items appearing in the trees are added to
the trees in special cases only. According the Russellian approach, on the other hand, an
occurrence of a that-clause always refers to its fully interpreted logical form (or syntactic
tree); an occurrence of a that-clause always refers to what one derives via the procedure
adumbrated above,
3 I take the Russellian app'roach to be what all Russellian theories have in comi-.on. A
theory of propositional attitudes and propositional attitude ascriptions is Russellian if and
only if it respects the principles of Direct Reference and Semantic Innocence.
4 Kaplan 1989b, pp. 568-9.
5 I follow Kaplan in my usage of 'occurrence': an occurrence of a term is a token in a
context of utterance, or a context of inscription. I believe that Kaplan introduces this term
in Kaplan 1989a.
6 Dummett has claimed that the causal theory of reference is "only a theory about the
senses of... names rather than one which replaces sense by something different.,"
(Dummett, "Frege's Distinction Between Sense and Reference," in Dummett, 1978. Here
Dummett seems to be equating sense with that which deterrlines reference, and if we
follow Dummett in equating these things,then his point correct. It is, however, a mistake
to equate sense with that which determines reference, for it is essential to Frege's
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conception of sense that senses also serve as the contents expressed by occurrences of
terms.
7 The reason for the, perhaps excessive, use of "scare quotes" around such phrases as
'way of thinking of the referent' is that I do not know what such "ways of thinking" are. I
want to remind the reader that these phrases require further explanation. (I suspect that, in
most cases, saying "X thinks of Y in way Z" is another of saying that X thinks that Y has
some class of properties; this interpretation, however, will not suite the Fregean theorist's
purposes--he is trying to analyze thinking that in terms of "ways of thinking.")
8 In "Demonstratives," Kaplan advances the relatively conservative thesis that
demonstratives and indexicals are directly referential, According to the Russellian
approach defended here, however, all occurrences of referring terms--proper names,
indexicals, demonstratives, deictic pronouns, and perhaps natural kind terms--are directly
referential. (Note that definite descriptions are not directly referential. Following
Russell, I will say that an occurrence of a definite description which manages to "pick an
object out" denotes the object it "picks out.")
9 Though it will not be discussed here, I also endorse what might be called a Principle of
Direct Predication which maintains that the content expressed by an occurrence of a
predicate is the property designated by the predicate and not whatever it is that determines
the property.
It is interesting to note that such a Principle of Direct Predication has not received
the attention that the Principle of Direct Reference has received. This is primarily because
the notion of sense, "mode of presentation," or a "way of thinking," is superfluous in the
case of predicates. For example, 'renates are cordates' does not express an "obvious truth,"
yet Fregean theorists need not posit senses or modes of presentation in order to explain
this fact; it can simply be claimed that 'renate' and 'cordate' designate different, yet
coextensive, properties; they express distinct contents. Similarly, senses or modes of
presentation need not be posited in order to explain the fact that a subject might assent to
an occurrence of 'Turtles are renates', yet dissent from an occurrence of 'Turtles are
cordates'; since the two predicates designate distinct properties, the two sentences express
distinct propositions. There is no reason to posit senses, or more generally cognitive
values, for non referring terms. (A historical point; Frege himself had need of senses for
predicates because he nearly identified the concept expressed by a one-place predicate
with its extension. A concept for Frege is, we might say, a "non-saturated" extension.
Hence, for Frege occurrences of 'renate' and 'cordate' would designate the same concept,
and he needs senses in order to explain the fact that 'renates are cordates' does not express
an "obvious truth." My point is that, unless one accepts the rather dubious
saturated/unsaturated distinction, one has no reason whatsoever for positing senses in
addition to concepts and extensions. For a discussion of his views concerning concepts,
see Frege, "Comments on Sense and Meaning," in Frege 1979.
10 Kripke 1972, and Putnam 1975.
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I 1 In a famous footnote, Frege states
In the case of an actual proper name such as 'Aristotle' opinions as to the
sense may differ, It might, for instance, be taken to be the following: the
pupil of Plato and teacher of Alexander the Great, Anybody who does this
will attach another sense to the sentence 'Alexander was born is Stagira'
than will a man who takes as the sense of the name; the teacher of
Alexander the Great who was born in Stagira, So long as the [referent]
remains the same, such variations of sense may be tolerated, although they
are to be avoided in the theoretical structure of a demonstrative science and
ought not to occur in a perfect language.
(See, "On Sense and Reference," in Frege 1966, p. 58, footnote.) In this passage Frege
seems to have overlooked that senses often serve as referents; any difference in sense will,
in some contexts, result in a difference of referent. Thus it would seem that even
differences of sense ought not be "tolerated,"
12 In the ensuing discussion I do not consider the "cluster theory" and thus a proponent
of the cluster theory might object that I have given descriptivist theories of cognitive
value short shrift. In response to such an objector I would point out, first, that my purpose
here is not so much to refute descriptivist theories, as to illustrate how Kripke's arguments
against such theories serve to support the Russellian approach to propositional attitudes
and propositional attitude ascriptions. Second, it seems to me that though the cluster
theory is at least a plausible theory of reference determination, it is an extremely
implausible theory of content, It is surely implausible to suppose that 'Aristotle' as it
occurs in 'Aristotle taught Alexander the Great' expresses (with varying weights) the
content of every description the speaker associates with 'Aristotle'. Note that all that is
important for supporting the Principle of Direct Reference is that the content of the cluster
of descriptions the speaker associates with a term cannot both determine the referent of
the term and serve as the content presented by occurrences of the term. This is why I do
not bother to summarize Kripke's arguments against the cluster theory qua a theory of
reference determination.
13 Kripke 1972, p. 30.
14 Putnam explains that no narrow psychological state "presupposes the existence of any
individual other than the subject to whom that state is ascribed" (Putnam 1975, p. 220).
Putnam points out that the only motivation for restricting talk of psychological states to
talk of such narrow states is the assumption that "psychological states in the narrow sense
have a significant degree of causal closure (so that restricting ourselves to psychological
states in the narrow sense will facilitate the statement of psychological laws)" (Putnam
1975, p. 221). Putnam is rightly skeptical of this claim; it seems that there may be laws of
psychology which appeal to wide psychological states. (E.g. "If x is jealous of y, then x
will . . . . toward y.") But the rather strong claim that there are no wide psychological
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states which can play a role in psychological laws and in psychological explanations
should be distinguished from the much more plausible claim that if two subjects behave in
different ways, then they must be in different narrow psychological states. If physicalism
is true, and I assume that it is, then behavior is caused by some kind of physical
mechanism; since psychological states are individuated by the kind of behavior the
instances of the states cause, different kinds of behavior must be accompanied by different
narrow psychological states. To reject this claim is to reject physicalism.
15 First, note that I speak of the phenomenon of opacity, rather than of "opaque contexts,"
"opaque positions," or "opaque constructions." The phenomenon of opacity is, roughly,
the phenomenon of a normal understanding subject's assenting to an occurrence of E(a),
yet dissenting from an occurrence of E(3), where E( ) is a sentential function and cc and 13
are coreferring terms. (Thus E(a) and XE() are sentences which differ only in that E(a)
has a in that position where (P3) has [, The phenomenon of opacity will be discussed in
greater detail in Chapter 2.)
I believe that Quine first used 'opaque' to describe "constructions" for which
"substitutivity" fails; roughly, a "construction" is opaque just in case coreferring terms
cannot be interchanged in the construction salva veritate. (See Quine 1960, Chapter IV.)
This way of speaking is inappropriate for my purposes because it begs the questions in
which I am interested; e.g. "Does it follow from a sincere understanding subject's dissent
from an occurrence of E, that he does not hold the attitude of belief toward the content
presented by this occurrence?" And, "Does if follow from the subject's dissent from an
occurrence of E that many occurrences of rN believes that f (where N refers to the
subject) are false?"
Second, some might object that cognitive values, or senses, were originally posited
to account for "Frege's puzzle of identity" rather than the phenomenon of opacity. I
maintain, however, that instances of Frege's puzzle of identity are merely instances of the
phenomenon of opacity: To say that occurrences of -a=P1 "contain extensions of our
knowledge," or "are not obvious," while occurrence of r=R "do not contain extensions
of our knowledge," or "are obvious" (where a and P are coreferential) is to say that one
can imagine a normal understanding subject who would assent to an occurrence of ra=a(
but dissent from an occurrence of ra-=p,. (Or, to put the point another way, a general
explanation of the phenomenon of opacity will afortiori serve as a solution to Frege's
puzzle of identity.)
16 Putnam argues that narrow psychological state determines cognitive value by
appealing to the Fregean conception of what it is to know the meaning of a term. Putnam
argues that
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there cannot be two different logically possible worlds LI and L2 such
that, say, Oscar is in the same psychological state (in the narrow sense) in
LI and L2 (in all respects) but in Ll Oscar understands [N] as [expressing
the cognitive value cv] and in L2 Oscar understands [N] as [expressing the
cognitive value cv']. (For, if there were, then in LI Oscar would be in the
psychological state knowing that [cv] is the meaning of [N], and in L2
Oscar would be in the psychological state knowing that [cv'] is the meaning
of IN], and these are different, and even--assuming that [N] has just one
meaning for Oscar in each world--incompatible psychological states in the
narrow sense), [Putnam 1975, p. 221],
I think that this argument begs the question against the Fregean ,theorist who is willing to
deny that narrow psychological state determines grasped cognitive value: it seems to me
that this Fregean theorist must be willing to deny the claim that knowing that cv is the
meaning of N and knowing that cv' is the meaning of N are, or involve, different
psychological states in the narrow sense. What Putnam should have argued, and what I do
argue, is that if the defender of the Fregean conception concedes that narrow
psychological state does not determine grasped cognitive value, then there is no reason to
posit cognitive values--they no longer do any explanatory work.
17 Davidson, "On Saying That", in Davidson 1990, p. 108.
18 Strictly speaking Frege had no truck with propositions, as I use the term. Frege
maintained that the cognitive value expressed by an occurrence of a sentence is a thought,
while the semantic value presented by an occurrence of a sentence is its truth value. But
even for Frege the truth value assigned to an occurrence of a sentence is determined by the
semantic values presented by the terms appearing in the sentence, and the syntactic
structure of the sentence. Hence there is no harm in interpreting Frege's theory as
involving propositions, as I use the term.
19 The Principle of Semantic Innocence can be stated more formally, albeit less lucidly,
as follows:
For all contexts of utterance c, declarative sentences Y, names N,
propositional attitude verbs ;, and Russellian propositions p, I presents p
relative to c if and only if, relative to c, X as it appears in rN ;s that
presents p,
20 One might object to this argument against the Fregean analysis by denying the
assumption that Mary's utterance of 'he' is strictly coreferential with John's utterance of
'Twain'. It might be suggested that even though the occurrence of'Twain' refers to a
cognitive value, the fact that the term 'Twain' has Twain, the man, as its ordinary semantic
value suffices to make Twain salient in the context of John and Mary's conversation. Thus
'he', as uttered by Mary, can be interpreted as a "pronoun of laziness" which refers to the
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most appropriate salient entity, viz. Twain. Consider, however, the following
conversation:
(e) John: Odile believes that Twain is a great author.
Mary: I grasp it when I think of Twain too.
If 'Twain' as it occurs in John's utterance refers to a cognitive value, then this cognitive
value is salient in the context of the conversation--more salient than is Twain--and thus we
ought to have no difficulty in interpreting 'it' as it occurs in Mary's utterance as referring
to this cognitive value. That is, if 'Twain' in John's utterance refers to a cognitive value,
then (e) should be more natural than (a). Example (e), however, is not more natural than
example (a); no ordinary speaker will interpret 'it' and 'Twain' as they appear in an
occurrence of (e) as being coreferential.
21 Similar problems arise in examples involving factive propositional attitude verbs. For
instance, there is a sense in which someone who utters an occurrence of 'Odile knows that
Twain is a great author' asserts both that Odile knows that Twain is a great author, and
that Twain is a great author. Frege's response to these difficulties is to posit the kind of
referential ambiguity discussed above. Frege wrote that in these cases the relevant clause
"... is to be taken twice over, with different reference, standing once for a thought, once
for truth value," (Frege, "On Sense and Reference," in Frege 1966, p. 76.)
22 "Theories of Meaning and Learnable Languages," in Davidson 1990, pp. 14-5,
23 In Chapter 9 of Dummett 1973, Dummett maintains that a commitment to an infinite
hierarchy of cognitive values will lead to "a reductio ad absurdum of the whole theory,"
(p. 267). Dummett thus attempts to amend Frege's analysis of attitude ascription so that
there are referents and ordinary senses only: under Dummett's proposal, a referring term
appearing inside a that-clause both presents (refers to) and expresses its ordinary sense.
(Dummett concedes that in making this amendment he must deny that referents are always
determined by senses.) Dummett, however, overlooks the fact that secondary senses,
ternary senses, etc. will be needed by the Fregean theorist in order to account for
situations such as the following: Suppose that Odile attaches the same sense to
occurrences of both 'Noam' and 'Chomsky'. Odile now utters occurrences of
(i) I believe that Noam is great thinker.
and
(ii) I believe that Chomsky is a great thinker,
Under Dummett's proposal, the that-clauses of (i) and (ii) present the same thought, and,
assuming the appearances of 'I believe that' express the same sense, the occurrences of (i)
and (ii) express the same thought. Now suppose, however, that Oscar assents to Odile's
utterance of (i), yet dissents from Odile's utterance of (ii). In order to account for Oscar's
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behavior, a Fregean theorist must posit a difference in the senses expressed by the
occurrences of (i) and (ii), but unless secondary senses are invoked, there can be no such
difference.
24 Church, A. 1951.
25 The only argument Davidson offers against this "protean" interpretation of the
Fregean analysis is suggested in his rather cryptic comment that "the problem is not how
the individual expressions that make up a sentence governed by believes', given the
[semantic values] they have in such a context, combine to denote a proposition; the
problem is rather to state the rule that gives each the [semantic value] it does have." I
think Davidson must have in mind something like the argument I state.
26 Frege readily admitted that the same term may express distinct senses for different
subjects. (See, again, the passage concerning 'Aristotle' discussed in note 11.) It will be
argued in section 2.2 that Frege is compelled to make this concession, though doing so
undermines his theory.
27 One might attempt to analyze (9) as follows:
(9*) -3x y (y is a way of thinking of Twain &
Believes <x, y A CV('played quarterback')>)
(Let 'CV( )' designate a partial function from expressions to the cognitive values of
occurrences of those expressions--ignoring for the time being that the cognitive value
expressed by terms, and even occurrences of terms, varies intersubjectively. And let '^'
denote concatenation for cognitive values; i.e. ^ is a partial function from "simple"
cognitive values to "complex" cognitive values.) Our untutored intuitions dictate that an
occurrence of (9) would be true, even if somebody assented to occurrences of 'Clemens
played quarterback.' Yet if there were such a person, (9*) would be false. Therefore (9*)
cannot be a correct analysis of (9).
28 A proper statement of the Principle of Full Articulation might require a third clause
concerning the time of the occurrence. This third clause might be required to account for
the fact that the same sentence can have different truth conditions if uttered at different
times; e.g. an occurrence of 'Odile is hungry' at t l might be true, while an occurrence of
this same sentence at t2 might be false. This third clause can be omitted, however, if we
allow the properties designated by predicates to be indexed to times; e.g. we could allow
that 'is hungry' designates different properties at different times. I am not sure which of
these approaches is to be preferred. Again, temporal issues will be ignored here.
29 The Naive Russellian Theory is described in greater detail by Nathon Salmon in
Salmon 1986, pp. 16-18.
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30 I will use capital letters to demarcate used sentences and formulas, and follow the
usual practice of using numerals to demarcate mentioned sentences and formulas.
31 The "semantic similarity" clause is needed to account for cases involving indexicals,
and other context sensitive terms. E.g. if Odile assents to an occurrence of 'He is a great
author' in a context where 'he' refers to Twain, then it does not follow that Oscar's
utterance of 'Odile believes that he is a great author' is true in context where 'he' refers to,
say, Nixon.
32 This argument assumes that c is semantically similar to itself with regard to (3) and
(4). The argument assumes, for example, that, relative to c, 'Odile' has one semantic value
only.
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2.0 The Fundamental Difficulty with the Fregean Strategy.
Frege's theory of sense and reference is specifically designed to account for the
phenomenon of opacity; i.e. senses and thoughts are posited specifically to preclude the
epistemological and semantic arguments from opacity and also to account for the
cognitive significance of occurrences. The purpose of this chapter is, first, to illustrate
how Frege's theory can be generalized into what I call the Fregean strategy for
precluding the arguments from opacity, and second, to argue that any theory which
utilizes this strategy will face a fundamental difficulty. The argument against Fregean
theories presented in this chapter differs from the arguments presented in Chapter I in
that the fundamental difficulty with the Fregean strategy is wholly independent of the
principles of direct reference and semantic innocence; thus in this chapter I argue that
there are compelling reasons for rejecting Fregean theories which are independent of the
principles of direct reference and semantic innocence. (I will call theories which utilize
the Fregean strategy Fregean theories. This term is somewhat misleading because many
of the theories which I would call Fregean involve a kind of psychologism that Frege
himself would find objectionable.)
The chapter proceeds as follows: In section 2.1 1 briefly discuss Frege's theory of
sense and reference; and describe the Fregean strategy for precluding the arguments from
opacity. In section 2.2 I present what I call the Fregean strategy's Scylla: Though it is
usually assumed that only Russellian theories are susceptible to the arguments from
opacity, in fact even Fregean theories are susceptible to the arguments; if all the premises
of the epistemological and semantic arguments from opacity are granted, then there is no
reason to suppose that Fregean theories cannot also be refuted by arguments from
opacity.1 Moreover, in order to preclude the arguments from opacity, the cognitive
values posited by Fregean theories must be individuated extremely finely, so finely that
what cognitive value is presented by an occurrence of a referring term will vary
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intersubjectively: a single occurrence of a referring term may express distinct cognitive
values for distinct subjects. But this difficulty, the difficulty of individuating cognitive
values finely enough to preclude the arguments from opacity, is only the Scylla of the
difficulty facing the Fregean strategy, and in section 2.3 1 present what I call the Fregean
strategy's Charybdis: Because the Fregean theorist is forced to individuate cognitive
values extremely finely, the Fregean theorist undermines his ability to account for, first,
the publicity of the content of our propositional attitudes, and second, the legitimacy of
our ordinary attitude ascribing practices. If cognitive values--the objects of our
propositional attitudes--are individuated so finely that the cognitive value complex (or
thought) expressed by an occurrence of a sentence varies intersubjectively, then the
Fregean theorist will be unable to account for the facts that beliefs, desires etc., are
shared, and that ordinary subjects are able to ascribe such attitudes to one another.
Finally, in section 2.4 I summarize the argument against the Fregean strategy presented
in the previous sections, and I briefly discuss the significance of the fundamental
difficulty with the Fregean strategy.
2.1 The Fregean Strategy for Avoiding the Arguments and Problems Posed by the
Phenomenon of Opacity.
How does Frege's theory of sense and reference endeavor to preclude the
epistemological and semantic arguments from opacity, and account for the cognitive
significance of occurrences? I begin with a brief explanation of how Frege's theory
precludes the epistemological arguments from opacity. Because Frege does not endorse
the Principle of Direct Reference, he is not compelled to maintain that the token of
'Twain' which appears in (O1) and the token of 'Clemens' which appears in (02) express
the same content. Rather Frege posits distinct senses to serve as the contents expressed
by these tokens, and this allows him to distinguish the content expressed by (O I) from
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the content expressed by (02). More specifically, Frege posits thoughts to serve as the
contents expressed by occurrences of declarative sentences. Thoughts are composed of
senses: the thought expressed by an occurrence of a declarative sentence is composed of
the senses expressed by the terms appearing in the sentence. Because the tokens of
'Twain' and 'Clemens' appearing in (OI) and w(02) express distinct senses, it follows
that (O1) and (02) express distinct contents, or thoughts, and Frege thereby avoids the
contradictory result that Odile both holds and does not hold the same attitude toward the
same content. Thus, by positing senses, which are individuated more finely than
referents, and maintaining that the content expressed by an occurrence of a declarative
sentence--a thought--is composed of these finely individuated entities, Frege is seemingly
able to preclude the epistemological arguments from opacity.
Frege's strategy for precluding the epistemological arguments from opacity can be
stated slightly more formally as follows: Let us call the Fregean thought expressed by
(O1) 'T', and the Fregean thought presented by (02) 'T*'. According to Frege's theory of
sense and reference it follows from Odile's assent to (01) at t and the Epistemological
Principle of Assent that
(C) Believes <Odile, T> at t.
and it follows from Odile's dissent from (02) at t' and the Epistemological Principle of
Dissent that
(D) -,(Believes <Odile, T*> at t').
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Because T and T* are not composed of identical senses, T is not identical to T* and
therefore (C) and (D) are not contradictories. (More precisely, even assuming that Odile
does not "change her mind" in the interval between t and t', no contradiction can be
derived from (C) and (D).)
As was briefly discussed in section 1. 1, the sense expressed by an occurrence of a
term also accounts for the cognitive significance of occurrences of sentences containing
the term. For example, the reason that occurrences of
(11) Twain is identical to Clemens.
seem to "contain ... valuable extensions of our knowledge," 2 while occurrences of
(12) Twain is identical to Twain.
do not seem to contain valuable extensions of our knowledge, is that occurrences of
'Twain' and 'Clemens' express distinct senses, or cognitive values. We judge that
occurrences of (11) convey informative truths, while occurrences of (12) convey obvious
truths, because of the senses expressed by the terms appearing in the occurrences.
Similarly, according to Frege's theory of sense and reference, Odile judges that (O1) is
true and thus assents to it, yet does not judge that (02) is true and thus dissents from it
because these occurrences express distinct thoughts: Odile assents to (O1) because she
holds the attitude of belief toward the content expressed by this occurrence, and she
dissents from (02) because she does not hold the attitude of belief toward the content
expressed by this occurrence. Moreover, (Oi) and (02) express distinct thoughts
because the tokens of 'Twain' and 'Clemens' appearing in (Ol) and (02) express distinct
senses. Thus Frege's theory of sense and reference accounts for the cognitive
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significance of an occurrence by appeal to the cognitive values expressed by the terms
appearing in the occurrence. 3
How does Frege's theory of sense and reference endeavor to preclude the
semantic arguments from opacity? Frege does not endorse the Principle of Semantic
Innocence, and thus he is not compelled to maintain that (O I) presents the same
proposition as the that-clause of an occurrence of
(3) Odile believes that Twain is a great author.
More precisely, because Frege does not endorse the Principle of Semantic Innocence, he
is not compelled to maintain that 'Twain' as it appears in (01) refers to the same referent
as it does in an occurrence (3). Frege's famous move here is to identify the semantic
value of a term appearing inside a that-clause with the cognitive value the term expresses
when it appears outside of a that-clause; i.e. cognitive values serve as the oblique
referents of referring terms. Thus according to Frege's theory, the semantic value of
'Twain' as it appears inside the that-clause of an occurrence of (3) is identified with the
cognitive value which is expressed by 'Twain' as it appears in (01). And Frege identifies
the semantic value presented by 'Clemens' as it appears in occurrences of
(4) Odile believes that Clemens is a great author.
with the cognitive value which is expressed by 'Clemens' as it appears in (02). By
distinguishing the senmantic values presented by 'Twain' and 'Clemens' when they appear
in occurrences of (3) and (4), Frege is able to distinguish the propositions presented by
these occurrences.4 Consequently, according to Frege's theory of sense and reference it
does not follow from the fact that an occurrence of (3) is true in a context c, that an
occurrence of (4) must also be true in c. Thus, by denying the Principle of Semantic
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Innocence, and alloying terms occurring inside that-clauses to have their oblique
referents as semantic values, Frege's theory of sense and reference is able to maintain that
occurrences of
(4n) Odile does not believe that Clemens is a great author.
are true, while occurrences of (4) are false.
Frege's strategy for avoiding the arguments and problems posed by the
phenomenon of opacity is thus relatively straightforward: for every referring term one
posits a number of cognitive values, which are something like "ways of thinking" of the
referent of the term. These cognitive values perform three central functions: First,
cognitive values serve as constituents of content--they are constituents of the objects
toward which subjects hold propositional attitudes. In order to serve this first function,
cognitive values must be objective in the sense that the same--numerically identical--
cognitive value can be accessed, or "grasped," by different subjects at different times: if,
as Frege thought, cognitive values are abstract objects, then the same cognitive value can
be grasped by different subjects at different times, and if, as many contemporary Fregean
theorists suppose, cognitive values are psychological states of some kind, then the same
cognitive value canrf be instantiated by different subjects at different times, It is this first
function of cognitive values which is responsible for precluding the epistemological
arguments from opacity: Cognitive values can be individuated much more finely than
referents, and thus the Fregean theorist hopes to avoid the contradictory conclusions of
the epistemological arguments from opacity by appropriately individuating the contents
expressed by occurrences of sentences.
The second function served by cognitive values is to account for the cognitive
significance of occurrences. According to a Fregean theory, Odile assents to (OI) yet
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dissents from (02) because 'Twain' as it appears in (Ol1) and 'Clemens' is it appears in
(02) express distinct cognitive values for Odile,
Finally, the third function of cognitive values is to serve was the semantic values,
the oblique referents, of terms occurring inside the that-clauses of attitude ascriptions.
This third function is responsible for precluding the semantic arguments from opacity:
the Fregean theorist hopes to avoid the contradictory conclusions of the semantic
arguments from opacity by appropriately individuating the contents presented by
occurrences of the that-clauses of attitude ascriptions.
Any theory which posits some kind of entity to serve the above three functions--
whether these entities are called "senses," "states," "guises," "cognitive roles," "modes of
apprehension," "modes of presentation," "sentences of mentalese" or what-have-you--
utilizes what I call the Fregean strategy for precluding the arguments from opacity. 5 The
Fregean strategy can be more precisely defined in terms of Ramsey sentences; i.e. we can
identify the class of Fregean theories as the class of theories which endorse, or entail, a
certain set of Ramsey sentences. To this end, let us first define an instance of the
phenomenon of opacity as a situation involving a subject and occurrences of two
sentences 2(a) and £(P) , hich meets the following necessary and jointly sufficient
conditions:
(1) The subject (who is sincere, normal, and non reticent) is in some
manner presented with a token of E(o) and a token of X(P),where oc and P3
are coreferrential; e.g. the subject hears utterances of, or sees or feels
inscriptions of, XI(a) and E(n). ('1()' is a variable ranging over open
sentences, and 'a', and 'P' are variables which range over proper names.
Thus '2(a)' and 'X(3)' are open for replacement by quotation names for
sentences which differ only in that in one position they have distinct, yet
coreferring, referring terms.)
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(2) The subject fully understands occurrences of both the token of X(oc)
and the token of XI(), (I assume that it is compatible with a subject's
"fully understanding" tokens of Z(a) and E(P) that the subject not know
that a and 0 are coreferentiai.) 6
(3) The subject assents to the token of E(a), yet dissents from the token
of E(p).
Fregean theories can now be characterized as the set of theories T which satisfy the
following schema:
Theory T posits a domain of cognitive values, and/or provides a principle
of individuation for cognitive values, and for all instances of the
phenomenon of opacity O involving a subject named N and occurrences
of (aQ) and X(P), T maintains that a proper account of O will entail the
following Ramsey sentence (where the domain of the quantifiers is the
posited domain of cognitive values):
3w vx 3y 3z [(w is expressed by E(a)) & (x is expressed by E(P)) & (y is
expressed by oa) & (z is expressed by w) & (w contains y as a constituent)
& (x contains z as a constituent) & ((y.z) and therefore (w-x)) &
(i) (x and y are contents--they are the kind of thing that serve as the
objects of propositional attitudes) &
(ii) (the subject assents to E(a) because E(a) expresses w and the subject
holds the attitude of belief toward w, while the subject dissents from E(P)
because X(P) expresses z and the subject does not hold the attitude of
belief toward z) &
(iii) (the that-clauses of relevant occurrences of rN believes that E(oa
present w as semantic value) & (the that-clauses of relevant occurrences of
rN believes that X(P) present x as semantic value)]
(Note that a "complete" Ramsey sentence would contain no theoretical terms, and thus
would be much more complicated than the above sentence; a complete Ramsey sentence
would replace appearances of theoretical terms such as 'presents', 'semantic value'
'express' etc. with either non theoretical terms, or additional bound variables. 7)
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Fregean theories are thus committed to there being a domain of entities--cognitive
values of some kind--which serve the three functions cognitive values were posited to
serve. I argue in the following sections, however, that there cannot be any such entities.
The fundamental difficulty with the Fregean strategy is that there are can be no entities
which serve all three of the functions cognitive values were posited to serve.
2.2 The Fregean Strategy's Scylla.
The arguments from opacity against the Naive Russellian Theory require that
there be (or that there could be) an instance of the phenomenon of opacity; they require
that there be a subject such as Odile who assents to an occurrence such as (O1), yet
dissents from an occurrence such as (02). Let us say that Odile's situation, as described
in Chapter 1, is an instance of opacity with regard to R, where R is the Naive Russellian
Theory according to which (O1) and (02) express the same content; i.e. according to R
(O1) and (02) present the same Russellian proposition. More generally, let an instance
of opacity with regard to theory T be an instance of opacity such that the occurrences of
X(a) and X(P) are said by T to express the same content. (Recall that 'content' is a theory
neutral term designating the objects of our propositional attitudes, whatever these may
be.) Consequently, assuming the requisite principle of compositionality of content, there
is an instance of opacity with regard to theory T if and only if there is an instance of
opacity involving occurrences of E(a) and E(P), and according to T the tokens of a and
p which appear in these occurrences express the same content.
It is at least in principle possible for there to be instances of opacity with regard
to theories which utilize the Fregean strategy. For example, suppose that Fregean theory
F employs a principle of individuation for cognitive values according to which the
cognitive value presented by occurrences of both 'Cicero' and 'Tully', for a subject Oscar,
is identified with the content presented by the description 'a famous Roman orator'. (Of
59
course no actual theorist is likely to hold such a undiscriminating principle of
individuation; Frege certainly did not. 8) If theory F maintains that occurrences of both
'Tully' and 'Cicero' express this one cognitive value for Oscar, then according to F
occurrences of both
(13) Cicero orated.
and
(14) Tully orated.
express the same content for Oscar. (Let us call this content 'C'.) Now let us suppose
that our subject Oscar thinks that there are two famous Roman orators--one named
'Cicero' and the other named 'Tully'--and as a result Oscar assents to an occurrence of
(13), yet dissents from an occurrence of (14). (1 will call these occurrences '(013)' and
'(014)' respectively.) Since simple minded theory F maintains that (013) and (014)
express the same content for Oscar, Oscar's situation is an instance of opacity with
regard to F.
Moreover, and this is the crux of the point being made here, there being an
instance of opacity with regard to F is necessary and sufficient for there being both
epistemological and semantic arguments from opacity against F. Continuing with the
above example, it follows from Oscar's assent to (013) at t and the Epistemological
Principle of Assent that
(E) Believes <Oscar, C> at t.
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And it follows from Oscar's dissent from (014) at t' and the Epistemological Principle of
Dissent that
(F) -,(Believes <Oscar, C>) at t'.
Therefore, assuming that Oscar does not "change his mind" in the interval between t and
t', epistemological arguments from opacity against the simple minded Fregean theory can
be formulated.
The above example involving Oscar and (013) and (014) can also be utilized to
formulate semantic arguments from opacity against Fregean theory F. It follows from
Oscar's assent to (013) and the Semantic Principle of Assent that in some context c, an
occurrence of
(15) Oscar believes that Cicero orated.
is true. And it follows from Oscar's dissc nt from (O 14) and the Semantic Principle of
Dissent that in c
(16n) Oscar does not believe that Tully orated.
is also true. (For the sake of simplicity, let us assume that there is one context c in which
both (15) and (16n) are true.) According to simple minded theory F, however, for Oscar
occurrences of 'Tully' express the same cognitive value as occurrences of 'Cicero', and
consequently in any context in which (15) is true, an occurrence of
(16) Oscar believes that Tully orated.
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will also be true. Since (15) is true in c, (16) is also true in c. But it was previously
determined that (16n), which is simply the negation of (16), is true in c. Since a sentence
and its negation cannot both be true in the same context, the argument concludes that the
simple minded theory F must be rejected.
The defender of the Fregean strategy can, of course, accept the above arguments
as refutations of simple minded Fregean theory F, without rejecting the Fregean strategy
in general. Theory F is, after all, very simplistic; it is surely implausible to suppose that
for Oscar the tokens of 'Tully' and 'Cicero' appearing in (013) and (O 14) have as
cognitive value the content expressed by 'a famous Roman orator'. The above arguments
do illustrate, however, that it is possible to construct arguments from opacity against
theories which utilize the Fregean strategy; contrary to what is often assumed, merely
positing some kind of cognitive values to serve as the objects of our propositional
attitudes and the semantic values of that-clauses is not in itself sufficient for precluding
the arguments from opacity. Rather, in order to preclude the arguments from opacity, the
cognitive values posited by a Fregean theory must be appropriately individuated. 9
Armed with the terminology introduced above, a general statement of conditions
necessary and sufficient for constructing arguments from opacity against any semantic
theory can be formulated:
The Principle of Arguments firom Ooacity: For all theories T, there is a
nomologically possible instance of opacity withi regard to T iff
corresponding epistemological and semantic arguments from opacity
against T can be formulated.
Note that the principle does not state, nor does it entail, that if there is an instance of
opacity with regard to T, then T can be refuted. The principle merely states that if there
is an instance of opacity with regard to T, then there are corresponding epistemological
and semantic arguments from opacity against T, but one is not compelled to accept these
62
arguments as refutations of T unless one grants all of the premises of the arguments. 10
Also note the modal operator;: in order to formulate an argument from opacity against T,
one need not produce an actual instance of opacity with regard to T; it is sufficient to
show that there could be an instance of opacity with regard to T, The relevant modal
notion here is not logical possibility. We seek an explanation of the phenomenon of
opacity as it involves human beings in the actual world, and consequently we are
interested only in those possible instances of opacity that involve beings similar to us in
worlds similar to burs. Therefore the relevant modal notion is nomological possibility: it
is nomologically possible that p iff, roughly, there is a possible world w in which the
laws of physics, biology, psychology, etc., are similar to the laws which obtain in the
actual world, and p is true in w. (Or, if one objects to possible worlds talk, it is
nomologically possible that p iff given the laws of nature as they actually obtain, p could
be true.)
It follows from the above principle that there being epistemological and semantic
arguments from opacity against a Fregean theory T is contingent upon there being a
nomologically possible instance of opacity with regard to theory T. Furthermore, there
being a nomologically possible instance of opacity with regard to theory T is contingent
upon the particular account of cognitive values proffered by theory T. The above
argument against simple minded Fregean theory F can be constructed because F does not
distinguish the cognitive values expressed by the tokens of 'Cicero' and 'Tully' appearing
in (013) and (014) for Oscar, though Oscar assents to (013) yet dissents from (014).
This illustrates that if a Fregean theory T is to preclude the arguments from opacity
against it, then T must provide an account of cognitive value such that there are no
nomologically possible instances of opacity with regard to T. In other words, in order to
preclude the arguments from opacity, a Fregean theory T employing the Fregean strategy
must satisfy the following constraint:
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The Individuation Constraint: If there is a nomologically possible
instance of opacity involving a subject A, and occurrences of sentences
X(a) and XI(), then T must distinguish the cognitive values expressed by
these occurrences of ca and p for A.
Or equivalently,
It must be nomologically impossible for there to be an instance of opacity
with regard to T.
What is often overlooked is that for any Fregean theory T, it is an open question as to
whether theory T satisfies the individuation constraint.
Satisfying the individuation constraint is hardly a trivial task. For a Fregean
theorist to claim that his theory T satisfies the individuation constraint is for him to claim
that for every nomologically possible instance of opacity involving a subject A and
occurrences of referring terms a and P, according to T, these occurrences express
distinct cognitive values for A. But how are we to understand this strong modal claim,
and how can it be justified? There are two ways the Fregean theorist's strong modal
claim can be interpreted.
First, the Fregean theorist's strong modal claim could be interpreted as a semantic
claim concerning the meaning of the term 'cognitive value' (or 'sense' or what-have-you).
If the Fregean theorist's claim is interpreted in this way, it is simply definitive of the
cognitive values posited by T that for any nomologically possible instance of opacity
involving subject A, and occurrences of a and 3, these occurrences of a and 13 present
distinct cognitive values for A. Consequently, under this semantic interpretation of the
Fregean theorist's strong modal claim, sentences such as the following are analytic:
'Odile assents to (O1), yet dissents from (02) only if the tokens of 'Twain' and 'Clemens'
appearing in these occurrences present distinct cognitive values for Odile.' (Or at least
they are analytic if anything is.) Therefore, if the Fregean theorist's claim is interpreted
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as a semantic claim, then his theory T trivially satisfies the individuation constraint:
Under this first interpretation it is nomologically impossible for there to be an instance of
opacity with regard to theory T in the same way that it is nomologically impossible for
there to be a married bachelor.
The problem with interpreting the Fregean theorist's strong modal claim as a
semantic claim is that it precludes theories which utilize the Fregean strategy from
providing explanations of the phenomenon of opacity; i.e. it precludes such theories from
accounting for the cognitive significance of occurrences. If theory T simply defines
'cognitive value' (or what-have-you) so that the individuation constraint is necessarily
satisfied, then asserting that "Odile assents to (01), yet dissents from (02), because
'Twain' and 'Clemens' express distinct cognitive values for Odile" is like asserting that
"Oscar is not married because he is a bachelor." Even if these sentences are true, and
arguably they are not, they certainly do not provide us with acceptable explanations.
One of the functions cognitive values are posited to serve is to account for the cognitive
significance of occurrences; cognitive values are to explain why Odile assents to (01), yet
dissents from (02), despite the fact that (O1) and (02) in some sense say the same thing
about the same person. If the Fregean theorist's strong modal claim is interpreted
semantically, if it is true merely by fiat, then the Fregean theory cannot hope to provide
such explanations.
The Fregean theorist's strong modal claim must, therefore, be interpreted in a
second way; viz. it must be interpreted as a metaphysical claim concerning the nature of
a certain kind of entity. The Fregean theorist must be understood as positing cognitive
values as independent entities--entities whose identity conditions can be stated without
appeal to the phenomenon of opacity. If the Fregean theorist's claim is interpreted in this
second way, then Fregean theories can, at 'east in principle, provide an acceptable,
informative explanation of the cognitive significance of occurrences: Odile assents to
(O I), yet dissents from (02), because the tokens of 'Twain' and 'Clemens' appearing in
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these occurrences express distinct cognitive values for Odile, and these cognitive values
have intrinsic properties which, somehow, account for Odile's verbal behavior. (Or
perhaps it would be more appropriate to say that these cognitive values are instantiated
by entities, perhaps token brain states, which have intrinsic properties which account for
Odile's verbal behavior.) However, if cognitive values are understood as such
independent entities allegedly responsible for the phenomenon of opacity, then the
Fregean theorist is committed to there being, at least in principle, a means of
individuating these entities which is both principled and independent. If Fregean theory
T is to provide an adequate explanation of the phenomenon of opacity, then the Fregean
theorist who advocates T is committed to there being general principles which govern
how cognitive values are individuated; there must be some fact of the matter that makes
cognitive value x distinct from cognitive value y. Furthermore, these general principles
must involve independent individuation conditions; i.e. principles which do not
themselves appeal to the phenomenon of opacity.
The situation is analogous to Moliere's example concerning the soporific effects
of opium: the phenomenon to be explained is that when a normal subject, say Odile,
imbibes opium, she falls asleep. We might attempt to explain this phenomenon by
positing a certain property, "dormitivity," and claiming that Odile's falling asleep is due
to the fact that opiufn is a "dormitive substance." 11 But if we are now asked, "What is it
for a substance to have the property of dormitivity? How is the property of dormitivity
distinguished from other properties?" we cannot, on pain of undermining our
explanation, claim that for a substance to have the property of dormitivity just is for the
substance to have soporific effects on people who imbibe it. That is, in attempting to say
what it is for a substance to have the property of dormitivity we cannot, on pain of
undermining our explanation, appeal to the very phenomenon the property was posited to
explain. Analogously, cognitive values are posited to account for the phenomenon of
opacity, and consequently if they are to be explanatorily relevant to this phenomenon, it
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must be at least in principle possible to individuate them wholly independently of this
phenomenon. (That Odile assents to an occurrence of E(a), yet dissents from an
occurrence of E(P), cannot be constitutive of the occurrences of a and 13 expressing
distinct cognitive values for Odile; something other than Odile's behavior must make it
the case that the occurrences of a and b express distinct cognitive values for Odile.)12
Moreover, if the Fregean theorist violates the Independence Constraint (see
below) and thereby undermines the explanatory relevance of cognitive values with regard
to the cognitive significance of occurrences, his strategy for precluding the
epistemological and semantic arguments from opacity is also rendered ad hoc.
Concerning the epistemological arguments, if cognitive values were irrelevant to the
explanation of Odile's assent to (O1) and dissent from (02), then there would be no
motivation independent of the epistemological arguments from opacity for the claim that
'Twain' and 'Clemens' as they appear in (0 1) and (02) present distinct cognitive values.
If cognitive values could not be appealed to in order to explain Odile's judgment and
behavior with regard to (O1) and (02), then there would be no motivation for supposing
that the objects of Odile's attitudes were cognitive value complexes beyond the fact that
in positing cognitive values to serve as contents, the Fregean theorist precludes the
epistemological arguments from opacity. More generally, if cognitive values were
irrelevant to the explanation of cognitive significance, there would be no reason for
supposing that cognitive values serve as the constituents of contents, and the Fregean
strategy's method of precluding the epistemological arguments from opacity would be
rendered ad hoc. And concerning the semantic arguments from opacity, if there were no
good reason for supposing that cognitive values served as the constituents of contents,
then why suppose that cognitive values serve as the oblique referents of terms appearing
inside the that-clauses of attitude ascriptions? For the Fregean theorist is surely correct
in assuming that the semantic values of the that-clauses of attitude ascriptions are
contents; the semantic values of that-clauses are the objects of our propositional attitudes.
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Thus if the only reasons for supposing that cognitive values serve as contents are ad hoc,
it follows that the reasons for supposing that cognitive values serve as oblique referents
are also ad hoc. the upshot is that if the Fregean theorist violates the Independence
Constraint, not only does he forfeit the explanatory relevance of cognitive values to the
problem of the cognitive significance of occurrences, but his strategy for precluding the
epistemological and semantic arguments from opacity is also rendered ad hoc.
If the above is correct, then in order to preclude the arguments from opacity, and
also provide an adcount of the cognitive significance of occurrences, a Fregean theory
must satisfy both of the following metaphysical constraints: First, in order to preclude
the arguments from opacity, a Fregean theories T must satisfy
The Individuation Constraint: For every nomologically possible instance
of opacity involving a subject A, and occurrences of sentences X(oc) and
Z(p), T distinguishes the cognitive values expressed by these occurrences
of a and p for A.
and, second, in order to account for the cognitive significance of occurrences, and
thereby provide an explanation of the phenomenon of opacity, a Fregean theory T must
satisfy
The Independence Constraint: The cognitive values posited by T are
individuated wholly independently of the phenomenon of opacity; it is in
principle possible to state the individuation conditions for the cognitive
values posited by T without appealing to the phenomenon of opacity. 13
The challenge posed by the Fregean strategy's Scylla is the challenge of providing an
account of cognitive values which satisfies both of the above constraints. I maintain that
this challenge has yet to be met by a Fregean theory; i.e. every proposed account of
cognitive value I know of fails to satisfy at least one of the above constraints. (In
Appendix A I examine some proposed accounts of cognitive value, and show that each of
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these proposals fails to satisfy one or the other of the above constraints,) My central
argument against the Fregean strategy, however, does not presume that a Fregean theorist
cannot provide an account of cognitive value which satisfies the above constraints, nor
even that a Fregean theorist has yet to do so. Rather my central argument depends only
upon the much weaker thesis that a Fregean theory can satisfy the above constraints only
if it individuates cognitive values extremely finely, so finely that what cognitive value is
presented by an occurrence of a referring term will vary intersubjectively. That is, a
Fregean theory can satisfy the above two constraints (the individuation constraint in
particular) only if it allows occurrences of referring terms to present distinct cognitive
values for distinct subjects. I now turn to supporting this weaker thesis,
It is clear that if a Fregean theorist is to have any hope at all of satisfying the
individuation constraint, he must be capable of individuating cognitive values at least as
finely as the expression types (of the tokens) which present them; i.e. the Fregean must
be at least capable of individuating cognitive values such that for all subjects X and
distinct term types oa and 3, occurrences of a and 3 present distinct cognitive values for
X. That the Fregean must be capable of individuating cognitive values at least as finely
as expression types is obvious: for any pair of coreferring terms a and 3 which are not
of the same type, it is nomologically possible for there to be an instance of opacity
involving a and P, (For any two coreferring term types a and 3, it is nomologically
possible for there to be a sincere, understanding subject like Odile who understands
occurrences of these terms, yet does not believe that they are coreferential. Moreover, if
it is nomologically possible for there to be such a subject, then it is nomologically
possible for there to be some £( ) such that the subject assents to an occurrence of X(a),
yet dissents from an occurrence of X(3).) Thus the Fregean theorist might attempt to
satisfy the individuation constraint and the independence constraint by utilizing the
following principle of individuation for cognitive values: "No two occurrences of
distinct expression types can present the same cognitive value, for any subject."
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It is at least plausible to suppose that a Fregean theory utilizing such a principle
of individuation could satisfy the individuation constraint and the independence
constraint. But, first, it should be noted how counterintuitive the proposal is; the claim
that (tokens of) no two expression types can express the same cognitive value, where
cognitive values are the objects of our propositional attitudes, is both drastic and ad hoc.
What is left of our Fregean intuitions if occurrences of 'steed' and 'horse' cannot express
the same cognitive value, or sense? And what about our intuitions concerning foreign
languages? Surely one who holds the attitude of belief toward the content expressed by
an occurrence of 'Schnie ist weiss' also holds the attitude of belief toward the content
expressed by an occurrence of 'Snow is white'. The Fregean theorist might try to
preserve our intuitions by invoking a translation relation between expressions of different
languages, The Fregean could then form equivalence classes of expression types under
this relation, and claim that terms within the same equivalence class express the same
cognitive value. Notice, however, that the translation relation would have to do more
than preserve reference: the Chinese term for 'Twain', for example, could not be a
translation of 'Clemens'. But given this kind of difficulty, how is the translation relation
to be determined without appeal to the phenomenon of opacity?
Second, and more importantly, though it is certainly necessary for the Fregean to
be able to distinguish cognitive values as finely as expression types, it is not sufficient to
individuate cognitive values only as finely as expression types. Even this somewhat
drastic principle for individuating cognitive value does not individuate cognitive values
finely enough to satisfy the individuation constraint. As Kripke's "Paderewski" example
illustrates, there are nomologically possible instances of opacity in which the relevant
occurrences of coreferential terms ct and p3 are instances of the same term type; i.e. there
are nomologically possible situations in which a sincere, understanding subject falsely
thinks that different occurrences of the same referential term refer to different things. 14
If Peter thinks that there is a famous pianist named 'Paderewski', and that there is a
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famous statesman named 'Paderewski', and Peter also believes that statesmen never have
musical talent, then there may be some context c in which Peter dissents from an
occurrence of
(17) Paderewski is a musician,
and another context c' in which Peter assents to an occurrence of this same sentence.
(There is nothing all that special about Kripke's "Paderewski" example. The
phenomenon is common in cases involving indexicals and demonstratives: of course a
subject might assent to one occurrence of 'he is a musician' and dissent from another
occurrence of 'he is a musician', where the two occurrences of 'he' refer to the same
person.) According to a Fregean theory which individuates cognitive values only as
finely expression types, these occurrences would express the same content, and
consequently, by the Principle of Arguments from Opacity, it would be possible to
formulate both epistemological and semantic arguments from opacity against this
Fregean theory. Merely individuating cognitive values according to the expression types
(of the tokens which express the cognitive values) does not individuate cognitive values
finely enough; something more is needed.
It is apparent that what is needed is a principle of individuation for the cognitive
values presented by referring terms which appeals to something internal to the subjects
who use the term. The problem with individuating cognitive values by appeal to
expression types only is that the expre 3sion type of an occurrence used or perceived by a
subject is not directly related to the internal state of the subject and thus is not directly
relevant to explaining the subject's judgments and behavior. Thus the Fregean must
claim that differences in cognitive values are determined by differences in "the ways"
subjects understand occurrences of expressions, where "ways of thinking" are some kind
of mental properties, states, or abilities of the subject. But what, exactly, is a "way of
71
thinking"? There are, of course, many proposals: One might appeal to "modes of
apprehension" where a the mode of apprehension of a term is something like the kind of
experience the subject underwent when he learned how to use the term. (For example,
the mode of apprehension expressed by occurrences of 'Twain' for Odile might be some
kind mental image of a man in white suit--a memory of a picture she was looking at
when she learned the name 'Twain'. 15) Or perhaps the cognitive value expressed by an
occurrence of a term is an individual concept the subject associates with the occurrence,
Every property P determines an individual concept: a property P* such that x has P* just
in case x if the unique thing that has P. (For example, Odile may think of Twain via the
individual concept, the man who wrote The Adventures of Huckleberry Finn. 16) Another
proposal is to appeal to the "functional role" the term (or the "mentalese correlate" of the
term) plays in the subject's mental life, Under this proposal occurrences of 'Twain' and
'Clemens' express distinct cognitive values for Odile just in case these terms (or their
"mentalese correlates") play different roles in Odile's inference patterns, attitudes, and
behavior. (For example, occurrences of 'Twain' and 'Clemens' express distinct cognitive
values for Odile if Odile is disposed to infer from 'Twain is witty' to 'The author of The
Adventures of Huckleberry Finn is witty', but is not disposed to infer from 'Clemens is
witty' to 'The author of The Adventures of Huckleberry Finn is witty', 17)
I maintain that none of these proposals can succeed in satisfying the individuation
constraint and the independence constraint, and in Appendix A I provide some support
for this strong thesis. Here, however, I am concerned only to defend the weaker thesis
that in order to individuate cognitive values finely enough to satisfy the individuation
constraint, the cognitive value expressed by an occurrence of a referring term must be
permitted to vary intersubjectively. If I am correct in maintaining that Paderewski-like
cases compel the Fregean theorist to invoke mentalistic principles of individuation for
cognitive values such as those listed above, then this weaker thesis must be correct. Our
mental lives are extremely different from one another: distinct subjects may, and often
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do, have different educational backgrounds, different experiences, different beliefs and
desires, and even, dare I say, different WeltanschatungeLn. If such detailed features of
our mental lives are invoked in order to individuate cognitive values, then the cognitive
values expressed by occurrences of referring terms will vary from subject to subject.
More specifically, distinct occurrences of the same referring term might express different
cognitive values relative to the same subject; one occurrence might express distinct
cognitive values for distinct subjects; and distinct occurrences of the same term might
express distinct cognitive values for distinct subjects. Whether or not the cognitive
value(s) presented by an occurrence of a referring term varies intersubjectively in one of
these ways is contingent upon "the way" the subject(s) think(s) about the referent of the
term, where this "way of thinking" is determined by some detailed feature of the subject's
mental state.
2.3.1 The Fregean Strategy's Charybdis.
If the Fregean theorist is to have any hope of steering clear of Scylla, the problem
of providing an account of cognitive values which satisfies the individuation and
independence constraints, he must permit the cognitive values presented by occurrences
of terms to vary intersubjectively. However, if the Fregean theorist permits the cognitive
values expressed by occurrences to vary intersubjectively, he steers directly toward
Charybdis, the problems of accounting for the publicity of our propositional attitudes,
and preserving the legitimacy of our ordinary propositional attitude ascribing practices.
I will consider these problems in turn.
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2.3.2 The Problem of Preserving the Publicity of Content.
Frege maintained a sharp distinction between thoutghts, the contents of our
propositional attitudes, and ideas, the subjective phenomenological experiences of
consciousness. Thoughts, which are composed of senses, are objective, public, entities
capable of being grasped by different individuals at different times. Ideas, on the other
hand, are subjective, private, entities which "need an owner" in order to exist. 18 Thus
the fundamental difference between thoughts and ideas is that thoughts are essentially
communicable, while ideas are essentially incomntunicable. Dummett explains
Frege was the first to attach due weight to the fact that we cannot have a
thought which we do not express, to ourselves if not to others ....
Thought differs from other things also said to be objects of the mind, for
instance pains or mental images, in not being essentially private. I can tell
you what my pain is like, or what I am visualizing, but I cannot transfer to
you my pain or my mental image. It is the essence of thought, however,
that it is transferable, that I can convey to you exactly what I am thinking.
.. I do more than tell you what my thought is like--I communicate to you
that very thought. 19
The problem of accounting for the publicity of content can be stated as follows: if
cognitive values, the constituents of thoughts, or contents, are individuated by mentalistic
criteria such as those briefly discussed above, then contents cannot serve as that which is
communicated by occurrences.
Suppose, for example, that Odile and Oscar are apparently having a disagreement
concerning Twain. Odile is impressed with Twain's wit, and thus she is led to utter an
occurrence of
(18) Twain is witty.
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Oscar, on the other hand, is not amused by Twain's anecdotes, and thus he is led to
respond by uttering an occurrence of
(18n) Twain is not witty,
If, however, occurrences of 'Twain' express distinct cognitive values for Odile and Oscar,
then, despite appearances, there is no incompatibility between what Odile and Oscar
believe--if Odile and Oscar "think of Twain in different ways," then there is nothing in
the exchange which implies that they stand in the believes relation to contradictory
contents. If 'Twain' as it appears in Odile's utterance has as its cognitive value one finely
individuated "way of thinking of Twain," and 'Twain' as it appears in Oscar's utterance
has as its cognitive value a distinct "way of thinking of Twain," then there is nothing
incompatible in the contents expressed by Odile and Oscar's utterances. Odile and Oscar
are, we might say, "expressing contents at cross purposes."
Similarly, if cognitive values are permitted to vary intersubjectively, cases of
apparent agreement between two subjects will not in fact be cases of agreement.
Suppose, for example, that Odile admires Twain's writing style and is thus led to utter an
occurrence of
(1) Twain is a great author.
And suppose that Oscar is also fond of Twain's writing style, and thus he responds by
nodding and uttering a distinct occurrence of (I). Again, Odile and Oscar's utterances of
(I) present the very same proposition, and thus their utterances have the same truth
conditions. But, again, if they utilize distinct "ways of thinking of Twain," then they do
not believe the same thing--their utterances express distinct contents, and thus despite
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appearances Odile and Oscar are not manifesting agreement in what they believe. Odile
and Oscar are, again, "expressing contents at cross purposes,"
Examples such as the above illustrate that one of the consequences of permitting
cognitive values to vary intersubjectively is a widespread incontmensurability of content.
If cognitive values, the constituents of content, are permitted to vary intersubjectively,
then cases in which conversing subjects hold propositional attitudes toward the same
content will be the exception, and not the rule. Some philosophers, including Frege and
Dummett, have thought that this kind of inconmmensurability of content would undermine
our ability to communicate. If communication between A and B requires that A and B
"grasp," or instantiate, the very same content, yet A and B attach distinct cognitive values
to occurrences of referring terms, then it is of course going to be extremely difficult for
A and B to succeed in communicating. Frege was well aware of this problem; in a letter
to Jourdain Frege wrote,
Now if the sense of a name was something subjective, then the sense of
the [sentence] in which the name occurs, and hence the thought, would
also be something subjective, and the thought that one man connects with
this [sentence] would be different from the thought another man connects
with it; a common store of thoughts, a common science would be
impossible. It would be impossible for something one man said to
contradict what another man said, because the two would not express the
same thought at all, but each his own. 20
Frege hoped to avoid the problems posed by the incommensurability of content by
maintaining a sharp distinction between objective senses and thoughts on the one hand,
and subjective ideas on the other. If, however, Fregean theorists are forced to
individuate cognitive values by appeal to detailed psychological factors, then Frege's
distinction between objective senses, and subjective ideas becomes blurred, and
widespread incommensurability of content ensues.
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One might attempt to accommodate the incommensurability of content by
denying the Fregean model of communication; i.e. one might attempt to avoid the result
that communication is undermined by denying that A and B communicate only if A and
B "grasp," or instantiate the very same content, One could maintain, for example, that
communication between A and B requires only that A and B think of the same
proposition, as opposed to "thinking of the same proposition in the same way"; i,e.
perhaps communication between A and B requires only that A and B think of the same
referents and denotations, and does not require that they think of these referents and
denotations "in the same ways." Or perhaps communication between A and B merely
requires that A and B think of the same proposition in similar enough ways, I am,
however, skeptical about these proposals. It seems to me that these proposals encroach
upon the essential communicability of content. The Fregean model of communication
ought to serve as a constraint upon conceptions of content: contents, the objects of our
propositional attitudes, are whatever is shared and communicated by competent speakers
of a language, If under a certain conception of content it turns out that Odile and Oscar,
in the above example, are not expressing and believing the same content, then one must
reject that conception of content. In other words, the Fregean conception of
communication is correct: the contents of our propositional attitudes are, and must be,
what is communicated, and if the Fregean conception of content cannot preserve this
identity, then so much the worse for the Fregean conception of content. These complex
and murky issues, however, are somewhat beyond the scope of my present concerns, and
thus I will not pursue them here. Rather here I will be concerned to illustrate that even if
the Fregean theorist is able to account for communication by denying the Fregean model
of communication, the incommensurability of content raises other problems which are
not so easily avoided.
Recall that cognitive values are posited to serve not only was the contents
expressed by occurrences of referring terms, but also as the semantic values of those
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terms when they appear inside the that-clauses of occurrences of attitude ascriptions.
Permitting cognitive values to vary intersubjectively thus results not cz!i in
incommensurability of content, but also results in a kind of incommensurability of
semantic value, or reference. This incommensurability of semantic value undermines the
Fregean theorist's ability to account for the validity of simple arguments whose premises
contain attitude ascriptions. Consider, for example, the following argument:
1. Odile believes that Twain is witty.
2. Oscar does not believe that Twain is witty.
Therefore,
3. Odile believes something that Oscar does not believe.
This argument is intuitively valid. It seems to be an instance of the valid argument
schema
I. R<a, p>
2. -(R<b, p>)
Therefore,
3. lx (R<a, x> & -(R<b, x>))
If cognitive values are permitted to vary intersubjectively, however, the above argument
is not an instance of this schema. The problem is that if cognitive values are permitted to
vary intersubjectively, the that-clauses of premises I and 2 cannot be interpreted as two
occurrences of the same singular term: if cognitive values are permitted to vary
intersubjectively, the appearances of 'Twain' in these premises may refer to distinct
"ways of thinking of Twain," and as a result the that-clauses of premises I and 2 may
have distinct thoughts as semantic values. 'T'hus;, if cognitive values are permitted to vary
intersubjectively, the existential generalization by way of which the conclusion is derived
is not warranted. This result, however, is unacceptable. The existential generalization is
warranted; ordinary speakers make such inferences all the time.
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It is important to see that this kind of difficulty is not limited to a few special
cases; if cognitive values are allowed to vary intersubjectively, almost all intuitively valid
arguments involving propositional attitude ascriptions will turn out to be invalid.
Consider the intuitively valid argument
1. Odile believes everything that Oscar believes.
2. Oscar believes that Twain is witty.
Therefore,
3. Odile believes that Twain is witty.
The problem is, again, that if cognitive values are allowed to vary intersubjectively, then
it does not follow from the form of the argument that the that-clauses in premises 2 have
the same thought as semantic value. Thus, if cognitive values are permitted to vary
intersubjectively, this argument is not an instance of the valid schema
1. Vx (R<a, x> -> R<b, x>)
2. R <a, p>
Therefore,
3. R<b, p>
Again, however, this result is unacceptable. We commonly employ such arguments, and
we intuit that they are valid. An adequate analysis of the logical form of these arguments
must respect these untutored intuitions. 2 1
I conclude that if cognitive values are permitted to vary intersubjectively, a
Fregean theorist will be unable to account for the publicity of content: if the Scylla of
the Fregean strategy forces the Fregean theorist to permit the cognitive values presented
by occurrences to vary intersubjectively, then the Fregean theorist will be unable to
account for the communicability of content, and he will be unable to account for our
untutored intuitions concerning the validity of arguments involving attitude ascriptions.
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2.3.3 The Problem of Preserving the Legitimacy of Our Ordinary attitude
Ascribing Practices.
According to a Fregean theory, an occurrence of a belief ascription is true if and
only if the subject of the ascription holds the attitude of belief toward the content
presented by the that-clause of the ascription. Furthermore, the content presented by the
that-clause of an ascription is a thought--it has cognitive values as constituents. Once
cognitive values are permitted to vary intersubjectively, however, it is far from clear that
this can be a proper analysis of propositional attitude ascriptions. Consider, for example,
Oscar's utterance of
(3) Odile believes that Twain is a great author.
According to the Fregean analysis of attitude ascriptions, an occurrence of (3) is true just
in case Odile stands in the believes relation to the thought presented by the that-clause of
the occurrence. But, in order to individuate cognitive values finely enough to avoid the
arguments from opacity, the Fregean must claim that what is presented by the that-clause
in an occurrence of (3) varies intersubjectively; i.e. it is quite likely that Oscar and Odile
"think of Twain in different ways," and consequently it is quite likely that occurrences of
the that-clause of (3) present distinct thoughts for Oscar and Odile. if one occurrence of
a that-clause presents distinct thoughts for two subjects, then how, in the absence of
special knowledge concerning one another's "ways of thinking of referents," can one
subject truly ascribe an attitude to the other? I assume that our ordinary attitude
ascribing practices are legitimate: Ordinary subjects are capable of making true attitude
ascriptions concerning the beliefs, desires, doubts etc. of other subjects, and they are
capable of doing so even in the absence of special knowledge concerning "the ways" the
subjects of their ascriptions think of things. But how can the Fregean analysis of attitude
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ascriptions preserve the legitimacy of our ordinary attitude ascribing practices if
cognitive values are permitted to vary intersubjectively?
Consider again Oscar's utterance of the ascription (3). What thought is presented
by the that-clause of Oscar's utterance of (3)? There are only two proposals worthy of
consideration: the speaker oriented proposal, and the subject oriented proposal. The
speaker oriented proposal maintains that the thought presented by the that-clause of an
attitude ascription is determined by the person who utters the ascription; in terms of the
above example, the cognitive values Oscar assigns to the terms appearing in the that-
clause determine the thought presented by the that-clause. The subject oriented proposal,
on the other hand, maintains that the thought presented by the that-clause of an ascription
is determined by the subject of the ascription; in terms of the above example, the
cognitive values Odile assigns (or would assign) to the terms appearing in the that-clause
determine the thought presented by the that-clause. I will argue that neither proposal is
compatible with the legitimacy of our ordinary attitude ascribing practices. 22
Suppose that the Fregean theorist opts for the speaker oriented proposal; i.e.
suppose that an occurrence of a belief ascription is true if and only if the subject of the
ascription holds the attitude of belief toward the content that the speaker assigns to the
that-clause of his utterance. I will present three objections to this proposal.
First, this proposal is susceptible to refutation via the semantic arguments from
opacity. Suppose that Oscar assigns the same cognitive values to occurrences of both
'Twain' and 'Clemens'. (Suppose he acquired the names when he was told that "there is a
famous author who is called both 'Twain' and 'Clemens"'.) Now consider, again, the
instance of opacity in which Odile assents to an occurrence of
(I) Twain is a great author.
yet dissents from an occurrence of
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(2) Clemens is a great author.
(I will continue to call these occurrences '(O1)' and '(02)' respectively.) Now suppose
that, in a context c, Oscar sincerely utters occurrences of both
(3) Odile believes that Twain a great author.
and
(4n) Odile does not believe that Clemens is a great author.
It follows from the semantic principles of assent and dissent that Oscar's utterances of (3)
and (4n) are true. Oscar, however, assigns the same cognitive value to occurrences of
both 'Twain' and 'Clemens', and consequently, according to the speaker oriented
proposal, Oscar's utterance of (3) in c is true if and only if an utterance, by Oscar, of (4)
Odile believes that Clemens is a great author. is true in c. But, again, (4n) is simply the
negation of (4), and a sentence and its negation cannot both be true relative to the same
context.
The above argument against the speaker oriented view assumes that it is
nomologically possible for a speaker to assign the same cognitive values to occurrences
of distinct terms a and P, and it also assumes that it is possible for such a subject to utter
true ascriptions of the form rN believes that YE(a• and FN believes that --- (p1, where N
refers to the subject. Thus the Fregean theorist opting for the speaker oriented proposal
might try to avoid this objection by denying either one of these assumptions. Denying
either assumption, however, would be counterintuitive and ad hoc. First, the Fregean
theorist must grant that it is nomologically possible for a subject to assign the same
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cognitive value to distinct coreferring terms. To deny this assumption would be to deny
that a bi-lingual speaker can assign the same cognitive value to distinct terms, but this is
implausible and ad hoc. What independent reason could there be for supposing that it is
nomologically impossible for a bi-lingual speaker of French and English to assign the
same content to occurrences of 'London' and 'Londres'? Furthermore, it is extremely
implausible to suppose that speakers must assign different cognitive values to different
name variations: surely those who know James Higginbotham well assign the same
content to occurrences of both 'James Higginbotham' and 'Jim Higginbotham'.
Concerning the second assumption, to claim that Oscar cannot truly utter an occurrence
of (3) and (4n) because he assigns the same "way of thinking" of Twain to occurrences of
both 'Twain' and 'Clemens' is simply to abandon our ordinary attitude ascribing practices:
if Odile assents to (01), yet dissents from (02), then, other things being equal, Oscar's
utterances of (3) and (4n) are true, regardless of the "way(s) in which Oscar thinks of
Twain." 23
My second objection to the speaker oriented proposal concerns what Richard has
called the Echo Prinriple.24 Suppose Odile swears up and down that she believes that
Twain is a great author; suppose even that she is renowned for sincerely uttering
occurrences of both
(I) Twain is a great author.
and
(19) I believe that Twain is a great author.
Our untutored intuitions dictate that if Oscar utters an occurrence of
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(3) Odile believes that Twain is great author,
and his justification for making this utterance is Odile's sincere utterances of (1) and (19),
then Oscar's utterance of (3) is true. More generally, our ordinary attitude ascribing
practices respect the following principle:
The Echo Principle: If a normal, sincere, understanding subject A named
N utters an occurrence of A, or an occurrence of rI believe that E1 in a
context c, and if on the basis of this utterance another normal,
understanding subject B utters an occurrence of rN believes that P1 in a
semantically similar context c', then, ceteris paribus, B's utterance is
true.2 5
My second objection to the speaker oriented proposal is that it is incompatible with the
Echo Principle.
Suppose that Oscar and Odile assign distinct cognitive values to occurrences of
'Twain'. Further suppose, what is quite likely the case, that Odile does not hold the
attitude of belief toward any content which has as a constituent the cognitive value Oscar
assigns to occurrences of 'Twain'. And finally suppose that on the basis of Odile's sincere
utterances of (I) and (18), Oscar is led to utter an occurrence of
(3) Odile believes that Twain is a great author.
Assu.ming that Odile has not revised her beliefs, our untutored intuitions, encapsulated in
the above statement of the Echo Principle, dictate that Oscar's utterance of (3) is true.
According to the speaker oriented proposal, however, Oscar's utterance of (3) is false:
despite Odile's sincere utterances of (1) and (19), if occurrences of 'Twain' present
distinct cognitive values for Odile and Oscar, and Odile does not hold the attitude of
belief toward any content which has as a constituent the cognitive value Oscar assigns to
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occurrences of 'Twain', then Oscar's utterance of (3) is false, If cognitive values are
permitted to vary intersubjectively, then it is quite likely that the that-clause in Oscar's
occurrence of (3) does not express a thought toward which Odile holds the attitude of
belief. This result, however, is unacceptable. If Odile swears up and down that she
believes that Twain is a great author, and if on the basis of such utterances Oscar utters
an occurrence of (3) then, other things being equal, our untutored intuitions dictate that
Oscar's utterance of (3) is true,
My third and final objection to the speaker oriented proposal is that it is
incompatible with another principle which is respected by our ordinary attitude ascribing
practices. If Odile is renowned for sincerely uttering occurrences of (1) and (18), then in
semantically similar contexts occurrences of
(3n) Odile does not believe that Twain is a great author.
are false. More generally, our ordinary attitude ascribing practices respect the following
"Dis-Echo Principle";
The Dis-Echo Principle: If a normal, sincere, understanding subject A
named N utters an occurrence of E, or an occurrence of r believe that f7,
in a context c, and another normal understanding subject B utters an
occurrence of 'N does not believe that I in a semantically similar context
c', then, ceteris paribus, B's utterance is false.
The situation described above will also serve to illustrate that the speaker oriented
proposal is incompatible with the Dis-Echo Principle. If, as is assumed in the above
situation, Odile does not hold the attitude of belief toward any content which contains the
cognitive value Oscar assigns to occurrences of 'Twain', then, despite Odile's sincere
utterances of (1) and (19), the speaker oriented proposal will predict that Oscar's
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(relevant) utterance of (3n) will be true. Again, however, this result is unacceptable; if
Odile sincerely utters occurrences of (1) and (18), then Oscar's utterance of (3n), in a
semantically similar context, is false.
If the Fregean theorist adopts the speaker oriented proposal--which maintains that
the thought expressed by a that-clause within an ascription is determined by the person
who utters the ascription--then semantic arguments from opacity against his theory will
be forthcoming, and he will be unable to preserve the untutored intuitions which are
encapsulated in the Echo and Dis-Echo Principles. I conclude that the speaker oriented
proposal does not preserve the legitimacy of our ordinary attitude ascribing practices, and
therefore it must be rejected. I now turn to the subject oriented proposal.
According to the subject oriented proposal, the thought presented by the that-
clause of an occurrence of an attitude ascription is determined by the cognitive values the
subject of the ascription assigns (or would assign) to the terms appearing in the that-
clause of the ascription. In terms of the above example, the subject oriented proposal
maintains that the thought presented by the that-clause of Oscar's utterance of (3) is
determined by the cognitive values Odile assigns to the terms appearing in that-clause.
(Of course an immediate problem arises because there may not be, and probably is not, a
one-to-one correspondence between term types and cognitive values; e.g. Odile probably
assigns distinct cognitive values to different occurrences of 'Twain'. Let us, for the time
being, overlook this difficulty.) My argument against the subject oriented proposal
proceeds as follows: I first present a number of more-or-less technical difficulties with
the proposal, and I consider, and reject, various ways of amending the proposal to avoid
these technical difficulties. I conclude with a more general, conceptual, objection which
applies to any version of the subject oriented proposal.
The subject oriented proposal, as it is stated above, cannot account for cases in
which the subject of the ascription is not familiar with all of the terms appearing in the
that-clause of the ascription. Suppose, for example, that a Chinese speaker, Mao,
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believes that Twain is a great author, though he assigns no cognitive value whatsoever to
utterances or inscriptions of 'Twain'. (Suppose that Mao assents to occurrences of the
Chinese translation of (1).) In such a situation our untutored intuitions dictate that
Oscar's utterance of
(20) Mao believes that Twain is a great author,
would be true. The subject oriented proposal predicts, however, that Oscar's utterance of
(20) will be neither true nor false: Since Mao assigns no cognitive values whatever to
occurrences of 'Twain' the subject oriented proposal predicts that 'Twain' as it appears in
the that-clause of Oscar's utterance has no referent, and thus according the subject
oriented proposal Oscar's utterance of (20) suffers from reference failure. 26
The obvious move for the Fregean to make here is to appeal to some kind of
translation relation between English and Chinese. More specifically, the Fregean theorist
might attempt to avoid the above difficulty by defining a translation relation R, which
holds between terms of all languages. He could then form equivalence classes of terms
under R, and modify the subject oriented proposal was follows:
The Modified Subject Oriented Proposal: The cognitive value referred to
by a referring term a appearing the that-clause of an attitude ascription is
the cognitive value the subject of the ascription assigns to occurrences of
any term a' which is a member of C, where C is the equivalence class of a
under R.
There are several difficulties with this proposal. First, this proposal succeeds in avoiding
the above difficulty only if there are no two terms a and a', both of which are members
of the equivalence class formed by 'Twain' under R, such that Mao assigns distinct
cognitive values to occurrences of a and a'. But how can the translation relation be
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specified so as to ensure that this cannot occur, without appealing to the phenomenon of
opacity? Second, it is not at all clear how this proposal can be extended to cover cases
involving demonstratives and indexicals. For example, how could the modified subject
oriented proposal be extended to account for the intuitive truth of Tvwain's utterance of
(21) Mao believes that I am a great author.
If Oscar's utterance of (20) is true, then, other things being equal, Twain's utterance of
(21) is also true. Thus the modified subject oriented proposal must claim that 'I'--at least
as it appears in Twain's utterance of (20)--is a translation of Mao's name for Twain.
Consequently, if the modified theory is to be extended to cover ascriptions involving
indexicals and demonstratives, the translation relation must hold between occurrences of
terms. But how can a translation relation which holds between occurrences be defined
beforehand? How can we translate future occurrences ui 'I'? The modified subject
oriented proposal can account for the truth of Twain's utterance of (21) only if 'I' as it
appears in that occurrence is a translation of Mao's name for Twain. But how could we
have known before Twain uttered (21) that this occurrence of 'I' was a translation of
Mao's name for Twain? (A similar difficulty is presented by cases in which the only
term the subject employs is a demonstrative. For example, suppose that Mao has never
heard of Twain under a name, but he comes to believe that Twain is a great author by,
say, watching him write a book--Mao, we could say, has a "demonstrative belief" about
Twain that he is a great author. If this situation obtains, then there are many contexts in
which wan utterance of (20) would be true, yet it is not at all clear how the modified
subject oriented proposal can account for the truth of these occurrences.)
The Fregean theorist might attempt to avoid the above difficulties by appeal to
yet another version of the subject oriented proposal. The difficulties presented above
arise because Mao, the subject, is not appropriately related to a term which appears in the
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that-clause of the speaker's ascription. It seems that these problems would not arise if
one could state what cognitive value is referred to by a referring term appearing in a that-
clause without appealing the term itself. Thus the defender of the subject oriented
proposal might suggest the following referential version of the proposal:
The Referential Version of the Subject Oriented Proposal: The cognitive
value referred to by a referring term appearing in the that-clause of an
ascription is "the way (or perhaps a way) in which the subject thinks of
the referent of the term."
According to the referential version of the subject oriented proposal, Oscar's utterance of
(20) Mao believes that Twain is a great author,
expresses the proposition that Mao holds the attitude of belief toward a content which has
Mao's own "way of thinking of Twain" as a constituent, regardless of whether Mao
assigns this cognitive value to occurrences of 'Twain', or translations of 'Twain'.
Again, however, there are several difficulties with this version of the subject
oriented proposal. First, it does not specify what cognitive value is presented by a
referring term appearing inside of a that-clause, because, assuming that such a term has a
referent, it is unlikely that the subject of the ascription has only one way of thinking of
that referent. When Oscar utters an occurrence of
(3) Odile believes that Twain is a great author.
to which one of Odile's "ways of thinking" of Twain is Oscar referring? More
importantly, the proposal seems to abandon the spirit of the Fregean approach. The
Fregean approach, as I understand it, is an internalist, Cartesian, view of content and
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propositional attitudes; it maintains that our beliefs, desires, etc. can to be specified and
individuated independently of the actual state of "the external world," But in specifying
the contents expressed by occurrences of referring terms the referential version of the
subject oriented proposal makes an essential appeal to the referents of those terms, and in
doing so the proposal abandons the internalistic spirit of the Fregean approach.
Not surprisingly, abandoning the spirit of the Fregean approach in favor of the
referential version of the subject oriented proposal has a price. One of the alleged
advantages of Fregean theories concerns their ability to account for our untutored
intuitions with regard to occurrences of ascriptions such as
(22) Odile believes that Santa is fat.
There are situations in which our untutored intuitions dictate that an occurrence of (22) is
true. The Fregean theorist who does not endorse the referential version of the subject
oriented view can account for these intuitions because the content expressed by the that-
clause of occurrences of (2i) in no way depends upon 'Santa' having an ordinary referent.
If, however, the referential version of the subject oriented proposal is adopted, this virtue
of Fregean theories will be lost: there obviously is no "way in which Odile thinks of the
referent of 'Santa'," '(This point illustrates the tension between Frege's claim that "empty"
referring terms present senses, on the one hand, and his account of senses as "modes of
presentation of objects" on the other. What is a "mode of presentation" of nothing?27)
Another difficulty, shared by all versions of the subject oriented proposal, is that
it cannot account for our intuitions concerning the truth conditions of occurrences of
ascriptions such was
(8) Aristotle believed that Twain was a great author.
90
The term 'Twain' as it appears in occurrences of the above ascription of course has a
referent, and thus it at least makes sense to speak of "Aristotle's way of thinking of
Twain." In this case the difficulty is not that there is no referent, but rather that there is
no such "way of thinking" of the referent: Aristotle did not think of Twain in any "way"
at all. Thus even the referential version of the subject oriented proposal will incorrectly
predict that occurrences of (8) are neither true nor false,
A similar difficulty is presented by occurrences of ascriptions such as
(23) Nobody believes that Twain is a great author,
and
(24) Everybody believes that Twain is a great author,
The problem presented by occurrences of (23) and (24) is not that the subject has no
"way of thinking of Twain," rather the problem is that there is no particular subject
whose "way of thinking of Twain" could serve as the semantic value of 'Twain'. 28 All
versions of the subject oriented proposal will predict that no particular content is
expressed by occurrences of such ascriptions, but, intuitively, this prediction is not
correct. our untutored intuitions suggest that an occurrence of (23) asserts that nobody
holds the attitude of belief toward what is expressed by the that-clause of the occurrence,
where the that-clause of the occurrence serves to specify the relevant content, Note that
there is no straightforward way of solving this problem by appealing to "hidden"
quantification over cognitive values. For example, (24) cannot plausibly be analyzed
was having the following logical form:
(24*) Vx 3y (y is a "way of thinking of Twain" &
Believes<x, y^CV('is a great author')>).
91
(Let 'CV( )' designate a function from expression types to their cognitive values--for
convenience I assume that the cognitive values of predicates do not vary
intersubjectively. And let 'A' designate a concatenation device for cognitive values; more
precisely, 'A' designates a partial function from "simple" cognitive values to "complex"
cognitive values and contents.) The reason that occurrences of (24) cannot be analyzed
along the lines of (24*) is that (24*) would be true even if everybody dissented from
occurrences of
(1) Twain is a great author.
yet assented to occurrences of
(2) Clemens is a great author.
The fact that everybody assented to occurrences of (2) would suffice to make an
occurrence of (24*) true, but our untutored intuitions dictate that in such a situation an
occurrence of (24) would be false. Consequently nothing along the lines of (24*) can
serve as a Fregean analysis of (24). (Similar remarks apply to w(23), and other
ascriptions which fail to specify a particular subject.)
I conclude my arguments against the subject oriented proposal with a more
general, conceptual, objection which applies to all versions of the proposal. Simply put,
the objection is that the subject oriented proposal is not a plausible analysis of what
ordinary speakers do when they utter attitude ascriptions. In saying of someone that he
"fears that it's raining," or "wonders whether Jeeves did it," or "believes that the Sox will
take it this year," does an ordinary speaker really refer to certain finely individuated
"ways of thinking"? It certainly does not seem as if in making ordinary attitude
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ascriptions we are referring to such entities; rather it seems that in uttering an occurrence
of 'Oscar believes that the Sox will take it this year,' one is simply describing the world
as Oscar believes it to be, viz. such that the Sox are going to take it this year. The that-
clauses of ordinary attitude ascriptions do not seem to specify "ways of thinking" of the
world; rather they seem to refer to conceivable states of the world. My final objection to
the subject oriented proposal is that things are not as they do not seem to be: it cannot be
that in making attitude ascriptions ordinary speakers refer to finely individuated "ways of
thinking," because there are occurrences of true (and false) attitude ascriptions where the
speaker simply lacks the ability to refer to an appropriate "way of thinking."
Consider Oscar's utterance of
(3) Odile believes that Twain is a great author.
Under the subject oriented proposal, if this occurrence is to be true, the occurrence of
'Twain' must have one of Odile's "ways of thinking" of Twain as its semantic value. But
what determines the referent of this occurrence? What makes it the case that this
particular "way of thinking" is the referent of the occurrence? 29 Though this is not the
appropriate place to undertake an analysis of reference, it is, I think, generally agreed that
if a subject uses a term a to refer to an object O, then there must be an explanation as to
why this particular occurrence of a is associated with the particular object O. As
Fregean theorists insist, something must determine the referent of an occurrence;
something must make it the case that this is the referent of the occurrence. (Note that we
are here concerned with "speaker reference," or "occurrence reference," as opposed to
"semantic reference," or "type reference"; it is clear that there is no language or idiolect
in which the type 'Twain' has one of Odile's cognitive values as its referent.) I know of
only two kinds of proposal concerning what the reference determining mechanism might
be: First, there are, broadly speaking, descriptive theories of reference determination.
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According to such theories, an occurrence of ca refers to O just in case the speaker
associates with ac (or this particular occurrence of oa) a criterion for identifying 0: The
criterion may be manifested in the form of a description, or a weighted cluster of
descriptions, which uniquely denotes O, or as an ability to recognize 0, or an ability to
distinguish O from relevant alternatives. 30 Second, there are causal theories of reference
determination. 3 I According to causal theories an occurrence of ct refers to O just in case
there is an appropriate "causal chain" linking this occurrence of a to O. (These kinds of
theories of reference are not incompatible: one might consistently propound a mixed
theory, part causal, part identity criterion. 32) Neither of these kinds of theories can
adequately explain how a term appearing in the that-clause of an ordinary attitude
ascription can be used to refer to a cognitive value.
Consider Oscar's utterance of
(3) Odile believes that Twain is a great author.
Under the subject oriented proposal, if this occurrence is to be true, the occurrence of
'Twain' must have one of Odile's "ways of thinking" of Twain as its semantic value. But
what determines the referent of this occurrence? What makes it the case that this
particular "way of thinking" is the referent of this occurrence? It is clear that causal
theories of reference can be of no avail where: there is no appropriate causal chain
linking the appearance of 'Twain' in Oscar's utterance to some "way in which Odile
thinks of Twain." (Even assuming that Odile utilizes such a "way of thinking," this
cognitive value was certainly never "baptized" 'Twain'.) Consequently, if the Fregean
theorist is to explain how Oscar's utterance of 'Twain' manages to refer to some particular
"way in which Odile thinks of Twain," he must invoke some kind of descriptivist theory
of reference. Since it can be safely assumed that Oscar has never perceived a cognitive
value, it cannot be that Oscar's utterance of 'Twain' refers to a particular cognitive value
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because he has some perceptual capacity to recognize that cognitive value, or because he
has the perceptual ability to distinguish that cognitive value from other relevant cognitive
values. Consequently, if Oscar's utterance of 'Twain' refers to a particular cognitive
values, it must be that Oscar "mentally employs" a description, or a cluster of
descriptions, which is uniquely satisfied by one of Odile cognitive values, i.e. one of her
"ways of thinking of Twain," the difficulty is that ordinary speakers can utter true (or
false) attitude ascriptions even if they lack the ability to formulate a description which
uniquely denotes an appropriate cognitive value.
Suppose, as is likely, that Odile thinks of Twain in at least two different ways:
Suppose that Odile thinks of Twain as the author of The Adventures of Huckleberry Finn,
(Let us call this "way of thinking" 'CV 1'.) and that she also thinks of Twain was the
author of Tom Sawyer. (Let us call this second "way of thinking" 'CV2'.) Further
suppose that Odile is not confused: she believes that CV I and CV2 determine the same
referent. (This may, or may not, require her to possess, or be capable of grasping, a third
cognitive value which is some kind of fusion of CV I and CV2.3 3) And finally, suppose
that Oscar's utterance of (3) is intuitively true--suppose that Odile is prone to sincerely
utter sentences such as (1). Which cognitive value, CV I or CV2, has Oscar referred to in
uttering (3)? If Oscar's utterance of (3) is to have a truth value, he must have mentally
employed a descrip'tion which denotes only one of CV I or CV2. But Oscar may not
possess the ability to formulate such a description: suppose that Oscar thinks of Twain as
"the greatest American author," and he has never even heard of The Adventures of
Huckleberry Finn, or Tom Sawyer. How can Oscar formulate a description which
uniquely denotes CV I, as opposed to CV2, if he has no knowledge whatsoever of what
distinguishes CVI from CV2? 34 (Note that if the Fregean strategy is to succeed in
precluding the arguments from opacity, Oscar's utterance of (3) cannot be interpreted as
an existential claim; it cannot be analyzed as asserting that "There is some cv which
determines Twain, and Odile holds the attitude of belief toward cv^CV('is a great
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author')." For if occurrences of (3) are analyzed in this way, then occurrence of (4) must
be given the very same analysis, and thus the Fregean theorist will be unable to
distinguish the truth conditions of occurrences of (3) and (4),)
A subject might think of an entity in myriad different ways; the more a subject
knows, or believes, about an object, the more "ways of thinking about the object" he will
be capable of employing. (If this is right, then the difficulties presented by the
intersubjective variance of cognitive values will be most acute in situations which
involve, instead of famous individuals like Twain, familiar persons and objects.) Under
the subject oriented proposal, if a speaker is to make a true (or false) attitude ascription
concerning what that subject believes (etc.) about that entity, he must be able to specify
by description one of these "ways of thinking." But there is no reason to suppose that an
ordinary subject who makes a true (or false) attitude ascription will possess such an
ability. Indeed, given how little ordinary speaker's know (or even believe) concerning
one another's "ways of thinking," it seems that ordinary speakers will rarely possess such
an ability. I conclude that the subject oriented proposal cannot be a correct account of
what ordinary speakers do when they make attitude ascriptions.
This general, conceptual, objection to the subject oriented proposal concludes my
objections to the subject oriented proposal, and thus also concludes my exposition of the
second half of the Fregean strategy's Charybdis. If the Scylla of the Fregean strategy
forces the Fregean theorist to permit the cognitive values presented by occurrences of
referring terms to vary intersubjectively, then the Fregean analysis of attitude ascriptions
must adopt either the speaker oriented proposal, or the subject oriented proposal. Neither
proposal, however, preserves the legitimacy of our ordinary attitude ascribing practices.
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2.4 A Brief Summary.
It is often alleged that Fregean theories are superior to Russellian theories because
it is possible to formulate arguments from opacity against Russellian theories, while it is
not possible to formulate arguments from opacity against Fregean theories. It was shown
in section 2.2, however, that this claim is simply false; it is at least in principle possible
to formulate semantic and epistemological arguments from opacity against Fregean
theories. Furtherrhore, in order to preclude refutation by way of arguments from opacity,
Fregean theories must individuate cognitive extremely finely, so finely that the cognitive
value presented by an occurrence of a referring term will vary intersubjectively. But this
difficulty, the difficulty of providing an independent principle of individuation for
cognitive values which individuates them finely enough to preclude the arguments from
opacity, is only the Fregean strategy's Scylla; once cognitive values are permitted to vary
intersubjectively the Fregean theorist must face Charybdis, the problems of accounting
for the publicity of the contents of our propositional attitudes, and preserving the
legitimacy of our ordinary propositional attitude ascribing practices. I argued in section
2.3 that, once the cognitive values presented by an occurrence of a referring term is
permitted to vary intersubjectively, Fregean theories are unable to provide solutions to
these problems. 35 The conclusions reached in sections 2.2 and 2.3 taken together imply
that the Fregean strategy suffers from a fundamental difficulty: there could not be any
entities which could serve all three of the functions cognitive values were posited to
serve.
The arguments of this chapter complete my case against the Fregean approach to
propositional attitudes and propositional attitude ascriptions. Not only are Fregean
theories objectionable won the grounds that they violate the principles of direct reference
and semantic innocence, but they are also objectionable for wholly independent reasons.
Fregean theories abandon what seem to be extremely plausible general semantic
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principles in order to provide an acceptable account of propositional attitudes and
propositional attitude ascriptions, but the account of propositional attitudes purchased at
the cost of these general principles is in a way internally inconsistent, and thus is wholly
unacceptable. Consequently, since the Fregean approach exacts a high price, yet yields
little or no benefit, I suggest that the Fregean approach be rejected in favor of the
Russellian approach, which respects the principles of direct reference and semantic
innocence. Thus in the remaining chapters I will be concerned to formulate an
acceptable Russellian theory; i.e. a Russellian theory which is not subject to refutation
via the problems and arguments based upon the phenomenon of opacity.
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Chapter 2 Notes
1 Of course if one or the other of the arguments from opacity is unsound, then this
argument poses no threat to either Russellian theories or Fregean theories.
2 Frege, "On Sense and Reference," in Frege 1966, p. 56.
3 Note that Odile would assent to (01) yet dissent from (02) only if she would assent to
relevant occurrences of (12), yet dissent from relevant occurrences of (1 1). This reflects
the fact that the essence of the phenomenon of opacity is the phenomenon of recognition
failure. Frege's theory of sense and reference is first and foremost a theory of recognition
failure, These issues are further exploreca in Appendix A.
4 Again, strictly speaking Frege had no truck with propositions, as I use the term, but
there is no harm in interpreting Frege's theory as involving propositions. Frege
maintained that the truth value of a sentence is compositionally determined by the
semantic values--the referents and designations--of the terms appearing in the sentence. I
have merely added a step in this compositionality: the semantic values of the terms
appearing in a sentence compositionally determine a proposition, and the proposition
thus determined has the property of truth, or the property of falsity.
5 As was explained in Chapter 1, according to Frege's conception of reference and
content the cognitive value presented by an occurrence of a referring term is also
responsible for determinining the referent of the occurrence, This function of cognitive
values, however, is not directly relevant to the Fregean strategy for precluding the
arguments from opacity, and thus will be overlooked here,
6 I will not undertake the daunting task of analyzing the notion of understanding an
occurrence. Suffice it to say that understanding an occurrence requires knowing the
meanings of the words which make up the occurrence, and, following Wittgenstein and
others, at least a sufficient condition for knowing the meaning of a word is possessing an
ability to use the word appropriately. Notice that this conception of understanding an
occurrence allows for the possibility of a subject understanding occurrences of both
'Twain is a great author' and 'Clemens is a great author', even though he does not know
that 'Twain' and 'Clemens' are coreferential. Ancient astronomers had false beliefs
concerning 'Hesperus' and 'Phosphorus', but they were certainly competent in using these
terms to refer to Venus.
7 Ramsey sentences are first presented in Ramsey's paper, "Theories," in Braithwaite
1931. They are explained and discussed in Block, 1980, and in Lewis, "How to Define
Theoretical Terms," in Lewis 1983.
8 Frege, unfortunately, never provides identity conditions for senses. Frege does
however seem to be committed to there being (at most) one referent or designation for
every sense. Furthermore, Frege seems committed to the idea that senses are
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epistemologically transparent in the sense that one who "grasps" a sense would not (or
perhaps cannot) "take" the sense to correspond with referent r at t I, and distinct referent
r' at t2. (Of course to maintain that a proper account of senses will have it that senses
possess these properties is not to provide an account of senses.) Thus Frege would deny
that occurrences of 'Tully' and 'Cicero' express the content expressed by occurrences of 'a
famous Roman orator', for Oscar, if Oscar thought that Tully and Cicero were two
people.
9 To my knowledge, Scheffler was the first to point out that theories which utilize the
Fregean strategy also face the arguments from opacity. In "On Synonymy and Indirect
Discourse" (1955), found in Scheffler 1955, Scheffler, first, hints at the distinction
between the epistemological and the semantic arguments from opacity, and second, points
out that positing cognitive values does not in itself preclude the arguments from opacity.
Scheffler directs his argument against Carnap's notion of "intensional isomorphism," but
the point can be adjusted to apply to the Fregean strategy in general. Scheffler
writes,
To exclude the possibility that [Odile] may truly be said to [believe that
Twain is a great author but not that Clemens is a great author] is to express
a psychological theory as well as a semantical one, and a highly improbable
one at that. For the same limitations which prevent [Odile] from seeing
that [an occurrence of] a sentence [expresses the same singular
proposition] as another may prevent [her] from seeing that one sentence
[expresses the same thought as] another. .. Generalizing now, if our
notion of the relation between [a that-clause] and some appropriate that-
content is to be faithful to presystematic use and psychologically plausible,
then no matter how semantically narrow this relation is conceived, short of
identity, it will be two wide for some cases.
(Of course Kripke's "Paderewski" case illustrates that even identifying "that-content" with
that-clauses will not individuate "that-content" finely enough.)
Salmon also realizes that the arguments from opacity can also be used agaitist
theories which utilize the Fregean strategy. Salmon does not notice, however, that his
theory employs a version of the Fregean strategy in order to avoid the epistemological
arguments from opacity, and thus is susceptible to epistemological arguments from
opacity. This will be investigated in section 3.1 . See Salmon 1986,
10 Here I foreshadow my response to the epistemological arguments from opacity: In
section 4.1 I will argue that the Epistemological Principle of Dissent should be rejected,
though I maintain, unlike many other Russellian theorists, that the Semantic Principle of
Dissent cannot be rejected. Salmon, Soames, Barwise and Perry, and Richard have all, at
one time or another, proposed rejecting the Semantic Principle of Dissent. See Salmon
1986; Soames 1987; Barwise and Perry 1983; and Richard, "Direct Reference and
Ascriptions of Belief," in Salmon and Soames (eds.), 1988.
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I 1 Moliere, Le Malade Imaginaire, act three,
12 Perhaps another analogy can clarify this last point. Consider a fictional case based
upon Mendel's work in genetics. Suppose that we are interested in accounting for the
phenomenon of differing offspringflower color. The observable facts of this
phenomenon are as follows: Sometimes a red flowered plant coupled with a red
flowered plant produces a red flowered plant, while other times a red flowered plant
coupled with a red flowered plant produces a white flowered plant, and still other times a
red flowered plant coupled with a red flowered plant produces a pink flowered plant.
How can this phenomenon be explained? Similarly to the way in which a Fregean theory
attempts to account for the phenomenon of opacity, we could posit entities called "geno-
types" and claim that the flower color of offspring is determined by the "geno-types" of
the parent plants. Our initial theory might run as follows; if both parent plants have "red
geno-types," then they will produce red flowered offspring. If both parent plants have
"white geno-types," then they will produce white offspring, and if one parent plant has
"red geno-types" and the other "white geno-types" then they will produce pink flowered
offspring. In giving this account of the phenomenon of differing offspring flower color,
we commit our theory to satisfying an individuation constraint for geno-types, and we
thus commit ourselves to several strong modal claims reminiscent of the Fregean
theorist's strong modal claim. For example, we are committed to the claim that for every
nomologically possible instance in which a white flowered plant is produced from two
red flowered plants, both of the parent plants must have "white geno-types." How is this
strong modal claim to be understood? Again, if our theory is to provide an explanation
of the relevant phenomena, our posited geno-types must be understood as independent
entities which are responsible for the phenomenon of differing offspring flower color.
But if our strong modal claim is interpreted as such a metaphysical claim, we then
commit ourselves to there being, at least in principle, a way of individuating geno-types
which does not appeal to the phenomenon of differing offspring flower color. We
commit ourselves to there being some way of individuating geno-types by appeal to say,
the strands of DNA present in the cells making up the plants, or the mass of the root
systems, or the acidity of the fluid in the stems, or some combination of such
independent properties. We are committed to this claim because if geno-types cannot be
individuated independently of the phenomenon of offspring flower color, then we cannot
explain this phenomenon by appeal to these entities, We cannot say that Red Plant A and
Red Plant B produced a white Plant C because A and B both have, or are of, white geno-
types, if geno-types cannot be individuated without appealing to the phenomenon of
differing offspring flower color.
101
13 In Schiffer 1990, Schiffer argues in favor of a similar constraint, which he calls the
Intrinzsic-Description Constraint:
if a thing plays the role of [a cognitive value], then it must be intrinsically
identifiable in a way that does not describe it as a [cognitive value]. In
other words, it must be possible to answer the question, "What is the
[cognitive value] of so-and-so?" in terms of an intrinsic characterization of
the [cognitive value] whose meaning implies nothing about the thing it
applies to being a [cognitive value]. If a thing is a [cognitive value], it
must be intrinsically identifiable as some other kind of thing.
(Schiffer uses 'mode of presentation' instead of 'cognitive value'.) Schiffer presents the
following argument in support of his claim:
If there really are things which play the [role of cognitive values], then it is a contingent
fact about them that they play that role. Consequently, if there are [cognitive values],
then it must be possible to say what they are in terms that do better than to characterize
them as [cognitive values], or as potential [cognitive values].
14 Kripke 1979.
15 Salmon seems to have something like this in mind when he posits "modes of
acquaintance." See Salmon 1986, pp, 107-9. As will be explained in Chapter 3,
Salmon's "modes of acquaintance" do not serve as the semantic values of terms appearing
inside that-clauses--but of course there is a possible theory in which they do play such a
role.
16 This seems to be the essence of Frege's view. I owe this way of putting it to Schiffer
1990, and Schiffer 1989, Chapter 3.
17 Views appealing to "conceptual," "functional", or "cognitive" roles are defended in
Block 1986, and Fodor "Propositional Attitudes" in Fodor 1981, and Fodor "Substitution
Arguments and the Individuation of Beliefs," in Fodor 1990. A more detailed view
involving conceptual roles is developed in Boer and Lycan 1986. (Boer and Lycan's
view is criticized in Richard 1990. Views appealing to conceptual roles are also
discussed in Schiffer 1992, Schiffer 1990, and Schiffer 1989.
18 Frege, "Thoughts," in Salmon and Soames, (eds.) 1988.
19 Dummett, "Frege's Distinction Between Sense and Reference," found in Dummett
19 78, pp. 116-7.
20 Gabrial, Hermes, Kambartel, Theil and Veraart (eds.) 1980. (I found the passage in
Evans 1982, p. 15.)
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21 One might attempt to preserve the validity of arguments involving attitude ascriptions
by claiming that the quantifiers in these arguments are substituttional, rather than
objectual. There are several difficulties with this move.
First, because the proposition expressed by an occurrence is partly a function of
the time of the occurrence, it will be extremely difficult to specify the substitution class
of the quantifiers. For example, arguments such as the following are invalid:
1. Odile believes that it's raining.
2. Odile will believe tomorrow everything that she believes today.
Therefore,
3. Tomorrow Odile will believe that it's ra'ning.
In order to ensure that such arguments are not predicted to be valid, 'it's raining' will have
to be precluded from the substitution class of the quantifiers. But then the Fregean will
not be able to account for intuitively valid arguments in which 'it's raining' would have to
be a substitution instance. (I owe this argument to Richard 1990, p. 76-8.)
Second, and more importantly, it seems that the only motivation a Fregean
theorist might have for appealing to substitutional quantification would be the hope that
expression types could serve to individuate cognitive values. As Paderewski-like cases
make clear, however, this hope is unfounded.
22 These two proposals are considered in Richard 1990, in Forbes 1990. I am indebted
to both Richard's and Forbes' discussion of these issues.
23 Forbes, in Forbes 1990, brings out this problem is a slightly different way. Suppose,
first, that Oscar assigns the same cognitive value to occurrences of 'Twain' wand
'Clemens', and, second, that Odile assents to occurrences of 'Twain is witty and Clemens
is not witty.' According to the semantic principle of assent, it follows that relevant
occurrences of
Odile believes that Twain is witty and Clemens is not witty.
are true. But how can Oscar report Odile's belief that Twain is witty and Clemens is not
witty? If Oscar were to utter an occurrence of the above sentence, he would be asserting
that Odile holds the attitude of belief toward an obviously contradictory content: Let 'cv'
refer to the cognitive value Oscar assigns to occurrences of both 'Twaiin' and 'Clemens',
and let 'CV(<_,_>)' designate a (partial) function from ordered pairs f individuals and
expressions to the cognitive values the individual assigns to occurrences of those
expressions. Furthermore, let '^' denote concatenation for cognitive values. (Thus, ^ is a
partial function from "simple" cognitive values to "complex" cognitive values.)
Allowing for a few shortcuts,* Oscar's utterance of the above ascription can now be
interpreted as asserting that Odile holds the attitude of belief toward the following
erplicitly contradictory content:
(cv^CV(<Oscar, 'is witty'>)) & (-(cv^CV(<Oscar, 'is witty'>)))
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But Fregean theories are specifically designed to avoid the result that occurrences of
ascriptions such as the above attribute to their subjects belief in such "explicit
contradictions." In other words, if Fregean theories, in the end, allow for attributions of
"explicit contradictions," then it is difficult to see what advantage Fregean theories might
have over the Naive Russellian theory. (* I assume that occurrences of 'and' present
"cognitive value conjunction," symbolized with '&'. I also assume that
cvACV(<Oscar, 'is not witty'>)
is equivalent to
i(cvACV(<Oscar, 'is witty'>)
In other words, I also assume that occurrences of 'not' present "cognitive value negation,"
symbolized with '--'.)
24 One might attempt to defend a version of the speaker oriented proposal by appealing
to similarity relation between contents. That is, one might say that Oscar's utterance of
(3) Odile believes that Twain is a great author.
is true just in case the content Oscar assigns to the that-clause is sufficiently similar to the
content Odile assigns, or would assign, to the that-clause. This strategy, however, holds
little promise. First, how is the relevant similarity relation to be defined? Second, such a
strategy does not succeed in avoiding any one of the three objections offered here:
Under any plausible definition of the similarity relation, it will be possible to formulate
semantic arguments from opacity, and there will be nomologically possible cases in
which the Echo and Dis-Echo Principles are not respected.
25 The ceteris paribus clause is needed to rule out cases in which the subject has revised
his beliefs--the principle does not hold if A "changes his mind" concerning the content
expressed by the occurrence of E. Also, I concede that it is not clear what it is for B to
utter an ascription "on the basis of' A's utterance of X. This issue, however, is not
relevant to my concerns here.
26 I assume that occurrences of sentences suffering from reference failure are neither
true nor false. I think this view of occurrences containing empty terms is correct, though
the correctness of this view is not presupposed by the arguments I present against the
subject oriented proposal; i.e. my arguments do not presuppose that on the final analysis
occurrences of sentences containing empty terms will turn out to neither true nor false.
Some of my arguments against the subject oriented proposal are of the following form:
"The subject oriented proposal predicts an instance of reference failure for a particular
occurrence, and therefore, if this proposal is correct, our intuitions should dictate that this
occurrence is neither true nor false. But our intuitions do not dictate this, and
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consequently the subject oriented proposal is false." Thus all that is presupposed by my
arguments is that our untutored intuitions, regardless of whether or not these intuitions
are correct, dictate that sentences containing empty terms are neither true nor false, This
assumption is, I think, indubitable.
27 This tension in Frege's notion of sense is nicely expounded in Evans 1982, Chapter 1.
It is important to note that if Evans is correct in maintaining that the notion of sense
cannot be extended to solve the puzzles associated with enipty terms, then, despite what
is often claimed, Russellian theories are no worse off with regard to these puzzles than
are Fregean theories; any solution that succeeds for Fregean theories will also succeed for
Russellian theories, and vice versa,
28 Similar difficulties are presented by occurrences of ascriptions such as
Oscar and Odile believe the Twain is a great author.
Suppose that Oscar and Odile do not "think of Twain in the same way." Whose "way of
thinking" is referred to by the occurrence of 'Twain' in the ascription?
29 What is being asked here is, "What secondary sense does Oscar employ in thinking of
a particular way in which Odile thinks of Twain?" Note that if we are to know what
content Oscar's utterance of (3) presents, we must grasp a particular "way" in which
Oscar thinks of one of Odile's ways of thinking of Twain, Hence even if Oscar can
manage to refer to a particular "way in which Odile thinks of Twain," it seems extremely
unlikely that anyone will grasp the thought that Oscar expressed. These difficulties are
of course even more pronounced in cases involving iterated attitude ascriptions.
30 The fundamental idea underlying descriptive theories of reference is that, according
to such theories, the referent of an occurrence of a referring term is determined by
intrinsic properties of the speaker; i.e. God, or a clever scientist, could determine the
referent of an occurrence by examining the speaker's brain. This idea seems to underlie
at least one of Dummett's accounts of sense:
... any one person, if he is to be said to understand ('the Thames'], must
be IN COMMAND OF some correct means of identifying the river: if he
knows only that 'the Thames' is used as the name of a river, and cannot in
any way TELL which river it is the name of, . . he has only a partial
understanding of its sense. (Capitalized words indicate my emphasis. The
passage appears in Dummett 1978, p. 99.)
31 Causal theories of reference are bases upon Kripke's causal "picture" of the referent
of an occurrence is determined. Kripke summarizes his "picture" of reference as follows:
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An initial "baptism" takes place. Here the object may be named by
ostension, or the reference of the name may be fixed by a description.
When the name is "passed from link to link," the receiver of the name
must, I think, intend when he learns it to use it with the same reference as
the man from whom he heard it. If I hear the name 'Napoleon' and decide
it would be a nice name for my pet aardvark, I do not satisfy this
condition, (Kripke 1972, p. 96).
(Note, first, that Kripke does not distinguish "type reference" from "occurrence
reference," and second, as Kripke points out, the above "picture" cannot serve as an
eliminative definition, as it appeals to the notion of intending to use a term to refer to the
same referent.)
32 For a sketch of such a "mixed theory of reference," see Evans 1977.
33 One might object that if Odile believes that CV I and CV2 determine the same
referent, then CV 1I and CV2 must be identical. there are several reasons for rejecting
such a proposal. First, under this proposal Odile, who realizes that CV I and CV2
determined the same referent, could not grasp the content presented by Otho's utterance
of (1), where Otho does not realize that CV I and CV2 determine the same referent.
Second, it might be that, despite what Odile believes, CV I and CV2 determine distinct
referents, in which case they could hardly be identical. And finally, the proposal is ad
hoc, and hardly in keeping with the spirit of the Fregean strategy: surely the Fregean
theorist does not want to claim that 'Hesperus' and 'Phosphorus' express the same sense
for modern day astronomers.
34 Moreover, as was previously pointed out, Odile may not have had any contact with
Twain whatsoever. Under this assumption, there is no appropriate "way of thinking"
which might satisfy whatever description Oscar employs, and thus the subject oriented
proposal predicts that Oscar's utterance lacks a truth value. this prediction, however,
does not accord with our intuitions: our intuitions dictate that if Odile has had no contact
with Twain whatsoever, if she has "never even heard of him," then Oscar's utterance of
(3) is false.
35 Thus the arguments advanced in this chapter are in a way analogous to the arguments
against Fregean theories advanced by Kripke, Putnam, and Kaplan: One of the central
purposes of the arguments advanced by these Philosophers is to show that senses, or
cognitive values, cannot both determine referents, or semantic values, and also serve as
constituents of the contents expressed by occurrences of declarative sentences.
Analogously, the arguments presented in this chapter attempt to show that senses, or
cognitive values, cannot both serve to preclude the epistemological and semantic
arguments from opacity, and also serve as (i) constituents of publicly accessible contents
presented by occurrences of declarative sentences, and (ii) the referents of terms
appearing in the that-clauses of attitude ascriptions.
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3.0 Criticism of Three Russellian Theories.
In this chapter I will explicate and criticize the Russellian theories proposed by
Salmon, Richard, and Crimmins and Perry. I Though these theories are Russellian in
that they can be interpreted as respecting the principles of semantic innocence and
direct reference, each of them rejects at least one of the tenets of The Naive Russellian
Theory. Recall that The Naive Russellian Theory maintains, in addition to the
principles of Direct Reference and Semantic Innocence, the following three general
tenets. First,
The Principle of Full Articulation: The proposition presented by an
occurrence of a declarative sentence is wholly determined by (a) the
semantic values--the referents and designations--of the phonetically or
orthographically realized terms occurring in the sentence, (b) the logical
form of the sentence.
And second,
The Principle of Propositional Truth: The truth conditions of an
occurrence of a declarative sentence are identical to, and determined by,
the truth conditions of the proposition presented by the occurrence; i.e.
no two occurrences which present the same proposition can have distinct
truth conditions.
And finally third, The Naive Russellian Theory also endorses a binary analysis of
propositional attitudes and propositional attitude verbs: propositional attitudes--the
actual mental phenomena--are binary relations between agents and Russellian
propositions and, furthermore, occurrences of propositional attitude verbs designate
these binary relations. Further recall that the phenomenon of opacity was shown to
pose three central difficulties for The Naive Russellian Theory: epistemological
arguments from opacity, the problem of accounting for the cognitive significance of
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occurrences, and the semantic arguments from opacity. It is because of these
difficulties that each of the Russellian theories considered in this chapter rejects at least
one of the above tenets of The Naive Russellian Theory.
This chapter proceeds as follows: For each of the three Russellian Theories
there are two sections, an expository section and a critical section. The expository
sections will focus on how the theories endeavor to avoid the problems posed by
opacity; i.e. in the expository sections I will attempt to answer the question, "How does
the theory endeavor to preclude the epistemological and semantic arguments from
opacity, and also account for the cognitive significance of occurrences?" In the critical
sections I will raise objections to the theories, most of which are variations on a similar
theme: Each of the theories examined is a Russellian theory; i.e. each theory represents
an attempt to preserve the principles of Direct Reference and Semantic Innocence,
while avoiding the arguments and problems posed by the phenomenon of opacity. 2
Consequently, none of these theories utilizes the Fregean strategy for avoiding the
problems posed by the phenomenon of opacity. Nonetheless, the strategies employed
by these Russellian theories are similar enough to the Fregean strategy to be caught
between the Scylla and Charybdis of the Fregean strategy: To avoid the
epistemological arguments from opacity and account for the cognitive significance of
occurrences, each of the Russellian theories posits a kind of entity, a mediator, which
serves to individuate the relata of propositional attitudes; each of the theories analyzes
propositional attitudes--the mental phenomena--as ternary relations between agents,
Russellian propositions, and some kind of mediator. But in order to avoid refutation by
epistemological arguments from opacity and account for the cognitive significance of
occurrences, these mediators must be individuated extremely finely, and they must be
individuated independently of the phenomenon of opacity. As a consequence, these
Russellian theories are threatened by the Fregean strategy's Scylla. Moreover, these
Russellian theorists also assume, like the Fregean theorist, that these finely individuated
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mediators must somehow be incorporated into the propositions presented by
occurrences of attitude ascriptions if the truth conditions of occurrences of ascriptions
such as
(3) Odile believes that Twain is a great author.
and
(4) Odile believes that Clemens is a great author.
are to be distinguished. In making this assumption, however, the Russellian theorists
become vulnerable to the second half of the Fregean strategy's Charybdis, viz. the
problem of preserving the legitimacy of our ordinary attitude ascribing practices. As
was argued in section 2.3.2, the semantics of ordinary attitude ascriptions do not seem
to involve appeal to anything like finely individuated mediators of propositional
attitudes.
3.1.1 Salmon's Russellian Theory.
Salmon's theory differs from The Naive Russellian Theory in that it rejects the
binary analysis of propositional attitudes and also, strictly speaking, denies that
occurrences of propositional attitude verbs designate propositional attitudes.
According to Salmon's theory, propositional attitudes--the mental phenomena--are
ternary relations between agents, Russellian propositions, and what Salmon calls
"modes of apprehension of Russellian propositions." (Thus "modes of apprehension"
are the mediators posited by Salmon's theory.) Propositional attitude verbs, however,
do not designate these ternary relations; rather occurrences of propositional attitude
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verbs designate binary relations which are formed by existential generalizations on
instances of ternary propositional attitudes. For example, Salmon maintains that
Odile's holding the attitude of belief toward the Russellian proposition that Twain is a
great author is to be analyzed as follows:
(G) BEL <Odile, P, MA>
where 'P' designates the Russellian proposition that Twain is a great author, and 'MA'
designates the "mode of apprehension" by which Odile "grasps" P. (I continue to
ignore issues concerning time and tense.) Thus the attitude of belief is identified with
the ternary BEL relation where an agent holds the attitude of belief toward a Russellian
proposition p just in case the agent has (something like) a "disposition to inward assent
[to p] when taken in such and such a way." 3 According to Salmon's theory of attitude
ascriptions, however, 'believes' as it appears in occurrences of
(3) Odile believes that Twain is a great author.
does not designate the ternary BEL relation. Rather Salmon maintains that 'believes' as
it appears in occurrences of (3) designates an existential generalization of the ternary
BEL relation. More specifically, Salmon would analyze an occurrence of (3) as
follows:
(3*) 3m (BEL<Odile, P, m>)
where the variable 'm' ranges over "modes of apprehension." 4
I now turn to explicating how Salmon's theory endeavors to avoid the problems
posed by the phenomenon of opacity. I will begin by considering the epistemological
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arguments from opacity. Since Salmon maintains that propositional attitudes--the
mental phenomena--are ternary relations between agents, Russellian propositions, and
"modes of apprehension of Russellian propositions," the epistemological principles of
assent and dissent must be amended:
Salmon's Epistemological Principle of Assent: If, at time t, a normal,
sincere, understanding subject A assents to an occurrence of a
declarative sentence E which presents Russellian proposition p, then
there is some mode of apprehension MA such that in assenting to the
occurrence of E, A apprehends p via MA, and BEL<A, p, MA>, at t.
Salmon's Epistemological Principle of Dissent: If, at time t, a normal,
sincere, understanding subject A dissents from an occurrence of a
declarative sentence E which presents Russellian proposition p, then
there is some mode of apprehension MA such that in dissenting from the
occurrences of E, A apprehends p via MA, and --,(BEL <A, p, MA>), at
time t. (Again, dissenting from an occurrence of a sentence is to be
sharply distinguished from assenting to the negation of an occurrence of
a sentence.)
Hence, according to Salmon's theory, what follows from Odile's assent to (O1) is not
that
(A) Believes <Odile, P>
but rather that
(H) BEL <Odile, P, MA,>
(where 'MA,' designates the "mode of apprehension" by which Odile--in assenting to
(O l)--apprehends the Russellian proposition P.) And what follows from Odile's dissent
from (02) and the epistemological principle of dissent is not that
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(B) -,(Believes <Odile, P>)
but rather that
(I) -,(BEL <Odile, P, MA,>)
(where 'MA9' designates the "mode of apprehension" by which Odile--in assenting to
(02)--apprehends the Russellian proposition P. I again ignore temporal factors.) Since
(G) and (H) are not contradictories, Salmon's Russellian theory is seemingly able to
preclude refutation by way of epistemological arguments from opacity. (Note that
Salmon's theory succeeds in precluding this argument from opacity only if MA, is not
identical to MA9.)
How does Salmon's theory account for the cognitive significance of
occurrences? In answering this question it will be useful to compare Salmon's theory
with Frege's theory of sense and reference. According to Frege's theory, the cognitive
significance of an occurrence, relative to an understanding subject, is determined by the
content expressed by that occurrence. Frege maintains that the reason that Odile
assents to (0.1) is that (01) expresses thought T for Odile, and Odile holds the attitude
of belief toward this content. Thus, according to Frege's theory, the cognitive
significance of an occurrence, relative to a subject, is determined by the content
expressed by the occurrence relative to that subject. Salmon, however, denies that the
cognitive significance of an occurrence is determined by the content expressed by the
occurrence, Rather Salmon maintains that the cognitive significance of an occurrence,
for a subject, is determined by the "mode of apprehension" by which the subject grasps
the Russellian proposition expressed by the occurrence. Thus, according to Salmon's
theory, Odile assents to (O1), yet dissents from (02) because she grasps the Russellian
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propositions presented by these occurrences via different "modes of apprehension"; it is
not the content toward which Odile holds the attitude of belief which accounts for her
verbal behavior, but rather it is how--via what mode of presentation--she BELs a
particular content which accounts for her behavior.5
Salmon's strategy for avoiding the epistemological arguments from opacity and
accounting for the cognitive significance of occurrences is thus crucially dependent on
there being appropriately individuated mediators, or "modes of apprehension of
Russellian propositions," and even Salmon concedes that it is not clear what such
entities might be.6 It is clear, however, that whatever Salmon's "modes of
apprehension" are, they play a role very similar to the role played by Fregean senses
and thoughts. Consider the following passage in which Salmon explains the notion of a
"mode of apprehension of a Russellian proposition" by way of contrasting his theory
with Frege's theory of sense and reference:
On the Fregean conception, every piece of cognitive information, every
"thought," is made entirely of things like concepts, .. . To apprehend
such a "thought" is, it seems, to be fully acquainted with it. There is no
changing appearance, no superficial surface concealing the soul, no
guise or veil of outward manifestation interceding between the subject
and the thing-in-itself. To apprehend it is, as is true of a singular
proposition whose only constituent other than things like concepts is a
particular sensation or visual sense datum, an item of "direct
acquaintance." There is no "failing to recognize" a particular pain, for
example by mistaking it for someone else's tickle. To have such a
sensation or sense datum is to be acquainted with it in the fullest and
most complete way possible. But the modified naive theory allows for
propositions of a different sort: singular propositions involving external
individuals and material objects as constituents, Clearly, the mode of
apprehension for such propositions must be more complex than the mere
grasping of pure concepts and the experiencing of wholly internal
sensations. Apprehending such a proposition cannot be a wholly
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internal, mental act. The means by which one is acquainted with a
singular proposition includes as a part the means by which one is
familiar with the individual constituents of that proposition. The mode
of acquaintance by which one is familiar with a particular object is part
of the mode of apprehension by which one grasps a singular proposition
involving that object,7
This passage illustrates that Salmon's "modes of acquaintance" and "modes of
apprehension" are indeed close cousins to Frege's senses and thoughts, respectively.
There are three striking similarities: First, modes of apprehension, like Fregean
thoughts, are composed of intermediary objects of acquaintance: On Frege's theory,
one does not think of Twain directly, but only "through" a sense with which one is in
some sense "directly acquainted." Since senses are constituents of thoughts, thoughts
can be distinguished by appeal to senses; thoughts containing distinct senses are
themselves distinct. Similarly on Salmon's theory one can think about Twain only
"through" some "mode of acquaintance" with which one is again in some sense directly
acquainted. Furthermore, modes of apprehension, which are partially composed of
modes of acquaintance, can be distinguished by appeal to the modes of acquaintance
they contain.
Second, though on Salmon's theory modes of acquaintance are not constituents
of contents, Salmon's method for avoiding the epistemological arguments from opacity
is structurally very similar to Frege's method. Recall that Frege's theory precludes the
epistemological arguments from opacity by positing senses to serve as the contents
expressed by occurrences of terms, thereby individuating the contents expressed by
occurrences of sentences--thoughts--more finely than Russellian propositions.
Concerning the instance of opacity involving Odile, (OI), and (02), the Fregean
theorist claims that what follows from Odile's assent to (O1) and dissent from (02) is
that
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(B) Believes <Odile, T>
(where 'T' designates the Fregean thought expressed by (01).) And what follows from
Odile's dissent from (02) is that
(C) -(Believes <Odile, T*>)
(where 'T*' is the Fregean thought presented by (02).) Salmon's method of avoiding
the epistemological arguments from opacity differs from Frege's method only in that,
where Frege has the binary believes relation and thoughts, Salmon has the ternary BEL
relation and "Russellian propositions under modes of apprehension." Where Frege
distinguishes T and T* by appeal to distinct senses of Twain, Salmon distinguishes
MA, and MA2 by appeal to distinct "modes of acquaintance of Twain." The structural
similarity can be further elucidated if we identify "Russellian propositions under modes
of apprehension" as ordered pairs of Russellian propositions and modes of
apprehension, and reinterpret the BEL relation as a binary relation between agents and
such ordered pairs. What is the theoretical difference between a Fregean thought, and
an ordered pair consisting of a Russellian proposition and a "mode of apprehension" of
that proposition?' What reason could there be for preferring Salmon's response to the
epistemological arguments over Frege's response? (If, as was suggested in section
2.3.2, the cognitive value expressed by an occurrence of a term cannot be specified
independently of the referent of the term, then it is especially difficult to see how
Salmon's method of avoiding the epistemological arguments from opacity differs from
the Fregean theorist's method.)
Finally, the third striking similarity between Frege's senses and thoughts, and
Salmon's modes of acquaintance and modes of apprehension, is that both kinds of
entities are multiply realizable: where senses and thoughts are abstract objects which
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can be "grasped" by different subjects at different times, modes of acquaintance and
modes of apprehension are universals which can be instantiated by different subjects at
different times. 8 Because both Fregean senses and thoughts, and Salmon's modes of
acquaintance and modes of apprehension are multiply realizable in this way, both kinds
of entities can support nomological generalizations, and thus both kinds of entities can
be appealed to in order to account for the cognitive significance of occurrences. For
example, according to Frege's theory, Odile assents to (O1) because it expresses a
particular thought, T, for her. Implicit in this explanation of Odile's behavior is an
appeal to a general psychological law of the form
For all subjects X, if conditions C obtain, and X perceives a token of a
sentence of E which expresses thought T for X, then ceteris paribus X
will assent.
(The conditions C will presumably specify, among many other things, that X holds the
attitude of belief toward T.) There can be such a law only if T is multiply realizable in
the relevant sense; if the fact that (O1) expresses T for Odile is to account for Odile's
assent to (O1), then T must be such that different subjects could grasp T, and Odile
might not have grasped T, Similar remarks apply to Salmon's theory. If modes of
apprehension are to account for the cognitive significance of occurrences, they must
enter into such psychological laws, and consequently they must be multiply realizable--
they must be capable of being intantiated by different subjects at different times.
It is clear that, with regard to the epistemological arguments from opacity and
the problem of accounting for the cognitive significance of occurrences, Salmon's
theory is very similar to Fregean theories; with regard to the epistemological arguments
from opacity and the problem of cognitive significance the mediators posited by
Salmon's theory play roles very similar to the roles played by Fregean senses and
thoughts. With regard to the semantic arguments from opacity, however, Salmon's
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theory diverges drastically from the Fregean strategy. (That Salmon's theory diverges
from Fregean theories is to be expected: it would be surprising if Salmon's theory
could both satisfy the Russellian desiderata, and also mimic the Fregean strategy with
regard to all three of the problems posed by the phenomenon of opacity.) Recall the
semantic principles of assent and dissent:
The Semantic Principle of Assent: If a normal, sincere, understanding
subject assents to an occurrence of a declarative sentence E in a context
c, then .n occurrence of rN believes that f , where N refers to the
subject, is true in any context c', where c' is semantically similar to c
with regard to E and rN believes that , .
The Semantic Principle of Dissent: If a normal, sincere, understanding
subject dissents from an occurrence of a declarative sentence E in a
context c, then an occurrence of rN does not believe that A, where N
refers to the subject, is true in any context c' where c' is semantically
similar to c with regard to E and rN does not believe that fE.
It follows from Odile's assent to (01) and the Semantic Principle of Assent that an
occurrence of
(3) Odile believes that Twain is a great author.
(in a semantically similar context) is true. Salmon analyzes occurrences of (3) and also
occurrences of
(4) Odile believes that Clemens is a great author,
as follows:
(3&4*) 3m (BEL<Odile, P, m>)
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Thus according to Salmon's analysis of ascriptions, just as with The Naive Russellian
Theory, an occurrence of (3) is true in a context c if and only if an occurrence of (4) is
true in c. It follows from Odile's dissent from (02) and the Semantic Principle of
Dissent, however, that an occurrence of
(4n) Odile does not believe tLat Clemens is a great author.
is true in c (where c is semantically similar to the context of (01) and (02), But (4n) is
simply the negation of (4), and consequently they cannot both be true relative to the
same context of utterance, c. Salmon's theory can thus be refuted by semantic
arguments from opacity.
The source of the difficulty is that, under Salmon's analysis of attitude
ascriptions, the mediators posited in order to preclude the epistemological arguments
from opacity are not in any way specified by the corresponding attitude ascriptions,
The situation involving Odile and (01) and (02) does not serve an epistemological
argument from opacity against Salmon's theory because of MA, and MA,; so long as
MA, and MA, are distinct, (H) and (1) are not contradictories. According to Salmon's
analysis of (3) and (4), however, MA, and MA2 are not incorporated into the
propositions presented by occurrences of (3) and (4). Indeed, if Salmon desires to
maintain the Principle of Semantic Innocence and the Principle of Full Articulation,
how could he maintain that MA, and MA 2 are somehow specified by occurrences of (3)
and (4), respectively? There are no phonetically or orthographically realized terms
appearing in occurrences of (3) and (4) that could have MA, and MA 2, respectively, as
their semantic values, and consequently Salmon is compelled to maintain that
occurrences of (3) and (4) present the same proposition. As a result, because he also
endorses the Principle of Propositional Truth, Salmon is compelled to maintain that
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occurrences of (3) and (4) have the same truth conditions. In summary, if Salmon
maintains the Russellian desiderata, as well as the principles of full articulation and
propositional truth, he is compelled to maintain that occurrences of (3) and (4) have the
same truth conditions, and consequently Salmon's theory is susceptible to refutation by
the semantic arguments from opacity.
Salmon is well aware that his theory is unable to preclude the semantic
arguments from opacity. His response to these arguments is to deny the Semantic
Principle of Dissent. Salmon denies, for example, that it follows from Odile's dissent
from (02) that an occurrence of
(4n) Odile does not believe that Clemens is a great author.
(in a semantically similar context) is true. Recall that Salmon analyzes an occurrence
of (4n) as
(4n*) --,(3m (BEL<Odile, P, m>))
(where the variable 'm' ranges over "modes of apprehension"). But, relative to our
situation involving Odile, (01) and (02), an occurrence of (4n*) would clearly be
false: an occurrence of (4n*) is true only if there is no "mode of apprehension" such
that Odile "inwardly assents to P under that mode apprehension." But if Odile assents
to (01), then there is some "mode of apprehension" such that Odile "inwardly assents"
to P under that mode apprehension, viz. the mode of apprehension displayed, for Odile,
by (O1). Thus, according to Salmon's theory, what follows from Odile's assent to (01)
is not that relevant occurrences of (4), or (4n*) are true, but rather that relevant
occurrences of
119
(4n*') -,(BEL <Odile, P, MA 2>)
are true. But there is no non circuitous way to express what is expressed by
occurrences of (4n*') in ordinary English; the closest we can come is something like,
"Odile does not believe that Twain is a great author in the way that proposition is
presented by 'Clemens is a great author'."
The Semantic Principle of Dissent, however, is supported by our untutored
intuitions concerning the truth conditions of attitude ascriptions, and thus Salmon must
provide some explanation as to why our untutored intuitions go astray, Salmon
suggests three kinds of reasons in support of his claim that our untutored intuitions
concerning the truth conditions of ascriptions such as (4) and (4n) are incorrect. 9
First, ordinary speakers have "a tendency to confuse" ascriptions such as (4) and
(4n) with metalinguistic ascriptions such as
(4ml) Odile believes that occurrences of 'Clemens is a great author' are true.
Given that Odile sincerely dissents from (02), occurrences of (4ml) of course are false.
Thus Salmon maintains that at least part of the reason that our untutored intuitions go
astray is that we confuse what is presented by occurrences of (4) with what is presented
by occurrences of (4ml); occurrences of (4ml) are false, and thus our tendency to
confuse (4) with (4ml) leads us to think that occurrences of (4) are also false. (Similar
remarks apply to occurrences of (4n), and the negation of (4ml); we confuse
occurrences of (4n), which are false, with occurrences of the negation of (4ml), which
are true.)
Second, Salmon claims that ordinary speakers (and sophisticated speakers) are
apt to incorrectly infer from Odile's dissent from (02) that occurrences of
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(4n) Odile does not believe that Clemens is a great author.
are true, because ordinary (and sophisticated) speakers over generalize. Salmon
maintains that Odile's dissent from (02) implies that
(J) 3m (-(BEL<Odile, P, m>)).
There is some "mode of apprehension" by which Odile grasps P, such that Odile is not
"disposed to inward assent to P" when she grasps P under this mode of apprehension,
viz. the mode of apprehension by which Odile grasps P in dissenting from (02). Thus
Odile's dissent from (02) implies that (J), (though there is no straightforward way to
express (J) in English). According to Salmon's analysis of attitude ascriptions,
however, (J) does not imply that relevant occurrences of
(4n) Odile does not believe that Clemens is a great author.
are true. Recall that occurrences of (4n) are analyzed as having the same truth
conditions as occurrences of
(4n*) -(3m (BEL<Odile, P, m>)).
(J) obviously does not imply that relevant occurrences of (4n*) are true: Odile's dissent
from (02) does imply that there is some mode of apprehending P such that she does not
BEL that P under that mode of apprehension. Her dissent does not, however, imply
that there is no mode of apprehending P such that she BELs that P under that mode of
apprehension. (Note that (4n*) is obtained from (J) by replacing the existential
quantifier with a universal quantifier.) Therefore to assume that the truth of
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occurrences of (4n) follows from Odile's dissent from (02)--or more generally, to
endorse the Semantic Principle of Dissent--is to commit the error of over
generalization. Our intuitions concerning the truth conditions of occurrences of (4n) go
astray because we mistakenly assume that if follows from Odile's dissent from (02)
that Odile does not BEL that P under any mode of apprehension whatsoever, while all
that actually follows from Odile dissent is that there is one mode of apprehending P
such that Odile does not BEL that P via that mode of apprehension. (Note that this
second point concerning over generalization helps to "explain away" our intuition that
occurrences of (4n) are true, though it does not help to "explain away" our intuition that
occurrences of (4) are false,)
Salmon's third, and I think most compelling, reason for supposing that our
intuitions concerning the truth conditions of occurrences of (4) and (4n) go astray
concerns the distinction between semantically encoded information and pragmatically
imparted information. Salmon claims that the reason that ordinary speakers are prone
to incorrectly judge that occurrences of (4) are false (and that occurrences of (4n) are
true) is that they confuse these two kinds of information. Salmon explains,
where someone under discussion has conflicting attitudes toward a
single proposition that he or she takes to be two independent
propositions, ... there is an established practice of using belief
attributions to convey not only the proposition agreed to (which is
specified by the belief attribution) but also the way the subject of the
attribution takes the proposition in agreeing to it (which is no part of the
semantic content of the belief attribution). 10
Thus the reason that ordinary speakers incorrectly intuit that occurrences of (4) are
false is that there is an established practice of using (4) to pragmnatically convey more
than it presents, or semantically encodes: An occurrence of (4) presents, or encodes,
the Russellian proposition that there is some mode of apprehension or other such that
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Odile BELs the Russellian proposition P under that mode of apprehension. But,
according to Salmon, there is an established practice of using (4) to pragnmatically
convey information concerning which particular mode of apprehension Odile employs
in holding the BEL relation toward P. In the following passage, Salmon uses the
example of the ancient astronomer to illustrate the distinction between pragmatically
conveyed and semantically encoded information:
The ancient astronomer agrees to the proposition about the planet Venus
that it is it when he takes it in the way it is presented to him through the
logically valid sentence 'Hesperus is Hesperus' but he does not agree to
this same proposition when he takes it in the way it is presented to him
through the logically contingent sentence 'Hesperus is Phosphorus'. The
fact that he agrees to it at all is, strictly speaking, sufficient for both the
sentence 'The astronomer believes that Hesperus is Hesperus' and the
sentence 'The astronomer believes that Hesperus is Phosphorus'.
Though the sentences are materially equivalent, and even modally
equivalent ... there is a sense in which the first is better than the
second, given our normal purpose in attributing belief. Both sentences
state the same fact (that the astronomer agrees to the singular
proposition in question), but the first sentence also manages to convey
how the astronomer agrees to the proposition. Indeed, the second
sentence, though true, is in some sense inappropriate; it is positively
misleading in the way it (correctly) specifies the content of the
astronomer's belief. It specifies the content by means of a 'that'-clause
that presents the proposition in the "wrong way," a way of taking the
proposition with respect to which the astronomer does not assent to it.
This does not affect the truth value of the second sentence, for it is no
part of semantic content of the sentence to specify the way the
astronomer takes the proposition when he agrees to it [emphasis added].
The 'that'-clause is there only to specify the proposition believed. It
happens in the 'Hesperus'-'Phosphorus' type of case that the clause used
to specify the believed proposition also carries with it a particular way in
which the believer takes the proposition, a particular x by means of
which he or she is familiar with the proposition. In these cases, the
guise or appearance by means of which the believer would be familiar
with a proposition at a particular time t were it presented to him or her
through a particular sentence is a function of the believer and the
sentence. Let us call this function F,. For example, F,(x, S) might be
the way x would take the information content of S, at t, were it
presented to him or her through the very sentence S. In the case of the
ancient astronomer, we have
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BEL<the astronomer, that Hesperus is Hesperus,
F,(the astronomer, 'Hesperus is Hesperus')>
. . but not ...
BEL<the astronomer, that Hesperus is Hesperus,
F,(the astronomer, 'Hesperus is Phosphorus')>. I1
Thus Salmon maintains that our untutored intuitions incorrectly dictate that
occurrences of (4) are false (and that occurrences of (4n) are true) because we
systematically confuse pragmatically imparted information with semantically encoded
information: the information pragmatically conveyed by an occurrence is not part of
the proposition presented by the occurrence and therefore, by the Principle of
Propositional Truth, this information is irrelevant to the truth conditions of the
occurrence. The information semantically encoded (or presented) by an occurrence, on
the other hand, is contained in the Russellian proposition presented by an occurrence,
and therefore is relevant to the truth conditions of the occurrence. 12
3.1.2 Criticism of Salmon's Russellian Theory.
I have two objections to Salmon's theory. My first objection, which is
reminiscent of the Fregean strategy's Scylla, concerns the epistemological arguments
from opacity, cognitive significance, and the identity conditions for "modes of
apprehension." My second objection, reminiscent of the Fregean strategy's Charybdis,
concerns the semantic arguments from opacity, and the failure of Salmon's theory to
preserve our untutored intuitions concerning attitude ascriptions.
It was shown in section 2.2 that Fregean theories can succeed in precluding the
epistemological arguments from opacity and accounting for the cognitive significance
of occurrences only if cognitive values are appropriately individuated. It was shown
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above, however, that Salmon's method for precluding the epistemological arguments
from opacity and accounting for the cognitive significance of occurrences is very
similar to Frege's method, and thus it should come as no surprise that Salmon's theory
also faces difficulties similar to those discussed in section 2.2, According to Salmon's
theory, what follows from Odile's assent to (O1) is that
(H) BEL <Odile, P, MAI>
(where 'MA,' designates the "mode of apprehension" by which Odile--in assenting to
(O l)--apprehends the Russellian proposition P.) And what follows from Odile's dissent
from (02) is that
(I) -,(BEL <Odile, P, MA2>)
(where 'MA2 ' designates the "mode of apprehension" by which Odile--in dissenting
from (02)--apprehends the Russellian proposition P). Therefore ifMA, is not identical
to MA9, Salmon's Russellian theory is able to avoid refutation by way of this particular
epistemological argument from opacity. However, if Salmon's theory is to avoid
refutation by the arguments from opacity and account for the cognitive significance of
occurrences, it must be nomologically impossible for there to be an instance of opacity
involving a subject A, and occurrences of E(ot) and XE() such that these occurrences
display the same "mode of apprehension" for A. In other words, if Salmon's theory is
to be successful in precluding the epistemological arguments from opacity and
accounting for the cognitive significance of occurrences, Salmon's theory must satisfy
the following version of the Individuation Constraint:
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Salmon's Version of the Individuation Constraint: If there is a
nomologically possible instance of opacity involving a subject A, and
occurrences of sentences E(ct) and E(P), then these occurrences must
display distinct "modes of apprehension" for A.
Furthermore, since "modes of apprehension" are also to account for the cognitive
significance of occurrences (E.g. Odile assents to (O1) because it displays MA I for her,
and she dissents from (02) because it displays MA2 for her.) Salmon's theory must also
satisfy a version of the Independence Constraint:
Salmon's Version of the Independence Constraint: The posited "modes
of apprehension" must be individuated wholly independently of the
phenomenon of opacity; it must be at least in principle possible to state
the individuation conditions for the posited modes of apprehension
without appealing to the phenomenon of opacity.
My first objection to Salmon's theory is that if "modes of apprehension" are as
Salmon seems to conceive of them, then Salmon's theory does not satisfy the above
individuation constraint, and as a result his theory can be refuted by epistemological
arguments from opacity. Salmon never offers a detailed account of "modes of
apprehension" and he concedes that this is a weak point in his theory. It is relatively
clear, however, that Salmon conceives of "modes of apprehension" as event types--
kinds of "graspings"--which are distinguished by appeal to phenomenological
properties. In the examples that Salmon considers, he employs two methods of
individuating "modes of apprehension": first, "modes of apprehension" are
distinguished on the grounds that they contain distinct "modes of acquaintance," and
"modes of acquaintance" are, in turn, distinguished by appeal to phenomenological
properties. 13 Second, "modes of apprehension" are individuated by appeal to sentence
types via the function F,(_,_), from sentences and subjects to modes of apprehension.
(This function was introduced in the passage from Salmon cited above.) I assume that
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the value of F,(_,_) for some subject A and sentence X is partly determined by the
phenomenological properties of A's encounters with tokens of X. (I.e. I assume that if
the phenomenological properties of A's E encounters are sufficiently different from the
phenomenological properties of his E' encounters, then F,(A,4) is distinct from F,(A,
E').) If my interpretation is correct, if modes of apprehension are event types which are
individuated by phenomenological properties, then Salmon can successfully satisfy the
Independence Constraint. Phenomenological properties can, I assume, be specified and
distinguished without recourse to the phenomenon of opacity. I will now argue,
however, that under this interpretation Salmon's theory cannot satisfy the Individuation
Constraint.
Let us consider a situation which is based upon Salmon's Superman\Clark Kent
example. Suppose that on Monday Lois Lane observes Clark Kent sitting at his desk.
At this point she considers an occurrence of
(25) He is fighting a never-ending battle for truth, justice and the American way.
(Suppose that (25) is painted on a sign which hangs above Clark Kent's desk, and that
there is an arrow extending from the token of 'He' pointing directly at Clark Kent.)
After a moment of careful reflection, Lois determines that she really has no basis for
making such a judgment, and she "inwardly dissents" from the occurrence of (25).
According to Salmon's version of the Epistemological Principle of Dissent, it follows
that
(K) -BEL <Lois, C, MAE>
(Where 'C' designates the proposition presented by the occurrence of (25), and 'MAe'
designates the "mode of apprehension" by which Lois "grasps" C.) The following day,
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Tuesday, Lois is following Superman who is performing heroic deeds as usual except
that, due to complaints from the phone company, he is wearing his office clothes, Not
aware that Lois is tracking him, Superman decides to stop in at the office to make a few
calls. Lois follows him and is amazed to see the superhero at Clark Kent's desk. While
she observes him she again sees the sign, and she again considers an occurrence of
(25). After a moment of careful reflection, Lois determines that what the sign says is
true, and she "inwardly assents" to the occurrence of (25). According to Salmon's
version of the Epistemological Principle of Assent, it follows that
(L) BEL <Lois, C, MA,>.
If MA c is identical to MA, (if they are identical types), then Salmon's theory is refuted
by an epistemological argument from opacity. Is MAC identical to MA,? As I interpret
Salmon, MAc can be distinct from MA, only if there is some phenomenological
property PP such that MAC has PP, but MA, does not have PP. But what could this
phenomenological property be? The event token occurring on Monday seems to be a
phenomenological duplicate of the even token occurring on Tuesday, and thus, if event
types are individuated by the phenomenological properties of event tokens, it would
seem that MA c must be identical to MA,. It could even be stipulated that for some span
of time the two event tokens are molecule for molecule and phenomenological
matches; in both event tokens Clark Kent is sitting in exactly the same position, Lois
Lane's visual impression is exactly similar, etc., so that from the moment Lois Lane
peeks into Clark Kent's office and begins to consider the occurrence of (25) until the
moment she makes her judgment considering what is expressed by this occurrence, the
two event tokens are molecule for molecule and phenomenological matches. How can
MAc and MA, be distinguished in a non arbitrary, non question-begging way?
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I conclude that if "modes of apprehension" are event types individuated by
appeal to phenomenological properties, then Salmon's theory cannot satisfy the
Individuation Constraint, and can therefore be refuted by epistemological arguments
from opacity. 14 Since "modes of apprehension"--like Fregean thoughts--are also
invoked to account for the cognitive significance of occurrences, the above example
also serves to illustrate that Salmon's theory fails to provide an acceptable account of
the cognitive significance of occurrences: According to Salmon's theory, on Monday,
Lois Lane dissents from the occurrence of (25) because it displays MAC for her, yet on
Tuesday she assents to the occurrence (25) because it displays MAs for her. If, as I
have suggested, MA c is identical to MA s, then these explanations are undermined.
My second objection to Salmon's theory concerns his analysis of attitude
ascriptions, and the semantic arguments from opacity. Under Salmon's analysis of
attitude ascriptions, modes of apprehension are not constituents of the propositions
presented by occurrences of ascriptions. As a result Salmon's theory cannot preclude
the semantic arguments from opacity. Salmon's response to these arguments is to deny
that they are sound by denying the Semantic Principle of Dissent. Denying this
principle, however, comes at a price to our untutored intuitions, and I submit that this
price is too high. The intuitions in support of the Semantic Principle of Dissent are
firmly entrenched: if Odile dissents from (02), or if she sincerely utters an occurrence
of 'I do not believe that Clemens is a great author', then our intuitions dictate that
occurrences of
(4) Odile believes that Clemens is a great author.
(in semantically similar contexts) are false, and that occurrences of
(4n) Odile does not believe that Clemens is a great author.
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(in semantically similar contexts) are true. These intuitions are so entrenched that they
must be taken as data--an adequate account of propositional attitudes and propositional
attitude ascriptions must preserve the veracity of these intuitiois, Since Salmon's
analysis of ascriptions does not preserve these entrenched intuitions, it must be
rejected.
In claiming that Salmon's analysis of ascriptions must be rejected, however, I
am not that claiming that Salmon has failed to explain why, with regard to attitude
ascriptions, ordinary speakers intuit the truth conditions they do. Indeed, in this regard
I think Salmon's appeal to what he calls "pragmatically imparted information" is
roughly correct (or is at least the beginning of a correct explanation). Rather my
objection to Salmon's analysis of attitude ascriptions is that Salmon incorrectly assumes
that our intuitions are not correct. That is, because Salmon endorses the Principle of
Propositional Truth,
The Principle of Propositional Truth: the proposition presented by (or
the "information semantically encoded by") an occurrence of a
declarative sentence determines the truth conditions of the occurrence;
i.e. no two occurrences which express the same proposition can have
distinct truth conditions.
Salmon is compelled to maintain that, since the Russellian proposition presented by
occurrences of (4) is true, ordinary speakers must be incorrect in judging occurrences
of (4) to be false. My second objection to Salmon's theory is that Salmon assumes,
without argument and despite evidence to the contrary, that the Principle of
Propositional Truth is true.
Let us describe the phenomenon to be explained as follows: Ordinary speakers
who observe Odile's dissent from an occurrence of (02) (Odile says, "I don't think
that's true.") are without exception disposed to judge relevant occurrences of
130
(4) Odile believes that Clemens is a great author,
to be false. 15 More specifically, if an ordinary speaker observes Odile's sincere dissent
from (02), he will be disposed to say things like "that's false" when presented with a
token of (4). According to Salmon, however, this occurrence of (4) is true, and in
uttering "that's false" these ordinary speakers speak, and judge,falsely. Thus Salmon
readily concedes that his analysis is at odds with the judgments of truth and falsity that
ordinary speakers make concerning occurrences of attitude ascriptions. But if this is
so, why should it be supposed that Salmon and ordinary speakers are using the terms
'true' and 'false' in the same way? There are two ways of interpreting the apparent
conflict between the untutored intuitions of ordinary speakers and Salmon's analysis of
ascriptions: (i) it is a substantial disagreement, and either Salmon, or ordinary
speakers, are wrong; or (ii) it is not a substantial disagreement because Salmon and
ordinary speakers do not mean the same thing by 'true' and 'false'--they employ distinct
criteria in determining the "truth values" of occurrences of attitude ascriptions. Salmon
assumes that there is a substantial disagreement, and thus he maintains that ordinary
speakers are wrong. But why should we follow Salmon in supposing that there is a
substantial disagreement?
If the Principle of Propositional Truth were true, then there would be a
substantial disagreement Letween the intuitions of ordinary speakers and Salmon's
theory, and the passages cited in section 3.1.1 make it clear that Salmon endorses the
Principle of Propositional Truth, Salmon, however, gives no arguments in support of
the principle; he gives no arguments in support of the thesis that the Principle of
Propositional Truth encapsulates the criterion ordinary speakers actually employ in
judging the truth values of occurrences. Moreover, given the resistance ordinary
speakers have to altering their judgments concerning the truth values of attitude
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ascriptions such as (4) and (4n), it seems that there is at least prima facie reason to
reject the thesis that ordinary speakers employ the criterion encapsulated in the
Principle of Propositional Truth: if one endorses the principles of Direct Reference,
Semantic Innocence, and Full Articulation, then one is constrained to maintain that
occurrences of (3) and (4) present the same proposition. 16 Nonetheless, ordinary
speakers have an entrenched intuition to the effect that occurrences of (3) are true while
occurrences of (4) are false. Therefore, given the arguments in support of the
principles of Direct Reference and semantic Innocence, and the plausibility of the
Principle of Full Articulation, it would seem that the Principle of Propositional Truth is
at least open to question.
3.2.1 Richard's Russellian Theory.
Richard's theory of propositional attitudes can be seen as an attempt to improve
upon Salmon's theory. Concerning the epistemological arguments from opacity and the
cognitive significance of occurrences, Richard's theory is very similar to Salmon's
theory: Richard, like Salmon, analyzes propositional attitudes as ternary relations
between subjects, Russellian propositions, and a mediating entity. Furthermore, like
Salmon, Richard attempts to preclude the epistemological arguments from opacity and
account for the cognitive significance of occurrences by appeal to these appropriately
individuated mediating entities. Concerning the semantic arguments from opacity,
however, Richard's theory differs a great deal from Salmon's theory: Richard's theory
is especially designed to preclude the semantic arguments from opacity, and also
preserve the legitimacy of our ordinary attitude ascribing practices.
In explicating Richard's theory, which is rather complex, I will first explicate
the epistemological, or psychological, component of Richard's theory, and illustrate
how it endeavors to preclude the epistemological arguments from opacity and account
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for the cognitive significance of occurrences. I will then explicate the semantic
component of Richard's theory, and illustrate how it endeavors to preclude the semantic
arguments from opacity, while also preserving the legitimacy of our ordinary attitude
ascribing practices.
According.to Richard's theory, propositional attitudes--the mental phenomena--
are mediated relations between subjects and Russellian propositions. Thus, Richard's
analysis of propositional attitudes is very similar to Salmon's analysis: where Salmon
maintains that propositional attitudes are ternary relations between subjects, Russellian
propositions, and "modes of apprehension," Richard maintains that propositional
attitudes are ternary relations between subjects, Russellian propositions, and mental
representations, or more specifically "sentences of mentalese." For example, Odile's
holding the attitude of belief toward the Russellian proposition that Twain is a great
author is analyzed as follows:
(K*) BEL* <Odile, P, a>
where 'P' designates the Russellian proposition that Twain is a great author, 'a'
designates a sentence of mentalese which presents P, and <Odile, P, a> satisfies BEL*
if and only if subject Odile has a token of mentalese sentence a appropriately
instantiated in her brain. 17 (Again, I ignore temporal factors.) Hence the
psychological component presupposes what Richard calls Psychological Sententialism,
the view that "the psychological states that constitute our attitudes themselves involve
some kind of sentential structure." 18 Richard maintains that the psychological states
which constitute our having beliefs (desires, etc.) are relations to mental
representations; i.e. in order to hold the attitude of belief toward the Russellian
proposition p, one must be in the psychological state of having the belief that p, and to
be in this psychological state is to have a mental representation--a sentence of
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mentalese--which presents p somehow realized in one's brain. (Whether or not a
mentalese sentence c expresses a Russellian proposition p is partly contingent upon
certain external, contextual, factors; as Putnam and Burge have argued, external facts
concerning one's environment and linguistic community are also relevant in
determining the content of one's attitudes. From hereafter these external factors will be
taken for granted.) Following Richard, we can simplify this assumption by supposing,
for the time being, that tokens of mental representations are tokens of natural language
sentences written on various "blackboards" in one's head. (This working assumption
will later be rescinded. Also, Richard's more refined view is that such things as mental
"images" and "current perceptual experiences" also serve as tokens of mental
representations. 19 This point will be important later.) Therefore, it will be assumed
(for the time being) that to hold the attitude of belief toward the Russellian proposition
p is to have written on one's belief blackboard a (neurological) token of a natural
language sentence I which expresses p.
How does the psychological component of Richard's theory endeavor to
preclude the epistemological arguments from opacity? Richard, unfortunately, does not
address the epistemological issues directly, but it is relatively clear that his response
would be very similar to Salmon's response. Let us consider the instance of opacity
involving the ancient Babylonian astronomer and 'Hesperus' and 'Phosphorus'. The
ancient astronomer assents to an occurrence of
(26) P is P.
but dissents from an occurrence of
(27) H is P.
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where 'H' and 'P' are the terms of Babylonian which translate as 'Hesperus' and
'Phosphorus', respectively. (I assume, for convenience, that the Babylonians used the
English 'is'.) As I interpret Richard, he endorses the following versions of the
epistemological principles of assent and dissent:
Richard's Version of the Epistemological Principle of Assent: If a
sincere reflective understanding speaker assents to an occurrence of E at
t, then he has a token of I written on his belief blackboard, at t.
Richard's Version of the Epistemological Principle of Dissent: If a
sincere reflective understanding speaker dissents from an occurrence of
E at t, then he does not have a token of E written on his belief
blackboard, at t. 20
(Note that these principles presuppose that tokens of mentalese just are instances of
natural language term types.) It thus follows from the ancient astronomer's assent to
the occurrence of (26) and the above version of the Epistemological Principle of Assent
that
(K*) BEL* <the ancient astronomer, C, a>
where 'C' designates the Russellian proposition that Venus is Venus, and 'o' designates
(26), a neurological token of which is written on the ancient astronomer's belief
blackboard. And it thus follows from Odile's dissent from (27) and the above vetsion
of the Epistemological Principle of Dissent that
(L*) -(BEL* <the ancient astronomer, C, a'>)
where 'a" designates (27), a neurological token of which is not written on the ancient
astronomer's belief blackboard. Since (26) is distinct from (27), (K*) and (L*) are not
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contradictories, and thus Richard's theory is able to preclude this epistemological
argument from opacity.
How does the epistemological component of Richard's theory account for the
cognitive significance of occurrences? This is a difficult question to answer, as
Richard never discusses the relationship between a subject's verbal behavior and what
sentences of mentalese he has on his belief blackboard. Nonetheless, it is relatively
clear that it is the mentalese correlate of an occurrence of a sentence which determines
the cognitive significance of the occurrence. In other words, the astronomer assents to
the occurrence of (26) because he has a neurological token of (26) written on his belief
blackboard, and he dissents from the occurrence of (27) because he does not have a
neurological token of (27) written on his belief blackboard. (A detailed account of the
cognitive significance of these occurrences of (26) and (27) for the astronomer would, I
assume, involve appeal to sentences such as I (ALMOST) ALWAYS TELL THE
TRUTH being written on the astronomer's "desire blackboard," etc.) 2 1
The semantic component of Richard's theory is rather complex, and
consequently before explicating this component of the theory in detail, I will first give
a more general description of it. Richard summarizes the semantic component of his
theory as follows:
Suppose that Maggie thinks that Odile is tired. For Maggie to think that,
it is, of course, not necessary that she think to herself, 'Odile is tired'.
She could think Germanically to herself, 'Odile ist mude'. Or she might
think to herself, 'You are tired', looking at Odile, But for Maggie to
think the thought in question, she does need to think of Odile and to
think of the property of being tired--and, of course, to think that the one
has the other. For Maggie to think that Odile is tired she must have
some representation of Odile and of being tired "put together" in an
appropriate way. In sotne sense of 'sentence', she must employ a mental
sentence saying that Odile is tired.
Suppose I say, 'Maggie thinks that Odile is tired', attempting to
tell you what Maggie thinks. My sentence has a part--'that Odile is
tired'--that itself has parts representing Odile and being tired. On each
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side of the fence--on the side of the speaker and on the side of the
thinker--we find the same sort of thing: a sentence, or sentence-like
representation, whose various parts pick out objects and properties:
THE SPEAKER THE THINKER
'Odile is tired' DU BIST MUDE
Odile
eing tired,
What makes my report true is that my sentence faithfully represents a
sentence of Maggie's; what makes it false is not faithfully representing
such, (emphasis added).22
It is by invoking the represents relation and thereby loosening the constraints on
the truth conditions of attitude ascriptions, that Richard hopes to preserve the
legitimacy of our ordinary attitude ascribing practices. Theories utilizing the Fregean
strategy maintain that the ascription 'Maggie thinks that Odile is tired' is true only if the
that-clause of this ascription presents, or specifies, something like a Fregean thought,
one constituent of which is a cognitive value which Maggie somehow employs in
thinking of Odile. The problem with the Fregean theorists' view of ascriptions,
according to Richard, is that "they assume that [true] attitude ascription involves a
match of non referential cognitive content [i.e. cognitive value] between what the t-
clause names and some object of attitude of the person under discussion." 23 On
Richard's view there need not be such a match between the semantic value of the that-
clause, and the content believed (doubted etc.); rather according to Richard's theory it is
sufficient for the truth of an occurrence of 'Maggie thinks that Odile is tired' that the
that-clause of the ascription in some way represent Maggie's mental sentence, DU
BIST MUDE.
Furthermore, on Richard's view what mental sentence a that-clause can
represent is in part determined by the context in which the ascription occurs. Richard
explains:
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What counts as faithful representation varies from context to context
with our interests and expectations. Context places certain restrictions
on what can represent what. Sometimes these are very specific -- for
example, 'Clark Kent' is to represent only [CLARK KENT]. Sometimes
they are less specific -- a context may say that 'Greg' in 'Maggie wished
that Greg would leave her alone' is to represent terms that connect with
Maggie's current perceptual experience of Greg. Sometimes context is
silent on these matters, and expressions are free to represent any
[mental] expressions with which they corefer. The upshot is that
'Maggie thinks that Odile is tired' is true in a particular context provided
that its [that-clause] represents, according to the context, one of the
sentences which constitutes Maggie's thoughts. 24
Thus not only is it not necessary that the that-clause of an ascription somehow express
or specify the non referential content grasped by the subject of the ascription, but
whether a that-clause represents a subject's mental sentence is contingent upon certain
features of the context of utterance.
I now turn to explicating the semantic component of Richard's theory in more
detail. Richard conceives of the semantic value of a that-clause as being composed of
both the terms (types) contained in the that-clause, and the Russellian proposition
expressed by the occurrence of the that-clause. Richard calls these compound entities
"RAMs" ("Russellian Annotated Matrices"). A RAM is a structure of ordered pairs,
one member of each pair being an expression (type), and the other member being the
Russellian semantic value of that expression. (Richard calls such ordered pairs
"annotations".) Richard maintains that both occurrences of that-clauses and the
sentences of mentalese written on the appropriate blackboards in one's head present (or
determine) RAMs. For example, suppose that Odile has the sentence TWAIN IS A
GREAT AUTHOR written on her belief blackboard. This sentence determines the
following RAM:
138
Odile's RAM:
<<IS A GREAT AUTHOR, being a great author> <TWAIN, Twain>>.
Now suppose that Oscar utters
(3) Odile believes that Twain is a great author.
According to Richard's theory the that-clause of Oscar's utterance determines
Oscar's RAM:
<<'is a great author', being a great author> <'Twain', Twain>>
For Oscar's utterance of (3) to be true, Oscar's RAM must represent Odile's RAM; or
more precisely, for Oscar's utterance of (3) to be true, Oscar's RAM must represent a
RAM in Odile's "RS" (representational system), where Odile's RS contains all the
RAMs which are determined by all the sentences of mentalese written on Odile's belief
blackboard.
I have stressed that the focal point of Richard's theory is the represents relation,
and up to this point I have said almost nothing about this relation. What is it for one
RAM to represent another RAM? (Note that there has been a subtle shift in what
represents what; strictly speaking that-clauses do not represent mental sentences; rather,
RAMs determined by that-clauses represent RAMs determined by mental sentences.)
The only general constraint on the represents relation is that if RAM x is to represent
RAM y, the sentences determining x and ymust present the same Russellian
proposition. (In other words, x can represent y only if, stripped of the linguistic, or
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representational, elements of their annotations, x and y are identical Russellian
propositions.) Richard gives an account of the represents relation, and this general
constraint on the relation, in terms of correlation functions. A correlation function is a
function that maps annotations to annotations while preserving reference and
designation. For example, a correlation function might map <'Twain', Twain> to
<'Sam', Twain>, and <'is a great author', being a great author>, to <'is a terrific writer',
being a great writer>, though a correlation function could not map <'Twain', Twain> to
<'Dostoyevsky', Dostoyevsky>, nor could a correlation function map <'is a great
author, being a great author> to <'is Russian', being Russian>, Therefore, for every
correlation function f, if the image of RAM x under f is RAM y, then RAM x and RAM
y, stripped of their linguistic elements, would be identical Russellian propositions. A
necessary condition for RAM x to represent RAM y can now be stated in terms of
correlation functions: RAM x represents RAM y only if there is a correlation function
f such that f(x)=y. In this way the general constraint on the represents relation is
enforced.
Though this is the only general constraint placed upon the represents relation,
some occurrences of ascriptions involve other constraints as well, What additional
constraints may 1, in operation is determined by the context in which the ascription
occurs. This is because, on Richard's view, propositional attitude verbs are indexicals.
Richard explains:
In the case of 'that' and 'here', the intentions of the speaker help us
determine what the uses of the terms refer to. In the case that interests
us, the intentions of the speaker help determine what a use of 'Twain' in
'Odile believes that Twain is dead' can represent .... The analogy with
'that' and 'here' is simply this: Which possible mediators of Odile's
belief are relevant to the truth of a use of [(3)] is in part a function of
various contextually varying factors, including the intentions of the user,
his interests, and his beliefs about his audience's interests. 25
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Thus according to Richard the semantic value of 'believes' varies from context
to context similar to the way in which the semantic values of 'here' and 'that' vary from
context to context. Just as 'that' refers to different objects in different contexts, so
'believes' designates different relations in different contexts,2 6 This is not to say,
however, that 'believes' does not have a constant meaning; just as 'here' and 'that' have
characters which, given a context of utterance, determine a referent, so 'believes' has a
character which, given a context, determines a relation. In many contexts we intuit that
the that-clause of an ascription need only pick out the appropriate Russellian
proposition in order for the ascription to be true. In other contexts, however, meeting
this general constraint is not sufficient for the truth of an ascription; in some contexts it
is not sufficient for RAM x to represent RAM y that x and y, stripped of their linguistic
elements, are the same Russellian proposition. In these more sensitive contexts
restrictions are placed upon correlation functions. In other words, 'believes' is an
indexical which designates different relations in different contexts, and what changes
about the relation designated by 'believes' from context to context is the restrictions
which are placed on correlation finctions. Every context c supplies, or induces, a set
(perhaps the empty set) of restrictions on correlation functions. A belief ascription
occurring in c whose that-clause expresses RAM x is true iff there is a correlation
function f which obeys the restrictions induced by c and the image of RAM x under f is
a RAM in the subject's RS.
What is a restriction, and what is it for a correlation function to obey a
restriction? A restriction has three elements: a subject, an annotation, and a set of
annotations. For example the following depicts a restriction:
Odile; <'Twain', Twain>; (<TWAIN, Twain>, <CLEMENS, Twain>}
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What this says is that in determining the truth value of an ascription concerning Odile,
one is restricted to correlation functions which map <'Twain', Twain> to either
<TWAIN, Twain> or <CLEMENS, Twain>. For a correlation function f to obey this
restriction is for f to map <'Twain', Twain> to a member of (<TWAIN, Twain>,
<CLEMENS, Twain>). For example, suppose that the above restriction is induced by
the context in which Oscar utters
(3) Odile believes that Twain is a great author.
Call the RAM determined by the that-clause of (3) 'Oscar's RAM'. Oscar's utterance of
(3) is true if and only if there is a correlation function f which obeys the above
restriction, (i.e. which maps <'Twain', Twain> to either <TWAIN, Twain> or
<CLEMENS, Twain>) and f of Oscar's RAM is a RAM in Odile's RS. More generally,
Richard claims that an ascription of the form rN believes that EP is true in a context of
utterance c if and only if there is a correlation function f which maps the RAM
determined by I to a RAM in the RS of the referent of N, and f obeys all of the
restrictions which are induced by c.
How does the semantic component of Richard's theory endeavor to preclude the
semantic arguments from opacity? Let us again consider an instance of opacity
involving the ancient astronomer and 'Hesperus' and 'Phosphorus'. Suppose that the
ancient Babylonian astronomer assents to an occurrence of
(26) P is P.
but dissents from an occurrence of
(27) H is P.
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where 'H' and 'P' are the terms of Babylonian which translate as 'Hesperus' and
'Phosphorus', respectively. If, as we have been assuming, mental terms (tokens) just
are terms (types) of natural languages, it follows that the ancient astronomer has a
token of (26) written on his belief blackboard, but does not have a token of (27) written
on his belief blackboard. Furthermore, according to Richard's theory there being a
token of a sentence on a subject's belief blackboard is both necessary and sufficient for
that subject's having the RAM determined by that sentence in his RS. Thus the ancient
astronomer has
P=P RAM: <<'is', identity>, <<'P', Venus>, <'P', Venus>>>
in his RS but does not have
H=P RAM: <<'is', identity>, <<'H', Venus>, <'P', Venus>>>.
in his RS. Since RAMs are individuated as finely as the expression types occurring in
them, the P=P RAM is not identical to the H=P RAM.
Suppose that in a particular context c, our naive intuitions dictate that an
occurrence of
(28) The ancient astronomer believes that Phosphorus is Phosphorus,
is true, while our intuitions dictate that, in c, an occurrence of
(29) The ancient astronomer believes that Phosphorus is Hesperus,
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is false. Richard would have it that, in such a sensitive context, the following
restriction is induced:
The astronomer; <'Phosphorus', Venus>; (<'P', Venus>)
<'Hesperus', Venus>; (<'H', Venus>)
If context c induces the above restriction, then, since there is a correlation function f
which obeys this restriction and also maps the RAM expressed by the that-clause of
(28) to a RAM in the astronomer's RS (viz. the P=P RAM), it follows that (28) is true
in context c. And since there is no correlation function which obeys the above
restriction and maps the RAM presented by the that-clause of (29) to a RAM in the
astronomer's RS, (29) is false in context c. Thus Richard's analysis avoids refutation by
way of this semantic argument from opacity.
Because Richard construes propositional attitude verbs as indexicals so that in
different contexts different restrictions are placed on what the RAM determined by
that-clause can represent, Richard's analysis is, unlike Salmon's analysis, seemingly
able to preclude the semantic arguments from opacity, without denying the veracity of
our untutored intuitions concerning attitude ascriptions. Moreover, Richard's analysis
differs from Frege's analysis in that Richard's analysis requires of a true ascription only
that its that-clause determine a RAM which represents a RAM in the subject's RS;
Richard does not require anything like a match in cognitive value. Consequently
Richard's analysis seems better suited to preserve the legitimacy of our ordinary
attitude ascribing practices,
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3.2.2 Criticism of Richard's Russellian Theory.
In this section I will present criticisms of both the epistemological and the
semantic components of Richard's theory, and my criticisms will again be reminiscent
of the Fregean strategy's Scylla and Charybdis. First, I will argue that the
epistemological component of Richard's theory does not successfully preclude the
epistemological arguments from opacity and, consequently, it also fails to account for
the cognitive significance of occurrences. Second, I will argue that--despite the fact
that it is specifically designed to do so--the semantic component of Richard's theory
fails to preserve the legitimacy of our ordinary attitude ascribing practices,
Richard's strategy for precluding the epistemological arguments from opacity is
structurally very similar to Salmon's strategy; both Salmon and Richard analyze
propositional attitudes as ternary relations between subjects, Russellian propositions,
and a finely individuated, publicly accessible, mediator. Furthermore, they both
attempt to preclude the epistemological arguments from opacity and account for the
cognitive significance of occurrences by appeal to these mediators; the only difference
between the theories is that Salmon identifies mediators with "modes of apprehension"
while Richard identifies them with sentences of mentalese. Hence, just as Salmon is
committed to versions of the individuation and independence constraints, so Richard is
committed to versions of these constraints:
Richard's Version of the Individuation Constraint: If there is a
nomologically possible instance of opacity involving a subject A, and
occurrences of sentences XE(o) and E(P), then the mentalese correlates of
these occurrences for A must be distinguished.
Richard's Version of the Independence Constraint: The posited
sentences of mentalese must be individuated wholly independently of
the phenomenon of opacity; it must be at least in principle possible to
state the individuation conditions for the posited sentences of mentalese
without appealing to the phenomenon of opacity.
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In section 3.1.2 1 argued that Salmon's theory cannot satisfy the relevant version of the
Individuation Constraint; Salmon does not individuate "modes of apprehension" finely
enough. My objection to Richard's theory is not that it fails to satisfy the relevant
version of the Individuation Constraint, but rather that it fails to satisfy the relevant
version of the Independence Constraint: in providing individuation conditions for the
mediating entities posited by his theory, Richard, in the end, appeals to the
phenomenon of opacity itself,
According to the epistemological component of Richard's theory, what follows
from the ancient astronomer's assent to an occurrence of
(26) P is P.
is that
(K*) BEL* <the ancient astronomer, C, '>
and what follows from the astronomer's dissent from
(27) H is P.
is that
(L*) -(BEL* <the ancient astronomer, C, o'>).
So long as a is distinct from a', (K*) and (L*) are not contradictories and Richard's
theory successfully precludes the corresponding argument from opacity. We have been
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assuming that tokens of mentalese expressions are instances of natural language types,
and under this assumption Richard's theory is very similar to a Fregean theory which
individuates cognitive values by appeal to natural language expression types. It was
shown in section 2.2, however, that Kripke's "Paderewski" cases can be used to refute
such Fregean theories, and thus, given the similarity between Richard's theory and such
Fregean theories, it is not surprising that "Paderewski" cases also pose problems for
Richard's theory.
Suppose' that Peter assents to an occurrence of
(17) Paderewski is a talented musician.
but dissents from a distinct occurrence of this same sentence. It follows from Peter's
assent to the occurrence of (17) and
Richard's Version of the Epistemological Principle of Assent: If a
sincere reflective understanding speaker assents to an occurrence of E
at t, then he has a token of E written on his belief blackboard, at t.
that
(M*) BEL* <Peter, Q, o>.
where 'Q' designates the Russellian proposition that Paderewski is a talented musician.
And it follows from Peter's dissent from the other occurrence of (17) and
Richard's Version of the Epistemological Principle of Dissent: If a
sincere reflective understanding speaker dissents from an occurrence of
S at t, then he does not have a token of S written on his belief
blackboard, at t.
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that
(N*) --,(BEL* <Peter, Q, a'>,
The problem is of course that if we continue to assume that mental tokens are instances
of natural language types, it follows that both a and o' are identical to (17), and thus
(M*) and (N*) are contradictories. 27
The essence of the problem is that under the working assumption that mental
tokens are instances of natural language types, Richard's theory does not individuate the
mediating entities finely enough: if Richard's theory can individuate triples of agents,
Russellian propositions, and sentences of mentalese only as finely as natural language
expression types, Richard's theory has no way of individuating Peter's "Paderewski the
musician" beliefs, from his "Paderewski the statesman" beliefs. As a result, Kripke's
"Paderewski" case serves as a kind of instance of opacity with regard to Richard's
theory; under the assumption that the mediating entities are natural language types,
Richard's theory does not satisfy the individuation constraint. If Richard is to avoid
these difficulties he must abandon the assumption that token mental sentences are
tokens of natural language types, and provide an independent principle of individuation
for the mediating entities which individuates them more finely than natural language
types.
Richard attempts to do this by amending his theory in the following way: first
an equivalence relation, T and V' are of the same representational type for x is defined
over natural language and mental expression tokens. The equivalence classes formed
under this relation are now identified with, or mapped one-to-one with,
representational types, and it is these representational types which now serve as the
mediating entities. 28 But how are the equivalence classes of natural language and
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mentalese tokens determined? What is it for two tokens to be of the same
representational type for a subject x?
Richard states that there are two sorts of conditions which are necessary and
jointly sufficient for two tokens to determine (or be of) the same representational type:
"outside" conditions, and "inside" conditions. In the case of proper name tokens t and
"t', the outside condition for I and T' being of the same representational type is that I
and I' must be part of the same "causal chain of transmission." 29 Thus it is not enough
that tokens T and V' be phonetically, orthographically, or even "electro-chemically"
similar in order for them to be of the same representational type; e.g. a token of
'Aristotle' used to refer to the shipping magnate is not of the same representational type
as a token of 'Aristotle' used to refer to the Greek philosopher. It is clear, however, that
the outside condition alone will not solve Richard's problem concerning Peter and
Paderewski, as the two tokens of 'Paderewski' appearing in the relevant occurrences of
(17) may very well be members of the same "causal chain of transmission." So if
Richard is to avoid the recently rehearsed argument from opacity against his view, he
must appeal to the inside condition.
The inside condition is what Richard calls "the recognition condition." Roughly
speaking, two tokens T and V' satisfy the recognition condition for x if and only if x
recognizes the referent of t as being the referent of 'V. Richard explains:
Usually when we hear someone talking about someone, we know (or
think we know) who is being talked about. We hear someone say,
'Reagan was going to bomb Nicaragua', and we simply assume that it is
the former president who is being discussed, not his wife, son, or
daughter, much less an animal rights philosopher, or erstwhile White
House chief of staff,
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When this is true--when, intuitively speaking, we recognize the
subject of discussion--it seems appropriate to think that we are in some
sense "filing" or "grouping" the token 'Reagan' we are "processing"
along with certain other tokens on our blackboard ("presidential tokens")
and segregating it from certain others. In such a case, the new token of
'Reagan' bears the interior relation for sameness of representational type
to the presidential tokens. 30
Since Peter does not recognize one token of 'Paderewski' (the token in the
sentence to which he assents) as referring to the same individual as is referred to by the
other token (the token in the sentence from which he dissents), he does not "group," or
"file" the tokens together. Therefore, the "interior" condition for the individuation of
representational types dictates that corresponding to the one lexical type 'Paderewski',
Peter has two representational types. Assuming that the criteria for two tokens being
of the same representational type can be extended to cover terms other than names,
Richard can now preclude the epistemological argument based upon Kripke's
'Paderewski' case by appeal to representational types: Richard's versions of the
epistemological principles of assent and dissent can be amended as follows:
Richard's Amended Epistemological Principle of Assent: If a sincere,
reflective, understanding speaker assents to an occurrence of X at t, then
he has a token of the same representational type as this token of E
written on his belief blackboard, at t.
Richard's Amended Epistemological Principle of Dissent: If a sincere,
reflective, understanding speaker dissents from an occurrence of E at t,
then he does not have a token of the same representational type as this
token of S written on his belief blackboard, at t.
According to these amended principles, what follows from Peter's assent to the
occurrence of (17) is that
(M*') BEL* <Peter, Q, RT?
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where 'RT,. designates the representation type of the occurrence of (17) to which Peter
assents. And what follows from Peter's dissent from the distinct occurrence of (17) is
that
(N*') -(BEL* <Peter, Q, RTC.>
(where 'RT,' designates the representational type of the occurrence from which Peter
dissents). Is RT, identical to RT.? I assume that two token sentences E and E' are of
the same representational type if and only if they are isomorphically composed out of
constituent terms which are of the same representational type. Let us call the token of
(17) to which Peter assents to, and the token from which he dissents t,.. Since the token
of 'Paderewski' appearing in t. and the token of 'Paderewski' appearing in ty, are of
distinct representational types, and the representational type of a sentence token is
determined by the representational types of the tokens appearing in the sentence, it
follows that t. and t. , are of distinct representational types. Therefore, since t. and t.,
are of distinct representational types, and RTC and RT , . are the representational types of
tO and t,, respectively, it follows that RTC and RT , are not identical.31
The problem with Richard's response to the 'Paderewski' instance of opacity is
that it violates the Independence Constraint. Recall that representational types are
equivalence classes defined under the same representational type for x relation, and that
there are two necessary and jointly sufficient conditions for a name token T being of the
same representational type as a name token x', for X: first, I and t' must be members
of the same historical chain of transmission, and second, t and V' must be recognized by
X as referring to the same object. It is the second condition which violates the
Independence Constraint. The problem is that we have no independent means of
determining whether a subject recognizes two tokens as referring the same thing; the
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phenomenon of recognition failure is too closely associated with the phenomenon of
opacity. (The relation between the two phenomena is further explored in Appendix A.)
Consider again the instance of opacity involving Odile and (OI) and (02). It is
surely correct that in some intuitive sense Odile does not recognize the relevant token
of 'Twain' as referring to the same thing as the relevant token of 'Clemens'. But how do
we know this? Though Richard calls the recognition condition an "interior" condition,
there is nothing "interior" about its application; we have no method whereby we look
inside Odile's brain to determine whether or not she "files" the relevant mental tokens
together. (Note that if we did possess such a method, then the "recognition condition"
would be stated in neuro-physiological terms, and would not involve the concept of
recognition at all.) What, then, justifies the intuitive claim that Odile does not
recognize 'Twain' as it appears in (01) as referring to the same thing as 'Clemens' as it
appears in (02)? I submit that what justifies this claim is simply Odile's behavior with
regard to sentences containing the terms 'Twain' and 'Clemens': we intuit that Odile
does not recognize the token of 'Twain' appearing in (01) as referring to the same thing
as the token of 'Clemens' appearing in (02) because Odile assents to (01) yet dissents
from (02), and because she tends to say things like, "I like Twain, but I'm not sure
about Clemens," etc. Thus the problem with Richard's recognition condition is that we
have no means of determining whether or not a subject recognizes two tokens as
referring to the same thing other than by appeal to (what can be construed as) instances
of the phenomenon of opacity. 32 Consequently, in invoking the recognition condition
Richard is implicitly appealing to the phenomenon of opacity itself, thereby violating
the Independence Constraint. 33
I now turn to criticizing the semantic component of Richard's theory. Richard
attempts to preserve the legitimacy of our ordinary attitude ascribing practices by
analyzing propositional attitude verbs as complex indexicals. Richard claims, for
example, that the semantic value of an occurrence of 'believes' is a relation which holds
152
between a subject and RAM x if and only if there is a correlation function f which
obeys all the restrictions induced by the context of utterance and there is a RAM in tlhe
subject's RS which is the image of RAM x under f; since different contexts of utterance
will induce different restrictions, the relation designated by 'believes' varies from
context to context. It should be noted that the claim that propositional attitude verbs
are indexical in this way is an empirical claim concerning how ordinary speakers use
and understand occurrences of attitude verbs; it is as an empirical claim concerning
what is required of a speaker if he is to know the meaning of attitude verbs.
Consequently, if Richard's analysis of attitude verbs is correct, it should accord with
ordinary speaker's intuitions concerning the meanings of sentences containing attitude
verbs. As I will now argue, however, Richard's analysis does not accord with many
such intuitions, and this constitutes compelling evidence against Richard's analysis.
If Richard's analysis of propositional attitude verbs were correct, then there
could be no "eternal sentences" containing propositional attitude verbs, 34 (An eternal
sentence is a sentence whose truth conditions do not vary from context to context.) For
example, if Richard's view were correct, then one could not determine what
propositions are presented by sentences such as
(30) What one believes is one's own business,
and
(31) Hope is all we have.
unless certain contextual features were specified. On Richard's view, (30) and (31) are
similar to
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(32) 1 smoke,
and
(33) He's nice.
But this prediction does not accord with the intuitions of ordinary speakers; (30) and
(31) are not "incomplete" in anything like the way in which (32) and (33) are
incomplete, In order to determine what proposition is presented by an occurrence of
(32) one must know who uttered (32) and in order to determine what proposition is
presented by an occurrence of (33) one must know which male is most salient in the
context (or something along these lines). But occurrences of (30) and (31), unlike (32)
and (33), seem to be true or false independently of any such contextual features. (Of
course (30) and (31) are probably context dependent because of the tense of the verbs,
or the context dependency of pronouns, but these considerations are clearly
irrelevant,35)
Another problem concerns the noun forms of propositional attitude verbs.
What, on Richard's theory, is the relationship between 'believes' and 'belief? Though
Richard never discusses the noun forms of attitude verbs, it is clear that they must be
interpreted as nonindexical expressions which designate the appropriate
epistemological attitudes, as opposed to one of the many possible designatums; i,e. an
occurrence of 'belief must designate the epistemological attitude of belief, and not one
of the many possible semantic values of 'believes'. (Richard himself certainly uses
'belief in this way.36 ) But this bifurcation between the semantic values of the noun
and verb forms of propositional attitude expressions does not accord with how ordinary
speakers use these expressions. For example, it seems that for any context c, if an
occurrence of
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(3') Belief is the attitude Odile holds toward the
proposition, or thought, that Twain is a great author,
is true in c, then an occurrence of
(3) Odile believes that Twain is a great author.
is also true in c. But under Richard's analysis (3') no more entails (3) than 'Mary loves
John' entails 'Mary loves him'. There are contexts in which 'him' and 'John' are not
coreferential, and in these contexts 'Mary loves John' and 'Mary loves him' may differ
in truth value. Similarly, under Richard's analysis there are contexts in which 'belief
and 'believes' do not designate the same relation, and thus there are contexts in which
(3') is true, yet (3) is not true. Suppose Odile holds the attitude of belief toward the
Russellian proposition that Twain is a great author because she has a token of the
sentence of mentalese CLEMENS IS A GREAT AUTHOR written on her belief
blackboard, though she does not have a token of the sentence of mentalese TWAIN IS
A GREAT AUTHOR written on her belief blackboard. Further suppose that the
context relative to which (3') and (3) are uttered induces a restriction according to
which <'Twain', Twain> must be mapped to <TWAIN, Twain>. If the context
determined such a restriction, there would be no acceptable correlation function f such
that the image of the RAM expressed by the that-clause of (3) under f was a RAM in
Oscar's RS. Consequently Richard's theory predicts that in some contexts (3') would be
true, while (3) would be false. This prediction, however, does not accord with how
ordinary speakers use expressions of propositional attitudes.
Another problem for Richard's analysis concerns occurrences of iterated attitude
ascriptions. The problem arises because of the following property of indexicals: the
semantic value of an occurrence of an indexical (or a demonstrative) is always
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determined relative to the context in which it appears. For example, if Oscar utters an
occurrence of
(34) Odile believes that today is Monday,
in context c, then the semantic value of 'today' is determined relative to c; 'today' as it
appears in Oscar's utterance of (34) refers to the day on which the utterance takes place.
Therefore, according to Richard's analysis, two occurrences of 'believes' ('doubts' etc.)
will designate the same relation only if the occurrences happen to take place in contexts
which are semantically similar with regard to 'believes' ('doubts' etc.). This result,
however, does not accord with our untutored intuitions concerning the truth conditions
of occurrences of iterated attitude ascriptions.
For example, suppose that Oscar sincerely utters
(3) Odile believes that Twain is a great author.
in a context c. Since 'believes' is an indexical, the semantic value of 'believes' as it
appears in Oscar's utterance is determined relative to c, Let us call the semantic value
determined by Oscar's utterance of 'believes' in c, 'c-bel'. Now suppose that, on the
basis of Oscar's utterance of (3), Otho utters an occurrence of
(35) Oscar believes that Odile believes that Twain is a great author
in a distinct context c'. Since the semantic value of an occurrence of 'believes' is
determined relative to its context, both appearances of 'believes' in Otho's utterance of
(34) designate the same semantic value. Let us call this semantic value, 'c'-bel'. The
difficulty arises because c-bel need not be coextensive with c'-bel; there may be many
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restrictions in operation in c which are not in operation in c', or vice versa, Let us
suppose that this is the case, and thus c-bel is not identical to, or coextensive with, c'-
bel. According to Richard's analysis of attitude ascriptions, Otho's utterance of (35) is
true just in case the c'-bel relation holds between Oscar, and the following RAM:
RAM (35):
<<'believes', c'-bel><<'Odile', Odile>, <'Twain is a great author', P>>>
where 'P' designates the Russellian proposition that Twain is a great author. More
specifically, Otho's utterance of (35) is true just in case there is correlation function f
such that f obeys all the restrictions induced by c' and f(RAM (35)) is a RAM in Oscar's
RS. The problem is that, even if c' induces no restrictions at all, there is no such
correlation function: since c-bel is distinct from c'-bel, Oscar (we may suppose) does
not have any RAMs in his RS which contain the c'-bel relation as a Russellian
constituent, The problem is thus that when Oscar utters (3) in c he presents a
Russellian proposition p. But when Otho utters (35) on the basis of Oscar's utterance,
the that-clause of Otho's utterance does not present p. The problem arises because,
according to Richard's analysis, 'believes' designates distinct relations in c an c'.37
The above considerations serve as compelling evidence against Richard's
analysis of propositional attitude verbs. Richard is correct in pointing out that
propositional attitude ascriptions which attribute a particular belief (desire, etc.) to a
particular subject seem to exhibit a kind of context sensitivity; our untutored intuitions
dictate that in some contexts all that is required for an ascription to be true is that its
that-clause present an appropriate Russellian proposition, while in other contexts,
sensitive contexts, our untutored intuitions dictate that the that-clause of an ascription
must do more than this. Richard attempts to account for this context dependency of
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attitude ascriptions by locating the context dependency within the semantics of
propositional attitude verbs. The difficulties discussed above arise because
propositional attitude expressions--nouns and verbs--are used to do more than to
ascribe particular beliefs (desires etc.) to particular subjects, and these other uses of
attitude expressions do not seem to involve the kind of context sensitivity posited by
Richard's analysis, 38 This suggests that it is a mistake to locate the context sensitivity
of attitude ascriptions within the semantics of attitude verbs, (Of course Richard could
claim that propositional attitude expressions are ambiguous, e.g., that sometimes
propositional attitude verbs are indexicals, and sometimes not, but this would be an ad
hoc and counterintuitive move,)
I conclude this section with a more general objection to Richard's analysis of
attitude ascriptions: Richard's analysis, like the Fregean analysis, does not preserve the
legitimacy of our ordinary attitude ascribing practices. Recall that the Fregean analysis
encounters this difficulty because it requires ordinary speakers to use the that-clause of
their utterances to designate (or mnatch) finely individuated cognitive values. This is
problematic because in many cases ordinary speakers simply lack the ability to refer,
even "by description," to such esoteric entities. Richard's analysis attempts to avoid
this difficulty by denying that it is necessary for the truth of an ascription that the that-
clause of the ascription match the content of the subject's propositional attitude.
Rather, according to Richard's analysis, an ascription is true just in case the that-clause
represents an appropriate mental representation, and whether or not the that-clause
represents an appropriate mental representation is contingent upon whether or not the
speaker designates an appropriate believes-relation. In making this move, however,
Richard has merely relocated the problem. Richard's analysis suffers from essentially
the same difficulties which plague the Fregean analysis of attitude ascriptions, except
that in Richard's case the problems do not concern the semantic values of that-clauses,
but rather arise with regard the semantic values of occurrences of attitude verbs.
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According to Richard's analysis, propositional attitude verbs are indexicals
whose "constant meanings" are characters, functions from contexts to relations.
Simplifying somewhat, the character of 'believes' is a function from contexts c, to sets s
of ordered pairs cx,r> of subjects x, and RAMs r. More precisely, Richard defines the
character of 'believes' (designated by 'CHAR( )') as follows:
CHAR(c)=s where <x, r> is a member of s iff there is a correlation
function f, and a RAM q such that q is a RAM in x's RS and the image
of r under f is q, where f obey R(c), 39
What is R( )? Richard states that R( ) is a "function which takes a context to the set of
restrictions it provides." 40 Thus it is R( ) which accounts for the context sensitivity of
'believes'; 'believes' will express distinct relations in contexts c and c' only if R(c) is
distinct from R(c'). Thus, if an ordinary speaker, or listener, is to know what is said by
an attitude ascription uttered in a context c, he must know the value of R(c); i.e. he
must know what restrictions are in operation in c. However, given that determining
what restrictions are in operation in a given context will require ordinary speakers to
have detailed knowledge concerning one another's mental representations (or more
specifically, one another's representational types), is it at all plausible to suppose that
ordinary speakers, and listeners, have the ability to come to know the value of R( ) for
a given context? (Note that, though Richard makes a few sketchy remarks concerning
what factors determine the restriction in operation in a given context, 4 1 he never
considers the question of how ordinary speakers might come to know what restriction is
in operation in this context.)
Suppose that Oscar utters
(3) Odile believes that Twain is a great author.
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in a context c. In order for Oscar, and his listeners, to know what proposition Oscar's
utterance has presented, in order for them to know what Oscar has said, they must be
able to compute the value of R(c). Suppose that R(c) is the following restriction:
Odile; <'Twain', Twain>; (<RT,, Twain>, <RT,, Twain>)
where 'RT,' and 'RT2' designate representational types; i.e, sets of mental
representation tokens, including perhaps "mental images," and "current perceptual
experiences." (Recall that the epistemological arguments from opacity, specifically
"Paderewski" cases, force Richard to use representational types as the linguistic
elements of annotations.) I submit, however, that it is not at all plausible to suppose
that in order for Oscar and his listeners to know what Oscar has said--in order for them
to know the truth conditions of Oscar's utterance--they must know that the above
restriction is induced by the context of Oscar's utterance. Indeed, I suggest that it is
extremely implausible to suppose that Oscar and his listeners--who certainly know the
truth conditions of Oscar's utterance--are even capable of coming to know that the
above restriction is in operation. Oscar and his listeners, it may be assumed, know next
to nothing about, and believe next to nothing about, Odile's mental representations.
Consequently, they simply lack the ability to discern that the above restriction, as
opposed to some other restriction which contains other representational types, is in
operation in the context of Oscar's utterance. And if Oscar and his listeners cannot
discern whether restriction A or restriction B is operation, they cannot determine the
semantic value of 'believes' as it appears in Oscar's utterance, and consequently they
cannot know the truth conditions of Oscar's utterance, But this is unacceptable;
ordinary speaker and ordinary listeners typically do know the truth conditions of
ordinary occurrences of attitude ascriptions. 42
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Thus another difficulty with Richard's analysis is that it is incompatible withl the
ability of ordinary speakers to understand, to know what is said by, occurrences of
attitude ascriptions. That Richard's analysis suffers from this difficulty is rather ironic.
In criticizing the Fregean analysis of attitude ascription, Richard states,
there is nothing in our day-to-day practice of attitude ascription that
could be construed as looking for sameness or similarity of sense, as a
basis for our ascriptions. We just listen and look: if B utters 'Tully is
tubby' and we think him sincere, we will say, 'He thinks Tully is Tuby'.
What does similarity of sense have to do with it?43
I of course concur with this objection to the Fregean analysis, but the objection applies,
mutatis mutandis, with equal force to Richard's own analysis: There is nothing in our
day-to-day practice of attitude ascription that could be construed as looking for what
restriction is in operation in a given context. We just listen and look. What do
restrictions on what mental representations a that-clause can represent have to do with
it?
3.3.1 Crimmins and Perry's Russellian Theory.
Crimmins and Perry's theory differs from the theories of Salmon and Richard in
two important respects. First, though Crimmins and Perry follow Salmon and Richard
in endorsing a ternary analysis of propositional attitudes, Crimmins and Perry do not
identify the third elements of these relations--the mediators--with multiply realizable
universals, but instead identify them with particular brain-events, or mental
representation tokens. Identifying the mediators of propositional attitudes with such
particulars, rather than multiply realizable universals, has important consequences for
Crimmins and Perry's response to the epistemological arguments from opacity, and
their approach to the problem of cognitive significance. Second, Crimmins and Perry's
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theory differs from the theories of Salmon and Richard in that Crimmins and Perry
deny that the Principle of Full Articulation holds for occurrences of attitude ascriptions;
i.e. Crimmins and Perry deny that the proposition presented by an occurrence of an
attitude ascription is fully determined by (a) the semantic values--the referents and
designations--of the phonetically or orthographically realized terms appearing in the
sentence, and (b) the logical form of the sentence. 44 Denying the Principle of Full
Articulation is the key feature of Crimmins and Perry's response to the semantic
arguments from opacity. In this section I will first explicate Crimmins and Perry's
response to the epistemological arguments from opacity and their approach to the
problem of cognitive significance. I will then explicate their response to the semantic
arguments from opacity.
The token mental representations which serve as the mediators of propositional
attitudes in Crimmins and Perry's theory are called cognitive particulars. Individual
instances of propositional attitudes--particular beliefs, desires, etc.--are kinds of
cognitive particulars. Thus, since cognitive particulars are tokens, as Crimmins and
Perry use the term it is impossible for two individuals to have (or instantiate) the same
belief. Cognitive particulars also have structure and content. They are structured
entities composed of notions and ideas, where notions are mental representations
(tokens) of objects, and ideas are mental representations (tokens) of n-ary relations.
The content of a notion is an object and the content of an idea is an n-ary relation.
Thus the content of a belief is the Russellian proposition determined by (i) the content
of the notions and ideas which make up the belief, and (ii) the structure of the belief.4 5
Hence, according to Crimmins and Perry's analysis of propositional attitudes, for Odile
to hold the attitude of belief toward the Russellian proposition that Twain is a great
author is for Odile to instantiate a belILf which is appropriately composed of a notion
whose content is Twain, and an idea whose content is the property of being a great
author.4 6
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Because notions and ideas are particulars, they can be individuated extremely
finely. Though Crimmins and Perry do not state specific individuation conditions for
notions and ideas, Crimmins suggests that notions are to be individuated finely enough
to account for the phenomenon of recognition failure:
When an agent perceives an individual and forms beliefs about the
object of perception, she may or may not recognize the individual. If
she recognizes it, she will connect the perception with a pre-existing
notion. Failure of recognition involves having multiple notions
of a single individual. When I do not recognize you at a distance, I do
not connect the notion I form in perception with my stable notion of
you. Many of the belief puzzle cases turn on just this phenomenon: an
agent has two unconnected notions (often, both stable notions) that
happen to be of the same individual.47
Thus if it is in some sense possible for Odile to fail to recognize Twain on a given
occasion, then Odile must at that time instantiate at least two distinct notions of Twain.
In order to individuate notions (and presumably ideas) this finely, there must be many
different conditions which are sufficient for the individuation of cognitive particulars.
For instance, Odile may have one notion of Twain which she associates with the name
'Twain', and a distinct notion she associates with the name 'Clemens'. She also may
have a notion of Twain which is associated with the sound of his voice, and perhaps a
notion which is involved in a particular sighting of Twain. Notions can also be
individuated by appeal to the beliefs of which they are constituents: Odile may have
one notion which is involved in her belief that Twain wrote Torn Sawyer, and another
notion which is associated with her belief that Twain wrote The Adventures of
Huckleberry Finn. And finally, Crimmins and Perry suggest that normal adults
typically possess "normal notions" of famous individuals. For example, Odile may
have a "normal notion" of Twain, a notion which is associated with a set of
stereotypical beliefs about Twain; a normal notion of Twain may be a notion which is
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associated with ideas of properties such as being a great author, being the author of The
Adventure of Huckleberry Finn, and being witty. (In order to have a normal notion,
one must have all of the requisite kinds of beliefs; e.g. assuming that the above is what
it is to have a normal notion of Twain, if Odile did not have a belief with the content
that Twain is a great author, then she would not posses a normal notion of Twain.)
The advantage of identifying the third elements of instances of propositional
attitudes with particulars instead of multiply realizable universals is that in doing so
Crimmins and Perry almost guarantee that their theory succeed in precluding the
epistemological arguments from opacity. 48 Odile assents to (01), yet dissents from
(02). According to Crimmins and Perry's theory, it follows from this that
(K**) BEL**<Odile, P, b>
and that
(L**) -(BEL**<Odile, P, b'>)
(where 'P' designates the Russellian proposition that Twain is a great author, and 'b' and
'b" designate beliefs). Since b and b' are mental tokens of some kind, there is (almost)
no question of their being identical: b and b' are parts, or features of, the particular
brain-events which are responsible for Odile's assent to (01) and dissent from (02),
respectively, and since b and b' occur at different times, there is (almost) no question of
their being the same belief.49 Hence, because Crimmins and Perry identify the
mediators of propositional attitudes with particulars, their theory can successfully
preclude the epistemological arguments from opacity.
How do Crimmins and Perry propose to account for the cognitive significance
of occurrences? The advantage of identifying the mediators of propositional attitudes
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with particulars, rather than multiply realizable universals, is that in doing so Crimmins
and Perry insulate their theory from refutation via the epistemological arguments from
opacity. The disadvantage of identifying the mediators of propositional attitudes with
particulars is that, because they are particulars, the mediators cannot account for the
cognitive significance of occurrences. It may be instructive here to contrast Crimmins
and Perry's theory with Frege's theory. Frege accounts for the cognitive significance of
occurrences by appeal to senses, or thoughts, which are multiply realizable. For
example, according to Frege's theory, Odile assents to (O 1) because (OI) presents a
certain thought for Odile, and she dissents from (02) because this occurrence presents a
distinct thought for her. In stating such an explanation of Odile's behavior, the Fregean
theorist is implicitly appealing to a general psychological law of the form
For all subjects X, if conditions C obtain, and X
grasps a proposition via T,, then X will assent.
where conditions C probably include facts concerning Odile's "background" beliefs and
desires, her abilities, etc., and 'T,' designates the mode of apprehension (01) displays
for Odile. Note that in order for this law to make sense, T, must be a multiply
realizable--it must be possible for there to be a number of instances of subiects grasping
propositions via T,. Crimmins and Perry, however, have no recourse to such general
laws; i.e. the following cannot serve as a general law of psychology:
For all subjects X, if conditions C obtain, and X grasps
a proposition via cognitive particular CP, then X will assent.
The problem is that there cannot be instances of subjects grasping propositions via a
cognitive particular: if CP is a cognitive particular instantiated by Odile, and CP' is a
cognitive particular instantiated by Oscar, then CP is not identical to CP'.
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Of course it does not follow from the fact that Crimmins and Perry's theory
does nothing in the way of providing an account of the cognitive significance of
occurrences, that their theory is incompatible with there being such an account. After
arguing that the epistemological arguments from opacity force one to identify the
mediators of propositional attitudes with cognitive particulars (though Crimmins and
Perry would not put it that way), Crimmins points out that
It does not follow--and it is not true--that there are no instances of
believing that can be usefully thought of as involving useful states. It is
no doubt conceivable that there is, or might have been, a certain neural
state such that, when any person is in that state, the person believes that
it is raining then and there.... And certainly there are important
internal properties that are shared across different instances of
believing.50
(I assume that one of the ways in which a state--a multiply realizable universal--can be
"useful" or "interesting" would involve its playing a role in psychological laws, such as
the one stated above.) Crimmins and Perry's theory thus diverges from the theories of
Salmon and Richard (and even Frege), in that the entities posited in order to preclude
the epistemological arguments from opacity do not themselves serve to account for the
cognitive significance of occurrences, Rather, and here I am to some extent
interpreting Crimmins, it is various properties shared by cognitive particulars which
account for the cognitive significance of occurrences.
The second important respect in which Crimmins and Perry's theory differs
from the theories of Salmon and Richard is that Crimmins and Perry do not endorse the
Principle of Full Articulation:
The Principle of Full Articulation: The proposition presented by an
occurrence of a declarative sentence is wholly determined by (a) the
semantic values--the referents and designations--of the phonetically or
orthographically realized terms appearing in the sentence, (b) the logical
form of the sentence.
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More specifically, Crimmins and Perry deny that the propositions presented by
occurrences of attitude ascriptions are fully determined by (i) the semantic values of the
phonetically and orthographically realized terms appearing in the ascription, and (ii)
the logical form of the ascription. Thus Crimmins and Perry ae able to maintain that
occurrences of
(3) Odile believes that Twain is a great author,
and
(4) Odile believes that Clemens is a great author,
present distinct propositions, even though they have the same logical form and are
isomorphicly composed of (phonetically or orthographically realized) terms having the
same semantic values. According to Crimmins and Perry's analysis of attitude
ascriptions, an occurrence of (3) asserts, roughly, that Odile holds the attitude of belief
toward the Russellian proposition that Twain is a great author via a certain token
sentence of mentalese--a certain cognitive particular--but Crimmins and Perry deny that
this cognitive particular is the semantic value of any of the phonetically or
orthographically realized terms appearing in the ascription. Rather Crimmins and
Perry maintain that this cognitive particular is somehow provided by the context of
utterance, or tacitly referred to by the utterance as whole, More specifically, Crimmins
and Perry analyze an occurrence of (3) as
(3**) 3b (BEL** <Odile, P, b> & Con(b) = P &
b is appropriately composed of Nt and gI,)
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where 'P' designates the Russellian proposition that Twain is a great author, 'Con( )'
designates a function from beliefs to their contents, 'N1' designates a notion of Twain,
and 'Iga' designates an idea of being a great author, 5 1 And Crimmins and Perry
analyze a relevant occurrence of (4) as
(4**) (3b) (BEL** <Odile, P, b> & Con(b) = P &
b is appropriately composed of NC and Iga)
where 'Ne' designates a notion of Twain which is distinct from N,; N, is Odile's
"Clemens way of thinking of Twain". Thus according to Crimmins and Perry, a
relevant occurrence of (3) asserts that Odile holds the BEL** relation toward the
Russellian proposition that Twain is a great author via a belief which contains N, as a
constituent--N, is tacitly referred to by the occurrence of (3) as a whole. The
occurrence of (4), on the other hand, asserts that Odile holds the BEL,** relation toward
the Russellian proposition that Twain is a great author via a belief which contains Nc as
a constituent--Nc is tacitly referred to by the occurrence of (4) as a whole.
Consequently, since (3**) and (4**) express distinct propositions, Crimmins and Perry
can allow that the occurrence of (3) is true, while the occurrence of (4) is false, In this
way Crimmins and Perry endeavor to preclude the semantic arguments from opacity.
Crimmins and Perry's strategy for precluding the semantic arguments from
opacity assumes that in making attitude ascriptions ordinary speakers tacitly refer to
cognitive particulars, and thus cognitive particulars are unarticulated constituents of
propositions. But how can a constituent of a proposition be specified by an occurrence
if it is not the semantic value of a term appearing explicitly in the occurrence? Or more
generally, how can Crimmins and Perry justify their denial of the Principle of Full
Articulation? Crimmins claims that "it is very common in natural languages for a
statement to exploit unarticulated constituents," and he goes on to point out that
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We report the weather, for example, as if raining and snowing and
sleeting and dark of night were properties of times, but they are one and
all relations between times and places. If I say 'it is raining,' you
understand me as claiming that it rains at that time at some place the
context supplies. 52
Similar evidence for the presence of unarticulated constituents would seem to be
provided by sentences containing relative predicates. Consider an occurrence of 'Magic
Johnson is tall.' The predicate 'tall' is a relative predicate; in order to know whether or
not a particular occurrence of 'Magic Johnson is tall' expresses a truth, we have to have
some idea as to who or what Magic is alleged to be taller than. But there is no
phonetically or orthographically realized expression which has the appropriate relatum,
or relata, as semantic value. Hence it seems that, just as with occurrences of 'It's
raining', the appropriate relatum is provided by the context of utterance: in some
contexts the missing relatum is something like, the average professional basketball
player, and in these contexts the sentence is false. But in other contexts the missing
relatum is something like the average person, and in these contexts the sentence is true,
Occurrences of sentences containing quantifiers also seem to provide counterexamples
to the Principle of Full Articulation: consider an occurrence of 'Everybody was there'.
In order to know whether or not an occurrence of this sentence is true, one must know
what the domain of the quantifier is. In some contexts the domain might be restricted
to all the members of a particular Philosophy department, while in other contexts the
domain might include all living humans. Again, however, there is no phonetically or
orthographically realized term appearing explicitly in the occurrence which specifies
the relevant domain. Crimmins and Perry suggest that phenomena such as these also
serve as counterexamples to the Principle of Full Articulation, and that consequently
their denial of this principle in order to account for the truth conditions of attitude
ascriptions is not an ad hoc maneuver. 53
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3.3.2 Criticism of Crimmins and Perry's Russellian Theory.
I will raise three difficulties for Crimmins and Perry's theory. The first
concerns the truth conditions of common beliefidesire explanations of behavior, while
the second and third concern the alleged phenomenon of tacit reference, or of a specific
unarticulated constituent's being provided by a context. Again, the difficulties
encountered by Crimmins and Perry's theory are reminiscent of the Scylla and
Charybdis of the Fregean strategy.
My first objection concerns the ability of Crimmins and Perry's theory to
account for our untutored intuitions concerning the truth conditions of ordinary
belief\desire explanations of behavior. Crimmins seems to think that one of the
advantages his theory has over a Russellian theory such as Salmon's is that on his
theory such "folk" explanations will present or semantically encode, rather than merely
pragmatically convey, truths. That is, Crimmins seems to think that his theory
preserves the "literal truth" of explanations such as
(10a) Odile desires Twain come to the party
and
(10b) she believes that if wine is served, then Twain will come to the
party,
and that's why
(10c) Odile is going to serve wine.
But if the unarticulated constituents of the proposition(s) presented by an occurrence of
this explanation are particulars, then it is not at all clear that Crimmins and Perry's
theory preserves the literal truth of such explanations. The problem is not that
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Crimmins and Perry's theory predicts the wrong truth conditions for each of the sub-
sentences of an occurrence of (l0a-b-c), rather the difficulty is that Crimmins and
Perry's theory does not account for our untutored intuitions with regard to (IOa-b-c) as
a whole. More specifically, Crimmins and Perry's theory cannot account for why the
conjunction of the propositions expressed by occurrences of (10a) and (10b) predicts,
or explains, the proposition expressed by an occurrence of (I Oc).
It will be useful to again contrast Crimmins and Perry's theory with Frege's
theory. Recall that according to Frege's theory the above "folk" explanation is of the
form
Fregean Explanation Form.
(a) X desires content C
(b) X believes content (CV(E occurs) -- C is realized)
Therefore,
(c) X acts so as to make E occur.
('X' in the above formula is a schematic letter open for replacement by names for
subjects; 'C' is a schematic letter open for replacement by terms referring to Fregean
thoughts; 'E' is a schematic letter open for replacement by expressions designating
potential events. 'CV' denotes a function from semantic values to cognitive values; i.e.
from propositions to the thoughts which determine them. I here overlook the fact that
there could be no such function--for every proposition there are many thoughts which
present it.) Consequently, the Fregean theorist can account for the truth of (lOa-b-c) by
maintaining that an occurrence of (l0a-b-c) implicitly appeals to a general
psychological law of the form
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Fregean Law Form
For all subjects x, if
(a) x desires content C
(b) x believes content (CV(E occurs) ->C is realized)
then (ceteris paribus)
(c) x acts so as to make E occur.
In this way the Fregean theorist can account for truth conditions of an occurrence of
(10a-b-c) as a whole. The conjunction of the propositions presented by occurrences of
(10a) and (10b) predicts, or explains, the proposition presented by an occurrence of
(10c) because the propositions presented by occurrences of (10a) and (10b) in
conjunction with the appropriate psychological law entail the proposition presented by
occurrences of (10c). Thus the Fregean theorist can maintain that an occurrence of
(10a-b-c) is true for essentially the reason that an occurrence of 'That wire is copper,
and that's why it conducts electricity' is true; both claims are true in virtue of a relevant
general covering law.
Crimmins and Perry, however, cannot avail themselves to such an account of
the truth conditions of (10a-b-c), More specifically, Crimmins and Perry do analyze
(10a-b-c) as being of a form analogous to the Fregean Form:
Crimmins and Perry Explanation Form
(a) X has desire D
(b) X has belief (CP(E occurs) --- D is realized)
Therefore,
(c) X acts so as to make E occur.
('D' is a schematic letter open for replacement by terms designating cognitive
particulars which are desires. 'CP' designates a function from semantic values to
cognitive particulars which present them. Again, I here overlook the fact that it is not
even plausible to suppose that there is such a function--for every proposition there are
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many cognitive particulars which present it.) However, because they maintain that
desires and beliefs are cognitive particulars, there can be no general psychological laws
of the form
Crimmins and Perry Law Form
For all subjects x, if
(a) x has desire D
(b) x has belief (CP(E occurs) -- D is realized)
then (ceteris paribus)
(c) x acts so as to make E occur.
According to Crimmins and Perry's analysis, the sub-sentences of an occurrence of
(1 Oa-b-c) do not assert that Odile instantiates some kind of multiply realizable universal
that is explanatorily relevant to Odile's behavior. As a result, their analysis cannot
account for our untutored intuitions concerning the truth conditions of such "folk"
explanations of behavior. Even if occurrences of (10a), (10b) and (10c) are true on
Crimmins and Perry's analysis, their analysis cannot account for why the propositions
presented by occurrences of (10a) and (10b) explain, or predict, the proposition
presented by an occurrence of (10c). Consequently, contrary to what is suggested by
Crimmins, it is not all clear that Crimmins' theory preserves the "literal truth" of "folk"
explanations of behavior, 54
My second objection to Crimmins and Perry's theory concerns the alleged
phenomenon of tacit reference, or of a propositional constituents being provided by a
context. Consider again an occurrence of 'It's raining'. Suppose I look out my window
and utter this sentence--suppose that I am just telling you in an offhand way that it is
raining. What proposition have I presented? According to Crimmins and Perry "you
understand me as claiming that it rains at that time at some place the context supplies."
But precisely which place is tacitly referred to by my utterance? Can any of the
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following candidates plausibly be identified as the proposition presented by my
utterance as a whole?
(a) Rains <t, directly outside my window>
(b) Rains <t, my block>
(c) Rains <t, Cambridge>
(d) Rains <t, the greater Boston area>
(e) Rains <t, Eastern Massachusetts>
Note that (a)-(e) all have different truth conditions; e.g. it can be raining on my block,
even though it is not raining directly outside my window. Therefore, assuming that this
list exhausts the plausible candidates (though it clearly does not), only one of (a)-(e)
can be the proposition I asserted. But which one? This question clearly has a false
presupposition: In uttering 'It's raining', I intended to assert proposition (a) no more,
nor no less, than I intended to assert proposition (b), and thus there is no reason to
interpret me as having asserted proposition (a) as opposed to proposition (b), or vise
versa. An utterance of 'It's raining' in a context c typically has the same truth
conditions as an utterance of 'It's raining here and now' in c, and the phonetically or
orthographically realized indexical 'here' no doubt has a place as its semantic value.
But it is a mistake to attempt to specify exactly which place is specified by the
occurrence of 'here'--this occurrence of 'here' is not coreferential with any nonindexical
place description, nor with any nonindexical place name. Therefore to interpret me as
having expressed one of (a)-(e) is to alter, and embellish, what I asserted. 5 5
My objection to Crimmins and Perry's analysis of propositional attitude
ascriptions is that, just as it is implausible to suppose that my utterance of 'it raining'
tacitly refers to, e.g., the space directly outside my window, so it is implausible to
suppose that occurrences of attitude ascriptions tacitly refer to, and thereby specify,
particular notions and ideas. Consider an occurrence of the ascription
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(35) She believes that he is a great leader,
where 'he' refers to Clinton, and 'she' refers to Odile. (Suppose that we are at a political
rally at which Clinton is giving a speech. We are observing Odile, whom we do not
know, and Odile is obviously enjoying Clinton's speech.) Waiat proposition do I assert
in making this utterance? Again, consider some plausible alternatives:
(a) ]b (BEL <Odile, Q, b> & Con(b) = Q &
b is appropriately composed of NV and Ig)
(where Q is the Russellian proposition that Clinton is a great leader and
N, is the notion linked to Odile's current visual perception of Clinton;
this is the perceptual notion Odile would be employing if she were deaf,
or simply were not listening.)
(b) 3b (BEL <Odile, Q, b> & Con(b) = Q &
b is appropriately composed of N, and I,,)
(where N, is the notion linked to Odile's current audio perception of
Clinton; this is the perceptual notion Odile would be employing if she
were blind, or simply were not watching.)
(c) 3b (BEL <Odile, Q, b> & Con(b) = Q &
b is appropriately composed of Ng and Igo)
(where Ng is the notion involved in Odile's belief that Clinton is the
former Governor of Arkansas; this is the notion Odile would have if she,
for some reason, did not think that former Governor Clinton was
identical to President Clinton),
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(d) 3b (BEL <Odile, Q, b> & Con(b) = Q &
b is appropriately composed of Nn and Ig,,)
(where N, is the "normal notion" involved in stereotypical beliefs about
Clinton; this is the "normal notion" Odile would have if she knew that
former Governor Clinton won the presidential election).
Note that, just as with the above case involving 'It's raining', all of (a)-(d)
present distinct propositions, and they are all plausible candidates (though they are
certainly not the only plausible candidates). Which one of these propositions have I
asserted with my utterance of (35)? Again, this question has a false presupposition; I
intended to assert (a) no more, nor no less, than I intended to express (b). Just as in the
case involving 'It's raining', it is a mistake to interpret my utterance as asserting
anything as specific as any of (a)-(d). To interpret me as making a claim about some
specific notion of Odile's is to embellish, and alter, what I have expressed. 56
Perry has a potential response to this objection. Perry is willing to concede that
some occurrences of ascriptions do not specify the notions and ideas employed by the
subject of the ascription, but rather merely express constraints upon the notions and
ideas employed by the subject. 57 More specifically, Perry allows that my utterance of
(35) She believes that he is a great leader.
may be correctly analyzed as
(35*) 3b [(BEL <Odile, Q, b> & Con(b)= Q &
3n (C(n) & b is appropriately composed of n and I )]
'C( )' in the above formula designates some condition, or constraint, on Odile's notion
of Clinton. For example, C( ) in the above might be one of the following:
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C'( ) = is a normal notion of Clinton.
C"( ) = is a perceptual notion of Clinton.
C"'( ) = is the notion of Clinton Odile is currently employing.
By analyzing my utterance of (35) in this way, Perry avoids the difficulty presented
above; (35*) does not presuppose that I tacitly refer to a specific notion Odile has of
Clinton. Rather (35*) merely requires that I tacitly specify a certain constraint on
Odile's notion of Clinton.
Reverting to constraints upon notions, however, merely relocates the problem:
Just as I do not intend to refer to Odile's visual notion of Clinton any more, or any less,
than I intend to refer to her audio notion of Clinton, so I do not intend to "constrain"
Odile's notion of Clinton by way of C'(), any more or any less than I intend to
constrain Odile's notion of Clinton by way of C"(). I simply have no intention to assert
a proposition concerning such a specific constraint, and to interpret me as having
asserted a proposition concerning such a constraint is again to embellish, and therefore
alter, what I have asserted. 58
My third objection to Crimmins and Perry's theory concerns' tacit reference
failure. If, in making ordinary attitude ascriptions, speakers tacitly refer to notions and
ideas, then there ought to be cases of tacit reference failure. If Crimmins and Perry's
analysis is correct, then there ought to be occurrences of attitude ascriptions such that
the speaker attempts to specify notions which simply do not exist; Crimmins concedes
that such an occurrence should lack a truth value, as the referential presupposition of
the occurrence has not been fulfilled. These predictions, however, do not accord with
our untutored intuitions. To begin with, Crimmins and Perry's analysis cannot account
for our intuitions with regard to ascriptions, and negated ascriptions, which concern
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propositional contents that are wholly foreign to the subject. For example, again
consider occurrences of
(8) Aristotle believed that Twain was a great author.
and
(8n) Aristotle did not believe that Twain was a great author.
Our untutored intuitions dictate that occurrences of (8) are false, while occurrences of
(8n) are true. Aristotle could not possibly have believed that Twain was a great author,
as the proposition presented by the that-clause was completely unknown to Aristotle.
Thus our untutored intuitions dictate that occurrences of (8) are false, and occurrence
of (8n) are true. Crimmins and Perry's analysis, however, seems to predict that
occurrences of both (8) and (8n) lack truth values. If it assumed that an occurrence of
(8) attempts to specify Aristotle's notion of Twain, then Crimmins and Perry would
analyze the occurrence as follows:
(8*) ]b (BEL <Aristotle, P, b> & Con(b) = P &
b is appropriately composed of N, and Ia)
(where 'P' designates the Russellian proposition that Twain is a great author, and 'Nt'
allegedly designates Aristotle's notion of Twain). The problem is that'N,' lacks a
referent--Aristotle did not have a notion whose content was Twain--and thus Crimmins
and Perry's theory incorrectly predicts that an occurrence of (8) would be neither true
nor false. (Crimmins and Perry's analysis of occurrences of (8n) of course faces a
similar difficulty.)
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Crimmins and Perry's analysis also has difficulty with more familiar sounding
ascriptions and negated ascriptions, To borrow an example from Crimmins, suppose
we come upon a man who seems to be gazing up at the Washington Monument. 59
Unbeknownst to me, however, the man is blind. Upon seeing the man, I utter,
(36) That yokel believes it's the tallest thing in the world.
Crimmins claims that my utterance attempts to specify the yokel's current visual notion
of the Washington Monument. Consequently, since the yokel has no such notion,
Crimmins and Perry's theory predicts that--regardless of the yokel's opinions
concerning the height of the Washington Monument--my utterance lacks a truth value.
But, again, this prediction does not accord with our intuitions. The fact that the man
has no current visual notion of the Washington Monument seems to be irrelevant to the
truth conditions of my utterance. Consider what the truth conditions of my utterance
would be for each of the following situations:
Situation 1. Suppose that, also unbeknownst to me, moments before I
uttered (36) the yokel had sincerely said to you, "It's so good to be here,
under the shadow of the tallest thing in the world." (Suppose that he
believes this because his tour guide lied to him.)
Situation 2. Suppose that, again unbeknownst to me, moments before I
uttered (36) the yokel had sincerely said to you, "It's so good to be here,
under the shadow of the second tallest thing in the world." (Suppose
that his tour guide told him a different lie.)
Our intuitions dictate that if situation 1 were the actual state of the world, my
utterance of (36) would be true, not meaningless. Granted, I am confused. I am wrong
in thinking that the exhibited gazing behavior has something to do with the yokel's
belief, and thus my justification for thinking that the yokel believes it's the tallest thing
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in the world is undermined, but these epistemological issues should not be confused
with the truth conditions of my utterance. What one says can be true even if one thinks
that it is true for the wrong reasons. Similarly, our intuitions dictate that if situation 2
were the actual state of the world, my utterance would be false. In this case I would be
under the same confusion; I misinterpret the exhibited gazing behavior, and thuv, my
justification for thinking that the yokel believes it's the tallest thing in the wor!d is
undermined. But, again, this confusion concerning the justification of my claim does
not affect the truth conditions of my claim. Thus Crimmins and Perry's analysis seems
to make the wrong predictions foir even quite ordinary claims.60
Crimmins and Perry can again invoke the constraint analysis of ascriptions in
order to preserve our untutored intuitions. They can claim, for example, that an
occurrence of (8)--which we would intuitively judge to be false--does not attempt to
specify Aristotle's notion of Twain, but rather presents a proposition containing a
constraint upon Aristotle's alleged notion of Twain. For instance, an intuitively false
occurrence of (8) might present that
(8**) 3b [(BEL <Aristotle, r, b> & Con(b) = r &
]n (C(n) & b is appropriately composed of n and I,g)]
(where C( ) is some constraint on Aristotle's alleged notion of Twain. For example,
C( ) might be the constraint, is a notion of Twiain). There is no non referring term in
(8**), and thus (8**) accords with our intuitions that an occurrence of (8) would be
false. This strategy could also be employed to preserve our intuitions concerning my
utterance of (36), and all other cases of alleged tacit reference failure.
There are, however, several serious difficulties with invoking the constraint
analysis of ascriptions in order to avoid the difficulties posed by occurrences which
allegedly suffer from tacit reference failure. The first difficulty is that we have no way
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of determining whether a given ascription merely presents a constraint on notions, or if
it attempts to specify the notions employed by the subject. It is clear from the above
that, if it is to preserve our untutored intuitions concerning attitude ascriptions,
Crimmins and Perry's theory must analyze at least some occurrences of ascriptions as
presenting constraints on notions (and ideas), as opposed to tacitly referring to specific
notions. But how is it determined whether a given occurrence of an ascription specifies
a notion, or merely specifies a constraint on notions?
Crimmins and Perry recommend the following procedure:
look at what would happen if the appropriate notions were to fail to
exist. If the report would then be false, then it is a case of notion
constraint rather than [specification]; if the report would fail to make a
claim, then it is a case of (attempted) notion [specification]. 6 1
This statement of the procedure, however, will not do. The basic idea behind the
recommended determination procedure is that in cases in which specification of notions
does not seem relevant to the truth conditions of the ascription, then the ascription
merely presents a constraint on notions; it does not matter whether we judge the given
ascription to be true, or to be false. So the recommended determination procedure is
better stated as follows:
look at what would happen if the appropriate notions were to fail to
exist. If the report would then be [either true or] false, then it is a case
of notion constraint rather than [specification]; if the report would fail to
make a claim, then it is a case of (attempted) notion [specification].
The problem with this procedure for determining whether a given ascription attempts to
specify notions, or merely present a constraint on notions, is that for most occurrences
of ascriptions, it is not all clear what "the appropriate notions" are. Consider again the
case in which we are observing Odile at the Clinton rally. When I utter 'She believes
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that he is a great leader' what are the appropriate notions? Does my claim concern
Odile's perceptual notions, her normal notions, or what? As was pointed out above,
there seems to be no answer to this question, But without an answer to this question,
the proposition presented by my utterance cannot be determined by Crimmins and
Perry's theory.
The second difficulty with invoking the constraint analysis of ascription is that,
in reverting to the constraint analysis, Crimmins and Perry's analysis encounters
difficulties similar to the semantic arguments from opacity; i.e. in invoking the
constraint analysis, Crimmins and Perry's analysis becomes susceptible to the very type
of difficulty their theory was designed to avoid. Consider again the case involving the
Washington Monument and the yokel. Our untutored intuitions dictate that, if situation
I is the actual state of the world, my utterance of
(36) That yokel believes it's the tallest thing in the world.
is true. Recall situation 1:
Situation 1. Suppose that, also unbeknownst to me, moments before I
uttered (36) the yokel had sincerely said to you, "It's so good to be here,
under the shadow of the tallest thing in the world." (Suppose that he
believes this because his tour guide lied to him.)
In order to preserve this intuition, my utterance of (36) must present a constraint which
is satisfied by one of the yokel's notions of the Washington Monument. What
constraint is presented by my utterance? What is C( ) in the following analysis of my
utterance?
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(36*) ]b [(BEL <the yokel, R, b> & Con(b) = R &
3n (C(n) & b is appropriately composed of n and I,t)]
(where 'R' designates the Russellian proposition that the Washington Monument is the
tallest thing in the world, and 'I,' designates the yokel's idea of being the tallest thing in
the world).
Crimmins informs us that my utterance attempts to express something about a
visual notion the yokel has of the Washington Monument. But if C( ) is identified with
the constraint, is a visual notion of the Washington Monument, then analysis (36*)
incorrectly predicts that my utterance of (36), relative to situation 1, is false. It was
stipulated that the yokel is blind, and thus he has no visual notions whatsoever.
Therefore if we are to preserve our intuition that relative to situation I my utterance of
(36) is true, C( ) must be more inclusive than is a visual notion of the Washington
Monument.
We might try interpreting C( ) in (36*) as the more inclusive constraint, is a
perceptual notion of the Washington Monument, but this will not do either. Suppose
that in situation I the yokel has no direct perceptual contact with the Monument
whatsoever. That is, suppose that the actual state of the world relative to which I utter
(36) is as follows:
Situation 1'. Suppose that, also unbeknownst to me, moments before I
uttered (36) the yokel had sincerely said to you, "It's so good to be here,
under the shadow of the tallest thing in the world." Further suppose that
he believes this because his tour guide lied to him, and that he has had no
direct perceptual contact with the monument whatsoever.
Our intuitions dictate that relative to situation 1', my utterance of (36) is true. But if
C( ) in (36*) is interpreted as designating the constraint is a perceptual notion of the
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Washington Monument, then the proposition presented by (36*) is again false, and thus
(36*) cannot serve as an analysis of my utterance of (36),
Similarly, interpreting C( ) in (36*) as is a normal notion of the Washington
Monument will not suffice; again, we can just stipulate into situation I that the yokel
lacks the requisite stereotypical beliefs about the Washington Monument:
Situation I". Suppose that, also unbeknownst to me, moments before I
uttered (36) the yokel had sincerely said to you, "It's so good to be here,
under the shadow of the tallest thing in the world." Further suppose that
he believes this because his tour guide lied to him, and that he has had no
direct perceptual contact with the monument whatsoever, and he does not
possess the beliefs required for having a normal notion of the Washington
monument.
If C( ) in (36*) is interpreted as is a normal notion of the Washington Monument, then
the proposition presented by (36*) is againfalse, and thus (36*) still cannot serve as an
analysis of my utterance of (36).
Even interpreting C( ) as something as inclusive as the constraint, is a notion of
the Washington Monument which is a constituent in the yokel's occurrent belief that lie
is standing under that thing, (where 'that thing' refers to the Washington Monument)
will not do. Again, situation I can merely be stipulated to be such that we intuit that
my utterance of (36) would be true relative to situation 1, though the analysis presented
by (36*) would be false:
Situation 1'". Suppose that, also unbeknownst to me, moments before I
uttered (36) the yokel had sincerely said to you, "The Washington
monument is the tallest thing in the world." Further suppose that he
believes this because his friend guide lied to him, and that he has had no
direct perceptual contact with the monument whatsoever, and he does not
possess the beliefs required for having a normal notion of the Washington
monument, and he does not know where he is, though his mental
disposition is such that if his surroundings where described to him, he
would declare, "I am beside the Washington Monument, which is the
tallest thing in the world".
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Our untutored intuitions dictate that if I were to utter (36) relative to situation I"', then
my utterance would be true. The analysis presented by (36*), where C( ) is interpreted
as designating the constraint, is a notion of the Washington Monument which is a
constituent in the yokel's occurrent belief that he is standing under that thing, (where
'that thing' refers to the Washington Monument), would be false (or meaningless)
relative to situation I", as in this situation the yokel has no occurrent belief that he is
standing under that thing.
The difficulty manifesting itself here arises because our intuitions dictate that as
long as the yokel is disposed to sincerely utter things like, "The Washington Monument
is the tallest thing in the world," my utterance is true; the facts concerning how the
yokel is epistemologically linked to the Washington Monument are irrelevant to the
truth conditions of my utterance. Consequently, if the analysis presented by (36*) is to
preserve these intuitions, C( ) in (36*) must be interpreted so that no matter what
notion the yokel employs in his belief that the Washington Monument is the tallest
thing in the world--no matter how the yokel is epistemologically linked to the
Washington Monument--this notion satisfies C(). As a result, C( ) must be interpreted
as an extremely inclusive constraint.
The problem is that if C( ) is allowed to be extremely inclusive, then Crimmins
and Perry's theory becomes susceptible to difficulties similar to the semantic arguments
from opacity, and thus fails to preserve the legitimacy of our ordinary attitude ascribing
practices. For example, suppose that C( ) is the inclusive constraint, is a notion of the
Washington Monument. Further suppose that the actual state of the world is as follows:
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Situation 3. The yokel, for whatever reason, thinks that there are two
Washington Monuments, one of which is the tallest thing in the world.
(Thus there is some notion of the Washington Monument which is a
constituent of a belief that has Russellian proposition R as its content. Let
us call this notion, 'N,,'.) Furthermore, let us suppose that the yokel
thinks the Monument he is standing next to when I utter (36) is not the tall
monument, but rather is the shorter monument. (Thus there is another
notion of the Washington monument which is not a constituent of a belief
that has Russellian proposition R as its content. Let us call this notion,
'Nsm'. Lastly, if the yokel were presented with an occurrence of 'It's the
tallest thing in the world," he would dissent.
Our naive intuitions dictate that, if situation 3 were to obtain, my utterance of
(36) That yokel believes that it's the tallest thing in the world.
relative to situation 3 would be false, while my utterance of
(36n) That yokel does not believe that it's the tallest thing in the world.
relative to Situation 3 would be true. (Note that, if necessary, further stipulations can
be added to Situation 3 to solidify these intuitions.) Crimmins and Perry, however,
would analyze my utterances of (36) and (36n) as follows:
(36*) 3b [(BEL <the yokel, R, b> & Con(b) = R &
3n (C(n) & b is appropriately composed of n and I,,)]
(36n*) -(3b [(BEL <the yokel, R, b> & Con(b) = R &
3n (C(n) & b is appropriately composed of n and lu)])
(where C( ) in (36*) and (36n*) is the inclusive constraint is a notion of the
Washington Monument).
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The problem of course is that these analyses incorrectly predict that my
utterance of (36) relative to Situation 3 is true, while my utterance of (36n) relative to
Situation 3 is false, The constraint is a notion of the Washington Monurent is so
inclusive that it is satisfied by both Ntm and Nts, Consequently, relative to Situation 3
(36*) presents a truth--there is some notion of the Washington Monument, viz, Nim,
which is a constituent of a belief of the yokel's which has R as its content. And for
similar reasons relative to Situation 3 (36n*) presents a falsehood. Thus (36*) and
(36n*) do not accord with our intuitions concerning the occurrences of (36) and (36n),
respectively, and consequently Crimmins and Perry's theory fails to preserve the
legitimacy our ordinary attitude ascribing practices.
This difficulty for Crimmins and Perry's theory is reminiscent of the
fundamental difficulty facing the Fregean strategy. In order to preclude the arguments
from opacity, the Fregean theorist is compelled to individuate cognitive values
extremely finely, but in doing so he undermines his account of attitude ascription; if
cognitive values are individuated finely enough to steer clear of Scylla, the Fregean
theorist cannot preserve the legitimacy of our ordinary attitude ascribing practices.
Analogously, Crimmins argues that the cognitive particulars--the mediators of
propositional attitudes--must be identified with particulars, as opposed to multiply
realizable universals, because "we must rule out the possibility of two instances of
believing, or one of believing and one of not believing, involving the same agent, time,
and [mediator]." 6 2 In other words, Crimmins thinks that the arguments from opacity
cannot be successfully precluded if the mediators of propositional attitudes are any
kind of multiply realizable entity; i.e. Crimmins maintains that the only way of
ensuring that the mediators are individuated finely enough to preclude the arguments
from opacity is to identify them with neurological particulars, where is impossible for
different subjects to instantiate, or "grasp," the same cognitive particular. However, in
order to avoid the problems associated with (tacit) reference failure and thus preserve
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the legitimacy of our ordinary attitude ascribing practices, Crimmins and Perry must
invoke the constraint analysis of attitude ascriptions. But, if the constraint analysis is
invoked, then Crimmins and Perry's theory of ascriptions is roughly equivalent to a
theory which identifies the mediators of propositional attitudes with very "course
grained" multiply realizable universals, and thus the theory encounters difficulties
similar to the arguments from opacity.
3.4 Conclusion: The Lessons for Russellian Theorists.
Let us review. Salmon's Russellian Theory differs from The Naive Russellian
Theory in that Salmon abandons the binary analysis of propositional attitudes.
Salmon's theory attempts to preclude the epistemological arguments from opacity and
account for the cognitive significance of occurrences by positing "modes of
apprehension" and analyzing propositional attitudes as ternary relations between agents,
Russellian propositions, and appropriately individuated "modes of apprehension." It
was argued, however, that Salmon does not individuate "modes of apprehension" finely
enough--his theory does not satisfy the Individuation Constraint. As a result Salmon's
theory can be refuted by epistemological arguments from opacity, and "modes of
apprehension" cannot account for the cognitive significance of occurrences.
Furthermore, Salmon's theory cannot avoid the semantic arguments from opacity
because it endorses, in addition to the principles of Semantic Innocence and Direct
Reference, (i) the Principle of Full Articulation, (ii) the Principle of Propositional
Truth, and (iii) a straightforward binary analysis of attitude verbs. As a result,
Salmon's Theory cannot distinguish the truth conditions of occurrences of
(3) Odile believes that Twain is a great author.
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from the truth conditions of occurrences of
(4) Odile believes that Clemens is a great author.
These sentences are isomorphicly constructed out terms which have identical semantic
values, and thus occurrences of these sentences must present the same proposition.
Consequently, by the Principle of Propositional Truth, occurrences of these sentences
must have the same truth conditions.
Richard's theory can be understood as an attempt to improve upon Salmon's
theory. With regard to the epistemological arguments from opacity and the problem of
the cognitive significance of occurrences, Richard's theory basically follows Salmon's
theory except that where Salmon posits "modes of apprehension," Richard posits
"representational types." It was argued, however, that Richard's means of individuating
representational types violates the Independence Constraint; in the end representational
types are individuated by appeal to instances of the phenomenon of opacity itself. As a
result representational types cannot account for the cognitive significance of
occurrences and Richard's method for precluding the epistemological arguments from
opacity is ad hoc. With regard to the semantic arguments from opacity, Richard's
theory differs from Salmon's theory in that Richard abandons a straightforward binary
analysis of propositional attitude verbs in favor of an analysis according to which
attitude verbs are complicated indexicals. If Richard's analysis of attitude verbs were
correct, then the truth conditions of (many) occurrences of (3) and (4) could be
distinguished without abandoning the principles of Propositional Truth and Full
Articulation. Against Richard's theory, however, it was argued that Richard's analysis
of attitude verbs is incorrect; propositional attitude verbs are not indexical in the way
required by Richard's theory. Moreover, Richard's theory of attitude ascriptions does
not preserve the legitimacy of our ordinary attitude ascribing practices: Richard's
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theory requires ordinary speakers to possess knowledge and abilities which they
typically do not possess.
Finally, Crimmins and Perry's theory differs from the theories of Salmon and
Richard in two important ways: First, Crimmins and Perry are seemingly able to
preclude the epistemological arguments from opacity once and for all because
Crimmins and Perry maintain that the mediators of propositional attitudes are cognitive
particulars rather than multiply realizable universals. The drawback of identifying the
third elements of instances of propositional attitudes with neurological tokens rather
than multiply realizable entities is that the mediators themselves cannot account for the
cognitive significance of occurrences. Thus Crimmins and Perry's theory does not in
and of itself offer any kind of solution to the problem of the cognitive significance of
occurrences. With regard to the semantic arguments from opacity, Crimmins and
Perry's theory differs from the theories of Salmon and Richard (and also The Naive
Russellian Theory) in that Crimmins and Perry deny the Principle of Full Articulation:
Crimmins and Perry allow that the proposition expressed by an occurrence may contain
unarticulated constituents which are tacitly referred to by the occurrence as a whole.
Thus, by appeal to unarticulated constituents, the propositions presented by occurrences
of (3) and (4) are distinguished, and therefore, by the Principle of Propositional Truth,
the truth conditions of these occurrences are distinguished.
As was shown above, however, Crimmins and Perry's theory of attitude
ascription faces several difficulties: First, analyzing occurrences of attitude ascriptions
as "tacitly referring to" unarticulated constituents, or even as presenting constraints on
such constituents, seems to embellish, and therefore alter, what is actually asserted by
occurrences of ascriptions; in most cases there is just no saying what the alleged
unarticulated constituents, or constraints, are. Second, Crimmins and Perry's theory
encounters difficulties associated with the alleged phenomenon of tacit reference
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failure, and consequently Crimmins and Perry's theory also fails to preserve the
legitimacy of our ordinary attitude ascribing practices.
What are the lessons for Russellian theorists? How can the Russellian theories
examined in this chapter be improved upon? It is, I hope, relatively clear that all of the
Russellian theories examined here run afoul of the fundamental difficulty with the
Fregean strategy: All of the Russellian theories considered in this chapter attempt to
steer clear of Scylla--the problem of precluding the epistemological arguments from
opacity and accounting for the cognitive significance of occurrences--by positing finely
individuated entities to serve as the mediators of propositional attitudes. But in
steering away from Scylla in this way, they steer directly for Charybdis, the problem of
preserving the legitimacy of our ordinary attitude ascribing practices. It should be
noticed that all three of the Russellian theories at least implicitly endorse two crucial
assumptions: First, all of the theorists considered in this chapter at least implicitly
endorse the Principle of Propositional Truth; they all assume, for example, that the
truth conditions of occurrences of (3) and (4) differ only if the propositions presented
by these occurrences are distinct. Second, they assume that the propositions presented
by these occurrences can be distinct only through the presence of the finely
individuated mediators of belief; they all assume, for example, that if the propositions
presented by occurrences of (3) and (4) are to be distinguished, it must be by appeal to
the distinct mediators utilized by Odile. (Salmon simply denies that occurrences of (3)
and (4) have distinct truth conditions, because his theory has no way of incorporating
"modes of apprehension" into the propositions presented by occurrences of (3) and (4).
Richard does not incorporate the mediators of belief directly into the propositions
presented by occurrences of (3) and (4), but rather "smuggles in" reference to the
mediators of belief by way of his complicated analysis of attitude verbs; what
distinguishes the semantic values of 'believes' are restrictions, and restrictions contain
sets of mediators. And finally Crimmins and Perry simply claim that the mediators of
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belief are unarticulated constituents of the propositions presented by occurrences of (3)
and (4).) It is because of these two crucial assumptions that the Russellian theorists
considered in this chapter get caught between Scylla and Charybdis: the three theories
considered here fail to preserve the legitimacy of our ordinary attitude ascribing
practices because they all assume that, e.g., the truth conditions of occurrences of (3)
and (4) can be distinguished only if these occurrences somehow represent the distinct
mediators utilized by Odile. This, however, runs counter to the fact that our ordinary
attitude ascribing practices do not require any knowledge of, or abilities to refer to,
anything like the posited mediators of propositional attitudes.
I suggest then that the lesson for the Russellian theorist is this; both
assumptions in the above paragraph must be rejected. First, the Principle of
Propositional Truth should be rejected. Note that, though the Principle of Propositional
Truth is at least implicitly endorsed by all three of the Russellian theorists, no argument
is offered in support of the principle. Moreover, I suggest that there is good to reject
the principle. Given the arguments in support of the principles of Direct Reference and
Semantic Innocence, and the intuitive plausibility of the binary analysis of attitude
verbs and the Principle of Full Articulation, it seems that the semantic arguments from
opacity themselves count as arguments against the Principle of Propositional Truth:
Our untutored intuitions to the effect that an occurrence of
(3) Odile believes that Twain is a great author.
may be true in c, while an occurrence of
(4) Odile believes that Clemens is a great author.
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may, at the same time, be false in c, should be interpreted not as evidence that such
occurrences do not present the Russellian propositions they seem to present, but rather
as evidence against the Principle of Propositional Truth. That is, instead of preserving
the Principle of Propositional Truth at the cost of either our untutored intuitions
concerning truth conditions or the straightforward Russellian analysis of attitude
ascriptions, I propose that the Principle of Propositional Truth be rejected ir. order to
preserve our intuitions concerning truth conditions and the straightforward Russellian
analysis of attitude ascriptions.
Second, the assumption that the mediators of belief, whatever they may be,
must be somehow represented by a true attitude ascription should be abandoned. Note
that if this second assumption is denied, then the Russellian theorist will no longer be
forced to steer between Scylla and Charybdis (or at least the channel between them will
be significantly broadened). If occurrences of (3) and (4) are not interpreted as saying
something about the complex epistemological and psychological facts which account
for Odile's behavior, then whatever epistemological theory we employ in order to
preclude the epistemological arguments from opacity and/or account for the cognitive
significance of occurrences will have no impact, or at least very little impact, on our
theory of propositional attitude ascriptions. I.e. if it is denied that ordinary attitude
ascriptions are in any sense about the complex psychological facts and conditions
which underlie, and are required for our having beliefs (desires, etc.), then these
complicated conditions can be individuated as finely as one likes without thereby
threatening the legitimacy of our ordinary attitude ascribing practices. This is not to
say, however, that these complex psychological facts are not relevant to, or even
necessary for, the truth of ordinary attitude ascriptions. For example, an occurrence of
(3) Odile believes that Twain is a great author.
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is no doubt true only if certain complicated neurological and psychological facts obtain.
But it does not follow that this occurrence preserits a proposition concerning these
complicated facts.
Perhaps an analogy can clarify this point. Consider an occurrence of
(37) Twain lived.
The truth of this occurrence is of course dependent upon all kinds of complicated
psychological facts concerning what it is to be alive. Suppose that humans are alive if
and only if they instantiate some complicated bio-chemical property involving DNA
and beta-waves. Under this supposition, an occurrence of (37) is true only if Twain
instantiated this complex property. It would be a mistake, however, to suppose that an
occurrence of (37) says something about DNA and beta-waves; it would be a mistake
to suppose that understanding an occurrence of (37), knowing the truth conditions of an
occurrence of (37), requires one to have some knowledge of DNA and beta-waves. An
occurrence of (37) is not about DNA and beta-waves and thus understanding such an
occurrence requires no knowledge of these specialized facts. Similarly there can be
little doubt that an occurrence of
(3) Odile believes that Twain is a great author.
is true only if Odile instantiates some complicated psychological, or neuro-chemical,
property. But it would be a mistake to conclude from this that knowing the truth
conditions of an occurrence of (3) requires one to have detailed knowledge of this
obscure psychological property.
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Chapter 3 Notes
I Salmon presents his theory in Salmon 1986, and Salmon 1989. Richard presents his
theory in Richard 1990, and Richard 1992. Crimmins and Perry present their theory in
Crimmins and Perry 1989. The theory is presented in more detail in Crimmins 1992a,
and is also sketched in Crimmins 1992b,
2 It is somewhat tendentious of me to interpret Richard's theory as respecting the
Principle of Semantic Innocence. Though Richard's theory can be interpreted so that it
respects this principle, Richard does not claim to endorse the principle. In the
conclusion of his book, Richard states, "With Frege and against Russell, I do not think
an attitude is characterized simply in terms of objects and properties. And like Frege, I
see this as requiring a sort of reference shift when an expression is embedded,"
(Richard 1990, p. 265).
3 Salmon 1986, p. I11. (The underlining is mine.)
4 Salmon's analysis of attitude verbs can perhaps be more perspicuously represented in
terms of "lambda notation." Salmon can be understood as maintaining that 'believes'
('desires' etc.) designates
Xxhp [3m (BEL <x, p, m>)].
5 That "modes of apprehension" are to account for the cognitive significance of
occurrences is made manifest in the following passage concerning the fabled ancient
astronomer who assents to an occurrence of 'Hesperus is Hesperus,' yet dissents from
an occurrence of 'Hesperus is Phosphorus':
When he reads and understands the sentence, 'Hesperus is Phosphorus',
he takes the proposition thereby encoded in a way different from the
way in which he takes this same proposition when he reads and
understands the sentence 'Hesperus is Hesperus'. He grasps the very
same proposition in two different ways, by means of two different
guises, and he takes this single proposition to be two different
propositions. When he takes it as a singular proposition of self-identity
between the first heavenly body sometimes visible in such-and-such
location at dusk and itself, he unhesitatingly assents inwardly to it.
When he takes it as a singular proposition identifying the first heavenly
body sometimes visible in such-and-such a location with the last
heavenly body visible in so-and-so location at dawn, he has no
inclination to assent inwardly to it, and may even dissent from it. His
verbal assent and his refraining from verbal assent with respect to the
two sentences are merely the outward manifestations of his inward
dispositions relative to the ways he takes the proposition encoded by the
two sentences, (Salmon 1986, p. 113),
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6 See Salmon 1986, p. 119-20, 126,
7 Salmon 1986, p. 107-8.
8 I assume that occurrences of sentences suffering from reference failure are neither
true nor false. I think this view of occurrences containing empty terms is correct,
though the correctness of this view is not presupposed by the arguments I present
against the subject oriented proposal; i.e. my arguments do not presuppose that on the
final analysis occurrences of sentences containing empty terms will turn out to neither
true nor false, Some of my arguments against the subject oriented proposal are of the
following form: "The subject oriented proposal predicts an instance of reference
failure for a particular occurrence, and therefore, if this proposal is correct, our
intuitions should dictate that this occurrence is neither true nor false. But our intuitions
do not dictate this, and consequently the subject oriented proposal is false." Thus all
that is presupposed by my arguments is that our untutored intuitions, regardless of
whether or not these intuitions are correct, dictate that sentences containing empty
terms are neither true nor false. This assumption is, I think, indubitable.
9 In Salmon 1989, p. 248-50, Salmon summarizes the three reasons he advances in
Frege's Puzzle.
10 Salmon 1989, p. 249. (Note the implicit appeal to the Principle of Propositional
Truth in this passage.)
1 1 Salmon 1986, p. 16-117. (Again note the emphasized portion of this passage, in
which Salmon commits himself to the Principle of Propositional Truth.)
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12 In the following passage Salmon's third reason and his commitment to the Principle
of Propositional truth is further elucidated:
Since the form of words 'Hesperus is Phosphorus' is considerably richer
in pragmatic impartations than other expressions having the same
semantic information content (e.g. 'Hesperus is Hesperus'), if one is not
careful one cannot help but mistake the 'that'-clause as referring to this
somewhat richer information--information which [the subject] does not
believe. ... Utterances of the locution ra believes that S may even
typically involve a Gricean implicature to the effect that the person
referred to believes the information that is typically pragmatically
imparted by utterances of S. Even so, that is not part of the literal
content of the belief attribution [emphasis added]. The general masses,
and most philosophers, are not sufficiently aware of the effect that an
implicature of this kind would have on ordinary usage. It is no
embarrassment to [Salmon's theory] that ordinary speakers typically deny
literally true belief attributions ... when these attributions involve a 'that'-
clause whose utterance typically pragmatically imparts information which
the speaker recognizes not to be among the beliefs . . of the subject of
the attribution, (Salmon 1986, p. 84-5).
13 Salmon 1986, p. 108-9, and throughout Chapter 8. (Recall that "the mode of
acquaintance by which one is familiar with a particular object is part of the mode of
apprehension by which one grasps a singular proposition involving that object," Salmon
1986, p. 108.)
14 In a very important footnote, Salmon states,
one cannot require ... that . . ways of taking objects are rich enough by
themselves to determine the object so taken, without the assistance of
extra-mental, contextual factors. Presumably, twin agents who are
molecule-for- molecule duplicates, and whose brains are in exactly the
same configuration down to the finest detail, may encounter different
(though duplicate) objects, taking them in the very same way. Likewise,
a single agent might be artificially induced through brain manipulations
into taking different objects the same way, (Salmon 1989, p. 275).
Salmon almost concedes here that his theory is susceptible to refutation via
epistemological arguments from opacity: if a subject A can "take two objects in the
same way," then surely it is nomologically possible to convince such a subject that he is
taking, or has taken, two objects in the same way, But if we could convince this subject
of this, then we could also lie to him, and convince him that he has "taken two objects in
one way," where he has really "taken one object in one way." If Salmon concedes this
much, then he concedes that his theory can be refuted by epistemological arguments
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from opacity. (Also note this passage implies that modes of apprehension are
universals.)
15 Ordinary speakers do not intuit that all occurrences of (4) are false--in some
"insensitive" contexts they will judge an occurrence of (4) to be true, and in other
contexts they will be hesitant to judge it to be either true or false.
16 This statement is too strong. As will be shown in the next section, Richard attempts
to maintain the principles of Direct Reference, Semantic Innocence, Full Articulation
and Propositional Truth by construing propositional attitude verbs as complicated
indexicals, and thereby distinguishing the propositions presented by occurrences of (3)
and (4).
17 I interpret Richard as maintaining that propositional attitudes are ternary relations,
though it also plausible to interpret Richard as following Salmon and maintaining that
propositional attitudes are binary relations: Recall that Salmon maintains that
occurrences of 'believes' designate existential generalizations of instances of the ternary
BEL relation; i.e. the semantic value of 'believes' is the following binary relation:
Ar Xp (3m (BEL <x, p, m>)) ( , )
(where m ranges over modes of apprehension). Similarly, Richard can be understood
as claiming that the attitude of belief is the following binary relation:
kx Xp (3a (BEL* c<, p >))(_, )
If Richard where interpreted in this way, then, just as Salmon must reject the Semantic
Principle of Dissent, Richard would be forced to reject the Epistemological Principle of
Dissent. Though it is plausible to interpret Richard in this way, I think it is more in the
spirit of his theory to interpret him as following Salmon and claiming that propostional
attitudes are ternary relations. (Note that in Chapter 4 1 will suggest that something
like this alternative interpretation of Richard is the correct analysis of propositional
attitudes.)
18 Richard 1990, p. 4.
19 Richard 1990, pp. 3, 41, 186.
20 Richard never explicitly endorses these principles: In the examples Richard
considers, he simply states what tokens he takes to be written on the subject's belief
blackboard, without considering the evidence required to support such statements.
Nonetheless, it is relatively clear from what Richard does say that he is committed to
these principles. That Richard is committed to this version of the Epistemological
Principle of Assent is relatively clear, though a brief argument illustrating why Richard
is committed to this version of the Epistemological Principle of Dissent is called for:
The reason that Richard is committed to this principle of dissent is that not endorsing
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such a principle is tauntamount to abandoning our untutored intuitions concerning the
truth conditions of occurrences, the very intuitions Richard's theory is designed to
preserve. Suppose that Richard denies this principle of dissent, yet maintains this
principle of assent. Further suppose that, as is compatible with this principle of assent,
Odile encounters (and understands etc.) an occurrence of 1, and dissents from it, even
though she has a token of I written on her belief blackboard. The problem is that, as
will shown be when Richard's view of ascriptions is explicated, it is sufficient for the
truth of an ascription of the form FOdile believes that E in any context c, that Odile
have a token of E written on her belief blackboard. Consequently, an ascription of the
form rOdile believes that fi is true in any context, even though Odile dissents from an
occurrence of L. This result is incompatible with our untutored intuitions concerning
attitude ascriptions.
21 That sentences of mentalese account for the cognitive significance of occurrences is
suggested by Richard's justification of folk explanations such as, "Randi waved because
Randi wanted Hesperus to rise, and he thought that if there was waving, Hesperus
would rise." In the process of justifying such explanations, Richard states,
It is plausible to think that, if Randi accepts a sentence of the form
W -- Rh
where W is a sentence with the truth condition of 'there is waving', Rh is
a sentence in which 'h' names Hesperus, 'R' picks out the property of
rising and he "desires-true" a token of Rh, this will make, or tend to
make, him wave, (Richard 1990, p. 174),
(For our purposes, accepting a sentence is equivalent to having a token of that sentence
written on one's belief blackboard.)
22 Richard 1990, p. 2.
23 Richard 1990, p. 60.
24 Richard 1990, p. 4.
25 Richard 1990, p. 136,
26 Richard's theory thus shares with Salmon's theory the rather odd feature that
occurrences of ascriptions of the form, rN believes that i do not assert that the referent
of N holds the epistemological attitude of belief toward the content expressed by E.
Richard thus seems committed to the view that attitude ascriptions are not strictly
speaking about propositional attitudes. (Recall that a subject holds the attitude of belief
toward a Russellian proposition p if and only if he has a mental sentence written on his
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belief blackboard which presents p.) Given this it is difficult to see how Richard's
theory could be a part of "folk psychology" as Richard claims it is.
27 A corresponding semantic argument from opacity can be constructed from this
case. If Peter assents to an occurrence of (17), and dissents from another occurrence of
(17), it follows from Richard's versions of the epistemological principles of assent and
dissent that a token of (17) is both written on, and not written on, Peter's belief
blackboard. Consequently, Peter both has and does not have the RAM
RAM (17):
<<IS A TALENTED MUSICIAN, being a musician>, <PADEREWSKI, Paderewski>>
in his RS. Consequently, in many contexts both the ascription
(17') Peter believes that Paderewski is a talented musician.
and the (negative) ascription
(17'n) Peter does not believe that Paderewski is a talented musician.
will be true. For example, if a context c determines no restrictions, then (17') is true in
c because RAM (17) is in Peter's RS, but (17'n) is true in c because RAM (17) is not in
Peter's RS. (I assume that there is no other RAM in Peter's RS which the that-clause of
(17'n) could represent.) In this way Kripke's 'Paderewski' cases can also be used to
generate semantic arguments from opacity against Richard's theory.
28 Actually, Richard never considers the epistemological arguments from opacity, and
thus I am to some extent constructing what his response to these arguments would be.
Because Richard does not distinguish the epistemological arguments from opacity from
the semantic arguments from opacity, he is only concerned with precluding the
semantic arguments from opacity. Thus he is only concerned to distinguish the RAM
associated with Peter's assent to the occurrence of (17) from the RAM associated with
Peter's dissent from the other occurrence of (17). This much can be accomplished by
distinguishing the linguistic elements of these RAMs and Richard attempts to do this by
identifying the linguistic elements with representational types. This same general idea
can be applied to the epistemological arguments from opacity, and I have thus taken the
liberty of augmenting Richard's theory accordingly.
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29 The idea of a causal or historical chain is taken from the causal theory, or "picture,"
of reference. The idea, first proposed in Kripke 1972, is that there is an initial
"dubbing event" in which a token I is somehow used to refer to an individual for the
first time. A second speaker may now use another token T' with the intention of
referring to whatever the first speaker referred to with his use of x, After hearing the
second speaker, a third speaker may use yet another token r" with the intention of
referring to whatever the second speaker referred to with his use of t', and so on. (Of
course t, V' and t" will be orthographically and/or phonetically similar.) In this way a
sort of historical tree of transmission is constructed; some tokens of type t will be
members, or nodes, of this tree, and others will not be.
30 Richard 1990, p. 184.
31 Richard's response to the corresponding semantic argument from opacity (See note
27 above.) is as follows: Because representational types are now the linguistic
elements of annotations, it follows from Peter's assent to token t. that the following
RAM is in Peter's RS:
RAM tA:
<<PAD,, Paderewski>, <IS A TALENTED MUSICIAN, is a talented musician>>
where 'PAD,' designates the representational type of the token of 'Paderewski'
appearing in the token t0, and the mentalese correlate token of t0 which is written on
Peter's belief blackboard. Moreover, it follows from Peter's dissent from token t., that
the following RAM is not in Peter's RS:
RAM t40
<<PAD,, Paderewski>, <IS A TALENTED MUSICIAN, being a talented musician>>
where 'PAD2' designates the representational type of the token of 'Paderewski'
appearing in t. , and the mentalese correlate of t. , which is not written on Peter's belief
blackboard.
Once representational types are introduced as the linguistic elements of
annotations, finer grained restrictions can be invoked and Richard can avoid the
semantic argument from opacity against his theory. Suppose that, as is described
above, Peter has RAM t0 in his RS, but does not have RAM t, in his RS. It follows
that in all contexts the ascriptions
(17') Peter believes that Paderewski is a talented musician,
and
(17'n) Peter does not believe that Paderweski is a talented musician.
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canriot both be true. Assume, for reductio, that there is some context c in which both
(17') and (17'n) are true. In order for (17') to be true in c, there must be a correlation
function that njaps the annotation
<'Paderewski', Paderewski>
to the annotation
<Pad,, Paderewski>
which obeys all the restrictions determined in c. (I am assuming that Peter refers to
Paderewski only via tokens of 'Paderewski'.) But in order for (17'n) to be true in c,
there must be no correlation functions which obey the restrictions determined by c and
map the annotation
<'Paderewski', Paderewski>
to an annotation occuring in a RAM in Peter's RS. Obviously there can be no such
context. Hence by individuating the linguistic elements of the RAMs in a subject's RS
as finely as representational types, Richard is able to preclude the semantic argument
from opacity involving Peter and 'Paderweski'.
32 In conversation Richard has suggested that the "interior condition" should not be
interpreted as a criterion for the identity of representational types, but rather as a
heurestic device for determining whether representational type A is identical to
representational type B; i.e. satisfying the exterior and interior condtions is not
sufficient for the identity of A and B, though failing to satisfy either of these conditions
is sufficient for the distinctness of A and B. In the end, representational types will be
individuated by some kind of neuro-chemical property. (I should point out that
Richard concedes that his explication of the interior condition is not clear.)
33 I think it is relatively clear how Odile's utterance of, 'I like Twain, but I'm not sure
about Clemens' can be construed as an instance of the phenomenon of opacity; the
phenomenon of opacity could be redefined so as to include such utterances as instances
of opacity. I do not, however, think that this is a serious problem, and thus I will not
undertake the task here.
34 If Richard allows, as seems plausible, that occurrences of infinitive propositional
attitude verbals designate the epistemological attitudes, rather than one of the many
relations which serve as designatums, then there may be eternal sentences which
contain propositional attitude verbs. For example, 'To understand life is a worthy goal'
seems to be an eternal sentence which expresses something about the epistemological
attitude, or state, of understanding.
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35 Another way in which many (perhaps all) belief ascriptions are context sensitive
concerns degrees of belief; there is no absolute criterion dictating how firm a subject's
convictions must be in order for a belief ascription about that subject to be true.
Consequently it seems plausible to suppose that the degree of belief required for the
truth of an ascription varies from context to context. For example, in a context in
which I am conversing with a fellow philosopher, my utterance of 'I believe that God
exists' might be true, while in another context in which I am conversing with a Priest,
an occurrence of this same sentence might be false, even though my convictions
concerning God's existence do not change from context to context. This point also
applies to other attitude verbs, and thus there is undoubtedly a sense in which
propositional attitudes are context dependent, but this is not the kind of context
dependency required by Richard's theory.
36 For example, Richard states, "belief and other propositional attitudes are mediated
relations," (Richard 1990, p. 38).
37 Richard briefly considers this problem and he suggests a means of avoiding it. (See
Richard 1990, pp. 244-6.) Richard suggests that the Russellian component of
annotations containing 'believes', or BELIEVES, ('doubts' or DOUBTS etc.) be
identified with the character, or "constant meaning," of 'believes', as opposed to one of
the many possible semantic values of 'believes'. It is not clear, to me at any rate, what
this proposed amendment amounts to: Is Richard suggesting (a) that the semantic value
of an embedded occurrence of 'believes' is the character of believes? Do the characters
of attitude verbs serve as the oblique designations of occurrences of the verbs? Or is
the suggestion merely (b) that the RAM determined by a sentence containing a
propositional attitude verb does not contain the semantic value of the verb as a
Russellian constituent, even though the semantic value of the term is still the relation
determined by the character? Crimmins, who criticizes Richard on this point, interprets
Richard as maintaining (a), and in responding to this criticism Richard does not correct
Crimmins' interpretation. (See note 3 in Crimmins 1992b.) It is not clear, however,
that interpretation (a) of Richard's proposal even makes sense: If embedded
occurrences of 'believes' designate the character of 'believes', then this character must,
in some contexts, determine itself as semantic value. But it is not clear that this is
coherent: A character is a function which, given a context, determines a semantic
value. In set theoretic terms, a character is a set of ordered pairs, the first elements of
which are contexts, and the second elements of which are sets. If, given some contexts,
the character of 'believes' determines itself as semantic value, then the character of
believes contains an ordered pair whose second element is itself. But this of course
violates the axioms of standard set theory. Interpretation (b), on the other hand, is also
problematic: If the that-clause of an ascription determines a RAM such that the
Russellian constituent corresponding to the embedded attitude verb is the character of
that verb, and truth is defined in terms of RAMs, then the relation designated by the
embedded verb makes no contribution toward the truth conditions of the ascription.
Under interpretation (b), the semnantic value designated by an embedded occurrence of
'believes' ('desires' etc.) is wholly superfluous.
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At any rate, even if it is granted that Richard's amendment succeeds in rescuing
Richard's analysis from the above problem concerning iterated attitude ascriptions,
Richard's amendment is ad hoc: The essence of the problem is that attitude verbs do
not seem to be indexical: when Otho sincerely utters 'I believe that snow is white' in a
context c, and Oscar sincerely utters this same sentence in context c', then, contrary to
Richard's analysis, it follows that Otho and Oscar hold the same attitude toward the
same proposition. Moreover, if Richard's proposal can rescue his analysis from the
above difficulty, it does so only at an extremely high price: If the characters of
propositional attitudes serve as the Russellian elements of annotations, then RAMs can
serve as the "vehicles of truth" only if the predicate 'true' is itself analyzed as an
indexical; "'is true'... is a predicate that determines a different [property] in different.
.. contexts," (p. 246). This complication is both undesirable, and unwarranted.
38 How does Richard's theory cope with ascriptions such as 'The Greeks believed that
the Earth was flat'? Richard does not consider such "plural ascriptions," but it seems
that in order to account for them Richard must either (a) posit something like
Representational Systems for groups of people, or (b) claim that the RAM determined
by the that-clause of this ascription is to represent RAMs in the RS of most (many?)
individual Greeks. Both options, however, are problematic. Concerning (a), it seems
extremely unlikely that there is one set of mental representation types such that all of
the relevant Greeks employed instances of those types. More importantly, concerning
both (a) and (b), in order to know the truth conditions of 'The Greeks believed that the
Earth was flat' one does not even have to consider whether the RAM expressed by the
that-clause represents a RAM in the appropriate Greek community RAM. In making
ascriptions such as 'The Greeks believed that the Earth was flat' we simply do not
consider what sentences of mentalese the Greeks might have employed. How could we
citizens of the Twentieth Century even consider such mental representations, especially
those of us who do not speak ancient Greek?
39 According to Richard's definition of the character of 'believes', CHAR( ) is function
from contexts to intensions, i.e. functions from ordered pairs of subjects and RAMs to
sets of possible worlds. For the sake of simplicity, I suppose that CHAR( ) is function
from contexts to extensions, i.e. sets of ordered pairs.
40 Richard 1990, p. 142,
41 See Richard 1990, p. 136.
42 In a footnote in Richard 1992, Richard states that "an adequate account of
representations will individuate them so finely that direct--as opposed to
quantificational--reference to them will turn out to be (practically) impossible," (p.
131). It is not clear what Richard is proposing here. I assume that by 'quantificational
reference' Richard means something like, "reference by description." Is Richard
suggesting that in order for Otho to grasp the proposition expressed by Oscar's
utterance of (3), Otho and Oscar must refer (?!) to the same representational types via
the same descriptions? Surely this is implausible. But under any other interpretation,
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Richard's proposal does not change anything: The problem is that ordinary speakers do
not know enough about one another's representational types to compute the value of
R( ) for a given context c. That is, if r is the value of R(c), they cannot "refer" to r
"directly," "quantificationally," or any other way, because they lack the ability to
distinguish r from r' and r" etc. (Note that if a speaker is to know the truth conditions
of a belief ascription, he must know which particular relation is denoted by the
occurrence of 'believes'. But this requires him to know which particular restriction is in
operation in the context. If r is the restriction determined by R( ), the speaker must
somehow be able to distinguish r from other restrictions which might also have been
determined.)
43 Richard 1990, p. 83.
44 In denying the Principle of Full Articulation Crimmins and Perry are not
committing themselves to the view that there are propositional constituents which are
not in any way represented syntactically. That is, Crimmins and Perry allow for the
possibility of there being syntactic items which are not phonetically or orthographically
realized--something like traces or PRO--which have the relevant propositional
constituents as semantic values. They remain neutral as to whether or not there are
wholly unrepresented propositional constituents, and are concerned only to deny that
all propositional constituents must be overtly represented.
45 Crimmins and Perry maintain that, though notions and ideas are particulars, the
same notion or idea can be a constituent in many beliefs (desires, etc.) just as "one may
... be a member of many different committees or clubs," (Crimmins and Perry 1989,
ftnt. p. 692.)
46 This is an accurate statement of Crimmins and Perry's account of explicit, or
occurrent belief, though Crimmins offers a different analysis of tacit belief. Crimmins
maintains that a subject tacitly holds the attitude of belief toward a Russellian
proposition p just in case, roughly, "it is as if A has an explicit belief in p," (Crimmins
1992a, p. 65). To simplify exposition, I will concentrate on Crimmins and Perry's
account of explicit belief. (As will become apparent in Chapter 4, I deny that there is
any important distinction between tacit and explicit, or occurrent, beliefs; I deny that
there are two "kinds" of belief.)
47 Crimmins 1992a, p. 78. Note that, as I understand him, in appealing to the
phenomenon of recognition failure Crimmins, unlike Richard, does not violate the
Independence Constraint. Richard violates the Independence Constraint because he
appeals to the phenomenon of recognition failure as a metaphysical criterion for the
identity of representational types. Crimmins, on the other hand, merely states that
however notions are in the end to be individuated, they must be individuated at least
finely enough to account for the phenomenon of recognition failure. (Because
cognitive particulars are physical entities they presumably will be individuated by
appeal to physical properties such as causal history and location.)
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48 Crimmins and Perry, like Richard, never consider the relation between a subject's
verbal behavior and the mental representations the subject instantiates. Thus I am to
some extent constructing what I think Crimmins and Perry's responses to the
epistemological and semantic arguments would be.
49 This statement is perhaps a bit too strong, as it does not follow from the fact that b
and b' are tokens that they are not identical, especially since Crimmins and Perry
maintain that a notion can appear in more than one belief. (See footnote 45.) It is
conceivable that one mental token is associated with both Odile's assent to (O1), and
her dissent from (02). Consequently, even if the mediators of propositional attitudes
are tokens, it is not obvious that the individuation and independence constraints will be
satisfied. Nonetheless, for the sake of argument I will grant that there is some
independent means of individuating cognitive particulars which individuates them
finely enough to preclude all nomologically possible epistemological arguments from
opacity.
50 Crimmins 1992b, p. 52.
51 This is, unfortunately, only a characterization of Crimmins and Perry's analysis.
Much of what I omit concerns how my rather enigmatic phrase 'appropriately
composed of' is to be understood. Showing how the content of a belief is determined
by its structure and the contents of its constituents is a rather complicated project which
extends beyond my somewhat limited concerns here. Also, additional complexities are
required in order to account for the truth of ascriptions concerning tacit beliefs: On
Crimmins' view, it would be true to say of an ordinary subject that he believes that
stationwagons are inedible, though it is unlikely that he instantiates a belief that has this
Russellian proposition as content.
52 Crimmins and Perry 1989, p. 699.
53 For more alleged counterexamples to the Principle of Full Articulation, see
Crimmins 1992a, p. 16-21, and Perry 1986. (The arguments against Crimmins and
Perry's analysis of attitude ascriptions presented in section 3.3.2 can be generalized to
show that none of these phenenoma can adequately be accounted for by appeal to tacit
reference and unarticulated constituents. I will not, however, develop this point
further.)
54 I am not maintaining that Crimmins and Perry cannot in some way extend there
theory so that it could potentially preserve the "literal truth" of such folk explanations
of behavior. That is, I am not maintaining that the Deductive-Nomological model of
explanation is the only model of acceptable explanations of behavior. All I am
claimning is that, first, this familiar way of accounting for the truth conditions of
explanations is not open to them, and second, if they are to succeed in preserving the
"literal truth" of such folk explanations, then the onus is on them to provide an
alternative model of explanation.
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55 This is not to say that a more specific location is never intended by an utterance of
'It's raining.' For instance, if I utter this sentence in response to your query, "What's the
weather like directly outside your window?" clearly my utterance is true just in case
proposition (a) is realized. (Though of course what counts as being "directly outside
my window" probably varies from context to context).
Also note that in situations in which no specific location is presented by an
occurrence of 'It's raining', our intuitions concerning the truth conditions of the
occurrence are quite hazy. For example, if I utter 'It's raining' in an offhand way, and it
is raining in the greater Boston area, my utterance seems "truer" than it would be if it
were raining directly outside my window only. A correct account of the semantics of
'Its raining' should account for not only the context sensitivity of this sentence, but also
the nebulousness of our intuitions concerning the truth conditions of its occurrences. It
does not seem, however, that Crimmins and Perry's theory can account for the haziness
of our intuitions. If some specific, well defined, place is tacitly referred to by an
occurrence of 'its raining', then one would expect ordinary speakers to have firm and
well defined intuitions concerning truth conditions.
56 Note that I am not claiming that there are no such things as notions, nor am I
claiming that all speakers are too "epistemologically distant" to refer to them. It seems
at least plausible to suppose that there are "cognitive particulars" such as beliefs and
that these entities are composed of entities like notions and ideas. And it even seems
plausible that we can, when we have the requisite knowledge and intentions, refer to
them. For example, it seems plausible to suppose that the occurrence of 'it' in my
utterance of 'It is Quine's normal notion of Clinton' refers to Quine's normal notion of
Clinton (if Quine has such a notion). All I am claiming is that it is extremely
implausible to interpret ordinary speakers uttering ordinary attitude ascriptions as
tacitly referring to specific notions and ideas. The only thing that could determine that
I had tacitly referred to this particular notion as opposed to that particular notion would
be my intention to refer to this notion as opposed to that notion, but in ordinary cases
speakers lack such intentions.
57 Perry seems willing to admit that both ascriptions, and negated ascriptions, might
express constraints on notions rather than tacitly refer to specific notions. Crimmins,
however, maintains that all ascriptions at least attempt to specify notions, though some
negated ascriptions merely express constraints on notions. (See note 60.) Crimmins
eschews the constraint analysis with regard to (positive) ascriptions because he thinks it
is implausible to suppose that specific constraints are provided by occurrences (See
Crimmins 1992a, p. 168-9). I, of course, agree with Crimmins on this point, but why
does he find it any more plausible to suppose that specific notions, as opposed to
constraints, are specified?
58 Schiffer makes a point quite similar to this in Schiffer 1992.
59 Crimmins 1992a, p. 183-4,
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60 Of course similar arguments would apply if I uttered
(36n) That yokel does not believe that it's the tallest thing in the world,
More specifically, we intuit that occurrences of (36n) would be false, rather than
meaningless in situation 1, and true rather than meaningless in situation 2.
I find Crimmins' treatment of these difficulties very puzzling, He assumes,
without argument, that in either situation 1, or in situation 2, an occurrence of (36)
would be meaningless. And then he goes on to amend his account so that in either
situation I, or in situation 2, an occurrence of (36n) is predicted to be true, (He
suggests that the 'not' appearing an a relevant occurrence of (36n) designates a "wide-
scope"--it is not the case that--negation operator.) I do not understand what is
motivating Crimmins here: Why is Crimmins willing to abandon our intuitions
concerning occurrences of (36), but not (36n)?
61 Crimmins and Perry 1989, p. 705.
62 Crimmins 1992a, p. 44.
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4.0 Sketch of a Russellian Theory.
In this chapter I present what I think are the appropriate Russellian responses to
the problems and arguments posed by the phenomenon of opacity. That is, I present
solutions and responses to the problems and arguments posed by opacity which respect
the principles of direct reference and semantic innocence, and also heed the lessons
learned in the previous chapters. While these responses do not in and of themselves
constitute a full-fledged theory of propositional attitudes and propositional attitude
ascriptions, they do constitute a kind of a sketch of a viable Russellian theory. The
chapter proceeds as follows: In section 4. 1 I present and motivate a response to the
epistemological arguments from opacity, and in section 4.2 I discuss the problem of the
cognitive significance of occurrences. In section 4.3 I sketch the theoretical machinery
of "Discourse Representation Theory" (or "DRT") and utilize this machinery in
presenting a response to the semantic arguments from opacity. Finally, in section 4.4 I
utilize the machinery of DRT to sketch a Russellian account of the truth conditions of
ordinary "folk" explanations of behavior,
4.1 The Appropriate Russellian Response to the Epistemological Arguments From
Opacity.
Recall the epistemological arguments from opacity against the Naive Russellian
Theory: It follows from Odile's assent to (O1) and
The Epistemological Principle of Assent: If, at time t, a normal, sincere,
understanding subject assents to an occurrence of a declarative sentence 1,
then he holds the attitude of belief toward the content expressed by that
occurrence of £, at t.
that
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(A) Believes <Odile, P>.
(where 'P' designates the Russellian proposition that Twain is a great author.) And it
follows from Odile's dissent from (02) and
The Epistemological Principle of Dissent: If, at time t, a normal, sincere,
understanding subject dissents from an occurrence of a declarative
sentence Z, then he does not hold the attitude of belief toward the content
expressed by that occurrence of E, at t. (Again note that dissenting from
an occurrence of a sentence is to be distinguished from assenting to an
occurrence of the negation of a sentence.)
that
(B) --(Believes <Odile, P>).
(I am again ignoring time and tense.) In order to avoid refutation by way of the
epistemological arguments, a Russellian theorist must reject either, (i) at least one of the
tenets of the Naive Russellian Theory, or (ii) one of the above epistemological principles.
All of the Russellian theorists considered in Chapter 3 opt for (i); they all reject
the Naive Russellian Theory's binary analysis of propositional attitudes in favor of a
ternary analysis. Thus they avoid refutation by the epistemological arguments by
claiming that what follows from Odile's assent to (O1) is not that (A), but rather that
(A*) BEL <Gdile, P, m>
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(where 'm' designates some kind of mediator--a "mode of apprehension,"
"representational type," or "cognitive particular.") And they claim that what follows
from Odile's dissent from (02) is not that (B) but rather that
(B*) -(BEL <Odile, P, m'>)
where 'm' and 'm" allegedly designate distinct mediators. In this way the Russellian
theorists considered in Chapter 3 attempt to avoid the contradictory result that a binary
relation both holds and does not hold between Odile and the Russellian proposition that
Twain is a great author.
There are, however, several difficulties with this general strategy for avoiding
refutation by way of the epistemological arguments. First, as was illustrated in the
preceding chapters, it is very difficult to state an acceptable principle of individuation for
the posited mediators. (This difficulty is further elaborated in Appendix A.) It seems
that the Russellian theorists who posit such mediators are guaranteed to satisfy the
individuation and independence constraints only if the mediators are identified with
particulars. But if the mediators are identified with particulars, as opposed to multiply
realizable universals, then the general strategy of positing mediators is rendered ad hoc:
If mediators are particulars, then there can be no nomonological relationship between
mediators themselves and kinds of behavior. Second, the ternary analysis of
propositional attitudes does not accord well with the way ordinary subjects speak, and
think, about propositional attitudes. This is illustrated by the intuitive validity of
arguments such as the following:
(I) Oscar believes everything that Odile believes,
(2) Odile believes that Twain is a great author.
Therefore,
(3) Oscar believes that Twain is a great author.
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It seems natural to analyze this argument as
(1') Vx ((believes <Odile, x>) --- (believes <Oscar, x>))
(2') believes <Odile, P>
Therefore,
(3') believes <Oscar, P>
where 'believes' designates the attitude of belief, and 'P' designates the content expressed
by 'that Twain is a great author'. Theorists who endorse the ternary analysis of
propositional attitudes, however, cannot avail themselves to this analysis; they must
either deny that the argument has the logical form displayed in (1')-(3'), or they must
deny that occurrences of 'believes' designate the attitude of belief. (Crimmins and Perry
seem to opt for the former, while Salmon and Richard opt for the latter.) Both options,
however, are counterintuitive: our intuitions dictate that occurrences of propositional
attitude verbs designate binary relations and that what they designate are propositional
attitudes, not semantic proxies for them.
For these reasons I suggest that it is a mistake to analyze propositional attitudes as
ternary relations; the Naive Russellian theory is correct in maintaining that propositional
attitudes are binary relations, and that occurrences of attitude verbs designates these
binary relations. This is not to deny, however, that propositional attitudes are in some
sense "mediated relations" (What would a nonmediated relation be?). One must not
confuse the question, "What are the relata of propositional attitudes?" with question,
"What is it for a propositional attitude to hold between such relata?" Consider, for
example, the relation being North of. This is a relation which holds between Earth-
bound objects, and there is a sense in which it is a mediated relation: x is North of y only
if there is some appropriate mediating region of the Earth's surface which lies between x
and y. But it would be a mistake to conclude that being North of is a ternary relation
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which holds between triples consisting of two Earth-bound objects and a mediating
region of the Earth's surface; to draw this conclusion would be to confuse issues
concerning what the relata of being North of are with issues concerning what it is for one
of these relata to be North of another. To maintain that propositional attitudes must be
ternary relations because they are mediated relations would be to make a similar mistake.
While it is no doubt true that Odile can hold the attitude of belief toward the Russellian
proposition that Twain is a great author only if certain mediating psychological
conditions are met, it is a mistake to conclude that attitude of belief must be a ternary
relation between objects, propositions, and some aspect of these psychological
conditions,
The response to the arguments from opacity which I advocate does not require
one to deny the straightforward binary analysis of propositional attitudes and
propositional attitude verbs, nor any other tenet of the Naive Russellian Theory. Rather,
the response which I advocate is to deny the Epistemological Principle of Dissent. In
terms of the above argument, I maintain that (B) does not follow from Odile's dissent
from (02), The Epistemological Principle of Dissent, and also the Epistemological
Principle of Assent, however, seem to be supported by the intuitions that a subject cannot
fail to know the contents of his own mental states. (Hereafter I will refer to these sorts of
intuitions as Cartesian intuitions.) Though it is difficult to describe these intuitions in
detail, the general idea is well expressed by Stalnaker:
What we see and know is partly a matter of what we are looking at, and
what is true, and we can get it wrong. But we can't be wrong about what
we think, or think we think about. When I retreat from saying how things
are to saying how they seem--how they are according to me--I retreat
from a claim about the world to a claim about my own mind, and I can tell
that the claim is true by introspection--by observing what is internal to my
mind. 1
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In view of these intuitions, how can either the Epistemological Principle of Dissent or the
Epistemological Principle of Assent be denied? If a subject understands an occurrence
of I and sincerely indicates that he does not believe what is expressed by this occurrence,
then how could he possibly be wrong? When a normal understanding subject assents to
an occurrence of a sentence (He nods his head, or utters 'true'.) he is indicating that he
thinks what is expressed by the sentence is true, and, though the sentence may not in fact
express a truth, since he is retreating to a claim about his own mental states, surely he
cannot be mistaken. Similarly when a subject dissents from an occurrence of a sentence
(He shakes his head, shrugs his shoulders, or utters 'I don't believe it',), he may be wrong
in not thinking that what the sentence expresses is true, but insofar as he is reporting his
own mental states, insofar as he is reporting that he does not believe what is expressed by
the sentence, surely he must be correct. How can Russellian theorists reject the
Epistemological Principle of Dissent without abandoning the Cartesian intuition that a
subject cannot be mistaken concerning the contents of his own thoughts?
I think the line of reasoning expressed in the above paragraph is fallacious.
Though I heartily endorse our Cartesian intuitions--we are in some sense guaranteed to
know the contents of our own thoughts in a direct, nonempirical manner--these intuitions
do not provide support for the Principles of Assent and Dissent. In order to understand
why this is so, our Cartesian intuitions must be described more precisely: What exactly
is it we are guaranteed to know, and in what sense are we guaranteed to know it?
Since the advent of "anti-individualist" or "wide" theories of psychological
content, philosophers have been concerned with reconciling our Cartesian intuitions with
the fact that the content of one's thoughts may be determined by environmental factors
which are beyond one's ken. My belief that that's a beech tree is true just in case the
object of my belief is a beech tree; if it were an elm tree, my belief would be false,
regardless of whether or not I have even heard of elm trees. Given this kind of anti-
individualism, how can I be said to know what the content of my belief is? If I cannot
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distinguish beeches from elms, how can I know the difference between the thought that
that's a beecth tree and the thought that that's an elm n tree? And if cannot distinguish the
contents of these thoughts, then how can I know that I believe that that's a beech tree, as
opposed to believing that that's an elm tree?
Burge, and others, 2 have provided a solution to this difficulty. Burge maintains
that the certainty of our knowledge of the contents of our own thoughts is explained by
"cogito-like" judgments, where cogito-like judgments are judgments about the content of
one's current thought. Consider the thought that
(a) Water is wet.
To make a cogito-like judgment about one's thought that (a) is to make a self-ascriptive,
second order judgment about this thought, viz. the judgment that
(b) I am now thinking that water is wet.
When one makes a cogito-like judgment such as (b), the content expressed by the that-
clause is both thought, and thought about, simultaneously, Burge explains,
When one [judges] that one is thinking that p, one is not taking one's
thought (or thinking) that p merely as an object. One is thinking that p in
the very event of [judging] knowledgeably that one is thinking it. It is
thought and thought about in the same mental act. 3
Thus, when one makes the cogito-like judgment that
(b) I am now thinking that water is wet.
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one simultaneously thinks the thought that
(a) Water is wet.
It is this self-referential feature of cogito-like judgments which accounts for the certainty
of our self-knowledge. Burge explains that "the object, or subject matter, of one's
thoughts is not contingently related to the thoughts one thinks about it . .. An error
based on a gap between one's thoughts and the subject matter is simply not possible in
these cases."4 For example, when Bert makes the cogito-like judgment (b), his judgment
must be true because in judging that he is thinking that water is wet, Bert ipsofacto
thinks that water is wet. Suppose that Bert lived on Twin-Earth where twater--a
substance which has the molecular structure XYZ, yet is phenomenologically similar to
water--ran in the rivers and boiled in the teapots. If Bert inhabited this environment, then
when making the cogito-like judgment that he would express with the sentence 'I am now
thinking that water is wet' Bert would be making the cogito-like judgment that
(c) I am now thinking that twater is wet.
And if Bert's environment were such that (c) is the cogito-like judgment he would be
making, then Bert would ipso facto be thinking a different thought, viz. the thought that
(d) Twater is wet.
In making a cogito-like judgment the content of the that-clause is both thought and
thought about simultaneously, and consequently it is impossible for such cogito-like
judgments to be false; the content of a cogito-like judgment "is self-referentially fixed by
the judgment itself; and the judgment is self-verifying." 5
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It should be clear from the above how Burge's model of self-knowledge manages
to reconcile anti-individualism with our Cartesian intuitions. Our knowledge of the
content of our own thoughts is compatible with anti-individualistic theories of content
because no facts about the environment of a subject can impugn the correctness of a
cogito-like judgment made by that subject, In order to think an empirical thought certain
physical facts about one's environment, or enabling conditions, must obtain. For
example, in order for Bert to think a thought with the content twater is wet, it must be
XYZ that runs in the rivers and boils in the teapots of Bert's environment. One does not,
however, need to know the complex environmental facts which determine the content of
one's thought in order to think an empirical thought. In order to think that twater is wet
Bert need not have the capacity to distinguish XYZ from HO, nor must he know that the
content of his thought is individuated by his relation to certain physical and/or social
facts. One need not be a chemist and a philosopher to think that water is wet.
The same considerations hold for cogito-like judgments. If Bert makes a cogito-
like judgment, then the enabling conditions for making that judgment are met, regardless
of what these conditions involve. Bert need not have the capacity to distinguish H,O
from XYZ in order to make the cogito-like judgment that
(b) I am now thinking that water is wet.
And if (b) is the cogito-like judgment that Bert would make in his environment, then in
making this judgment Bert correctly identifies the content of his thinking. The necessary
correctness of cogito-like judgments is not impugned by anti-individualism because,
Burge explains,
If background conditions are different enough so that there is another
object of reference in one's self-referential thinking, they are also different
enough so that there is another thought. 6
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Burge's account of self-knowledge goes a long way toward explaining and
clarifying our Cartesian intuitions, It explains why we are guaranteed to know, in a non-
empirical manner, the content of our thoughts and it does so without positing suspicious
mental entities--Cartesian ideas, Empiricist sense data, or Fregean senses--that are in
some way "epistemologically transparent." Furthermore, Burge's account successfully
explains how we are guaranteed to know the content of our thoughts in this way even
though the content of our thoughts may be fixed by factors beyond our ken. Notice,
however, that it does not follow from Burge's account that a subject is guaranteed to
know whether or not he holds a particular propositional attitude toward the content of his
thinking. Thinking, or better entertaining, a particular content is to be distinguished
from holding the attitude of belief, or any other attitude, toward the content of one's
thinking. When a subject is thinking that p in the very act of judging knowledgeably that
he is thinking it, he cannot misidentify the content of his thoughts, but it does not follow
that he cannot be mistaken concerning the attitude he holds toward that content. As
Davidson states, "the argument shows only that one cannot go wrong in identifying the
content of an attitude, which is not a reason why one cannot go wrong about the
existence of the attitude."7 Burge's account of self-knowledge explains why a subject
cannot fail to know the contents of his own thoughts, yet it does not imply that a subject
is guaranteed to know whether or not he holds a particular attitude toward a particular
content. Consequently, assuming that Burge's account of self-knowledge is roughly
correct, the phenomenon of guaranteed self-knowledge does not provide support for the
epistemological principles of assent and dissent. Thus Russellian theorists can reject the
Principle of Dissent without abandoning our Cartesian intuitions.
Though neither the Epistemological Principle of Assent nor the Epistemological
Principle of Dissent is supported by the phenomenon of guaranteed self-knowledge, there
are cogent reasons for endorsing the Epistemological Principke of Assent. I will argue
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that there is a necessary connection between a subject's sincere understanding assent to
an occurrence of 1, and the subject's holding the attitude of belief toward the content
expressed by this occurrences of E, and thus the Epistemological Principle of Assent
enjoys a kind of privileged status. There is, however, no such necessary connection
between a subject's sincere understanding dissent from an occurrence of E and the
subject's not holding the attitude of belief toward the content expressed by this
occurrence of E.
Recall the'Epistemological Principle of Assent:
The Epistemological Principle of Assent: If, at time t, a normal, sincere,
subject who understands an occurrence of E assents to this occurrence,
then he holds the propositional attitude of belief towards the content
expressed by this occurrence of 1, at t.
Why is it that if a sincere understanding subject assents to an occurrence of E, then he
izmust hold the attitude of belief toward the content expressed by this occurrence'? What is
the necessary connection between sincere understanding assent to an occurrence, and
holding the attitude of belief toward the content expressed by the occurrence? It is
significant that an act of assenting to an occurrence need not involve a self-ascription; in
assenting to an occurrence of E, one need not utter, nor think a thought that would be
expressed by, a sentence of the form q believe that 2. Rather in assenting to an
occurrence one need only nod and judge that the content expressed by E is true. Thus the
Epistermological Principle of Assent is true not because of a ubiquitous ability of subjects
to know, and report, (i) the contents of their propositional attitudes and (ii) which
propositional attitudes they hold toward those contents, but rather the principle is true
because one's act of sincere assent to an occurrence of S constitutes conclusive evidence
that one holds the attitude of belief toward the content expressed by this occurrence. In
order to motivate and clarify this defense of the Epistemological Principle of Assent, I
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must at least adumbrate an account of what it is for a subject to hold a propositional
attitude--the attitude of belief in particular--toward a Russellian proposition.
Though I cannot give a comprehensive analysis of propositional attitudes, I
endorse a dispositional and broadly functional analysis. More specifically, I agree with
Stalnaker's rough characterizations:
To desire that P is to be disposed to act in ways that would tend to bring it
about that P in a world in which one's beliefs, whatever they are, were
true. To believe that P is to be disposed to act in ways that would tend to
satisfy one's desires, whatever they are, in a world in which P (together
with one's other beliefs) were true.8
(I optimistically maintain that all other propositional attitudes, e.g. hope, fear, regret,
etc., can be defined in terms of belief and desire. Also note that if Odile satisfies these
conditions for belief with regard to the Russellian proposition presented by (01), then
she also satisfies these conditions with regard to the Russellian proposition presented by
(02): If Odile is disposed to do what would best satisfy her desires if the proposition
presented by (O1) were true, then Odile is ipsofacto disposed to do what would best
satisfy her desires if the proposition presented by (02) were true.)
Hence I maintain that a subject holds the attitude of belief toward P if and only if
the subject is disposed to behave in certain ways. To maintain this dispositional analysis
of the attitude of belief, however, is not to deny that some kind of intrinsic
psychological\neurological properties must be instantiated by a subject if he is to hold the
attitude of belief toward a Russellian proposition, Just as a physical object has the
dispositional property of being brittle only if it instantiates certain intrinsic
physical\chemical properties, so a subject holds the attitude of belief toward a Russellian
proposition only if he instantiates certain intrinsic neurological\psychological properties.
(Moreover, just as an ordinary subject can know that an object is brittle even though he
has no detailed knowledge of the intrinsic properties responsible for its brittleness, so an
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ordinary person can know of a subject that he holds the attitude of belief toward P even
though the ordinary person has no detailed knowledge of the intrinsic properties
responsible for this belief,) Furthermore, the intrinsic properties responsible for a
subject's holding the attitude of belief toward a Russellian proposition may, and I assume
do, involve the instantiation of systems of mental representations which represent objects
and properties. (Consequently this dispositional analysis of propositional attitudes is
wholly compatible with a "representational theory of the mind.") This is not to suggest,
however, that holding the attitude of belief toward P requires that a subject "token" a
"sentence of mentalese" which represents P. As Stalnaker suggests, "these
representations could conceivably take the form of sentences of a language of thought
written in the belief center in one's brain, but they could also take the form of pictures,
maps, charts, or graphs, or (most plausibly) a diversity of redundant forms, none of
which are very much like any of the forms which our public representations take." 9
Thus to hold the attitude of belief toward P is to be disposed to behave in such a
way that, if one's beliefs are (or were) true, one's desires will be (or would be) satisfied.
And I assume that one can be so disposed only if one instantiates an appropriate mental
representation, or a system of mental representations, i.e. a mental representation whose
content is P. But what is it for a mental representation, or more generally a state of a
representational system, to have Russellian proposition P as its content? Not
surprisingly, I can give only the barest sketch of an answer to this question. Following
Dretske (more or less 10), 1 maintain that an instance of a state a of a representational
system (where humans are but one kind of representational system) represents, or has as
content, Russellian proposition P just in case instances of a are the result of a process or
mechanism whosefinction is to indicate P by producing or resulting in instances of state
a. (Misrepresentation of P occurs when the representational system instantiates an
instance of a state a which is produced by a mechanism whose function is to indicate P
by producing instances of a, though P does not in fact obtain.) A process or mechanism
221
indicates P by producing or resulting in instances of a state a just in case it is
nomologically necessary that the mechanism produce an instance of a if and only if P
obtains. For a process or mechanism to have as its function indicating p by producing
instances of a is for the process or mechanism to be, in some sense, designed to indicate
P by producing instances of a--indicating P by producing a is what the process or
mechanism is supposed to do. For example, a fuel gauge has the function of indicating
that the tank is half full by producing instances of states in which the needle points to the
'1/2' symbol. (Note that, if the gauge is working properly, instances of this state may
indicate not only that the tank is half full, but also that the battery has at least a certain
charge, and that the tank is placing a certain gravitational force on the bolts which secure
it, etc.. Though an instance of this state in a working fuel gauge may indicate all of these
propositions, it represents only the proposition that the tank is half full because the fuel
gauge is not designed to indicate these other propositions.) Similarly, I boldly assume,
an instance of a mental state o' instantiated by a subject who has just looked at the cat
lying on the mat represents that the cat is on the mat because this instance of a' is
produced by a (very complex) process or mechanism whose function is to indicate that
the cat is on the mat. (Of course instruments like fuel gauges have the functions they do
because we assign them those functions, and thus the functions of such instruments are
derivative of the functions of the processes which produce or result in our mental states.
But what determines the functions of the processes which produce our mental states? If
this question has an answer, I suspect that it has something to do with how our cognitive
faculties which produce these states develop through learning and natural selection: A
cognitive mechanism may have the function of indicating P by producing instances of a
because the mechanism's existence in an organism can be explained by the fact that,
under "ordinary circumstances," the mechanism produces instances of a if and only if P
obtains. 1 Let us leave it at that.)
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How and why does the Epistemological Principle of Assent follow from this,
admittedly very sketchy, analysis of propositional attitudes and their contents? Why does
it follow--ceteris paribus--from a normal subject's sincere understanding assent to an
occurrence of E that he holds the attitude of belief toward the content expressed by E?
The answer is that in engaging in the act of sincere understanding assent to an
occurrences of E, the subject manifests a disposition which is sufficient for holding the
attitude of belief toward the content expressed by E. That is, in engaging in the act of
sincere understanding assent to an occurrences of E, the subject behaves in such a way
that, if his beliefs are true, his desires will tend to be satisfied. For example, Odile may
desire to convince Oscar that she knows something about American literature, and she
may believe that Twain is a great author and that this is a fact concerning American
literature. If these beliefs are true, then Odile's assent to (01) in Oscar's presence would,
under normal circumstances, satisfy her desire. Consequently, an act of sincere
understanding assent to an occurrence of E which presents P is one way in which a
disposition sufficient for holding the attitude of belief toward P may be manifested.
(Moreover, since by assumption the assenting subject understands the occurrence of E, it
is plausible to assume that the subject has this disposition because he instantiates an
internal mental state whose content is the content expressed by the occurrence of E;
understanding an occurrence of E which expresses content P would seem to require
instantiating a state which represents P.) Thus in assenting to an occurrence of E one
does not correctly report that one believes the content expressed by E; rather the very act
of sincere understanding assent is a manifestation of one's belief in the content expressed
by E. 12
The Epistemological Principle of Dissent does not, however, enjoy this privileged
status, but before I present my arguments against the Epistemological Principle of
Dissent, a few clarifying remarks concerning the Epistemological Principle of Assent are
in order. First, note that both the "sincere," and the "understanding" provisos in the
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antecedent of the principle are required: An insincere assent to an occurrence is not a
manifestation of the appropriate disposition, and neither is an assent made in ignorance
of the content expressed by the occurrence. Second, note that while Russellian theories
cannot be refuted by epistemological arguments from opacity based upon the
Epistemological Principle of Assent alone (the Epistemological Principle of Dissent is
also required), it does follow from the Epistemological Principle of Assent alone that
subjects can, and often do, hold the attitude of belief toward contradictory--and therefore
impossible--Russellian propositions. For example, it follows from the Epistemological
Principle of Assent and Odile's sincere understanding assent to an occurrence of
(1&2n) Twain is a great author and Clemens is not a great author.
that Odile holds the attitude of belief toward a contradictory, and therefore impossible,
Russellian proposition. (For a Russellian proposition to be impossible is for it to obtain
in no possible world. I assume that Twain is necessarily identical to Twain.) I think that
this feature of the Russellian view is intuitively correct: Under ordinary circumstances, if
the ancient astronomer behaves as if Phosphorus rises in the morning and does not rise in
the morning, then he holds the attitude of belief toward the contradictory and impossible
proposition that Phosphorus rises in the morning and Hesperus does not rise in the
morning. And if Odile assents to an occurrence of (1&2n), then she holds the attitude of
belief toward the contradictory and impossible proposition that Twain is a great author
and Clemens is not a great author. Moreover, these contradictory beliefs may be crucial
for explaining some of our behavior because often our behavior is, in a way,
contradictory. Suppose, for example, that on one occasion Odile sees Twain and asks
him for his autograph, while on another occasion she sees Twain and thumbs her nose at
him. What other than a contradictory belief (or contradictory beliefs) could account for
this strange behavior?
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Despite the intuitive plausibility of belief in contradictory and impossible
propositions, however, this feature of the Russellian view is often taken to be a reason for
rejecting the Russellian view of propositions. First, it is sometimes objected that it
cannot be correct to attribute contradictory beliefs to a subject because (normal) subjects
are rational, and believing in contradictions is irrational, I will not here undertake an
investigation of what it is to be rational, but this objection clearly begs the question
against a Russellian theory: Clearly a Russellian theory maintains either (i) that (normal)
subjects are often'irrational, and rationality is a kind of goal to which ordinary subjects
aspire, or that (ii) a (normal) subject can be rational even if he holds the attitude of belief
toward contradictory propositions. The first option would involve appeal to a "wide"
analysis of rationality; under the first option rationality would involve consistency among
the Russellian propositions believed. The second option, on the other hand, would
involve appeal to a kind of "narrow" rationality; rationality would involve some kind of
consistency in the mental representations instantiated by a subject. 13
A more serious objection to the Russellian view concerns wMat it is to hold the
attitude of belief (or any other attitude) toward an impossible Russellian proposition.
According to the analysis of belief advocated above, to hold the attitude of belief toward
the Russellian proposition P is to be disposed to behave in such a way that if one's beliefs
were true, one's behavior would tend to bring about the satisfaction of one's desires. But
if the content of one's belief is impossible, then how are we to understand the above
counterfactual? What are we supposing the world to be like when we suppose, for
example, that Odile's belief that Twain is not Clemens is true? Since it is necessarily true
that Twain is Clemens, what we are supposing cannot be identified with a possible state
of the world. One way around this difficulty would be to deny that the Epistemological
Principle of Assent holds in cases where the relevant occurrence presents an impossible
proposition. Thus a subject's sincere understanding assent to an occurrence of 'there
exists a procedure for trisecting a Euclidean angle' would be treated in the same way that
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a sincere understanding assent to an occurrence of 'Santa is fat' would be treated. In
neither case does it follow from the subject's sincere understanding assent that he holds
the attitude of belief toward a Russellian proposition: in the latter case I does not
present a Russellian proposition at all, and in former case--it might be claimed--E
presents an inappropriate Russellian proposition. While this is an option, it is not an
option I readily adopt. For the reasons discussed above, it seems that (normal) subjects
do hold propositional attitudes towards impossible propositions. I leave this is an
unsolved problem for the Russellian view.
I have argued that the Epistemological Principle of Assent enjoys a privileged
status because there is a special connection between a subject's sincere understanding
assent to S and the subject's holding the attitude of belief toward the content expressed by
Y: A subject's assent to E is, ceteris paribus, a sufficient condition for the subject's
holding the attitude of belief toward the content expressed by E because to assent to I is
to manifest a disposition which is sufficient for holding the attitude of belief toward the
content expressed by E. There is, however, no similar reason for endorsing the
Epistemological Principle of Dissent. Recall the principle:
The Epistemological Principle of Dissent: If a normal, sincere, subject
who understands an occurrence of E dissents from this occurrence at t,
then he does not hold the propositional attitude of belief toward the
content expressed by this occurrence, at t.
An act of sincere understanding assent to an occurrence of E is a manifestation of one's
holding the attitude of belief toward the content expressed by S. But dissenting from an
occurrence of S does not in the same way constitute a manifestation of one's not holding
the attitude of belief toward the content expressed by 5. If a sincere understanding
subject dissents from an occurrence of 5, and thereby refrains from manifesting a
disposition which is sufficient for holding the attitude of belief toward the content of
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expressed by 1, it does not follow that he does not hold the attitude of belief toward this
content. Granted, the subject does not, in the very act of sincere understanding dis.,ent
from X, manifest a disposition sufficient for holding the attitude of belief toward the
content of 1. But of course it does not follow from the fact that the subject does not in
the act of dissenting manifest such a disposition that he does not have such a disposition.
For example, Odile dissents from (02) and thereby refrains from marifesting a
disposition sufficient for holding the attitude of belief toward the Russellian proposition
that Twain is a great author. Yet in assenting to (01) and, we may suppose, buying all of
Twain's books, Odile does at other times manifest a disposition sufficient for holding the
attitude of belief toward the proposition that Twain a great author. Hence Odile's dissent
from (02) is compatible with her holding the attitude of belief toward the content
expressed by (02).
What, if anything, does follow from a subject's sincere understanding dissent
from an occurrence of E? In some cases a subject might dissent from an occurrence of I
because he holds the attitude of belief toward the content expressed by the negation of X.
This does not, however, hold in general, For example, suppose that Odile is just not sure
whether Twain is a great author or not. If Odile were in this state of perplexity, she
would dissent from an occurrence of
(I) Twain is a great author.
even though she does not hold the attitude of belief toward the Russellian proposition
presented by an occurrence of
(I n) Twain is not a great author.
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Moreover, even it did follow from a subject's sincere understanding dissent From an
occurrence of E that he holds the attitude of belief toward the content expressed by an
occurrence of the negation of E, this would not engender epistemological arguments
from opacity. It is not contradictory to claim that Odile holds the attitude of belief
toward the Russellian proposition that Twain is a great author and also the Russellian
proposition that Twain is not a great author. If the attitude of belief is a mediated binary
relation between subjects and Russellian propositions, one should expect this kind of
conflict in belief contents to be relatively common. (This is not to deny that in most
contexts it would be extremely odd to say "Odile believes that Twain is a great author
and she also believes that Twain is not a great author." But the oddness of such an
ascription concerns the semantics and pragmatics of attitude ascriptions, not the nature of
propositional attitudes themselves.)
One thing that does, in most cases, follow from a subject's sincere understanding
dissent from an occurrence of E is that the subject does not hold the attitude of belief
toward the Russellian proposition that this very occurrence of I is true. For example, in
most cases, it does follow from Odile's dissent from (02) that she does not hold the
attitude of belief toward the Russellian proposition that (02) is true. If a sincere
understanding subject believes about an occurrence which he understands that it is true,
and he is sincere, th'en, usually, he will assent to it. (The qualifications are required
because it is, I suppose, possible for a subject to dissent sincerely from an occurrence
which he understands even though he has a disposition sufficient for holding the attitude
of belief toward the proposition that the occurrence is true.) Similarly it follows from a
subject's sincerely assenting to an occurrence of E that he believes about that occurrence
that it is true. Again, if the subject did not believe that the occurrence were true, then,
other things being equal, he would not have assented. 14 But, again, no contradiction is
engendered by these implications: I maintain that it follows from Odile's assent to (OI)
that
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(0) Believes <Odile, R>
where 'R' designates the Russellian proposition that (01) is true. And I maintain that it
follows from Odile dissent from (02) that
(P) --(Believes <Odile, S>)
where 'S' designates the Russellian proposition that (02) is true. Since (O1) is not
identical to (02), R and S are distinct Russellian propositions and thus (0) and (P) are
not contradictories. (The claim that sincere understanding acts of assent and dissent
require the presence and absence of certain background meta-linguistic beliefs,
respectively, is important because these background beliefs can be invoked by Russellian
theorists to account for the cognitive significance of occurrences. If an act of sincere
understanding assent to an occurrence requires that the subject believe that occurrence is
true, then the Russellian theorist can provide ordinary "folk" explanations of why, e.g.,
Odile assents to (01), yet dissents from (02): she assents to (01) because she believes
that (01) is true, and she dissents from (02) because she does not believe that (02) is
true. These issues concerning the cognitive significance of occurrences are further
explored in the next section.)
I conclude that Russellian theorists can reject the Epistemological Principle of
Dissent without denying our Cartesian intuitions, and furthermore, that while there are
cogent reasons for endorsing the Epistemological Principle of Assent, there are no
corresponding reasons for endorsing the Epistemological Principle of Dissent. What then
explains the intuitive appeal of the Epistemological Principle of Dissent? I suggest that
at least some of the intuitive appeal of the Principle of Dissent is due to a confusion
between the epistemnological claim the principle actually makes, and a similar sounding
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claim concerning what can truly be said of a subject who has just dissented from an
occurrence of a sentence; i.e. the Epistemological Principle of Dissent is confused with
the Semantic Principle of Dissent, We do, in many cases, have the intuition that it would
be false to make an ascription of the form rN believes that E7 relative to a context in
which it is known that the referent of N has just dissented from an occurrence of 1. But
these intuitions concerning the truth conditions of ascriptions do not support the
Epistemological Principle of Dissent unless an occurrence of an ascription of the form N
believes that f is'false only if the referent of N does not hold the attitude of belief
toward the content expressed by E. As will be shown in section 4.3, however, the
Russellian theorist is not compelled to grant such an assumption.
4.2 The Appropriate Russellian Response to the Problem of Accounting for the
Cognitive Significance of Occurrences.
The problem of accounting for the cognitive significance of occurrences is the
problem of explaining a subject's judgments and behavior with regard to occurrences;
e.g. "Why does Odile assent to (O1), yet dissent from (02)?" Or more specifically,
"What is it about these occurrences which is relevant to explaining Odile's judgments and
behavior with regard to these occurrences?" Providing a bona fide solution to this
problem would require a comprehensive theory of human judgment and behavior and, of
course, I know of no such theory. Consequently my goals in this section will be
somewhat modest. Rather than attempting to provide a bonafide solution to the problem
of cognitive significance, I will merely attempt to show that, contrary to what is often
alleged, Russellian theories are no worse off with regard to this problem than are Fregean
theories.
A brief review is in order. The Fregean approach maintains that it is the content
expressed by an occurrence for a subject which accounts for the cognitive significance of
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the occurrence for that subject. For example, the Fregean approach maintains that Odile
assents to (01) yet dissents from (02) because these occurrences express distinct
thoughts for her, and thoughts, which are composed of cognitive values, serve as the
objects of propositional attitudes. Russellian theories, on the other hand, must deny that
the cognitive significance of an occurrence for a subject is accounted for by the content
the occurrence expresses for the subject. Russellian theorists maintain that (O1) and
(02) express the same content--the same Russellian proposition--for Odile.
Consequently they cannot account for Odile's differing behavior with regard to (0 1) and
(02) by appeal to the content(s) expressed by these occurrences; it makes no sense to
maintain that Odile assents to (O1) yet dissents from (02) because of the contents
expressed by (O1) and (02), when these occurrences express the same content for her.
What, according to my view, accounts for the cognitive significance of
occurrences? I think Perry is correct in charging that the Fregean account of cognitive
significance commits the "fallacy of misplaced information"; viz. "The idea that all the
information in an utterance must come from [the proposition presented and/or the content
expressed.]15 Our problem is to explain why Odile, a rational agent with a full stock of
beliefs, desires and fears, behaves as she does in response to the perception and
comprehension of two distinct occurrences, two distinct physical events. Why should we
suppose that, in this rich and complex environment, Odile's behavior with regard to (O1)
(02) must be determined solely by whether or not she holds a particular attitude toward
the content expressed by these occurrences? Why should the Russellian theorist assume,
along with the Fregean theorist, that the fact that Odile "grasps" the contents of (01) and
(02) by way of perceiving distinct physical objects is irrelevant to Odile's behavior?
Surely the fact that Odile is responding to two qualitatively distinct occurrences is
relevant to explaining her behavior. Think of Odile as a black box which, given input,
produces output. Given the perception (and comprehension) of (O1) as input, assent is
the output and given the perception (and comprehension) of (02) as input, dissent is the
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output. Our task is to find the difference in the inputs which explains the differences in
output. (Thus we assume that nothing, or nothing relevant, changes inside the box; i.e.
Odile does not "change her mind," or become insane, etc., between the time of her
perception of (0 1) and the time of her perception of (02).) One suggestion, the Fregean
suggestion, is that (O1) and (02) express distinct contents for Odile, and this difference
in expressed content is the relevant difference between the inputs. But we certainly are
not constrained to posit such a difference in content in order to account for the difference
in output. Moreover, given that, (i) there is already an obvious difference between the
inputs, viz. (O1) is numerically and qualitatively distinct from (02), and (ii) there is good
reason to suppose that (01) and (02) express the same content, i.e. there are good
reasons to endorse the Principle of Direct Reference, it seems that the Fregean account of
cognitive significance is neither the simplest, nor the most plausible account available.
I propose that the problem of the cognitive significance of occurrences can be
solved by appeal to the acts of perception and comprehension presupposed by instances
of the phenomenon of opacity; Odile assents to (01) yet dissents from (02) because the
event whereby Odile perceives and comprehends (O1) is different in important ways
from the event whereby Odile perceives and comprehends (02). Of course in saying
this, I fall far short of actually providing a solution to the problem of cognitive
significance; as was mentioned above, providing a bonafide solution to this problem
would require me to show how my approach can be incorporated in a comprehensive,
and true, theory of human psychology, and I know of no such theory. In order to
accomplish my goal of showing that the above adumbrated Russellian approach is no less
plausible than the Fregean approach, however, I only need to illustrate that it is just as
plausible to suppose that the Russellian approach can be incorporated in a comprehensive
theory of human psychology as it is to suppose that the Fregean approach can be so
incorporated. My strategy for doing this will be as follows: I assume that a
comprehensive theory of human judgment and behavior will be either a theory in the
232
domain of Cognitive Science whose laws are couched in wholly non intentional, terms,
or it will be an intentional theory, a theory whose laws take the form of familiar
belief/desire explanations. (I also assume physicalism: I assume that either kind of
theory will be compatible with a materialist metaphysics.) I will attempt to show that
with regard to either kind of comprehensive theory, my Russellian approach is just as
likely to be incorporated as is the Fregean approach. 16
The Fregean approach maintains that Odile assents to (O1) yet dissents from (02)
because these occurrences express distinct thoughts for her. How would this general
strategy for accounting for the cognitive significance of (OI) and (02) be realized by a
comprehensive non intentional psychological theory? The idea must be something like
this: Where T and T' are the thoughts expressed by (01) and (02), respectfully, Odile's
grasping T requires Odile to instantiate psychological state a, and Odile's grasping T'
requires Odile to instantiate psychological state a'. (As I argued in Chapter 1, if the
Fregean strategy is to be at all plausible from a psychological point of view, it must
appeal to psychological states such as a and a'; unless T and T' are identified with, or
mapped one-to-one with, a and a' respectively, the fact that T is distinct from T' is
completely irrelevant to the explanation of Odile's behavior. Note that a and a' can be
brain-states, functional-states, or any other kind of state compatible with physicalism.)
Odile's assent and dissent is then to be explained by invoking laws something like the
following:
A Fregean Law of Assent: For all subjects X, if conditions C are satisfied,
and X instantiates a, then X will assent.
A Fregean Law of Dissent: For all subjects X, if conditions C are
satisfied, and X instantiates a', then X will dissent.
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(Conditions C specify--in non intentional, physicalistic, terms--all other relevant features
of Odile's psychological state. Thus the same conditions C appear in both the Fregean
Law of Assent, and the Fregean Law of Dissent. In terms of the black-box metaphor,
that the same conditions are called for in both laws ensures that nothing inside the box
changes and thus that the difference in output must be due to a difference in input.) Thus
if the Fregean approach is to be realized by a comprehensive non intentional
psychological theory, physical states such as a and &' which are correlated one-to-one
with Fregean thoughts must be identified, and laws such as those stated above must be
discovered. Moreover, if the theory is to have any explanatory and predictive power, the
psychological states appealed to must be individuated independently of the behaviors
they are alleged to explain. The task of discovering and formulating such a theory is, of
course, rather daunting.
How would the Russellian approach adumbrated above be incorporated into a
comprehensive reduced psychological theory? Just as the real explanatory work on the
Fregean approach is done by the states a and o' which are required for the "grasping" of
Fregean thoughts T and T', so on the Russellian approach the real explanatory work is
done by mediating states gt and g', which are the psychological states Odile instantiates in
the perception of (O 1) and (02), respectfully. Mediating states are, roughly, the output
of our perceptual modules and the input to our linguistic modules. (Where, following
Fodor, a "module" is an "informationally encapsulated computational system" 17 which is
responsible for a particular cognitive ability.) Assuming that an ordinary speaker's
linguistic knowledge is somehow implemented in a module of his brain, the inputs to this
module in part consist of representations of occurrences he has perceived. These
representational inputs are tokens which, I assume, can be grouped into types, or
mediating states. 18 It is important to notice that mediating states need not beanything
like "sentences of mentalese": In perceiving an occurrence a subject instantiates an
instance of a mediating state, and thus there is a sense in which instances of mediating
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states are representations of occurrences--mediating states are not representations of
people, cities, properties, etc. (Nor, however, am I committed to the view that there is no
such thing as mentalese; as Fodor and other representationalists have argued, some kind
of "internal language" may be required in order to explain certain cognitive phenomena.)
How, exactly, might mediating states be invoked by a comprehensive reduced
psychological theory in order to account for the cognitive significance of (O1) and (02)
for Odile? If Odile perceives and comprehends (O1), then in the perception and
comprehension of (O 1) Odile instantiates a mediating state pt. And in perceiving and
comprehending (02), Odile instantiates a distinct mediating state pt'. Odile assents to
(01) yet dissents from (02) because in perceiving and comprehending these occurrences,
Odile instantiates distinct mediating states. More specifically, just as the Fregean
approach is committed to there being laws such as those displayed above, so the
Russellian approach is committed to there being laws something like the following:
A Russellian Law of Assent: For all subjects X, if conditions C are
satisfied, and X instantiates pt, then X will assent.
A Russellian Law of Dissent: For all subjects X, if conditions C are
satisfied, and X instantiates p', then X will dissent.
(Again, conditions C specify--in physicalistic, non intentional terms, all other relevant
features of Odile's psychological state. In terms of the black-box metaphor, that
conditions C are invoked in both laws ensures that the only relevant change between
Odile's assent and her dissent concerns p. and p.', the inputs.) The Russellian theorist who
opts for the approach sketched above thus faces a daunting task which is in all relevant
ways similar to the daunting task facing the Fregean theorist: the Russellian theorist
must discover a comprehensive psychological theory which appeals to mediating states
such as p and p', and, if the theory is to have any explanatory and predictive power, these
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states must be individuated independently of the behaviors they are alleged to cause.
Thus both the Fregean and the Russellian face similar daunting tasks if they are to
provide a solution to the problem of the cognitive significance, and therefore there is no
reason, at this point, to prefer one approach over the other. (Of course, as psychology
and cognitive science progress, one or the other approach to the problem of cognitive
significance may begin to look more plausible, and I hinted above that the Russellian
approach may have the edge due to its simplicity. But the question of which approach, if
either, will prevail in the end is an empirical one, and thus cannot be answered by
armchair ridden philosophers. 19) I conclude that if the Fregean approach is better suited
to account for the cognitive significance of occurrences, it is not because it is more
amenable to a non intentional comprehensive psychological theory.
Perhaps then, the Fregean approach to the problem of cognitive significance is
superior to Russellian approach adumbrated above not because it is more amenable to a
non intentional comprehensive psychological theory, but rather because the Fregean
account of cognitive significance is more amenable to a comprehensive intentional
psychological theory--a theory which utilizes familiar belief/desire explanations of
behavior. After all, the Fregean approach contends that Odile assents to (01) because
this occurrence expresses the content T, and Odile holds the attitude of belief toward this
content. So it would seem that the Fregean approach might be more amenable to familiar
intentional explanations of behavior than is the Russellian approach. Contrary to initial
appearances, however, the Fregean approach is not superior to the Russellian approach in
this regard either.
Intentional belief\desire explanations of behavior instantiate the following
schema:
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(i) N DESIRED that E.
(ii) N BELIEVED that if he did A, his DESIRE that E would be satisfied,
So,
(iii) N did A.
Attitude verbs are capitalized in the above schema to remind the reader that we are not
here doing semantics; we are not here trying to preserve the intuitive truth of certain
"folk" explanations of behavior. Rather in this context we are attempting to provide
scientific explanations of Odile's behavior. That is, we are trying to determine whether
the Russellian theorist can state belief\desire explanations which are true under his own
analysis. Consequently our untutored intuitions concerning the truth of these
explanations of behavior are in this context irrelevant. Thus the above schema and
instances of it are stated in theory-neutral terms: Under the Russellian interpretation,
'DESIRED' designates a relation which holds between subjects and Russellian
propositions, and that E designate the Russellian proposition expressed by 1. Under the
Fregean interpretation, on the other hand, 'DESIRED' designates a binary relation
between subjects and thoughts, and that Z designates a Fregean thought allegedly
expressed by E. I will argue that, first, there are beliefldesire explanations of Odile's
behavior--instances of tL 'bove schema--which are true under the Russellian
interpretation. And second, the belief\desire explanation of Odile's behavior which
would be given by the Fregean theorist is true under the Russellian interpretation. Thus
not only can the Russellian provide belief\desire explanations of Odile's behavior, but
furthermore the Russellian can endorse the instances of the above schema which would
be endorsed by the Fregean approach.
The Russellian approach adumbrated above can utilize the following instance of
the schema in order to explain Odile's behavior with regard to (O1) and (02):
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Intentional Explanation A
Part I.
(i) Odile DESIRED that she indicate that she BELIEVED that (OI)
conveyed a truth.
(ii) Odile BELIEVED that if she assented to (O1), she would succeed in
indicating that she BELIEVED that (Ol) conveyed a truth,
So,
(iii) Odile assented to (01).
Part 2.
(i) Odile DESIRED that she indicate that she did not BELIEVE that (02)
conveyed a truth.
(ii) Odile BELIEVED that if she dissented from (02), she would succeed
in indicating that she did not BELIEVE that (02) conveyed a truth.
So,
(iii) Odile dissented from (02).
The Russellian can endorse Intentional Explanation A because lines (i) and (ii) for both
part I and part 2 are true under the Russellian interpretation. Hence, if we assume the
legitimacy of instances of the belief\desire explanation schema, under the Russellian
interpretation both parts of explanation A provide legitimate explanations. Therefore the
claim that the Russellian approach to cognitive significance is not amenable to intentional
beliefldesire explanations is simply false.
Of course Intentional Explanation A is true under either the Russellian or the
Fregean inteipretation, and it is true under the Russellian interpretation because the very
occurrences (O 1) and (02) appear in the contents of the attitudes ascribed to Odile. Thus
the Fregean theorist might claim that, while the Russellian can give some beliefidesire
explanations, he cannot endorse as many as the Fregean theorist. That is, it might be
thought that Fregean approach to cognitive significance is superior to the Russellian
approach because the Fregean theorist, but not the Russellian theorist, can endorse the
following beliefldesire explanation:
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Intentional Explanation B
Part 1.
(i) Odile DESIRED that she indicate that she BELIEVED that Twain is a
great author,
(ii) Odile BELIEVED that if she assented to (01), she would succeed in
indicating that she BELIEVED that Twain is a great author.
So,
(iii) Odile assented to (01),
Part 2.
(i) Odile DESIRED that she indicate that she did not BELIEVE that
Clemens is a great author.
(ii) Odile BELIEVED that if she dissented from (02), she would succeed
in indicating that she did not BELIEVE that Clemens is a great author.
So,
(iii) Odile dissented from (02).
I maintain, however, that the above claim is false. That is, I maintain that if the above
explanation is true under a Fregean interpretation, then it also true under a Russellian
interpretation. (I also maintain that Explanation A is a better explanation: If the goal is
to provide an explanation of Odile's response with regard to an occurrence, then the
explanation is best couched in terms of Odile's belief about that occurrence. Note that,
intuitively, Odile's believing that (O1) express a truth is both necessary and sufficient for
her being disposed to sincerely assent to (O1), while Odile's holding the attitude of belief
toward the content expressed by (01) is only necessary for her being so disposed: she
may hold the attitude of belief toward the content expressed by (01), and yet not know
what content is expressed by (O 1).)
Why might it seem that intentional Explanation B is false under a Russellian
interpretation? Part 1 is unproblematic for the Russellian: if lines (i) and (ii) are true,
then, ceteris paribus, line (iii) must also be true. Part 2, however, seems problematic for
the Russellian interpretation. The seeming difficulty arises because, under the Russellian
interpretation, it is not true that Odile does not BELIEVE that Clemens is a great author.
Notice, however, that the truth of lines (i) and (ii) of part 2 do not entail that Odile does
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not BELIEVE that Clemens is a great author. Line (i) of part 2 is true under the
Russellian interpretation just in case Odile DESIRED that she indicate that she did not
BELIEVE that Clemens is a great author. But Odile can DESIRE that she indicate that
she did not BELIEVE that Clemens is a great author, even if she did in fact BELIEVE
the content that Clemens is a great author. (This DESIRE of Odile's is similar to my
DESIRE that I be given a prize for winning the Boston Marathon--the fact that I came in
more than two hours behind the winner does not imply that I have no such DESIRE.) It
is perfectly compatible with the Russellian view that Odile both hold the attitude of belief
toward the Russellian proposition that Clemens is a great author, and also hold the
attitude of belief toward the Russellian proposition that she does not believe the content
that Clemens is a great author. Consequently, line (i) of part 2 is true under the
Russellian interpretation. But if the Russellian theorist can endorse line (i), then lines (ii)
and (iii) are unproblematic.
I conclude that Russellian approach is just as amenable to a comprehensive
intentional psychological theory as the Fregean approach, and therefore that the
allegation that Fregean theories are better suited to account for the cognitive significance
of occurrences is unfounded,
What, then, accounts for the common allegation that Fregean theories are more
psychologically plausible than Russellian theories? I suggest this allegation arises out of
a conflation of semantic and psychological, or epistemological, issues. It is certainly
correct that our untutored intuitions dictate that appropriate occurrences of sentences
such as
(38) Odile believes that Twain is a great author, but not that Clemens is a great
author, and that's why she assented to (01), yet dissented from (02).
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are true. According to the Naive Russellian Theory, however, such occurrences are false,
and it is a short, though unwarranted, step from this semantic fact to the
epistemological\psychological conclusion that the Russellian view cannot account for the
cognitive significance of occurrences. I agree that the semantic component of an
acceptable Russellian theory must have it that many occurrences of sentences such as
(38) are true. But this semantic task should be distinguished from the epistemological
and psychological task of accounting for the cognitive significance of occurrences. (The
semantic task is taken up in section 4.4.)
4.3 The Appropriate Russellian Response to the Semantic Arguments From
Opacity.
It is agreed on all sides that an occurrence of an attitude ascription may convey
more information than is encapsulated in the Russellian proposition presented by the
occurrence. This much is implied by the fact that we may intuit that an occurrence of
(3) Odile believes that Twain is a great author.
is true, while an occurrence of
(4) Odile believes that Clemens is a great author.
is false. Beyond this point, however, there is little agreement. For those who endorse the
Principle of Propositional Truth, there are two options:
Option (i): Accept as veridical our untutored intuitions concerning the
truth values of the occurrences, and deny that the occurrences present the
same proposition. (This is the option taken by Frege, Richard, and
Crimmins and Perry.)
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Option (ii): Deny the veracity of our untutored intuitions, and maintain
that the occurrences present the same proposition. (This is the option
taken by Salmon,)
Option (i) is untenable. Any plausible way of pursuing option (i) will involve an appeal
to some kind of mediator--senses, sentences of mentalese, etc.,--and I have shown that
such entities cannot be responsible for ordinary speaker's intuitions concerning the truth
conditions of occurrences of ascriptions such as (3) and (4). Option (ii) is superior to
option (i), but because it assumes the Principle of Propositional Truth, option (ii) denies
the veracity of our untutored intuitions concerning the truth conditions of occurrences,
and this is unacceptable. In this section I will argue in support of a third option which
preserves the veracity of our untutored intuitions, yet denies the Principle of
Propositional Truth. That is, in this section I will argue in support of the following
option:
Option (iii): Maintain that occurrences of ascriptions such as (3) and (4)
present the same proposition, and also preserve the veracity of our
untutored intuitions, but reject the Principle of Propositional Truth.
Note that if this third option is accepted, the semantic arguments from opacity
against Russellian theories are undermined. The third option denies the Principle of
Propositional truth, and if this principle is denied, then it does not follow from the fact
that occurrences of
(3) Odile believes that Twain is a great author.
and
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(4) Odile believes that Clemens is a great author,
present the same Russellian proposition that these occurrences must have the same truth
conditions. I am therefore suggesting that the appropriate response to the semantic
arguments from opacity is to deny the soundness of these arguments by denying the
Principle of Propositional Truth. I concede, however, that in denying the Principle of
Propositional Truth, I take upon myself the burden of explaining what, if not simply the
proposition presented, does determine the truth conditions of an occurrence. Thus in the
remainder of this section I will sketch an account the truth conditions of occurrences
which is in accordance with a Russellian view of propositions. (My views on these
matters have been heavily influenced by work by Stalnaker, Kamp, and Heim. 20)
I have been assuming throughout that occurrences of sentences, as opposed to
sentences, present propositions, where occurrences are particular utterances or instances
of inscriptions in particular contexts. Up until this point, however, I have said next to
nothing concerning what contexts are and how they contribute toward what is presented,
and otherwise conveyed, by token sentences. The time has come to say something about
contexts, and the role they play in determining the truth conditions of occurrences.
Let us define a belief set for a subject x at a time t as the set of Russellian
propositions believed by x at t. (This set may, and probably does, contain incompatible
propositions.) I assume that the belief set for a subject x at a time t is determined by the
belief state of x at t, where a belief state is a "wide" state; i.e. full specification of a
subject's belief state would require a detailed description of the subject specifying both
internal properties, and certain relational properties which hold of the subject in virtue of
causal relations between the subject and his environment. Let us now define the context
for x and y at t as the set of Russellian propositions which are mutually believed by x and
y at t. (Two subjects x and y mutually believe p just in case at t x and y believe p, and at t
x and y believe that at t x and y believe p, and at t x and y believe that at t x and y believe
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that at t x and y believe p, etc.) Thus the context for x and y at t is a subset of the
intersection of the belief sets of x and y at t,
The central assumption of this model of communication is that the purpose of
making an assertion is to alter the context relative to which the assertion is made, and
thereby alter a listener's belief set. What is communicated by an occurrence is what, on
the basis of that occurrence, the speaker adds to the context. (For the sake of simplicity,
I assume throughout that all occurrences are assertions. This is a gross simplification,
but a discussion of force, and other kinds of speech acts would, at this point, only
complicate matters.) Upon correctly interpreting a speaker's utterance, a listener at least
temporarily adds what is communicated to his belief-set, and derives various propositions
as consequences. The derived propositions may or may not be acceptable, and on the
basis of the acceptability of the derived propositions, the listener may or may not accept
all, or part, of what is communicated into the context. (If the listener does not accept all
or part of what is communicated, then, in a paradigmatic discourse, the listener must
inform the speaker of what parts of what is communicated he does not accept. That is,
there is a presumption of acceptance: if speaker x communicates p, and listener y does
not protest, then x believes that y believes p, and y believes that x believes that y believes
that p, etc..) Note that in asserting Russellian proposition p, x communicates to y much
more than the presented Russellian proposition p; in asserting p to y, x communicates to y
a good deal of "pragmatically imparted" information. For example, one crucially
important piece of information that is communicated by x's assertion of p is the
proposition that x holds the attitude of belief toward p; let us call this proposition which
is communicated by x's assertion of p the "Moore proposition for x's assertion of p."
(The fact that an assertion of p communicates a Moore proposition accounts for the
contradictory feel of occurrences of "Moore's Paradox" sentences; e.g. "Twain is a great
author, but I don't believe it." An occurrence of the first conjunct communicates that
Twain is a great author and that the speaker believes that Twain is a great author, but this
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latter proposition is contradicted by the proposition presented by the second conjunct.
Hence an occurrence of the sentence communicates incompatible propositions.) It
follows from the above claims (coupled with a few other assumptions) that, in
paradigmatic discourse, if x asserts p to y and y does not protest, then p is mutually
believed, and thus is added to the context of the discourse. (Roughly, because x's
assertion of p communicates both p and the Moore proposition that x believes that p, a
listener y who accepts x's assertion comes to believe both p and that x believes p. And
because listener y'does not protest x's assertion of p, x comes to believe that y also
believes p, and that x believes p. Finally, because x and y are competent speakers and
believe of one another that they are competent speakers, they come to have mutual belief
in p; when listener y accepts p and that x believes p, both x and y come to believe not
only p and that x believes p, but also that they share these beliefs, and that they share the
belief that they share these beliefs, etc.)
According to the model of communication I am dogmatically sketching here,
ordinary discourse is a process whereby two or more subjects cooperatively amend a
context. In most cases this process is goal directed; in most cases, the participants of a
conversation are cooperatively attempting to perform some task, answer some question,
or increase their knowledge concerning some topic, and that they are attempting to do
this is also mutually believed. In other words, in paradigmatic discourse the participants
are cooperatively attempting to construct a context which meets some general
description. This fact is often exploited in the process of communication; the fact that
the participants share a desire to construct a context of a certain kind can be exploited to
resolve ambiguities. For example, if our goal in a discourse is to decide whether or not a
person should be allowed to fly a plane, then it is clear how my utterance of 'Flying
planes can be dangerous' is to be interpreted. And, more to the point, it is the mutually
understood goals of a discourse which determine whether or not a context is sensitive or
insensitive; i.e. it is the mutually understood goals of the discourse which determine
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whether or not an ascription is to be interpreted de re or de dicto. (This point will be
clarified, to some extent, below.)
Contexts are what are constructed through processes of ordinary discourse.
Contexts also serve, however, an essential function within the processes of their own
construction; contexts also serve as what Kaplan called "contexts of utterance." In
uttering I in order to assert p to y, x presupposes that y has the requisite knowledge, or
beliefs, for correctly interpreting the utterance of 1; e.g. if x uses the name 'Twain', x
presupposes that y is familiar with this name, and if x uses 'he', then x presupposes that y
knows, or can determine, who the intended referent is. This implies that speakers must--
if they want to be understood--limit their utterances to utterances of sentences which
require for correct interpretation only information which is already in the context. (In
special cases of accommodation an utterance U may itself introduce information into the
context which is necessary for the interpretation of U, but I will ignore these special
cases here. 2 1) Note, however, that as a conversation progresses and the context is
amended, the abilities of the participants to interpret utterances correctly will change, and
as a result the limitations on what the participants are licensed to utter also changes.
Whether or not a participant is licensed to utter a sentence E--whether or not he can
expect his utterance to be interpreted correctly--depends in part upon previous utterances
in the discourse. (E.g. one might not be able to begin a sentence with 'He' unless
someone has already attempted to refer to the intended referent of 'He'.) The context is
thus not only what the participants in a discourse construct and amend, it also places
constraints upon the sentences that can be uttered in order to amend it.
Given this model of communication, what determines the truth conditions of an
occurrence? A Russellian proposition, either presented or otherwise conveyed, is true
just in case it corresponds with the actual world, just in case it obtains. But what is it for
ant occurrence--which typically comnmunicates many propositions--to be true? If the truth
conditions of the proposition presented by an occurrence of an attitude ascription do not
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determine the truth conditions of the occurrence, then what does determine the truth
conditions of an occurrence? In what follows I first give a very rough answer to this
question, and then give a slightly more precise answer in terms of the "Discourse
Representation Theory" proffered by Kamp.22
The very rough answer is that Salmon is more-or-less correct with regard to what
is responsible for our intuitions concerning the truth conditions of occurrences; more
information is conveyed by an occurrence than the proposition presented by the
occurrence, and our intuitions concerning the truth conditions of occurrences are
sometimes sensitive to this additional information. Unlike Salmon, however, I do not
think that ordinary speakers are systematically confused concerning the truth conditions
of occurrences in their own language; ordinary speakers do not judge incorrectly when
they judge that an occurrence of
(4) Odile believes that Clemens is a great author.
uttered in a sensitive context, is false. But what is the relevant "extra" information which
is conveyed by an occurrence of an attitude ascription in a sensitive context which
accounts for our judgments of truth conditions? Consider the following situation: You
are in a conversation with Odile, and she asserts
(1) Twain is a great author.
Later, you are in a conversation with Oscar. Oscar asks you, "Does Odile believe that
Clemens is a great author?" Even if you have good reason to suppose that Odile has not
"changed her mind," you are not warranted to reply affirmatively. You would, however,
be warranted to respond affirmatively if Oscar had instead asked you, "Does Odile
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believe that Twain is a great author?" I suggest that this implies that the information
responsible for our differing intuitions with regard to
(3) Odile believes that Twain is a great author.
and
(4) Odile believes that Clemens is a great author.
is conveyed by Odile's utterance of (1). That is, Odile's utterance of (1) pragmatically
conveys information whose truth suffices for the truth of occurrences of (3), but not
occurrences of (4).
So what is the relevant information that Odile's utterance of (1) pragmatically
conveys? What proposition conveyed by Odile's utterance of (1) warrants, in a sensitive
context, a judgment that an occurrence of (3) is true, yet does not warrant a judgment that
an occurrence of (4) is true? Odile's utterance of (1) pragmatically conveys much
information. One of the propositions it conveys is the proposition the occurrence
presents, viz. that Twain (the man) is a great author. But Odile's utterance also conveys
the Moore proposition for her utterance, and other propositions which are similar to this
Moore proposition. For example, Odile's utterance of (i) conveys that Odile believes
that 'Twain is a great author', relative to the context in which it is uttered, presents a true
proposition. Thus, Odile's utterance conveys, among other things, that she thinks 'Twain'
relative to c, has a referent, and that this referent is a great author. (Note the paradoxical
quality of utterances of sentences such as, "Twain is a great author, but I don't think
'Twain' refers to a great author.") I suggest that it is this information concerning Odile's
beliefs concerning 'Twain' and what it refers to which is responsible for the differing
truth conditions of occurrences of (3) and (4): An occurrence of (3), in a sensitive
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context, communicates--adds to the context in which it is uttered--the proposition that
Odile believes that 'Twain' has a referent who is a great author, and an occurrence of (4),
in a sensitive context, communicates the proposition that Odile believes that 'Clemens'
has a referent who is a great author. Thus, assuming that Odile does not believe that
'Clemens' refers to a great author, to utter (4) in a sensitive context would be to add false
information to the context. 23
What about truth conditions? The proposition presented by occurrences of (3)
and (4) is true just in case it is actualized; i.e. just in case Odile holds the attitude of
belief toward the Russellian proposition that Twain is a great author. Occurrences of (3)
and (4), on the other hand, have, when uttered in sensitive contexts, distinct truth
conditions: the truth of an occurrence of (3) may require that Odile believe that 'Twain'
has as its referent a person named 'Twain', while an occurrence of (4) instead requires
that Odile believe that 'Clemens' has as referent a person named 'Clemens'. But how is
this proposal to be accommodated under the model of communication adumbrated
above? The idea is roughly this: the truth value of an occurrence is determined by
comparing the propositions the occurrence adds to context c with the actual environment:
an occurrence in a context c which brings about context c' is true just in case the
propositions which the occurrence adds to c correspond with the actual world. Under
this proposal the truth value of an occurrence is not merely a matter of what the
occurrence presents, but rather concerns what effect the occurrence has upon the context
in which it occurs. Consequently, an occurrence of (4) may be false in a context c
because relative to c an utterance of (4) would communicate, among other things, the
proposition that Odile believes that 'Clemens' refers to a great author. This proposition,
however, does not correspond with the actual world, and thus the occurrence is false.
(Thus a sensitive context for (4) is a context such that the proposition that Odile believes
that 'Clemens' refers to a great author is communicated by an occurrence of (4) relative to
that context. 24 But what determines whether or not an occurrence of (4) communicates
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this proposition? I cannot give an adequate answer to this question, but for present
purposes it will suffice to say that whether or not this proposition is communicated is
determined by the shared goals of the participants of the discourse,)
This sketch of what it is for an occurrence to be true is, I think, roughly correct,
but it does not suit my purpose of motivating option (iii), described above. According to
option (iii), the judgments ordinar: speakers make concerning the truth conditions of
occurrences of attitude ascriptions are correct; e.g. ordinary speakers are correct in
judging that an octurrence of (4), in a sensitive context, is false. Hence, in order to
motivate option (iii), I require an account of what it is for an occurrence to be true which
not only accords with our untutored intuitions concerning the truth conditions of
occurrences, but also explains how and why ordinary speakers have the intuitions and
make the judgments they do; in order to motivate option (iii) properly, I require an
account of truth for occurrences which at least helps to explain how it is that speakers are
able to know the truth conditions of occurrences. The account of truth conditions of
occurrences sketched above accords with our intuitions concerning truth conditions, but,
as it is stated in terms of a correspondence between contexts--sets of Russellian
propositions--and the actual world, it tells us nothing concerning how ordinary subject's
are able to correctly judge of an occurrence that it is true (or false.) The account
sketched above does nothing to explain the correspondence between the intuitive
judgments of ordinary speakers and the truth conditions of occurrences. If I am to
motivate option (iii), I must give an account of the truth conditions of occurrences which
is rooted in psychological reality; I must give an account which shows and explains why
an omniscient subject--a subject whose belief set contained all and only the Russellian
propositions actualized in the world--would make judgments in accordance with our
untutored intuitions. In the remainder of this section I will illustrate how an account of
truth for an occurrence which at least attempts to satisfy this psychological requirement
can be given by Discourse Representation Theory, or DRT.
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A context for x and y at t is a set of Russellian propositions. This set, however, is
determined by the belief states of x and y at t (where belief states are "wide" states),
Hence a change in the context of x and y must be accompanied by, and due to, a change
in the belief states of x and y; as the context of a paradigmatic discourse is amended,
there will be corresponding alterations in the belief states of the participants. Thus, in a
paradigmatic discourse with participants x and y, there will be a kind of correspondence
between parts, or features, of the belief states of x and y. Discourse Representation
Theory is, I propose, best thought of as a formal means of representing this dynamic
correspondence between the belief states of the participants of a discourse. A Discourse
Representation Structure (or DRS) is a model of the shared features of the belief states of
the participants in a successful discourse. (A discourse is chronologically well-ordered
finite sequence of well formed utterances. A paradigmatic discourse is a discourse
which proceeds via certain rules which facilitate mutual understanding among the
participants. One of the goals of DRT is to discover, and formulate, the rules governing
paradigmatic discourse.) Because DRT is concerned first and foremost with belief states
rather than the propositions those states determine, DRT is well suited to satisfy the
psychological requirement discussed above. That is, since DRT is a formal means of
representing the correspondence between the belief states of two or more participants of a
discourse, an account of the truth conditions of occurrences in terms of discourse
representations will be well suited to explain the correspondence between the judgments
of ordinary speakers and the truth conditions of occurrences of attitude ascriptions.
The best way to introduce DRT is to illustrate how it applies to a particular
example. Consider a discourse which consists of utterances of the following sentences:
Hob: The witch poisoned Spot.
Nob: She poisoned Rover too.2 5
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Hob's utterance occurs within a certain context. That is, Hob and Nob mutually believe a
set of Russellian propositions at the outset of the discourse. The belief states of Hob and
Nob, which both determine this context, will therefore determine an initial discourse
representation structure; this discourse representation structure characterizes the belief
states of Hob and Nob. (What it is for a DRS to characterize a mental state will be
defined below.) A plausible initial DRS for this discourse is depicted by the following
diagram:
DRS-la
Universe: a, b, c,
Conditions: 1. a is a witch
2. b is named 'Spot'
3. b is a dog
4. c is named 'Rover'
5. c is a dog
A few points of clarification concerning DRS-la are in order. First, the symbols
'a', 'b' etc. do not refer to ordinary entities "in the world." Rather they refer to reference
markers, where a reference marker is a mental representation type. E.g. 'a' does not, of
course, refer to a certain witch. Rather 'a' refers to a type, tokens of which are the mental
representation tokens which allow Hob and Nob to seemingly speak and think about the
same witch. (Thus a reference marker may fail to represent anything.) Nor, strictly
speaking, do the predicates appearing in the conditions designate properties. Rather
strictly speaking the predicates also designate mental representation types. E.g. the
predicate 'is a dog' appearing in condition 3 does not designate the property being a dog,
but instead designates a type, tokens of which are the mental representation tokens which
allow Hob and Nob to seemingly speak and think about the same property, the property
being a dog. For the sake of simplicity, however, in what follows the predicates
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appearing in conditions can be interpreted as serving double duty and designating both
properties and the relevant mental representation types, (Since properties are easily
purchased, predicates are almost guaranteed to have designations, Thus each of the
predicates appearing in the conditions designates a mental representation type which, in
turn, is guaranteed to represent a property.) The symbols appearing in the above
depiction of DRS- la represent correspondences between the belief states of Hob and
Nob, and nothing more. Thus DRS-la can be interpreted as representing the fact that
Hob and Nob are in belief states such that if there were real entities corresponding to 'a',
'b' and 'c', then conditions 1-5 would represent Russellian propositions in the context of
Hob and Nob's discourse.
Second, DRS-la is highly impoverished. A more plausible initial discourse
representation structure for Hob and Nob's discourse would involve a vastly larger
number of elements in the universe of the DRS, and many more conditions. In what
follows, I will attempt to keep the DRSs as simple as possible, but it is to be understood
that the DRSs posited by a complete theory of discourse representation would be much
more complex.
Third, note that there is an entity in the universe of DRS-I a for each definite NP
appearing in Hob's utterance, the first occurrence of the discourse. This is as required by
the following general rule for DRS construction:
The Familiarity Constraint: Every definite NP appearing in an occurrence
corresponds with a reference marker which is linked to a reference marker
already present in the DR.
(What it is for an occurrence of an NP to correspond with an already present reference
marker will be made clear below. For now, let it be understood that every occurrence of
an NP, whether definite or indefinite, corresponds with a reference marker. What is it
for reference markers m and m' to be linked? Roughly, the linked relation is an
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equivalence relation, and reference markers mn and m' are linked just in case m and m'
correspond with occurrences NP I and NP2 respectively, and NP I and NP2 are assumed
by the participants of a discourse to corefer or codenote, Thus the corresponds with
relation holds between occurrences of NPs and reference markers, while the linked to
relation holds between reference markers. Of course, as the linked to relation is an
equivalence relation, every reference marker is linked to itself. These terms and
conditions will be clarified as we proceed.) The intuitive idea behind The Familiarity
Constraint is that occurrences of definite NPs presuppose that all participants of a
discourse understand these NPs and believe that they have referents. (Cases of
accommodation are exceptions to this general constraint.) Hob's utterance, for example,
presupposes that Hob and Nob mutually believe that there is some unique salient witch,
and that there is some unique salient dog named 'Spot'. Furthermore, Hob assumes that
Nob will be able to "connect" these definite NPs with these existential beliefs; Hob
assumes that Nob will be able to determine that Hob's utterance of 'Spot' refers to Spot,
the dog they both know and love. There is, of course, an important difference between
the two NPs; viz. the NP 'the witch' denotes nothing, and thus the reference marker
corresponding to this NP, reference marker a, does not represent an entity "in the world."
The NP 'Spot', we may suppose, has a referent and thus the reference marker
corresponding to this NP, reference marker b, does represent an entity "in the world."
This semantic difference between the two NPs, however, does not arise at the level of
discourse representation structure.
Associated to the Familiarity Constraint for definite NPs there is another
constraint which applies to indefinite NPs:
The Novelty Constraint: Every indefinite NP appearing in an occurrence
corresponds with a reference marker which is not linked to a reference
marker already present in the DR.26
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When a speaker uses an indefinite NP, he typically assumes that his listener is not
familiar the individual denoted by the NP, For instance, if I report to you, "I met a
woman," unless I am being coy, I am assuming that you are not familiar with the woman
I met. If I thought you were familiar with her, and that you knew that her name was
'Mary', I would have instead reported to you, "I met Mary." (If there were no such name,
I would probably attempt denote her via a definite description, e.g. "the woman you
spoke to when ... ")
Discourse'is a dynamic process whereby a context is amended. Since a change in
context can only occur if there are corresponding changes in the belief states of the
participants, discourse is also a dynamic process whereby a DRS is amended. That is,
Hob's utterance of 'The witch poisoned Spot' induces a change in DRS-la. Allowing for
gross simplification, it may be supposed that Hob's utterance relative to DRS-la induces
the following DRS:
DRS- lb
Universe: a, b, c,
Conditions: 1. a is a witch
2. b is named 'Spot'
3. b is a dog
4. c is named 'Rover'
5. c is a dog
6. a poisoned b
Hob's utterance does not introduce any new elements into the universe of DRS-la. This
is because Hob's utterance contains definite NPs only, and thus the reference markers
corresponding with the definite NPs 'the witch', and 'Spot'--a and b respectively--must be
linked to reference markers already present in the universe of DRS-la. How does DRS-
l b indicate that reference marker a corresponds with the occurrence of 'the witch', and
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that reference marker b corresponds with the occurrence of 'Spot'? The only difference
between the sentence uttered by Hob and condition 6--the one condition added to the
conditions of DRS- la by Hob's utterance--is that condition 6 has the reference marker
symbols 'a' and 'b' instead of the NPs 'the witch' and 'Spot', respectively. This indicates
that the definite NP 'the witch' corresponds with reference marker a, and the NP 'Spot'
corresponds with reference marker b. Consequently, since all reference markers are
linked to themselves, and both reference marker a and reference marker b are in the
universe of DRS-la, it follows that the reference markers corresponding to the
occurrences of 'the witch' and 'Spot' are linked to reference markers already in the
universe of the DR. Thus the Familiarity Constraint for definite NPs is satisfied. (Note
that if Hob had instead uttered, 'A witch poisoned Spot', then either reference marker a
does not allegedly represent the witch Hob is seemingly talking about, or DRS-la is not
an appropriate initial DRS for the discourse.)
But why is that the occurrences of 'the witch' and 'Spot' are made to correspond
with reference markers a and b, respectively? Why not, for instance, make the
occurrence of 'the witch' correspond with reference marker b, and the occurrence of
'Spot' correspond with reference marker c? A full fledged theory of discourse
representation would state precisely how such correspondences are determined, but here I
will simply assume that the most intuitively plausible correspondences and linkages are
correct. Thus, since condition I indicates that reference marker a allegedly represents an
individual who is a witch, and conditions 2 and 3 indicate that reference marker b
allegedly represents a dog named 'Spot', the most plausible correspondence matches the
NP 'the witch' with reference marker a, and the NP 'Spot' with reference marker b.
Finally, let us consider how Nob's response to Hob's utterance affects DRS-lb.
Nob's utterance relative to DRS-IB induces DRS-lc:
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DRS-Ic
Universe: a, b, c,
Conditions: 1. a is a witch
2. b is named 'Spot'
3. b is a dog
4. c is named 'Rover'
5. c is a dog
6. a poisoned b
7. a poisoned c
Nob's response adds condition 7 to DRS-lb. Because 'she' is a definite NP, it cannot
introduce a reference marker into the universe of DRS-lb, but rather must correspond
with a reference marker which is linked to a reference maker already present in DRS-lb.
What determines which one of the already present elements this occurrence of 'she'
corresponds with and is linked to? In particular, why does the occurrence of 'she'
correspond with reference marker a, and not to reference marker b? This is a
complicated issue, and I will not discuss it any detail here. Suffice it to say that the
adverb 'too' appearing in Nob's utterance determines that 'She' can correspond with, and
be linked to, reference marker a only. (Note that if Nob had instead uttered, 'She
poisoned Rover', the occurrence of 'she' could have corresponded with, and been linked
to, either a or b.)
What about truth conditions? What is it for Nob's response--the occurrence--to
be true? Very roughly, Nob's response is true just in case there is some way of assigning
actual entities, entities "in the world," to the reference markers of the universe of DRS-lec
which satisfies all the conditions of DRS-lc. That is, Nob's utterance is true just in case
there is a (partial) assignment function f( ) from discourse referents to actual entities such
that, 1, f(a) is a witch; 2. f(b) is named 'Spot'; 3. f(b) is a dog; 4. f(c) is named
'Rover'; 5. f(c) is a dog; and 6. f(a) poisoned f(b). (I will say that Nob's utterance is
true relative to DRS-lb just in case there is an appropriate assignment function f( ) such
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that conditions 1-7 are satisfied under assignment function f (). An assignment functioll
f( ) is appropriate for a DRS D just in case f( ) is defined for all and only the elements
of the universe of D.) Note that for an occurrence to be false is not simply for there to be
no appropriate assignment function. If there is no appropriate assignment function, then
the occurrence is not true; i.e. it is either false, or infelicitous. (This issue will be
discussed in more detail below.)
This definition of truth for occurrences, however, does not accord with our
untutored intuitions concerning the truth condition of occurrences. The problem is that
the above definition does not seem to capture our intuitions concerning the truth
conditions of occurrences containing definite descriptions, nor occurrences containing
directly referential terms. Our untutored intuitions dictate that Nob's utterance is true
only if there is some particular witch, the witch whom Hob "has in mind," and this
particular witch poisoned the very dog Spot. According to the definition of truth for an
occurrence stated above, however, it is sufficient for the truth of Nob's utterance relative
to DRS-lb that some witch or other poisoned some dog or other named 'Spot'. Thus the
above account of truth must be amended.
On reflection, it is not at all surprising that the above description of DRSs
coupled with the above definition of truth for an occurrence fail to capture our intuitions
concerning the truthf of occurrences. Our intuitions concerning the truth conditions of an
occurrence are sensitive to the referents of the terms appearing in the occurrence and, as
Putnam and Burge have taught us, the referent of an occurrence cannot be determined by
the "narrow" mental state of the speaker alone. As thus far described however, DRSs are
models of narrow mental states only, and thus it is not surprising that the above
definition of truth for an occurrence does not capture our intuitions concerning reference.
If DRSs and something like the above definition of truth for an occurrence are to capture
our untutored intuitions concerning the truth conditions of occurrences, DRSs must be
augmented so that they somehow specify appropriate world-mind relations. That is,
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something must be added to DRSs to account for that feature of reference determination
which occurs "outside of the head," and the above definition of truth must be amended
accordingly. (If predicates are "directly designating" terms, a similar difficulty applies to
predicates. Again, for the sake of simplicity, this issue will be overlooked here.)
Consider the occurrence of 'Spot' which appears in Hob's utterance. What is
needed is some way of ensuring that the reference marker corresponding with this
occurrence, viz. reference marker b, is mapped to the very dog Spot. More specifically,
DRS-lb and the definition of truth for an occurrence must be amended so that Hob's
utterance is true only if there is some assignment function f( ) such that f(b) = Spot.
This can be accomplished by adding a set (perhaps the empty set) of external restrictions
to DRSs. One external restriction is added to a DRS for every successfully referring
directly referential NP of a discourse. (I will say that a restriction governs the reference
markers occurring in it. Later internal restrictions--which determine what reference
markers are linked--will also be added to DRSs, and these internal restrictions will also
be said to govern the reference markers occurring in them.) For example, DRS-lb, the
DRS which is induced by Hob's utterance relative to DRS-la, is amended as follows:
DRS- lb'
Universe: a, b, c,
Conditions: 1. a is a witch
2. b is named 'Spot'
3. b is a dog
4. c is named 'Rover'
5. c is a dog
6. a poisoned b
External Restrictions: 1. R(b) = Spot
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External restriction I governs reference marker b; it states that the reference marker b
represents Spot, the very dog referred to by Hob's utterance. There is no external
restriction for reference marker a because, first, the occurrence of 'the witch' of course
lacks a denotation, but more importantly the NP 'the witch' is not a directly referential
NP; hence even if the occurrence of 'the witch' had a denotation, no external restriction
would be added to DRS-lb'. ('R( )' designates a partial function from reference markers
to the actual entities they represent, if they represent an actual entity. I will say that an
assignment functibn f( ) obeys an external restriction governing a reference marker x just
in case f(x) = R(x).)
What about the (empty) definite description 'the witch' that appears in Hob's
utterance? Here matters are more complicated. The difficulty concerns the
presupposition of uniqueness for definite descriptions. Our intuitions dictate that Hob's
utterance is true just in case there is some unique witch who poisoned Spot, but under the
definition of truth given above, Hob's utterance is true just in case some witch or other
poisoned Spot. How are we to solve this probiem? One suggestion would be to add
external restrictions governing the reference markers corresponding to definite
descriptions. Assume for a moment that there are witches, and that one of them, say
Hilda, poisoned Spot. Under this assumption, our intuitions seem to indicate that Hob's
utterance is true just in case Hilda poisoned Spot, and we could ensure that our account
of truth for an occurrence captured this intuition by adding the external restriction,
R(a) = Hilda, to DRS-lb. While this proposal would solve the problem, I do not think it
is in the spirit of a Russellian view: A cornerstone of the Russellian point of view is the
idea that definite descriptions and directly referential terms function in different ways,
and the above proposal suggests that they be treated in more or less the same way.
Hence I will reject the suggested proposal in favor of what I think is a more illuminating
solution to the problem.
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As a way of motivating the solution I will offer, I want to highlight some often
overlooked similarities between definite and indefinite descriptions. Consider an
occurrence of 'The fattest man weighs over 400 lbs.' In a typical utterance of this
sentence, the speaker will not have a particular man in mind, and the speaker will not be
attempting to communicate something about a particular man. Rather a typical
occurrence of this sentence will be interpreted as communicating something like "the
fattest man, whoever he is, weighs over 400 lbs." But now consider a typical utterance of
'The fat man hit me.' Here, it seems, the speaker has a particular person in mind, and his
utterance is true just in case that particular person is a fat man who hit the speaker. Thus
sometimes the utterer of a definite description "has someone in mind," and sometimes the
speaker does not "have someone in mind." The same distinction applies to occurrences
of sentences containing indefinite descriptions. Consider an occurrence of 'A fat man
must have sat here.' Here again in a typical utterance of this sentence, the speaker would
have no particular man in mind; the utterance would be true just in case at least one fat
man sat in the place indicated. Compare the former with a typical utterance of 'A fat man
hit me.' Here again, the speaker would typically have someone in particular in mind.
Thus the difference between definite and indefinite descriptions is not that definite
descriptions are used to "single out" a particular entity, while indefinite descriptions are
merely used to quantify over and describe entities; both definite and indefinite
descriptions are used to "single out" entities, and to quantify over and describe entities.
What then is the difference between definite and indefinite descriptions? The
difference concerns truth conditions. It is not the case that an occurrence of 'The fat man
sat here' is true just in case at least one fat man sat in the place indicated. But it is the
case that an occurrence of 'A fat man sat here' is true just in case at least one fat man sat
in the place indicated. Definite descriptions, but not indefinite descriptions, presuppose
uniqueness. But what does this mean? It is traditionally taken to mean that an
occurrence of a definite description carries a presupposition to the effect that the
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occurrence must somehow manage to "single out" one entity from the domain of all the
entities there are. (Never mind how an occurrence might do this, and whether or not this
idea is coherent.) I suggest, however, a much different way of understanding the
presupposition of uniqueness carried by occurrences of definite descriptions. I suggest
that a felicitous occurrence of a definite description need only "single out" one of the
reference markers in the DRS relative to which the definite description was uttered.
Recall that in order to satisfy the Familiarity Constraint, the reference marker
corresponding with an occurrence of a definite description must be linked to an already
present reference marker. What I am suggesting is that the presupposition of uniqueness
carried by occurrences of definite descriptions concerns the linked to relation, and not the
denotes relation. For example, I maintain that an utterance of 'the fat man sat here' is
felicitous--satisfies the presupposition of uniqueness--relative to a DRS just in case there
is only one reference marker m to which the reference marker corresponding with the
definite description may be appropriately linked. The fact that there are many fat men in
the world is irrelevant to the felicity of the occurrence. If this way of understanding the
presupposition of uniqueness carried by definite descriptions is correct, then nothing
must be added to DRSs in order to account for our intuitions concerning the truth
conditions of occurrences of sentences containing definite descriptions. Under my
proposal the presupposition of uniqueness is a consequence of the definiteness of definite
descriptions, and is therefore (already) enforced by the Familiarity Constraint.
Perhaps an example can help to clarify this point. Suppose Oscar and Otho are
looking at a broken chair, and engage in a discourse. Suppose that the initial DRS for
their discourse is as follows:
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DRS-2a
Universe: a
Conditions: I. a is a man
2. a is fat
Oscar now utters, pointing to the broken chair, an occurrence of
(39) The fat man sat here.
This utterance induces the following DRS:
DRS-2b
Universe: a
Conditions: 1. a is a man
2. a is fat
3. a sat here (the place indicated).
Thus the occurrence of the defiaite description 'The fat man' corresponds with reference
marker a, and, since reference marker a is already present in DRS-2a, Otho's utterance is
in accordance with the Familiarity Constraint. What about the presupposition of
uniqueness? I maintain that the presupposition of uniqueness is satisfied because there is
only one reference marker in DRS-2a with which the occurrence of 'the fat man' can
appropriately correspond. (Again, a complete theory of discourse representation would
not depend upon intuitions at this crucial juncture, but would instead offer a theory
explaining why the occurrence of 'the fat man' must correspond with reference marker a.)
Since there is no ambiguity concerning which already existing reference marker 'the fat
man' is to correspond with and be linked to, Oscar's utterance is felicitous. In contrast,
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suppose that the initial DRS for Oscar and Otho's discourse was not DRS-2a, but rather
as follows:
DRS-2a'
Universe: a, b
Conditions: 1. a is a man
2. a is fat
3. b is a man
4. b is fat
The presupposition of uniqueness for Oscar's utterance of (39) relative to DRS-2a' would
not be satisfied, and consequently the occurrence would not be felicitous; i.e. Oscar's
utterance of (39) does not induce a unique DRS, and thus does not have unique truth
conditions. The problem is that it is indeterminate, or ambiguous, as to which already
present reference marker the occurrence of 'the fat man' is to correspond with and be
linked to: Oscar's utterance of (39) relative to DRS-2a' would be infelicitous because the
occurrence of 'the fat man' appearing in Oscar's utterance could be appropriately taken as
corresponding with either reference marker a, or reference marker b.
It might be objected that in interpreting the presupposition of uniqueness to
concern the corresponds with relation, as opposed to the denotes relation, I have not
succeeded in capturing our intuitions concerning the truth conditions of occurrences
containing definite descriptions. An objector might argue as follows:
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Suppose that DRS-2a is the initial DRS for Oscar and Otho's discourse,
and that Oscar utters an occurrence of
(39) The fat man sat here.
and thereby induces DRS-2b, Further suppose, however, that
unbeknownst to Oscar and Otho, there are two fat men, fm, and fm2, in
the vicinity, and that Oscar and Otho are only familiar with fm,, Finally,
suppose that fm2, but not fm,, actually sat in the chair and broke it.
According to the proposed interpretation of the presupposition of
uniqueness, Oscar's utterance is felicitous and true in case there is a
assignment function f( ) such that f(a) is a fat man who sat in the place
indicated. Thus, since there is an assignment function f*( ) such that
f*(a) = fm2, the proposed interpretation of the presupposition of
uniqueness predicts that Oscar's utterance is felicitous and true, but this
prediction does not accord with our intuitions. Our intuitions dictate that
Oscar's utterance is infelicitous because the presumption of uniqueness is
not satisfied: the occurrence of 'the fat man' can be interpreted as
denoting either fm, or fm,, and this is why our intuitions dictate that
Oscar's utterance is infelicitous.
The above objection assumes that in the described situation our intuitions dictate
that Oscar's utterance relative to DRS-2a is infelicitous. My response to the objection is
to deny this assumption: Our intuitions do not dictate that Oscar's utterance relative to
DRS-2a is infelicitous, rather the above described situation elicits the intuition that if
Oscar were to utter an occurrence of (39) relative to a DRS very much different from
DRS-2a, then this distinct occurrence of (39) would be infelicitous. In DRT the truth
conditions of an occurrence can be evaluated only relative to an initial DRS; an
occurrence is a token of a declarative sentence uttered relative to an initial DRS.
Relative to DRS-2a, Oscar's utterance of
(39) The fat man sat here,
is both felicitous and true. What the above objection implicitly asks the reader to do is to
evaluate a distinct (imaginary) occurrence. More specifically, the above objection
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implicitly asks the reader to evaluate an utterance of (39) not relative to DRS-2a, but
instead relative to a DRS in which there are two reference markers, one corresponding
with 'fm,', and the other corresponding with 'fm2'. In other words, in describing the
situation in which there are two fat men, the objector makes the reader a participant in an
imaginary discourse for which a DRS similar to DRS-2a' is the initial DRS. Relative to
this newly introduced DRS, an utterance of (39) is infelicitous, but this is precisely what
is predicted by my analysis of the presupposition of uniqueness. Relative to a DRS
similar to DRS-2a' an utterance of (39) is infelicitous because the occurrence of the
definite description can be appropriately taken to correspond with either of two already
present reference markers. Thus the intuitions elicited by the above objection do not in
any way conflict with the predictions offered by my account of truth conditions; they are
just the intuitions that my account of truth conditions would predict the reader to have.
Consequently the above objection does not pose a problem for my interpretation of the
presupposition of uniqueness carried by occurrences of definite descriptions; indeed, the
above objection offers evidence in support of my interpretation.
Truth for an occurrence can now be provisionally defined in accordance with our
intuitions concerning directly referential terms and definite descriptions:
A token of sentence E uttered relative to DRS D which induces a DRS D'
is true iff there is an appropriate assignment function f( ) such that (i) f()
satisfies all the conditions of D', and (ii) f( ) obeys all internal and
external restrictions which govern elements of the universe of D'.
(Internal restrictions are introduced into DRSs below.) The above definition is
provisional because it is not intuitively adequate. The intuitive inadequacy of the above
definition arises because the truth of an occurrence is defined in terms of DRSs, and
DRSs are constructed out of finite sequences of occurrences. Consequently, according to
the above definition, the truth of the nth occurrence of a discourse in part depends upon
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how the Ist through the (n-l)th occurrences affected the DRS being constructed. For
example, if the first occurrence in a discourse is an utterance of 'A witch poisoned Spot',
then all subsequent occurrences in the discourse will not be true, as the condition added
to the DRS by the first occurrence cannot be satisfied by any assignment function. This
result is counterintuitive; the truth conditions of an occurrence should not always depend
upon the truth conditions of all the occurrences preceding it, (Though often the truth
conditions of an occurrence depend upon the truth conditions of the occurrences
preceding it). I optimistically maintain that it is possible to refine DRT so that intuitively
correct sufficient and necessary conditions for the truth of occurrences can be
formulated, but I will not take on this difficult task here,2 7 The provisional definition of
truth for an occurrence stated above will suffice for our purposes.
Also note that it follows from the above definition that if there is no assignment
function f( ) which satisfies conditions (i) and (ii) for an occurrence O which induces a
DRS D, then O is not true; it does not follow that occurrence O is false. For example,
consider Hob's utterance of 'The witch poisoned Spot' relative to
DRS- I a'
Universe: a, b, c,
Conditions: 1. a is a witch
2. b is named 'Spot'
3. b is a dog
4. c is named 'Rover'
5. c is a dog
External Restrictions: 1. R(b) = Spot
(Note that DRS-la' is DRS- la with the addition of the appropriate external restrictions.)
Hob's utterance adds condition 6 to DRS-la', thereby inducing DRS-lb'
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DRS- lb'
Universe: a, b, c,
Conditions: 1. a is a witch
2, b is named 'Spot'
3. b is a dog
4, c is named 'Rover'
5. c is a dog
6. a poisoned b
External Restrictions: 1. R(b) = Spot
Hence, according the above definition of truth for an occurrence, Hob's assertion is true
if and only if there is an appropriate assignment function f( ) such that (i) f( ) satisfies
conditions 1-6, and (ii) f( ) obeys external restriction 1. Putting all this together, Hob's
utterance of 'The witch poisoned Spot' is true relative to DRS-la' just in case (i) there is
an assignment function f() such that 1. f(a) is a witch; 2. f(b) is named 'Spot'; 3. f(b)
is a dog; 4. f(c) is named 'Rover'; 5. f(c) is a dog; 6. f(a) poisoned f(b). And (ii),
f(b) is Spot. Since there is no assignment function which maps reference marker a to a
witch, Hob's utterance is not true, though it is not false either. This prediction seems to
accord with our untutored intuitions: our untutored intuitions dictate that Hob's utterance
is not false because it has a false referential presupposition. (What is it then for a token 'r
relative to a DRS 13 to befalse? Once truth for an occurrence is adequately defined (See
note 27), falsity for an occurrence could be defined as follows: A token z of a sentence S
uttered relative to DRS D which induces a DRS D' is false iff a token of the negation of
E would be true relative to DRS D.)
It is important that according to the above provisional definition of truth for an
occurrence, the truth value of an occurrence of a simple declarative sentence will almost
always be identical to the truth value of the proposition presented by the occurrence
(assuming that the occurrence has a truth value, and presents a proposition). For
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example, an occurrence of 'Rover chased Spot' relative to DRS- l a' would be true if and
only if there were an appropriate assignment function f( ) such that (i) f(c) chased f(b);
f(b) is a dog named 'Spot'; f(c) is a dog named 'Rover'; and (ii) f(b) is Spot; and f(c) is
Rover. But if there were such an assignment function, then the Russellian proposition
presented by this occurrence, viz, that Rover chased Spot, would also be true.
Conversely, if the Russellian proposition that Rover chased Spot is true, then there must
be an appropriate assignment function f( ) such that f(c) chased f(b). Hence if it is
assumed that Rover and Spot are dogs named 'Rover' and 'Spot,' respectively, it follows
that an occurrence of 'Rover chased Spot' relative to DRS-la' is true if and only if the
proposition presented by this occurrence is true. Thus DRT predicts that, for occurrences
of simple declarative sentences, differences between the truth values of occurrences and
the truth values of the propositions presented by those occurrences will not, in normal
situations, arise. As I will now begin to illustrate however, the truth values of
occurrences of attitude ascriptions will often diverge from the truth values of the
propositions these occurrences present.
How does this account of truth for occurrences apply in the case of attitude
ascriptions? In other words, how does an occurrence of an attitude ascription affect the
DRS relative to which it is uttered? The universe of a DRS for a discourse contains
reference markers which allegedly represent the "entities" to which the participants of the
discourse are existentially committed. For example, a is in the universe of DRS-la
because Hob and Nob are committed to there being a certain witch, and their utterances
presuppose the existence of such a witch. Note, however, that in some cases an NP
appearing within the that-clause of an ascription carries with it an existential
presupposition, while in other cases such an NP carries no such presupposition, For
example consider an utterance of
(3) Odile believes that Twain is a great author.
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In most cases the utterer of (3) presupposes that 'Twain' has a referent. That is, because
'Twain' is a definite NP, the occurrence of 'Twain' must correspond with a reference
marker which is linked to a reference marker already present in the universe of the DRS.
In these cases the speaker will assent to an "exportation version" of his utterance. That
is, if an occurrence of 'Twain' corresponds with a reference marker which is linked to a
reference marker already in the DRS for the discourse, then the speaker would assent to
an occurrence of 'There is somebody such that Odile believes that he is a great author'.
(Note that the speaker might assent to this "exportation version" of his utterance, and yet
not assent to a "substitution version" of his utterance relative to this DRS; i.e. he might
assent to this "exportation version" of (3), and yet dissent from an occurrence of (4).) In
other cases, however, the utterer of (3) does not presuppose that 'Twain' has a referent,
and in these cases the speaker would dissent from the "exportation version" of his
utterance. For example, imagine that Otho, who is skeptical concerning the existence of
Twain, utters the following discourse:
(40) Odile believes that there is a guy called 'Twain', and that Twain is a great author.
In this case the speaker, Otho, does not presuppose that there is a guy called 'Twain', nor
would he assent to an "exportation version" of his utterance. It is clear, however that in
Otho's utterance of (40) 'Twain' is in some sense intended to be "coreferential" with the
indefinite NP 'a guy called 'Twain". Hence the reference markers corresponding to the
two NPs must be linked to the same reference marker, yet there can be no such reference
marker(s) in the DRS of Otho's discourse, as Otho does not presuppose that there is a guy
called 'Twain'. How can this difference concerning the presuppositions carried by NPs
appearing inside the that-clauses of occurrences of attitude ascriptions be represented
within the framework of DRT?
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In making attitude ascriptions, in speaking about how others believe, or fear, etc.,
the world to be, we endeavor to add to the context of our discourse propositions
concerning what propositions the subjects of our ascriptions believe, fear, etc. Hence
discourses concerning a person's beliefs can be thought of as involving a sub-context for
that person: a sub-context for z in the context for x and y's conversation contains all and
only those propositions mutually believed by x and y to be believed by z. Corresponding
to contexts with sub-contexts there are DRSs with sub-DRSs. The difference with regard
to the existential presuppositions carried by terms appearing inside that-clauses can be
accounted for by appeal to DRSs with sub-DRSs. For example, suppose that Oscar's
utterance of (3), the utterance for which 'Twain' carries existential presupposition, occurs
relative to the following initial DRS:
DRS-3a
Universe: a, b
Conditions: I. a is named 'Odile'
2. b is named 'Twain'
3. b is named 'Clemens'
How does Oscar's utterance of (3), where 'Twain' as it appears in this utterance carries an
existential presupposition, affect DRS-3a? I suggest that the resulting DRS is
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DRS-3b
Universe; a, b,
Conditions: 1. a is named 'Odile'
2. b is named 'Twain'
3. b is named 'Clemens'
4. a is in a belief state which is
characterized by the following sub-DRS:
Universe: c,
Conditions: 1. c is a great author. 2 8
Internal Restrictions: 1. c ý- b
External Restrictions: 1. R(a) = Odile
2. R(c) = Twain
A few points of clarification: First, the sub-DRS appears as part of condition 4 of
the primary DRS, DRS-3b. Thus, since the occurrence of (3) relative to DRS-3a adds
condition 4, if this occurrence is to be true, there must be an appropriate assignment
function which, inter alia, satisfies this condition. But what is it for condition 4 to be
satisfied under an assignment function? I.e. what is it for a sub-DRS to characterize a
belief state under an assignment function f( )? A sub-DRS D of a primary DRS D'
characterizes a belief state of a subject x under an assignment function f( ) which is
appropriate for D' if and only if all the propositions determined by the conditions of D
under f( ) are elements of x's belief set. What propositions are determined by a given
sub-DRS under a given assignment function f( )? If all of the conditions of a given sub-
DRS contain reference markers which are (i) linked to elements of the universe of the
primary DRS, and (ii) linked to elements governed by external restrictions, then the sub-
DRS determines the Russellian propositions which are obtained by combining the value
of R( ) for each reference marker with the property designated by the appropriate
condition. E.g. the sub-DRS of primary DRS-3b determines the Russellian proposition
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that Twain is a great author. (Intuitively, the sub-DRS of DRS-3b determines this
proposition because 'Twain' is assumed to have a referent and it does have a referent.) A
sub-DRS also determines what I will call fusion propositions. A fusion proposition is
obtained by forming "lambda properties" from conjunctions of conditions, and applying
these properties to the entities represented by the reference markers which appear in the
conditions. For example, suppose that the sub-DRS of DRS-3b also contained the
following condition, 2. c is witty. What propositions would be determined by this sub-
DRS? First, as described above, this sub-DRS would determine the propositions that
Twain is a great author, and that Twain is witty. We now replace the terms referring to
reference markers appearing in the conditions with variables, and conjoin the resulting
open sentences. Thus in our example we obtain, 'x is a great author & x is witty'. We
now form a lambda predicate, viz. 'hx[x is a great author & x is witty]', and apply the
property designated by this predicate to the entity, or entities, represented by the
reference marker(s) which originally appeared in the conditions--reference marker a in
our example. Thus a sub-DRS which contained conditions 1. a is a great author, and 2.
a is witty, where a is an element of the universe of the primary DRS and R(a) = Twain,
determines the following three propositions: that Twain is a great author, that Twain is
witty, and that Xx[x is a great author & x is witty](Twain). Thus such a sub-DRS would
characterize a subject's belief state just in case the subject held the attitude of belief
toward these three propositions.
What if the reference marker(s) appearing in a conditions are not linked to a
reference marker in the universe of the primary DRS? Conditions containing such "free"
reference markers determine existentially quantified Russellian propositions, and sets of
conditions containing such "free" reference markers determine existentially quantified
fusion propositions. For instance, in the above example if reference marker c were not
linked to reference marker b, then the sub-DRS of DRS-3b would determine the
Russellian proposition that there is somebody who is a great author. Moreover, if c were
273
not linked to b, and the sub-DRS of DRS-3b contained condition 2, then the sub-DRS
would determine the fusion proposition that there is somebody who is a great author who
is named 'Twain'. 29 (Note that a sub-DRS containing the conditions, 1. a is witty, and
2. b is not witty, do not determine the conjunctive Russellian proposition that Twain is
witty and Twain is not witty, even if both a and b are governed by external restrictions
which force them to be assigned to Twain,)
Second (continuing with the clarificatory remarks), DRS-3b contains an Internal
Restriction, and nothing thus far has been said about these. Internal restrictions impose
constraints upon assignment functions by specifying links between the reference markers
in the universes of primary DRSs and reference makers in the universes of their sub-
DRSs. An internal restriction represents that the participants of a discourse assume, or
mutually believe, of two or more NP occurrences that they are to be understood as
coreferrential (or codenoting). (We may understand occurrences of 'Santa' and 'St. Nick'
as coreferring terms, even if we are in the know about Santa.) Thus the internal
restriction in the above DRS represents that the participants of the discourse assume that
the occurrence of 'Twain' appearing in Oscar's utterance of (3) is coreferential with past
occurrences of 'Twain' and 'Clemens'. Roughly put, the internal restriction in DRS-3b
represents that the participants assume that the person whom Odile is said to have a belief
about is Twain, the same guy assumed by all participants to exist, and to be named both
'Twain' and 'Clemens'. Note that Oscar's utterance contains appearances of two
successfully referring definite direct reference NPs, viz. 'Odile' and 'Twain'. Thus two
external restrictions are added, and each NP occurrence corresponds with a reference
marker which is linked to an already present reference marker. As is indicated by
condition 4, the occurrence of the definite NP 'Odile' corresponds with and is linked to
already present reference marker c: since this occurrence of 'Odile' appears outside of
any that-clause, it does not introduce a new reference marker into the DRS. The
occurrence of 'Twain', on the other hand, appears inside a that-clause, and consequently it
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corresponds with reference marker c, which is introduced into the universe of the sub-
DRS. As is required by the Familiarity Constraint, this new reference marker is then
linked via the internal restriction to reference marker b.
Putting the above points together, Oscar's utterance of (3) relative to DRS-3a is
true just in case there is an appropriate assignment function f( ) such that
f(c)=f(b)=R(c)=Twain; f(b) is named 'Twain and 'Clemens'; and the proposition that
Twain is a great author is an element of Odile's belief set. (This is the only proposition
determined by the sub-DRS of DRS-3b under assignment function f( ).)
We have been assuming that in Oscar's utterance of (3) relative to DRS-3a the
appearance of 'Twain' carries an existential presupposition; we have been assuming that
Oscar presupposes that this appearance of 'Twain' has a referent. That this appearance of
'Twain' carries an existential presupposition is reflected in DRS-3b: the internal
restriction of DRS-3b links b, which is an element of the universe of DRS-3b, with c, the
reference marker introduced by Oscar's utterance of 'Twain'. How can an utterance of
(40) Odile believes that there is a guy called 'Twain', and that Twain is a great author.
in which the appearance of 'Twain' does not carry an existential presupposition, be
represented in the framework of DRT? Note that Otho's utterance of (40) contains an
appearance of the indefinite NP, 'a guy', Hence the reference marker that corresponds
with this NP cannot be linked to a reference marker already present anywhere in the
initial DRS. Let us assume therefore that the initial DRS, the DRS relative to which
Otho utters (40), is as follows:
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DRS-4a
Universe: a
Conditions: 1. a is named 'Odile'
Let us take the two conjuncts of (40) in turn. I suggest that the DRS resulting from
Otho's utterance of 'Odile believes that there is a guy called 'Twain',' relative to DRS-4a
induces
DRS-4b
Universe: a
Conditions: 1. a is named 'Odile'
2. a is in a belief state which is
characterized by the following sub-DRS:
Universe: b,
Conditions 1. b is called 'Twain'
2. b is a guy
External Restrictions: 1. R(a) = Odile
The indefinite NP 'a guy', since it appears inside a that-clause, introduces reference
marker b into the sub-DRS. (Note that two conditions are added to the sub-DRS by
Otho's utterance: the first condition is obtained by replacing the introducing NP with the
corresponding reference marker, the other is obtained by predicating information
conveyed by the NP occurrence itself to the introduced reference marker. That
occurrences of NPs themselves introduce conditions into sub-DRSs will be important in
what follows.) As usual, the reference marker corresponding with the successfully
referring directly referential NP 'Odile' is governed by an external restriction.
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Now consider the second conjunct of (40): Otho's utterance of 'that Twain is a
great author', relative to DRS-4b induces
DRS-4c
Universe: a
Conditions: 1. a is named'Odile'
2. a is in a belief state which is
characterized by the following sub-DRS:
Universe: b,
Conditions: 1. b is called 'Twain'
2, b is a guy
3. b is a great author
External Restrictions: 1. R(a) = Odile
2. R(b) = Twain
Note that the truth of Otho's utterance does not require that b be assigned to an actual
entity; b is an element of the sub-DRS, and there is no internal restriction linking b to
some element of the universe of the primary DRS. (This indicates that Oscar does not
assume that 'Twain' has a referent, even though it does.) Thus Otho's utterance could be
true even if there were no appropriate assignment function f( ) such that the conditions of
the sub-DRS were satisfied under f( ), More specifically, Otho's utterance of (4) relative
to initial DRS-4a is true just in case there is some appropriate assignment function f( )
such that, f(a) = Odile, and f(b)=Twain; f(a) is named 'Odile'; and Odile holds the
attitude of belief toward the following Russellian propositions: that someone named
'Twain', that someone is a guy, that someone is a great author, and that someone who is a
guy named 'Twain' is a great author. (Note that the sub-DRSs determine existential
propositions, as opposed to singular propositions, because b is not linked to a reference
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marker in the universe of DRS-4c, and an appropriate assignment function for DRS-4c is
undefined for argument b,)
We are almost ready to illustrate how DRT can be invoked to distinguish the truth
conditions of occurrences of (3) and (4), but a few more pieces of machinery must be put
into place. Consider again DRS-3b, the DRS which was induced from Oscar's utterance
of (3) relative to DRS-3a:
DRS-3b
Universe: a, b,
Conditions: 1. a is named 'Odile'
2. b is named 'Twain'
3. b is named 'Clemens'
4, a is in a belief state which is
characterized by the following sub-DRS:
Universe: c,
Conditions; I. c is a great author,
Internal Restrictions: c -t b
External Restrictions: 1. R(a) = Odile
2. R(c) = Twain
If this were the DRS which resulted from an utterance of (3), it also could be the DRS
which resulted from an utterance (4), The only difference between (3) and (4) is that (3)
has 'Twain' where (4) has 'Clemens', but the fact that (3) has 'Twain' instead of 'Clemens'
appearing in its that-clause is not reflected anywhere in the above DRS. Consequently,
Oscar's utterance would have had the same truth conditions had he uttered (4) instead of
(3). In other words, if Oscar's utterance of (3) relative DRS-3a induces DRS-3b, then the
context which DRS-3a partially characterizes is an insensitive context. Consequently, as
it is often put, DRS-3b represents a de re interpretation of Oscar's utterance, What is
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needed in order to distinguish the truth conditions of occurrences of (3) and (4) is some
way of representing a de dicto interpretation of Oscar's utterance within the framework of
DRT. 30
Consider an utterance of
(41) Odile believes that the witty guy is a great author.
relative to DRS-5a:
DRS-5a
Universe; a, b
Conditions: 1., a is named 'Odile'
2. b is a witty guy
How can the de dicto interpretation of this utterance relative to DRS-5a be represented?
That is, how might an utterance of (41) relative to DRS-5a determine a DRS which has
distinct truth conditions from the DRS determined by an utterance of
(42) Odile believes that the bearded guy is a great author.
relative to DRS-5a, even though the occurrences of 'the witty guy', and 'the bearded guy',
denote the same individual? I suggest that the following represents a de dicto
interpretation of the utterance of (41) relative to DRS-5a:
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DRS-5b
Universe: a, b,
Conditions: 1, a is named 'Odile'
2. b is a witty guy
3. a is in a belief state which is
characterized by the following sub-DRS:
Universe: c,
Conditions: 1. c is a witty guy
2. c is a great author
Internal Restrictions: c "- b
External Restrictions: R(a) = Odile
Because the definite NP 'the witty guy' appears inside a that-clause, it corresponds with
the reference marker c which is introduced into the universe of the sub-DRS. And
because the NP is definite, c must be linked, via the internal restriction, to an already
present reference marker. If DRS-5b is the DRS brought about by the occurrence of (41)
relative to DRS-5a, then the truth of this occurrence requires that there be an appropriate
assignment function f( ) such that f(b) is a witty guy and that Odile have the fusion
proposition that f(b) is a witty guy who is a great author in her belief set. Contrast the
above with DRS-5b', which represents the de dicto reading of an utterance of (42)
relative to DRS-5a:
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DRS-5b'
Universe: a, b,
Conditions: 1. a is named 'Odile'
2. b is a bearded guy
3, a is in a belief state which is
characterized by the following sub-DRS:
Universe: c,
Conditions: I. c is a bearded guy
2. c is a great author
Internal Restrictions: c - b
External Restrictions: R(a) = Odile
The truth of the utterance of (42) relative to DRS-5a thus requires that there be an
appropriate assignment function f( ) such that f(b) is a bearded guy and that Odile have
the fusion proposition that f(b) is a bearded guy who is a great author in her belief set.
Thus if DRS-5b and DRS-5b' are brought about by the utterances of (41) and (42)
respectively, then these occurrences have distinct truth conditions. In other words, DRS-
5b and DRS-5b' represent de dicto interpretations of utterances of (41) and (42). The de
dicto interpretation of the utterance of (41) is represented by placing the condition, 1. c
is a witty guy, which is specified by the NP 'the witty guy', into the sub-DRS. Similarly,
the de dicto interpretation of the occurrence of (42) is obtained by placing the condition,
1. c is a bearded guy, which is specified by the NP 'the bearded guy', into the sub-DRS.
Note that these NP specified conditions might instead have been placed in the primary
DRSs, in which case the resulting DRSs would have represented de re interpretations.
Before applying this machinery to occurrences of (3) and (4), I would like to
highlight an advantage of DRT which has been brought out by the discussion thus far. It
is usually assumed that there are two kinds of belief ascriptions: de re ascriptions, and de
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dicto ascriptions. (Sometimes it is suggested that there is a third category of "de se"
attitude ascriptions. E.g. "Heimson believes that he [himseltf is Hume." An example of
a de se ascription is discussed in Appendix B.3 1 I) As was brought out by the above
discussion, however, there are actually three kinds of belief ascriptions. For any
ascription of the form N believes that E(t) , where t is a singular definite NP and I is a
sentential function, there are three kinds of interpretation:
(i) The ascription may be interpreted de re, where the occurrence of t carries an
existential presupposition.
(ii) The ascription may be interpreted de dicto, where the occurrence of T carries
an existential presupposition,
(iii) The ascription may be interpreted de dicto, where the occurrence of I: does
not carry an existential presupposition.
(Interpretations of type (ii) are often overlooked. Th;,t there are cases of type (ii) is
evidenced by the existence of situations in which a speaker assents to a token of 'Odile
believes that Twain is a great author' and also a token of 'There is somebody whom Odile
believes to be a great author' yet dissents from a token of 'Odile believes that Clemens is
a great author.' Also, note that there could not be a de re interpretation where t carried
no existential presupposition.) The DRT machinery thus far sketched accounts for this
three-way distinction. Consider an utterance of
(41) Odile believes that the witty guy is a great author.
relative to the following initial DRS:
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DRS-5a
Universe: a, b
Conditions: 1, a is named 'Odile'
2. b is a witty guy
There are three ways of interpreting an occurrence of (41) relative to DRS-5a.
Interpretation (i) is represented by the following DRS:
DRS-5bi
Universe: a, b,
Conditions: 1. a is named 'Odile'
2. b is a witty guy
3. a is in a belief state which is
characterized by the following sub-DRS:
Universe: c,
Conditions: 1. c is a great author
Internal Restrictions: c " b
External Restrictions: R(a) = Odile
The second interpretation of an utterance of (41) relative to DRS-5a is represented by the
following DRS:
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DRS-5bii
Universe: a, b,
Conditions: 1.
2.
3.
a is named 'Odile'
b is a witty guy
a is in a belief state which is
characterized by the following sub-DRS:
Universe: c
Conditions: i. c is a great author
2. c is a witty guy
Internal Restrictions: c d b
External Anchors: R(a) = Odile
And finally the third interpretation is represented by the following DRS:
DRS-5biii
Universe: a,
Conditions: 1.
2.
a is named 'Odile'
a is in a belief state which is
characterized by the following sub-DRS:
Universe: c
Conditions: 1. c is a great author
2. c is a witty guy
External Restrictions: R(a) = Odile
(Note that interpretation (iii) is not available if (41) is uttered relative to DRS-5a.
Interpretation (iii) is available only if (41) is uttered relative to a DRS which already
contains a sub-DRS, and the occurrence of the definite NP 'the witty guy' must
correspond with a reference marker which is linked to a member of the universe of this
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sub-DRS. For, example, DRS-5biii could be induced from an initial DRS which
contained a sub-DRS with r in its universe, and r is witty among its conditions.) Thus
DRT can account for all three interpretations of an occurrence of an attitude ascription. I
know of no other theory of attitude ascriptions which is able to do this.
How can this machinery be utilized in order to represent de dicto interpretations
of occurrences of (3) and (4)? The basic idea is that in order to obtain de dicto
interpretations of utterances of these sentences, the NPs 'Twain' and 'Clemens' must also
specify conditions which are placed in the sub-DRSs of the DRSs which are induced by
these utterances. Just as an utterance of
(41) Odile believes that the witty guy is a great author.
can be interpreted in such a way that it is true only if Odile believes for some individual i
that i is a witty guy who is a great author, so an utterance of
(3) Odile believes that Twain is a great author,
can be interpreted in such a way that it is true only if Odile believes that Twain is named
'Twain' and is a great author. An occurrence of (3), in a sensitive context, presents the
Russellian proposition that Odile believes that Twain (the man) is a great author, but it
also shows (to borrow Wittgenstein's term) and thereby communicates the Russellian
proposition that Odile believes that Twain is named 'Twain'. Similarly, an occurrence of
(4) Odile believes that Clemens is a great author.
presents this same Russellian proposition, but it shows and thereby communicates the
Russellian proposition that Odile believes that Twain is named 'Clemens'. Thus what the
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machinery of DRT does, in essence, is to take Salmon's insights concerning how the
names appearing in ascriptions affect our intuitions concerning truth conditions, and to
make these insights applicable to the actual truth conditions of occurrences. Again, I
maintain that Salmon is roughly correct in explaining why we have the intuitions we do,
but he is incorrect in thinking that these intuitions are not veridical; his mistake is his
tacit endorsement of the Principle of Propositional Truth.
At last the stage is set and the above insights can be applied within the framework
of DRT in order to distinguish the truth conditions of occurrences of (3) and (4). Let us
suppose that the initial DRS for an utterance of (3) is
DRS-6a
Universe: a, b
Conditions: 1. a is named 'Odile'
2. b is named 'Twain'
3. b is named 'Clemens'
Assuming that the goals of the discourse are such that the context which is partially
characterized by DRS-6a is sensitive, the utterance of (3) relative to DRS-6a induces
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DRS-6b
Universe: a, b
Conditions: 1. a is named 'Odile'
2. b is named 'Twain'
3. b is named 'Clemens'
4, a is in a belief state which is
characterized by the following sub-DRS:
Universe: c
Conditions: 1. c is named 'Twain'
2. c is a great author
Internal Restrictions: c <-> b
External Restrictions: 1. R(a) = Odile
2. R(c) = Twain
The utterance of (3) relative to DRS-6a is thus true if and only if there is some
assignment function f( ) such that f( ) obeys all the external and internal restrictions of
DRS-6b, and conditions 1-4 are satisfied under f(). Thus the occurrence of (3) is true if
and only if there is an appropriate assignment function f( ) such that, f(a) = Odile and
f(b) = f(c) = Twain; f(a) is named 'Odile', and f(b) is named 'Twain' and 'Clemens'; and
finally f(a) holds the attitude of belief toward the Russellian propositions determined
under f( ) by the conditions in the sub-DRS of condition 4; i.e. Odile must hold the
attitude of belief toward the Russellian propositions that Twain is named 'Twain', that
Twain is a great author, and that Twain is a great author named 'Twain'. (This last
proposition is mnore formally presented by 'Xx[x is a great author & x is named
'Twain'](Twain)'.)
Now let us determine the truth conditions of an utterance of (4) relative to DRS-
6a. Assuming that the context is a sensitive context, an utterance of (4) relative to DRS-
6a induces the DRS
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DRS-6b'
Universe; a, b
Conditions: 1. a is named'Odile'
2. b is named 'Twain'
3. b is named 'Clemens'
4. a is in a belief state which is
characterized by the following sub-DRS:
Universe: c,
Conditions: 1. c is named 'Clemens'
2. c is a great author
Internal Restrictions: c " b
External Restrictions: 1. R(a) = Odile
2. R(c) = Twain
The utterance of (4) relative to DRS-6a, similar to the occurrence of (3) considered
above, is true if and only if there is some appropriate assignment function f( ) such that,
f( ) obeys all the external and internal restrictions of DRS-6b', and conditions 1-4 are
satisfied under f(). Thus the occurrence of (4) is true if and only if there is an
appropriate assignment function f( ) such that, f(a) = Odile and f(b) = f(c) = Twain;
f(a) is named 'Odile', f(b) is named 'Twain' and 'Clemens'; and finally f(a) holds the
attitude of belief toward the Russellian propositions determined under f( ) by the
conditions in the sub-DRS of condition 4; i.e. Odile must hold the attitude of belief
toward the Russellian propositions that Twain is named 'Clemens', that Twain is a great
author, and that Twain is a great author named 'Clemens'. (Again, this last proposition is
more formally presented by, 'hx[x is a great author & x is named 'Clemens'](Twain)'.)
Thus DRT illustrates how, in sensitive contexts, the truth conditions of occurrences of (3)
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and (4) differ, even though these occurrences present the very same Russellian
proposition.
What about the truth conditions of negated ascriptions? If a token of
(4n) Odile does not believe that Clemens is a great author.
is uttered relative to DRS-6a, the following DRS is induced:
DRS-6bn'
Universe: a, b
Conditions: 1. a is named 'Odile'
2. b is named 'Twain'
3. b is named 'Clemens'
4. a is not in a belief state which is
characterized by the following sub-DRS:
Universe: c,
Conditions: 1. c is named 'Clemens'
2. c is a great author
Internal Restrictions: c -> b
External Restrictions: 1. R(a) = Odile
92. R(c) = Twain
The utterance of (4n) is true relative to DRS-6a if and only if there is some appropriate
assignment function f( ) such that f( ) obeys all the external and internal restrictions of
DRS-6bn', and conditions 1-4 are satisfied under f(). Thus the occurrence of (4n) is true
if and only if there is an appropriate assignment function f( ) such that, f(a) = Odile and
f(b) = f(c) = Twain; f(a) is named 'Odile', f(b) is named 'Twain' and 'Clemens'; and
finally, f(a) does not hold the attitude of belief toward all the Russellian propositions
determined under f( ) by the conditions in the sub-DRS of condition 4; i.e. Odile does
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not hold the attitude of belief toward at least one of the following propositions: that
Twain is named 'Clemens', that Twain is a great author, and that Twain is a great author
named 'Clemens'.
Have I succeeded in motivating option (iii)? Have I succeeded in showing that it
is plausible to maintain that, in keeping with the Russellian desiderata, occurrences of (3)
and (4) present the same Russellian proposition, yet even so our untutored intuitions are
correct in dictating that occurrences of (3) and (4) may have distinct truth conditions? I
concede that the above sketch of DRT is insufficient in that it does not address many
questions and concerns which need to be addressed. Three of the most pressing concerns
are as follows: First, an adequate account of DRT would have to be formalized with
much greater precision. In particular, instead of relying on intuitions, a set of formal
rules for constructing DRSs from discourses would have to specified. (Kamp calls the
set of rules for constructing DRSs from discourses the "construction algorithm." 32)
Furthermore, the above provisional definition of truth for an occurrence must be
modified so that it is intuitively adequate; the provisional account of truth for an
occurrence must be amended so that the truth value of an occurrence does not depend
upon every preceding occurrence in the discourse .
Second, the relationship between DRT and conventional truth-theoretic semantic
theories must be clarified. I have assumed here that DRT does not supplant traditional
truth-theoretic semantics, but rather complements such theories. That is, I have assumed
that something roughly along the lines of the Naive Russellian Theory--minus the
Principle of Propositional Truth--will give a correct account of the propositions presented
by occurrences; DRT was brought in to show how such a semantic theory can be made to
accord with our untutored intuitions. It may turn out, however, that a comprehensive
theory of discourse representation will itself be able to explain the relevant phenomena,
without recourse to anything much resembling the Naive Russellian Theory (minus the
Principle of Propositional Truth). 3 3 I have no argument to the effect that DRT will not
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in the end supplant traditional truth theoretic semantics, but I do not see the prospect of
DRT supplanting traditional truth theoretic approaches to semantics as a threat to the
central thesis of this dissertation. The central thesis of this dissertation is that a theory
which endorses both the Principle of Direct Reference and the Principle Semantic
Innocence can be defended from the problems and arguments posed by the phenomenon
of opacity. Therefore, so long as the supplanting discourse representation theory respects
principles at least similar to the principles of direct reference and semantic innocence, the
central thesis of this dissertation stands.
Third, and I think most importantly, a more precise statement of what discourse
representation structures are is required. What exactly are reference markers? What
exactly is the relationship between discourse representation structures, and what goes on
when actual people engage in actual discourses? My purpose in this section has been to
illustrate how DRT can be utilized to defend Russellian theories from the semantic
arguments from opacity, and thus I have not addressed these questions. An adequate
defense of DRT, however, would be required to provide answers to these difficult
questions. 34
Despite these deficiencies however, I maintain that the above sketch of DRT is
sufficient to justify the claim that option (iii) is superior to either option (ii), or option (i).
That is, the appropriate response to the semantic arguments from opacity is not to invent
a complicated way of distinguishing the propositions presented by attitude ascriptions,
nor is it to deny the veracity of our untutored intuitions concerning occurrences of
attitude ascriptions. Rather the arppropriate response to the semantic arguments from
opacity is to deny the Principle of Propositional Truth, and to provide an account of truth
for an occurrence which accords with our untutored intuitions.
Is DRT, as sketched above, something to which a Russellian theorist may avail
himself? There are, to be sure, similarities between reference markers and Fregean
senses, and I have argued in previous chapters that nothing can play the role that senses
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were posited to play. Is DRT, as sketched above, compatible with my arguments against
the Fregean strategy? First, it should be noted that DRT is wholly compatible with the
Russellian desiderata, viz. the principles of direct reference, and semantic innocence.
DRT is wholly compatible with the claim that the objects, or contents, of propositional
attitudes are Russellian propositions, and Russellian propositions are the semantic values
of occurrences of declarative sentences. And DRT is wholly compatible with the claim
that a declarative sentence presents the same Russellian proposition relative to a context
regardless of whether the sentence appears inside or outside of a that-clause.
Furthermore, unlike theories which take option (i) (ie. maintaining the Principle of
Propositional Truth, and inventing a way of distinguishing the propositions presented by
ascriptions such as (3) and (4)), option (iii) as realized by DRT does not require ordinary
speakers to refer to, or have the ability to specify, senses, sentences of mentalese,
cognitive particulars, or any other kind of esoteric mental entities. Thus option (iii) as
realized by DRT is not squeezed between the Scylla and Charybdis of the Fregean
strategy: The mental goings on which account for a subject's behavior play no part in
determining what is presented, or even communicated, by an occurrence of an attitude
ascription about that subject. In making attitude ascriptions speakers are not attempting
to refer to, nor even to represent, the mental goings on of the subject. Rather, in uttering
an attitude ascription a speaker is attempting to describe the world as the subject believes,
desires, etc. it to be. Of course in so doing the speaker, if his utterance is true, thereby
characterizes the mental state of the subject, but characterizing a mental state does not
require referring to, or representing, components or features of that mental state.
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4.4 A DRT Analysis of "Folk" Explanations of Behavior.
In this section I will sketch a strategy for utilizing the machinery of DRT to
account for the truth conditions of occurrences of "folk" explanations of behavior. I must
warn the reader that my remarks on this complicated issue leave many questions
unanswered, and thus are unfortunately rather programmatic in nature.
Recall the problem that occurrences of "folk" explanations of behavior pose for
the Naive Russellian Theory: Our untutored intuitions dictate that, in sensitive contexts,
occurrences of
(10a) Odile desires that Twain come to the party
and
(10b) she believes that if wine is served, then Twain will come to the party
and that's why
(10c) she is going to serve wine,
are true, while occurrences of
(10a) Odile desires that Twain come to the party
and
(IOb') she believes that if wine is served, then Clemens will come to the party
and that's why
(10c) she is going to serve wine,
are false. The difficulty presented by such folk explanations is not merely that of
accounting for why the occurrences of the sentential constituents (O10b) and (10b') can
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have distinct truth conditions--that is just the problem posed by the semantic arguments
from opacity. Rather the problem presented by such folk explanations is to account for
why what is conveyed by occurrences of (10a) and (10b) might serve as an explanation
of what is conveyed by (10c), while what is conveyed by occurrences of (10a) and (10b')
might not serve as an explanation of what is conveyed by (10c), The problem is not that
of accounting for the truth conditions of the sentential constituents of occurrences of
(10a-b-c) and (O1a-b'-c), rather the problem is that of accounting for the truth conditions
of occurrences of (10a-b-c) and (O1a-b'-c) as whole sentences,
The Naive Russellian Theory is unable to distinguish the truth conditions of
common belief\desire explanations such as (10a-b-c) and (O1a-b'-c) because it maintains
that the that-clauses of occurrences of (10b) and (10b') have the same Russellian
proposition as semantic value. Therefore, since occurrences of (10a-b-c) and (O1a-b'-c)
present the same Russellian proposition and the Naive Russellian Theory endorses the
Principle of Propositional Truth, it follows that the Naive Russellian Theory cannot
distinguish the truth conditions of occurrences of (10a-b-c) and ( 10a-b'-c).
The machinery introduced in section 4.3, however, provides a means of
individuating the truth conditions of occurrences of (10a-b-c) and (O1a-b'-c). Let us
assume that the DRS relative to which (10a) is uttered is
DRS-7a
Universe: a, b
Conditions: I. a is named 'Odile'
2. b is named 'Twain'
3. b is named 'Clemens'
An utterance of (10a) relative to DRS-7a induces
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DRS-7b
Universe: a, b
Conditions; 1. a is named 'Odile'
2. b is named 'Twain'
3. b is named 'Clemens'
4, a is in a mental state which characterized
by the following sub-DRS:
Universe: c
B-conditions; 1. c is named 'Twain'
D-conditions: 1. c comes to the party
Internal Restrictions: 1. c <-> b
External Restrictions: 1. R(a) =.Odile
2. R(c) =Twain
Reference marker a corresponds with the occurrence of the directly referential NP
'Odile', while reference marker c corresponds with the occurrence of the directly
referential NP 'Twain'. As these directly referential NPs successfully refer, external
restrictions I and 2 are added to DRS-7a. Since these occurrences are occurrences of
definite NPs, internal restriction I is added to DRS-7a, linking the introduced reference
marker c to already present reference marker b. Note that the sub-DRS of condition 4
allegedly characterizes the mental state of Odile, and thus contains both "B-conditions"
(Belief-conditions) and "D-conditions" (Desire-conditions). This new wrinkle in DRS
formation is required to account for the fact that de dicto desire ascriptions (and de dicto
regret ascriptions, etc.) often communicate propositions concerning what the subject
believes. For example, in a sensitive context an utterance of
(43) Odile desires that the witty guy come to the party.
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communicates that Odile believes that there is a guy who is witty. Similarly, in a
sensitive context an utterance of
(10a) Odile desires that Twain go to the party,
communicates that Odile believes that Twain is named 'Twain',
An utterance of (10b) relative to DRS-7b induces
DRS-7c
Universe: a, b
Conditions: I,
2.
3,
4,
a is named 'Odile'
b is named 'Twain'
b is named 'Clemens'
a is in a mental state which is
characterized by the following sub-DRS:
Universe: c
B-conditions: 1. c is named 'Twain'
2. If wine is served, then
c comes to the party
D-conditions: 1. c comes to the party
Internal Restrictions: 1. c -> b
External Restrictions: 1. R(a) = Odile
2. R(c) = Twain
The occurrence of 'Odile' in (10b) corresponds with reference marker a, while the
occurrences of 'Twain' in (10b) corresponds with reference marker c. And internal
restriction I (still) links the reference marker c with the appropriate already present
reference marker b.
Finally, an utterance of (10c) relative to DRS-7c induces
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DRS-7d
Universe: a, b
Conditions: 1. a is named 'Odile'
2. b is named 'Twain'
3. b is named 'Clemens'
4. a is in a mental state which characterized
by the following sub-DRS:
Universe: c,
B-conditions: I. c is named 'Twain'
2. If wine is served, then
c comes to the party
D-conditions: 1. c comes to the party
5. a is going to serve wine and this is
explained by the fact that a is in a
mental state characterized by condition 4.
Internal Restrictions: 1. c "- b
External Restrictions: 1. R(a) = Odile
2. R(c) = Twain
The occurrence of 'Odile' appearing in (10c) corresponds with reference marker a, which
is already present in the DRS, and is already governed by an external restriction. Thus
an assertion of (10a-b-c) in a sensitive context is true if and only if there is an appropriate
assignment function which satisfies DRS-7d. The conditions of DRS-7d are all familiar,
with the exception of condition 5, the only condition added to DRS-7c by the utterance
of (10c). What is it for an appropriate assignment function to satisfy condition 5?
First, condition 5 is satisfied by an appropriate assignment function f() only if
f(a) is going to serve wine. If there is no such assignment function, the entire occurrence
of (10a-b-c) is not true. But more than this is required for the satisfaction of condition 5.
297
Intuitively, condition 5 is satisfied only if the utterances of (10a) and (10b) offer an
explanation of Odile's serving wine. But what is for the utterances of (10a) and ( 10b) to
offer such an explanation?
I suggest that the utterances of (10a) and (10b) offer an explanation of Odile's
serving wine if and only if the conditions of the sub-DRSs added by these utterances
instantiate the appropriate structure. More precisely, the conditions of the sub-DRSs
added by these utterances must instantiate the same basic structure as is displayed by the
following familiar belief/desire explanation schemata:
(a) X desires C
(b) X believes (E occurs -> C is realized)
Therefore,
(c) X acts so as to make E occur.
That is, I suggest that an occurrence of (10a-b-c) is true only if the structure displayed by
the above schemata is instantiated at level of discourse representation. The reason that
an occurrence of (10a-b'-c) might be false relative to a context in which an occurrence of
(10a-b-c) is intuitively true is that the DRS induced by the occurrence of (10a-b-c) has
the appropriate structure, while the DRS induced by the occurrence of (O1a-b'-c) does not
have the appropriate structure. More precisely, the conditions added by the occurrence
of (10Oa-b-c) instantiate the structure displayed by the above schemata, while the
conditions added by the occurrence of (b0a-b'-c) do not instantiate this structure.
How is the structure of the above belief\desire explanation schemata instantiated
in DRS-7d? Condition 4 of DRS-7d is satisfied only if there is an assignment function
f*() such that
(a') f*(a) believes that if wine is served, then f*(c) comes to the party.
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and
(b') f*(a) desires that f*(c) comes to the party.
And condition 5 of DRS-7d is satisfied by f*( ) only if
(C') f*(a) is going to serve wine.
I maintain that if f*(a) is in a mental state characterized by condition 4, then the second
conjunct of condition 5 is satisfied by f*( ) because (a')-(b')-(c') have the appropriate
structure; i.e. because (a')-(b')-(c') can serve as an instance of the belief/desire
explanation schemata:
(a) X desires C
(b) X believes (E occurs -- C is realized)
Therefore,
(c) X acts so as to make E occur.
(Roughly, 'f*(a)' replaces schematic letter 'X'; ' that wine is served' replaces the
schematic letter 'E'; and 'that f*(c) comes to the party' replaces schematic letter 'C.)
Thus condition 5 of DRS-7d is satisfied by an appropriate assignment function f() just in
case (i) the first conjunct of condition 5 is satisfied by f( ), and (ii) the sub-conditions of
condition 4, together with the first conjunct of condition 5, instantiate the structure
displayed in the belief/desire schemata. The utterance of (10a-b-c) is true because, inter
alia, the DRS induced by this utterance has the structure displayed by the familiar
belief/desire explanation schemata.
What about an utterance of (l0a-b'-c) relative to DRS-7a? I maintain that this
utterance is false because the DRS induced by this utterance does not instantiate the
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structure displayed by the familiar belief/desire explanation schemata. The only
difference between (10a-b-c) and (lO10a-b'-c) concerns (lOb) and (10b'), Thus an utterance
of (10a-b'-c) relative to DRS-6a will induce a different DRS:
DRS-7d'
Universe: a, b
Conditions: I.
2.
3.
4.
a is named 'Odile'
b is named 'Twain'
b is named 'Clemens'
a is in a mental state which charactetzed
by the following sub-DRS:
Universe: c, d
B-conditions: I. c is named 'Twain'
2. d is named 'Clemens'
3. If wine is served, then
d comes to the party
D-conditions: I. c comes to the party
5. a is going to serve wine and this is
explained by the fact that a is in a
mental state characterized by condition 4.
Internal Restrictions: 1. c -" b
2. d -> b
External Restrictions: 1. R(a) = Odile
2. R(c) = Twain
3. R(d) = Twain
The differences between DRS-7d and DRS-7d' are a result of the differences between
(10b) she believes that if wine is served, then Twain will come to the party
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and
(10b') she believes that if wine is served, then Clemens will come to the party.
The occurrence of 'Twain' in the occurrence of (10b) corresponds with reference marker
c, which is already present in the universe of the sub-DRS. Yet the occurrence of
'Clemens' in the occurrence of (10b') introduces a new reference 1narker, viz. d, into the
universe of the sub-DRS. This indicates that as Odile believes the world to be, there may
be two individuals, one named 'Twain' and the other named 'Clemens'. Note however,
that the speaker presupposes that the occurrences of 'Twain' and 'Clemens' are
coreferential, as is indicated by the internal restrictions of DRS-7d'. (Internal restriction
2 ensures that the Familiarity Constraint is satisfied with regard to the occurrence of
'Clemens'.)
Under what conditions is condition 5 of DRS-7d' satisfied by an appropriate
assignment function? Condition 5 of DRS-7d' is satisfied by an appropriate assignment
function f*() just in case (i) the first conjunct is satisfied by f*(), and (ii) DRS-7d' has
the appropriate structure; i.e. just in case the sub-conditions of condition 4, together with
the first conjunct of condition 5, instantiate the structure displayed by tike belief/desire
schemata. Does DRS-7d' instantiate the appropriate structure? Condition 4 of DRS-7d'
is satisfied only if there is an assignment function f*( ) such that
(a') f*(a) believes that if wine is served, then f*(c) comes to the party.
and
(b") f*(a) desires that f*(d) comes to the party.
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And the first conjunct of condition 5 of DRS-7d' is satisfied by f*( ) only if
(c') f*(a) is going to serve wine.
Unlike sentences (a')-(b')-(c'), the sentences (a')-(b")-(c') do not serve as an instance of
the beliefldesire schemata. Consequently the second conjunct of condition 5 of DRS-7d'
cannot be satisfied by an appropriate assignment function, and thus the occurrence of
(10a-b'-c), relative to DRS-7a, is not true.
Thus DRT offers a means of accounting for the differing truth conditions of
occurrences of (10a-b-c) and (O1a-b'-c). The principal idea motivating the above account
is that occurrences of "folk" explanations of behavior do not require for their truth that
the presented propositions instantiate an appropriate explanatory structure, rather
occurrences of such explanations require for their truth that an appropriate explanatory
structure be instantiated at the level of discourse representation. Note, however, that the
account of "folk" explanations sketched above does not require that occurrences of "folk"
explanations refer to, or present, DRSs. Thus the above sketched account of the truth
conditions of "folk" explanations is wholly compatible with the principles of direct
reference and semantic innocence.
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Chapter 4 Notes
1 Stalnaker 1990, p. 131.
2 Burge's model of self-knowledge is presented in Burge 1988. Similar proposals are
sketched by Davidson 1987, and in Davidson 1984, and also in Stalnaker 1990. Burge's
approach is criticized, wholly unsuccessfully in my view, in Boghossian 1989.
3 Burge 1988, p. 654.
4 Burge 1988, p. 658.
5 Burge 1988, p. 658.
6 Burge 1988, p. 659.
7 Davidson 1988.
8 Stalnaker 1987a, p. 15. A very similar dispositional analysis of propositional attitudes
is presented and defended in Ruth Barcan Marcus 1990.
9 Stalnaker 1987a, p. 22.
10 The account of the content of a mental state stated here is a rough synopsis of the
views Dretske proffers in Dretske 1981 (especially part III), and ini Dretske 1988
(especially part III).
I 1 If the above question can be answered in non intentional terms, then Dretske's
analysis succeeds in solving the "problem of intentionality," the problem of explaining
how a physical entity--such as an instance of a mental state--can be about something. I
remain neutral as to whether or not the question can be answered in non intentional
terms, but I think that, regardless of the success or failure of a Dretske-style theory on
this score, the analysis of mental content in terms of indication and function is edifying.
12 It is not clear whether a similar "self-verifying" phenomenon occurs with regard to
propositional attitudes other than belief. The attitude of belief is unique in that one can
indicate one's belief in what is expressed by an occurrence by assenting to the
occurrence. There is no similar way in which one can indicate, for instance, that one
holds the attitude of hope toward what is expressed by an occurrence. If one wants to
know whether or not a subject holds the attitude of hope toward what is expressed by Z,
it seems that one must ask the subject, rDo you hope that E i If the subject responds
affirmatively, it is not clear whether this implies that (a) he does in fact hold the attitude
of hope toward this content, or only that (b) he believes that he holds the attitude of hope
toward this content. In responding affirmatively, does the subject hold the attitude of
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hope toward the content presented by 1, or does he merely hold the attitude of belief
toward the content that he holds the attitude of hope toward the content expressed by I?
I am not sure how to answer this question.
13 The "wide" and "narrow" views of rationality are discussed in greater detail Ruth
Barcan Marcus 1990.
14 I am not maintaining that if a subject assents to an occurrence of 1, then he is
conscious of his belief that this occurrence is true, In most cases it seems that the
assenting subject would not be aware that he has a meta-linguistic belief to the effect that
the relevant occurrence is true, but it does not follow from this that the assenting subject
has no such meta-linguistic belief. If I eat a sandwich, it follows, other things being
equal, that I believe that the sandwich is edible, though it is unlikely that I am aware of
this belief while eating the sandwich.
15 Barwise and Perry 1983.
16 It may be helpful to compare these two kinds of psychological theory with the
conceptual framework in Stich 1983. In Stich's terminology, both the above described
kinds of psychological theories--intentional and non intentional--are folk theories; i.e. on
either kind of theory the terms 'belief and 'desire' will have designations, and will not go
the way of 'phlogiston'. The distinction between the two kinds of theories concerns
whether or not the intentional notions of belief, desire, etc. are reducible to non
intentional notions. (Note that if Stich's skeptical thesis is correct, if the notions of belief
and desire will play no role at all in a comprehensive psychological theory, then neither a
Fregean theory nor a Russellian theory will be able to be incorporated into a
comprehensive psychological theory.)
17 Fodor "Precis of Modularity of Mind," in Fodor 1990.
18 If we assume, following Higginbotham, that linguistic knowledge, including
knowledge of the semantic values of terms, is propositional knowledge which is
somehow represented in the brain, then it is not at all surprising that the perception of
occurrences of distinct types results in distinct behaviors. The input to the linguistic
module is a representation of an occurrence. This representation is processed by the
linguistic component, and a representation of a proposition is derived. In deriving this
propositional representation, only relevant pieces of lexical knowledge, knowledge of the
semantic values of terms, are utilized. Thus the processing of an instance of a mediating
state which represents (01) will involve the utilization of different pieces of lexical
knowledge than will the processing of an instance of a mediating state with represents
(02). It also plausible to suppose that which pieces of lexical knowledge get utilized
affects which pieces of more general knowledge get utilized--the lexical knowledge
governing 'Twain' may be "hooked up" to pieces of knowledge to which the lexical
knowledge governing 'Clemens' is not "hooked up." Hence, contingent upon the
mediating state input, entirely different aspects and abilities of one's mind may be
utilized and it is no surprise that the behavior, the output, is distinct.
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Also note that, following a suggestion of Gabrial Segal's, if the above picture is
close to accurate, and the business of Semantics is to account for what goes on in part of
a speaker's linguistic module, then it may not be the business of Semantics to account for
the cognitive significance of occurrences. That which explains the cognitive significance
of occurrences may not be a feature of the linguistic module at all,
19 A philosopher, such as myself, would however be within his bounds if he were to
point out that, however a and a' are in the end to be individuated, they will be
individuated extremely finely, and thus cannot be mapped one-to-one with the contents
expressed by occurrences, as contents must be public entities.
20 My views owe a considerable debt to the views expressed in the following: Heim
1982 and Heim 1983; Kamp 1981, Kamp 1985, Kamp 1988 and Kamp 1990; Stalnaker
1979, Stalnaker 1981, Stalnaker 1987a Stalnaker 1987b, and Stalnaker 1988.
21 Cases of accommodation are discussed by Lewis 1979a.
22 Though my account of the truth conditions of an occurrence owes a great deal to
Kamp's theory, there are several important differences between our views. Two of these
differences are pointed out in the footnotes that follow.
23 There are obvious similarities between the meta-linguistic proposition that 'Twain is a
great author' relative to context c presents a truth, and what Stalnaker calls the "diagonal
proposition" which is deterrrmined by an occurrence of 'Twain is a great author'. The
diagonal proposition determined by an occurrence is, roughly, the set of possible worlds
w such that if the occurrence took place in w, it would be true in w,
24 Contexts, as I understand them, do not serve as what Kaplan would call "contexts of
evaluation," as contexts do not contain possible worlds.
25 This example is based upon the famous "Hob Nob sentences" first discussed in Geach
1962.
26 For a more detailed discussion of these constraints, see Heim 1982, and Heim 1983.
27 An intuitively adequate definition of truth for an occurrence would at least resemble
the following:
An token I of sentence £ uttered relative to DRS D which induces a DRS
D' is true iff there is an appropriate assignment function f( ) such that (i)
f( ) satisfies all conditions of D' that are relevant to t, and (ii) f( ) obeys
all internal and external restrictions of D' that are relevant to t.
What is it for a condition or restriction of a DRS D to be relevant to a token It? Roughly,
a condition or restriction is relevant to a token x just in case the condition or restriction
305
contains a reference marker which is linked to a reference marker which corresponds
with an occurrence of an NP appearing in t. (Note, again, that if there is no appropriate
assignment function, the token I relative to D is not true; it does not follow that the
occurrence is false.) This definition seems to work for discourses containing occurrences
of simple declarative sentences, but complications arise when the definition is applied to
discourses containing conditionals and other complex sentences. The difficulties here
arise because providing an intuitively adequate definition of truth for an occurrence
requires that one have a solution to the projection problem, and I have no solution to this
general problem.
28 My analysis of occurrences of belief ascriptions differs from Kamp's in that I do not
posit reference markers which represent belief states. (Asher presents an analysis very
similar to Kamp's'in Asher 1986.) Under Asher and Kamp's analysis, condition (4) of
DRS-2b would read (something like)
(4*) believes <a, p> and p is characterized* by the following sub-DRS:
Universe: c
Conditions: (1) c is a great author.
Reference marker p represents a belief state. Thus Kamp and Asher maintain that belief
is a relation between agents and belief states. Kamp and Asher seem to differ, however,
concerning what it is for a belief state p to be characterized* by a DRS. Kamp seems to
think that a belief state p is characterized* by a DRS D just in case the set of possible
worlds in which p is true is a subset of the worlds in which D is true, For Asher,
however, D must also have a "similar structure" to p. I think both Asher and, to lesser
extent, Kamp are mistaken in supposing that attitude ascriptions attempt to describe
mental states directly. Odile's holding the attitude of belief toward p requires that Odile
be in a some kind of belief state, but in reporting that Odile believes such and such, I am
not attempting to describe this particular belief state directly.
That ordinary attitude ascriptions do not describe, or refer to, mental states
directly is one of the lessons learned in Chapter 3.
29 The following constitutes a more or less formal method for determining the
propositions determined by a given sub-DRS D under an assignment function f():
D contains a set S=({ C, C2, ... C, ) of conditions. Take the power set of S, P(S). For
every set of conditions s element of P(S), follow the following procedure:
First--conjoin the conditions in s. (E,g. if the elements of s are 1. b is
named 'Santa', and 2. a kissed b, then form the conjunction, 'b is named
'Santa' & a kissed b'.)
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Second--replace the reference marker terms with variables (alphabetic
variants). (Continuing with our example, from the conjunction obtain, 'x
is named 'Santa' & y kissed x'.)
Third--Bind the left-most variable with a lambda operator. (Thus we
obtain 'hx[x is named 'Santa' & y kissed x]( )'.)
Fourth--Bind the next left-most variable with a lambda operator, and
continue until all variables are bound. (Thus we obtain 'ky[hx[x is named
'Santa' & y kissed x]( )]()'.)
What we have now is an n-ary predicate (where n is the number of distinct variables
appearing in the open sentence obtained in step two.) Note that there is a one-to-one
correspondence between open argument places, and types of original reference marker
terms; each open argument place is associated with a reference marker term type, (E.g.
in our complex predicate 'Xy[hx[x is named 'Santa' & y kissed x]( )]( )' the inner-most
open argument place is associated with the reference marker term type 'b', and the outer-
most open argument place is associated with term type 'a'.) What we need to do now is
to either plug the appropriate entities into the appropriate argument places of the
property, or relation, designated by the n-ary predicate, or bind the argument place with
an existential quantifier. These tasks are accomplished in the final two steps:
Fifth--For every open argument place in the n-ary predicate, if this
argument place is associated with a reference marker mn such that m is
linked to a reference marker in the universe of the primary DRS, then plug
a name referring to f(m) into the open argument place. If this argument
place is associated with a reference marker Pi which is not linked to a
reference marker in the universe of the primary DRS, then go to step six.
(Continuing with our example, suppose that f(a) = Sam, and that
reference marker b is not linked to a reference marker in the universe of
the primary DRS. Thus in step five 'Sam' is plugged into the "outer-most"
open argument place of our predicate, and we obtain 'Xy[hx[x is named
'Santa' & y kissed x]( )](Sam)'.)
Sixth--For all argument places which are associated with a reference
marker m such that m is not linked to a reference marker in the universe of
the containing DRS, each open argument place is to be filled with an
appropriate variable, and bound--from the outside--by an existential
quantifier. Thus, continuing with our example, the inner-most open
argument place in our predicate is bound--from the outside--by an
existential quantifier. Thus we obtain:
'3z [Xy[hx[x is named 'Santa' & y kissed x](z)](Sam)'
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The proposition presented by the resulting closed sentence is the proposition s contributes
toward the propositions determined by sub-DRS D under assignment function f().
Finally, the set of propositions determined by sub-DRS D under f( ) is the set
(p: p is determined by s under f( ) where s is a member of P(S)}.
30 On my view the de re/de dicto distinction is a distinction between two kinds of
ascription occurrences, and not a distinction between kinds of propositional attitudes. On
my view there is no such thing as a de dicto, or de re, belief. (Though I suppose it might
be said that on my view all attitudes are attitudes de re, but I think this would be
misleading way to put it. Also, on my view 'believes' is not ambiguous between
"believes de dicto," and "believes de re.")
31 I believe that the term 'de se' is due to Lewis 1979b.
32 For a more formal account of how DRSs are constructed from discourses, see Kamp
1981.
33 Both Kamp and Heim seem to think that DRT will supplant traditional truth theoretic
semantics. However, there is reason to doubt this conception of DRT: It not at clear that
DRT is able to account for the truth conditions of "donkey sentences," as Heim and
Kamp originally claimed it could. The difficulties DRT has with "donkey sentences"
seem to arise because Heim and Kamp's (rather complicated) analyses of conditionals
and quantified sentences are fundamentally incorrect. What I am suggesting is that these
shortcomings of DRT may not pose problems for a theory which combines DRT with a
more traditional truth-theoretic semantics.
34 For serious attempts to address the first two concerns, see Kamp 1981, and Asher
1986. For a serious attempt to address the third issue, see Kamp 1990. (I should point
out that in this latter paper Kamp does not endorse a Russellian analysis of the attitude of
belief.)
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Appendix A. The Crux of the Matter: Cognitive Values and the Phenomenon of
Recognition Failure.
In this appendix I will argue that, regardless of Charybdis, Fregean theories
cannot steer clear of Scylla; i.e. Fregean theorists cannot provide a principle of
individuation for cognitive values which satisfies both the individuation constraint and
the independence constraint. For the sake of illuminating what I think are interesting and
important features of the phenomenon of opacity, however, the argument in this
appendix will take a rather circuitous route: In section A. 1 I will first illustrate that the
essence of the phenomenon of opacity is the phenomenon of recognition failure, and I
will restate the Scylla facing the Fregean theorist in terms of the phenomenon of
recognition failure. That is, I will illustrate that if the Fregean theorist is to provide an
adequate theory of the phenomenon of opacity, he must provide an adequate theory of
recognition failure, and this, in turn, requires that the Fregean theorist provide a principle
of individuation for cognitive values which satisfies both the individuation constraint,
and the independence constraint, as these constraints pertain to the phenomenon of
recognition failure, I will then introduce three kinds of individuation principles for
cognitive values, and argue that any principle which is of one of these kinds will fail to
satisfy either the individuation constraint or the independence constraint. Finally, in
section A.2 I will explicate what I take to be the conceptual foundations of the Fregean
strategy and I will argue that the Fregean strategy for explaining the phenomenon of
recognition failure is fundamentally misconceived.
A.I Cognitive Values and the Phenomenon of Recognition failure.
The essence of the arguments from opacity is the phenomenon of recognition
failure. The reason that Odile assents to (01), yet dissents from (02) is that she in some
sense does not recognize Clemens as Twain; if there is an instance of opacity involving
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Odile, (Ol) and (02), then she must not believe that the tokens of 'Twain' and 'Clemens'
appearing in these occurrences are coreferential. Thus I conclude that in general, if, in a
context c, a subject assents to an occurrence such as (01), yet dissents from an
occurrence such as (02), then there is some identity sentence such as
(44) Twain is identical to Clemens,
such that, relative to c, the subject is disposed to dissent from occurrences of this
sentence.
Let us say that a normal understanding subject is in a state of recognition failure
concerning ra is identical to P relative to a context c, just in case he is, relative to c,
disposed to dissent from occurrences of rot is identical to P7, where ao and P are
coreferential relative to c. Furthermore, let us say that any situation in which a subject
is in a state of recognition failure is an instance of the phenomenon of recognition failure.
The following nomological conditional can now be formulated:
Nomological Conditional 1: If in context c there is an instance of opacity
involving a subject x, and terms a and 3, then, ceteris paribus x is in a state of
recognition failure concerning rax is identical to Pa relative to c.
(The conditional is not a material conditional; rather it is nomological. A nomological
conditional is, roughly, a material conditional which holds in all possible worlds
nomologically similar to the actual world, but does not hold in all possible worlds.)
The converse of Nomological Conditional 1 is also true. I assume that any
subject who understands occurrences of referring term a relative to a context c is not in a
state of recognition failure concerning occurrences of £ is identical to i relative to c.
Granted this assumption, the following nomological conditional also holds:
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Nomological Conditional 2: If there is, in a context c, an instance of recognition
failure concerning to Qc is identical to involving a subject x, then, ceteris
paribus, there is a sentential function X( ) such that, relative to c, x is disposed to
assent to occurrences of E(a), yet dissent from occurrences of 2(P).
If we allow 1( ) be a sentential function of the form, l is identical to - the conditional
is almost trivially true: If E( ) is of the form ra is identical to __, then E(a) is of the
form ra is identical to J and X(P) is of the form roa is identical to jP. In order to satisfy
the antecedent x must be disposed, relative to c, to dissent from occurrences of ao is
identical to P and it was assumed above that any subject who understands a relative to c
is disposed to assent to occurrences of Zt is identical to &l relative to c. I claim,
however, that the conditional holds in nontrivial cases as well; i.e. I claim that the
conditional is true for some E( ) not of the form x& is identical to . If, relative to a
context c, Odile is disposed to dissent from an occurrences of
(44) Twain is identical to Clemens.
there must be some reason why Odile does not believe that these tokens of 'Twain' and
'Clemens' are coreferential; there must be some property, e.g. being witty, such that Odile
believes that the referent of the token of 'Twain' has this property, while she does not
believe that the referent of the token of 'Clemens' has it. Consequently, if there is, in a
context c, an instance of recognition failure involving Odile and an occurrence of (44),
then there must be some predicate HT such that, relative to c, Odile is disposed to assent to
occurrences of
(45) Twain is H.
though she is disposed to dissent from occurrences of
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(46) Clemens is H.
Thus the Nomological Conditional 2 is true in nontrivial cases in which E( ) is not of the
form Tr is identical to I as well.
I assume that it follows from the fact that a subject is disposed, relative to a
context c, to perform a certain action that there is a possible world and a possible context
c' in which he does peiform this action. If this assumption is correct, it then follows from
Nomological Conditional 2 that
Nomological Conditional 3: If there is, in a context c, an instance of recognition
failure concerning ra is identical to P1 involving a subject x, then, ceteris paribus,
there is a nomologically possible instance of opacity involving a, 1, and x.
If we now combine Nomological Conditional 1 with Nomological Conditional 3
the following nomological biconditional is derived:
The Law of Recognition Failure: A subject x is in a state of recognition failure
concerning & is identical to p' relative to a context c IFF, ceteris paribus, relative
to c, there is a nomologically possible instance of opacity involving a, 3, and x.
The Law of Recognition Failure can be invoked in order to formulate arguments
from opacity against the Naive Russellian Theory. For example, let a be replaced by
'Twain' and p be replaced by 'Clemens'; if, relative to some context c, Odile is in a state
of recognition failure concerning 'Twain is Clemens', then it follows that there is a
nomologically possible instance of opacity in which Odile assents to an occurrence of
X('Twain'), yet dissents from an occurrence of Z('Clemens'). Since the Naive Russellian
Theory maintains that occurrences of 'Twain' and 'Clemens' express the same content,
this nomologically possible instance of opacity is an instance of opacity with regard to
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the Naive Russellian Theory. Therefore it follows from the Principle of Arguments from
Opacity, i.e.
The Principle of Arguments from Opacity; For all theories T, there is a
nomologically possible instance of opacity with regard to T iff, ceteris paribus,
corresponding epistemological and semantic arguments from opacity against T
can be formulated.
that corresponding epistemological arguments from opacity can be formulated.
The point of going through the rather tedious process of formulating the Law of
Recognition Failure is to justify and make precise the claim that the essence of the
phenomenon of opacity is the phenomenon of recognition failure. Arguments from
opacity against the Naive Russellian Theory can be formulated because there are
instances of recognition failure; that is, the Law of Recognition Failure makes it clear
that if there is a nomologically possible instance of recognition failure, then semantic and
epistemological arguments from opacity against the Naive Russellian Theory can be
formulated. It was shown in section 2.2, however, that it is at least in principle possible
to formulate arguments from opacity against Fregean theories. In order to reflect this
fact, the Law of Recognition Failure must be amended so that it can be invoked in order
to formulate arguments from opacity against Fregean theories as well as the Naive
Russellian Theory. This can be done by relativizing the phenomenon of recognition
failure to particular theories of content: let a subject be in a state of recognition failure
concerning rta is identical to 37 relative to c with regard to theory Tjust in case he is,
relative to c, disposed to dissent from occurrences of rc' is identical to i?, where
according to T, a and F3 express the same content relative to c. The Law of Recognition
Failure can then be amended so that it applies to Fregean theories as well as Russellian
theories as follows:
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The Relativized Law of Recognition Failure: A subject x is in a state of
recognition failure concerning rt is identical to PV with regard to T relative to a
context c IFF, ceteris paribus, relative to c, there is a nomologically possible
instance of opacity with regard to T involving a, 0, and x.
This more general statement of the Law of Recognition Failure can be invoked to
formulate arguments from opacity against Fregean theories as well as the Naive
Russellian Theory: if there is a sentence of the form r& is identical to P such that
according to the Fregean theory F, relative to c, ac and P express the same cognitive
value, and there is a subject who is disposed, relative to c, to dissent from occurrences of
rcz is identical to M1, then, by the Relativized Law of Recognition Failure, there is an
instance of opacity with regard to F. If we now invoke the Principle of Arguments from
Opacity,
The Principle of Arguments from Opacity: For all theories T, there is a
nomologically possible instance of opacity with regard to T iff corresponding
epistemological and semantic arguments from opacity against T can be
formulated.
then both semantic and epistemological arguments from opacity against Fregean theory F
can be formulated.
It follows from the Relativized Law of Recognition Failure that the Fregean
strategy for precluding the arguments from opacity can succeed if and only if there is
some Fregean theory F which individuates cognitive values so finely that it is
nomologically impossible for there to be an instance of recognition failure with regard to
F. Therefore, Fregean theories can be, and should be, understood as endeavoring to
account for the phenomenon of recognition failure; they can be understood as
endeavoring to provide an explanation as to why, e.g., Odile might be disposed to dissent
from occurrences of
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(44) Twain is identical to Clemens.2
Both the Individuation Constraint and the Independence Constraint can be
restated in terms of the phenomenon of recognition failure: An adequate Fregean theory
F must satisfy, first,
The Individuation Constraint: It is nomologically necessary that if there is an
instance of recognition failure concerning ra is identical to PS involving a subject
x, then F distinguishes the cognitive values expressed by these occurrences of a
and p for x.
and second,
The Independence Constraint: The cognitive values posited by F must be
individuated wholly independently of the phenomena of recognition failure and
opacity; it must be in principle possible to state the individuation conditions for
cognitive values without appealing to the phenomenon of recognition failure, or
the phenomenon of opacity.
The challenge facing the Fregean theorist is to provide a principle of individuation for
cognitive values which satisfies both of the above constraints. I claim that no such
principle of individuation has yet been offered; I claim that for every proposed Fregean
theory F, either (i) F does not even attempt to provide a principle of individuation for
cognitive values, 3 or (ii) F does not individuate cognitive values finely enough--there is a
nomologically possible instance of recognition failure with regard to F, or (iii) the
principle of individuation offered by F itself appeals to instances of the phenomenon of
recognition failure, or the phenomenon of opacity. 4 In what follows I will consider three
kinds of individuation principles, and I will argue that any principle of one of these kinds
will fail to satisfy either the individuation constraint, or the independence constraint, as
stated above.
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I will consider three kinds of individuation principles for cognitive values:
phenomnenologically oriented principles of individuation, descriptioni/property orienlted
principles of individuation, and finally principles of individuation which appeal to the
notion of conceptual role. I will argue that phenomenologically oriented and
description/property oriented principles violate the individuation constraint, while
principles which appeal to the notion of conceptual role violate the independence
constraint.
1. Phenomenologically oriented principles of individuation. One might attempt
to individuate cognitive values expressed by occurrences of referring terms Ca and P by
appeal to phenomenological properties; the cognitive value expressed by an occurrence
of a term for a subject might be identified with kinds of phenomenological experience
that the subject associates with the referent of the term. For instance, the Fregean
theorist might attempt to explain Odile's dissent from an occurrence of
(44) Twain is identical to Clemens.
by claiming that Odile associates with the occurrence of 'Twain' certain
phenomenological properties, particular kinds of phenomenological Twain experiences,
and associates with the occurrence of 'Clemens' distinct phenomenological properties, or
distinct kinds of phenomenological Twain experiences. (Never mind what it is for a kind
of phenomenological experience to be associated with an occurrence of a term, and never
mind what the identity conditions for kinds ofphenomenological experiences might be.)
The difficulty with such phenomenologically oriented proposals is that they fail
to satisfy the individuation constraint. That is, for any Fregean theory F which invokes
such a phenomenological principle of individuation, it is possible that there is an instance
of recognition failure concerning an occurrence of 'r is identical to ? where the subject
associates with the tokens of a and p3 the same kinds of phenomenological experiences.
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The problem, in essence, is that phenomenological differences are not essential to the
phenomenon of recognition failure.
Suppose that Odile perceives Twain at tl and in so doing undergoes a
phenomenological experience of kind K. At t2 Odile meets Twain again, and again she
undergoes a phenomenological experience of kind K; her two experiences are
phenomenologically identical. (Twin-Earth may have to be invoked in order to explain
how this could occur, but that it is not problematic, as long as it nomologically possible
that there be a Twin-Earth.) Now at t3 Odile is told that the first person she perceived is
named 'Twain' and she is told that the second person she perceived is named 'Clemens'.
(She is not told, nor is it in any way suggested, that she perceived distinct people at tl
and t2.) The Fregean theorist who endorses a phenomenological approach to
individuating cognitive values must maintain that it is nomologically necessary that Odile
now be disposed to assent to an occurrence of
(44) Twain is identical to Clemens.
because Odile must associate the same kind of phenomenological experience with both
'Twain' and 'Clemens'. It is clear, however, that it is not nomologically necessary that
Odile be disposed to assent to an occurrence of (44); despite the phenomenological
similarity of her perceptual experiences, Odile may have all sorts of reasons for believing
that she perceived different people at tl and t2. Consequently, principles of
individuation which appeal to phenomenological properties and/or experiences violate
the individuation constraint.
The Fregean theorist might object that in the above argument, I have not even
attempted to state what it is for two phenomenological experiences to be of the same
kind, and that I have assumed that in perceiving Twain at tl and t2 Odile has undergone
the same kind of phenomenological experience. The Fregean may claim that there is a
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way of individuating kinds of phenomenological experiences such that Odile undergoes
distinct kinds of phenomenological experiences. I concede to this objection that the
above argument is really an argument schema; until the Fregean theorist provides some
account of what it is for two phenomenological experiences to be of the same kind, no
substantial conclusion can be drawn from the above described example. It is, however,
incumbent upon the Fregean theorist to provide such a principle of individuation; until
the Fregean theorist provides an independent criterion of identity for cognitive values, the
Fregean theory has no explanatory power whatsoever. What the above argument, or
argument schema, illustrates is that if a Fregean theory F does provide a criterion for the
identity of phenomenological experience kinds, it will be possible to construct a
nomologically possible instance of recognition failure with regard to theory F. 5
I conclude therefore that no phenomenologically oriented principle of
individuation for cognitive values can succeed in satisfying the individuation constraint.
The essence of the difficulty is that is sufficient for an understanding subject to dissent
from an occurrence of a& is identical to P that the subject not believe that the
occurrences of oa and P refer to the same entity, yet it is not necessary for the subject's
having lacking this belief that the subject associate distinct phenomenological properties
with the occurrences of a and p. (Similarly, a subject might believe that sensory
impressions ca and 0 are of impressions of distinct entities, even though a and P are as
phenomenologically similar as one likes.)
2. Description oriented principles of individuation. Description oriented
principles of individuation maintain that the cognitive value expressed by an occurrence
of a referring term is a cluster of properties, or more precisely a complex property, which
is instantiated by the referent of the term. Thus the Fregean theorist who proposes a
description oriented principle of individuation for cognitive values maintains that Odile
dissents from an occurrence of
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(44) Twain is identical to Clemens.
because she associates property P with the occurrence of 'Twain' and associates distinct
property P' with the occurrence of 'Clemens'. If this kind of individuation principle is to
have any hope at all of satisfying the individuation constrain, P and P' cannot be ordinary
general properties which can obviously be believed to be instantiated by more than one
thing. For instance, P and P' cannot be identified with the general properties, is a witty
bearded man who smokes a pipe and is a great author, and is not a witty bearded man
who smokes a pipe and is a great author, respectively. For it is clear that a subject could
associate the same general property with the relevant occurrences of 'Twain' and
'Clemens', and nonetheless believe that these occurrences are not coreferrential; Odile
might associate the general property, is a witty bearded man who smokes a pipe and is a
great author with both 'Twain' and 'Clemens', and yet believe that the referent of 'Twain'
is not identical to the referent of 'Clemens'--Odile might think that there are two witty
bearded men who smoke pipes are great authors. If Odile were in this state, she would
be disposed to dissent from occurrences of
(44) Twain is identical to Clemens,
thus violating the individuation constraint.
The above considerations suggest that if a description oriented principle of
individuation for cognitive values is to succeed, the properties appealed to cannot be
ordinary general properties, but rather must be individual properties: every ordinary
general property P determines an individual property P1 where P1 is true of an object x
just in case x the unique entity which satisfies P. If the properties subjects associate with
occurrences of terms are identified with such individual properties, then it is at least
plausible to suppose that a description oriented principle of individuation could satisfy
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the individuation constraint: if it is granted that no subject can ever believe that there are
two entities which have the same individual property, then whenever a subject associates
the same individual property with terms a and 0, the subject will believe that a and 3 are
coreferential, The problem is that there is no reason for supposing that a subject could
not believe that two entities have the same individual property; the subject may associate
P, with both cc and t, and yet not realize that he associates the same individual property,
P,, with both oa and P. For example, Odile might associate P, with both 'Twain' and
'Clemens', and yef not believe that these terms are coreferential. A plausible candidate to
serve as the individual property Odile associates with 'Twain' might be the witty bearded
American author who smokes a pipe and lived in Hannibal. Suppose Odile associates
this one individual property with both 'Twain' and 'Clemens'. Why might Odile
nonetheless not believe that 'Twain' and 'Clemens' are coreferential? The problem is that
Odile might think that there are two Hannibals, both of which is home to a witty bearded
American author who smokes a pipe. In this case Odile would, despite the fact that she
associates the same individual properties with both 'Twain' and 'Clemens', not believe
that 'Twain' and 'Clemens' are coreferential. As a result she would dissent from
occurrences of
(44) Twain is identical to Clemens,
and thus the independence constraint is violated.
The defender of description oriented principles of individuation might respond to
this objection by simply maintaining that subjects cannot unknowingly associate the same
individual property with distinct referring terms a and 1.6 In terms of the above
example, the Fregean theorist may claim that if Odile thinks there are two Hannibals,
then she does not associate the same individual properties with 'Twain' and 'Clemens',
Odile, the Fregean claims, associates with 'Twain' the individual property the witty
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American author who lives in Hannibal1 , and associates with 'Clemens' the distinct
individual property, the witty American author who lives in Hannibal,. And these
individual properties are distinct because Odile does not believe that Hannibal, is
identical to Hannibal2.
There are two problems with this response. First, and most importantly, in giving
this response the Fregean theorist violates the independence constraint: The Fregean
theorist must provide a principle of individuation for cognitive values which does not
appeal to the phenomenon of recognition failure itself. The Fregean theorist has
identified cognitive values with individual properties, and he now proposes that oa and P
express the same individual property P, for a subject x, only if x is not in a state of
recognition failure concerning PI, or some constituent of PV. More precisely, the Fregean
theorist maintains that the cognitive values, the individual properties, expressed by a and
p are the contents expressed by definite descriptions the H and the H'. Moreover, the
contents expressed by these definite descriptions are identical only if there are no
constituent terms x and I' of predicates F and H' such that x is in a state of recognition
failure concerning occurrences of r% is identical to 1'., Thus in giving this response the
Fregean theorist may succeed in individuating cognitive values in accordance with the
individuation constraint, but in accomplishing this much he violates the independence
constraint.
The second problem with the Fregean response is that it seems to engender an
infinite regress: What, exactly, are Hannibal, and Hannibal2? What are the constituents
which serve to differentiate the individual properties Odile associates with 'Twain' and
'Clemens'? They cannot be cities; there is only one relevant city, Hannibal. Thus, it
seems, the property constituents expressed by 'Hannibal1' and 'Hannibal2' must be ways
of thinking of Hannibal; and therefore they must be distinct individual properties which
are instantiated by the city Hannibal, But once this move is made, the regress is
imminent: If cognitive values are identified with individual properties, yet individual
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properties contain other individual properties as constituents, then the Fregean theorist
will be unable to provide a principle of individuation for cognitive values,
3. Principles of individuation which appeal to the notion of conceptual role.7
Fregean theories which invoke the notion of conceptual role presuppose a
representationalist picture of the mind. For the sake of convenience, I will assume that
he relevant mental representations are expressions in the language of thought, and I will
use capital letters to designate such mental expressions (types). Conceptual roles are
properties of expressions of mentalese (types). Conceptual role theorists propose that
Odile dissents from an occurrences of
(44) Twain is identical to Clemens.
because TWAIN and CLEMENS, the "mentalese correlates" of 'Twain' and 'Clemens',
have distinct conceptual roles. What is it for two expression (types) of mentalese to have
distinct, or identical, conceptual roles?
Though Block does not propose a precise account of the identity conditions of
conceptual roles 8, he does describe what such an account might be like;
conceptual role .. . is a matter the causal role of the expression in reasoning and
deliberation and, in general, in the way the expression combines with and
interacts with other expressions so as to mediate between sensory inputs and
behavioral outputs. A crucial component of a sentence's conceptual role is a
matter of how it participates in inductive and deductive inferences. A word's
concptual role is a matter of its contribution to the role of sentences.
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For example, consider what would be involved for a symbol in the
internal representational system, '-', to express the material conditional. The '-'
in 'FELIX IS A CAT - FELIX IS AN ANIMAL' expresses the material
conditional if, for example, when the just quoted sentence interacts causally with;
'FELIX IS A CAT', the result is a tendency to inscribe 'FELIX IS AN
ANIMAL' (other things equal, of course),
'FELIX IS NOT AN ANIMAL', the result is a tendency to prevent the
inscription of 'FELIX IS A CAT', and a tendency to inscribe 'FELIX IS
NOT A CAT',
'IS FELIX AN ANIMAL?', the result is a tendency to initiate a search for
'FELIX IS A CAT'. 9
How, then, are the conceptual roles of TWAIN and CLEMENS, for Odile, to be
distinguished? These two expressions of mentalese have distinct conceptual roles just in
case instantiations of these expressions in Odile's brain have distinct "likely inferential
antecedents and consequents," and/or distinct likely "behavioral effects (or at least
impulses in motor-output neurons)." 10 Suppose, however, that Odile has very few
beliefs concerning the referent of 'Twain' and the referent of 'Clemens'. Suppose that
Odile does not believe that Twain is Clemens; she dissents from occurrences of 'Twain is
identical to Clemens. Further suppose, however, that for every property P--aside from
properties such as, is named 'Twain'--Odile believes that both Twain and Clemens have
P; Odile does not believe that Twain is identical to Clemens, yet she believes that Twain
is a great author, and that Clemens is a great author; that Twain is dead, and that Clemens
is dead; that Twain is American, and that Clemens is American, etc. Thus, for (almost)
every mentalese sentential function E( ), E(TWAIN) and E(CLEMENS) have the same
likely inferential and behavioral antecedents and consequents. For example if ( ) is,
IS A WITTY AUTHOR, then "inscriptions" of X(TWAIN) and E(CLEMENS) are
equally likely to have "inscriptions" of THERE IS AT LEAST ONE WITTY
AMERICAN AUTHOR as consequents.
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Given Odile's beliefs, how can the conceptual role theorist distinguish the
conceptual roles of TWAIN and CLEMENS for Odile? The conceptual role theorist
might attempt to distinguish the conceptual roles of TWAIN and CLEMENS for Odile
by appeal to the sentential function, _ IS IDENTICAL TO TWAIN. Given the
above description of Odile's beliefs, an "inscription" of TWAIN IS IDENTICAL TO
TWAIN, will have a very different conceptual role than CLEMENS IS IDENTICAL TO
TWAIN: an "inscription" of the former, but not the latter is likely play a direct role in
causing Odile to assent to an occurrence of
(44) Twain is identical to Clemens.
The difficulty of course is that in individuating the conceptual roles of TWAIN
and CLEMENS in this way, the conceptual role theorist violates the independence
constraint: if the cognitive role theorist is to explain why Odile dissents from an
occurrence of (44) by appeal to (alleged) fact that TWAIN and CLEMENS play distinct
conceptual roles, then he cannot individuate the conceptual roles of these mentalese
expressions by appeal to the fact that Odile dissents from, or is disposed to dissent from,
an occurrence of (44). 11
Block is well aware of the threat of circularity. As Block himself states,
The [conceptual role theorist's] explanation of behavior may seem circular, hence
trivial. How can [he] characterize a [conceptual role] ... in terms of a tendency
for representations that have it to cause jumping, [or dissenting] and then turn
around and explain jumping [or dissenting] by appeal to a representation's having
this [conceptual role]?I
Block's principle response to this difficulty is to point out that "a functionally
individuated entity can, in principle, be identified by independent (usually physicalistic)
means and the mechanism of its causal connection to the effects described. For example,
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a gene identified functionally via the methods of Mendelian genetics can be identified as
a clump of DNA via the methods of molecular genetics." 13 I, of course, concur with
Block's point, viz. there would be no circularity in the conceptual role theorist's
explanation of behavior if conceptual roles, following the paradigm of Mendelian genes,
could be individuated by appeal to independent physicalistic properties. But I do not
understand how conceptual roles thus individuated would properly called "conceptual
roles." That is, if behavior could be explained in physicalistic terms by appeal to
physical states and/or properties, without appeal to behavioral effects, then what
explanatory work could the notion of conceptual role do? There are not kinds of DNA in
addition to genes; rather genes are kinds of DNA. To vindicate the explanatory
relevance of conceptual roles by providing purely physicalistic individuation conditions
for them would be to render the notion of conceptual role superfluous. 14
Perhaps then, cognitive values should be identified with physicalistically
individuated states and/or properties; perhaps a physicalistic principle of individuation
which satisfied both the individuation constraint and the independence constraint could
be formulated. If the sole task were to explain behavior, e.g. explain why Odile dissents
from a particular occurrence of (44), then this empirical strategy would, I believe, be the
most promising avenue to pursue. But it is not at all clear that this avenue is open to the
Fregean theorist. The Fregean theorist maintains that the phenomena of recognition
failure and opacity can be explained by appeal to meanings, but surely publicly
accessible meanings cannot be identified with complex physicalistically individuated
properties or states. If the Fregean theorist concedes that the phenomena of recognition
failure and opacity can be explained only in terms of complex physicalistically
individuated properties or states, then he must concede that these phenomena cannot be
explained by appeal to meanings. But if the Fregean theorist concedes this much, then he
concedes that there is no reason to posit cognitive values over and above referents.
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A.2 The Misconceived Fregean Model of Recognition Failure.
I maintain that Fregean theories are unable to provide adequate principles of
individuation for cognitive values because the Fregean strategy for explaining the
phenomenon of recognition failure is fundamentally misconceived. Consider the
following famous passage from "Uber Sinn und Bedeutung";
The sense of a proper name is grasped by everybody who is sufficiently familiar
with the language or totality of designations to which it belongs; but this serves to
illuminate only a single aspect of the referen[t], supposing it to have one.
Comprehensive knowledge of the referen[t] would require us to be able to say
immediately whether an given sense belongs to it. To such knowledge we never
attain, (my emphasis). l S
Frege maintains that every "ordinary referent" has associated with it a (probably infinite)
number of "aspects" or senses. To think about a referent, to entertain a thought about a
referent, it is necessary to grasp one of its aspects. Because associated with any referent
there are many aspects, it is possible for a subject to grasp two distinct aspects of the
same referent. It is this possibility which is supposed to account for recognition failure:
According to Frege's theory of sense and reference, recognition failure can occur only if,
for example, one grasps the aspect associated with 'Twain', and also grasps the aspect
associated with 'Clemens', and these aspects are not identical, though they are both
aspects of the same referent, i.e. both aspects correspond with the man Samuel Clemens.
Recognition failure concerning (44) is then alleged to be a matter of the subject's failure
to realize that both of these grasped aspects correspond with Samuel Clemens.
This general model of recognition failure is employed by all Fregean theories:
associated with any object there are an infinite number of aspects, or "ways of thinking"
of the object. (The aspects, or ways of thinking, of an object of course are the cognitive
values presented by terms which refer to the object.) A subject can fail to recognize an
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object only if the subject "grasps" or in some way cognizes, two aspects of the object and
Jails to realize that both these aspects correspond with the same object. Thus, according
to the Fregean model of recognition failure, a subject is in a state of recognition failure
concerning r& is identical to P7 relative to c, (where a and P are coreferential relative to
c), just in case ca and 0 are associated with distinct aspects, or "ways of thinking," of their
referent, and the subject fails to realize that these aspects correspond with the same
referent. Furthermore, it is this realization failure which accounts for the subject's
disposition to dissent from occurrences of !& is identical to P relative to c; the subject is
disposed to dissent from ro is identical to jP because he fails to realize that the cognitive
values presented by a and 13, relative to c, have the same referent. Thus the essence of
the Fregean model of recognition failure, and thus the essence of the Fregean strategy for
precluding the arguments from opacity, is to reduce a subject's failure to recognize an
object to the subject's failure to realize that two ways of thinking of that object are ways
of thinking of the same object.
In positing aspects, or cognitive values, and reducing the phenomenon of
recognition failure to the phenomenon of realization failure, has the Fregean theorist
made explanatory progress? The Fregean theorist is attempting to describe the
conditions under which a subject will fail to recognize the referent of ca as the referent of
p; i.e. he is attempting to explain why a subject might not believe that the referent of a is
the referent of P. The Fregean suggests that this will occur whenever (i) the subject
associates distinct aspects of the referent with occurrences of a and 3 and (ii) the subject
fails to realize that these aspects correspond with the same referent. (Note that the
second conjunct is crucial: the Fregean theorist must allow that a subject might associate
distinct aspects with a and 3, and yet realize that they are aspects of the same entity.
That is, the Fregean must allow for a subject to believe what is expressed by an
informative and true statement of identity.) But in reducing the phenomenon of
recognition failure to the phenomenon of realization failure, has the Fregean made any
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progress at all? We began with the question, "Under what conditions will a subject not
believe that the referent of ao is the referent of P?" The Fregean theorist has posited
cognitive values, and replaced that original question with the question, "Under what
conditions will a subjectfail to realize that the aspect associated with aC is an aspect of
the same entity as the aspect associated with P?" But why is that subject's sometimes
realize that two aspects correspond with the same referent, and other times do not come
to this realization? Though no Fregean theorist I know of has even addressed this
question, it seems that it is necessary and sufficient for a subject's failing to realize that
two aspects are aspects of the same entity that the subject not believe that the aspects are
aspects of the same entity. If this assumption is correct, then the Fregean has managed to
reduce the question, "Under what conditions will a subject not believe that the referent of
a is the referent of P?" to the question, "Under what conditions will a subject not believe
that the aspect expressed by ao is an aspect of the same entity as the aspect expressed by
Note, however, that the problems posed by the above two questions are
isomorphic: the original problem was to explain how a subject might not believe that a
and p correspond, via the reference relation, to the same entity. The new problem is to
explain how a subject might not believe that aspect-1 and aspect-2 correspond, via the "is
an aspect of" relation, to the same entity. Thus, since the new problem and the old
problem are structurally isomorphic, the Fregean theorist must endorse the same strategy
in attempting to solve the new problem. That is, he must posit entities, meta-aspects, and
maintain that a subject can fail to believe that aspect- I and aspect-2 (which are in fact
aspects of the same entity) are aspects of the same entity, if and only if there are distinct
rneta-aspects associated with both aspect- 1 and aspect-2, and (i) the subject associates
distinct neta-aspects of the referent with aspect-1 and aspect-2 and (ii) the subject fails
to realize that these meta-aspects are meta-aspects of the same referent. But now of
course the regress is imminent: If the correct response to the first problem, explaining
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recognition failure, is to posit aspects and reduce recognition failure to realization
jailure, then the correct response to the second problem, explaining realization failure,
must be to posit meta-aspects, and reduce the problem of realization failure to the
problem of meta-realization failure, and so on.
The Fregean theorist may of course object that an infinite regress is not
engendered because there is a point at which the Fregean strategy of positing aspects (or
meta-aspects, or meta-meta-aspects, etc.) and reducing realization failure (or meta-
realization failure, etc.) to meta-realization failure (or meta-meta-realization failure, etc.)
is not the correct response. But if the Fregean objects in this manner, then the onus is on
him to explain why the Fregean strategy is appropriate with regard to the first problem,
but not the I +xth problem. If the regress can be stopped, if the Fregean strategy is
inappropriate at some level, then why is it appropriate at the first level, as a response to
the problem of recognition failure?
It is not surprising, upon reflection, that the Fregean strategy makes no
explanatory progress: It seems likely that the most promising procedure for providing an
explanation of the phenomenon of recognition failure would be to first provide a theory
of recognition success, and then explain the phenomenon of recognition failure in terms
of this theory. Recognition failure would be said to occur whenever one of the necessary
and jointly sufficient conditions for recognition success did not obtain. The Fregean
strategy, however, is utterly vacuous with regard to the phenomenon of recognition
success: the Fregean theorist maintains that a subject succeeds in recognizing the
referent of a- as the referent of p just in case (i) a and p express the distinct aspects, or
one and the same aspect, and (ii) the subject realizes that the aspect associated with a is
an aspect of the same entity as the aspect associated with p3. In the case recognition
success, the posited aspects do no explanatory work whatsoever; recognition success can
occur when the relevant terms oa and p express the same aspect, or distinct aspects. Why
not simplify matters and simply maintain that a subject succeeds in recognizing the
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referent of a as the referent of P just in case he realizes that ao and P are coreferential?
Granted, this is an entirely vacuous explanation, but parsimony dictates that it is to be
preferred over the explanation proffered by the Fregcan strategy.
The above remarks indicate that the Fregean strategy is fundamentally
misconceived. If there is a general explanation of the phenomena of recognition failure
and recognition success, then it is not the explanation proffered by the Fregean theorist.
But why should it even be supposed that there is some general explanation of the
phenomena of recbgnition failure and recognition success which can be discovered a
priori? The phenomenon of recognition failure is the phenomenon whereby a normal,
suitably informed, subject does not believe that a and P refer to, or more generally
correspond to, one thing, where in fact a and P do refer to, or correspond to, one thing.
And the phenomenon of recognition success is the phenomenon whereby a normal,
suitably informed, subject believes that a and P refer to, or correspond to, one thing,
where in fact a and 0 do refer to, or correspond to, one thing. (In the situations I have
been concerned with, 'a' and 'p' have been interpreted as metalinguistic variables ranging
over referring terms. But the above remarks apply, mutatis mutandis, if 'a' and '3' are
interpreted as variables ranging over perceptual impressions of entities.) Why should it
be supposed that there is some general, a priori, explanation as to why a subject will, or
will not, believe that a and P correspond with the same entity? It is clear that a subject
may believe, or not believe, that cc and P refer to (or correspond to) the same entity for
any number reasons. Why should Frege and his followers have even thought it possible
to state an a priori and general theory of recognition and recognition failure?
The answer, I suggest, is that Frege and his followers have wrongly assumed that
recognition failure can be explained by appeal to meanings, where meanings are publicly
accessible, and in some sense knowable a priori. If recognition failure could be
explained in terms of meanings, if a subject's failure to believe that oa and 3 refer to the
same entity could be explained in terms of the meanings of a and 3, then it would be
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possible to state a general, a priori, theory of recognition and recognition failure.
Therefore, if, as I have been arguing, it is not possible to state a general, a priori, theory
of recognition success and recognition failure, then explanations of these phenomena
cannot be given by appeal to meanings. The Fregean strategy for explaining the
phenomena of recognition failure and recognition success is fundamentally
misconceived, and the misconception can be traced, I suggest, to the mistaken
assumption that these phenomena can be explained by appeal to the meanings of public
language expressions. 16
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Appendix A Notes
I For the sake of clarity I define, or characterize, the phenomenon of recognition failure
in terms of a subject's disposition to dissent from an occurrence of a sentence of the form
it is identical to ~1, I maintain, however, that the conclusions reached in the section
would also apply if the phenomenon of recognition failure were defined so as to included
situations in which, where ao and 3 are "coreferential" sensory impressions of some kind,
a subject is disposed to behave as if ao and 3 are not "coreferential."
2 Note that if this claim is true, then there is only a superficial difference between the
puzzles posed by the phenomenon of opacity, and what others call "Frege's puzzle of
identity statements."
3 Most Fregean theorists do no even attempt to provide individuation conditions for
cognitive values. Most Fregean theorists are content merely to introduce a term which
allegedly refers to cognitive values--"mode of presentation," "mode of apprehension,"
"guise," appearance," "sense," "representation," "intension," etc.--and to state a criterion
of difference for cognitive values. Fregean theorists rarely, however, attempt to provide
a criterion of identity for cognitive values. But without such a criterion of identity,
Fregean theories have not explanatory power.
4 Dummett 1978, and following him Evans 1982, have proposed that cognitive values
be identified with abilities to recognize referents. To the extent that I understand this
proposal, I think it is obviously in violation of the independence constraint: cognitive
values are what is posited to explain one's ability, or one's inability, to recognize a
referent. Thus, to identify cognitive values with abilities is to put the cart before the
horse.
5 There are obvious similarities between the argument given here, and the argument
against Salmon's theory proffered in section 3.1.2.
6 Here the latent Cartesianism of the Fregean approach manifests itself. If cognitive
values are to play roles they were posited to play, then they must be in some way
epistemologically transparent: cognitive values must be like Cartesian ideas in that one
cannot "grasp" the same cognitive value twice and fail to realize that one has "grasped"
the same cognitive values twice. In other words, the Fregean theorist accounts for the
phenomenon of recognition failure by positing entities which are such that one cannot
fail to recognize them, and then analyzing recognition failure as a failure to realize that
these epistemologically transparent entities correspond to the same referent.
7 In this section I will focus on the "two factor" theory of conceptual role semantics, as
sketched in Block 1986, though I think my criticism applies to conceptual role theories in
general. I should also point out that though Block does not seem to see his theory as
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being Fregean,, there are no important differences between Block's "two factor" theory
of meaning, and Frege's theory of sense and reference,
8 To his credit, Block states that "the crucial question ... is what counts as identity and
difference of conceptual role," Block 1986, p. 628.
9 Block 1986, p. 628. (I do not understand how the single quotes are being used in this
passage.)
10 Block 1986, p. 668.
11 The conceptual role theorist may respond that he can distinguish the conceptual roles
of TWAIN and CLEMENS, even if Odile's beliefs are as described above. He may claim
that if Odile dissents from an occurrence of (44), then there is a mentalese sentential
function X( ) such that E(TWAIN) and E(CLEMENS) have distinct conceptual roles, viz.
IS NAMED CLEMENS. (Words in boldface capitals refer to the mentalese
correlates of English quote names; thus CLEMENS is the mentalese correlate of
'Clemens', while CLEMENS is the mentalese correlate of "Clemens",) Inscriptions of
the sentence of mentalese CLEMENS IS NAMED CLEMENS will, it may be assumed,
play a role in causing Odile's assent to an occurrence of
(47) Clemens is named 'Clemens',
while the sentence of mentalese TWAIN IS NAMED CLEMENS, it may be assumed,
play no such causal role. Conversely, the mentalese sentence TWAIN IS NAMED
TWAIN, it may be assumed, plays a direct role in causing Odile's assent to
(48) Twain is named 'Twain'.
while the sentence of mentalese CLEMENS IS NAMED TWAIN, it may be assumed,
plays no such causal role. Therefore it seems that the conceptual role theorist may be
able to distinguish the conceptual roles of TWAIN and CLEMENS for Odile without
appeal to the phenomenon of recognition failure.
The problem is that the above strategy for individuating the conceptual roles
violates the independence constraint because it appeals to the phenomenon of opacity,
where the relevant sentential function is either ' is named 'Clemens", or ' is named
'Twain". The essence of the phenomenon of opacity is the phenomenon of recognition
failure. Thus if the Fregean theorist posits entities or properties to explain the
phenomenon of opacity, he can appeal to neither the phenomenon of opacity, nor the
phenomenon of recognition failure in individuating the posited entities or properties.
12 Block 1986, p. 668.
13 Block 1986, p. 668.
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14 Block seems to be aware of this problem also, but I do not understand his response
and I suspect that he is confused. Block responds that,
The problem has to do with the type-token relation for mental representations.
The hope is that there will be a stable physical realization (at least over short
stretches of time) of, say, the representation 'CAT', which of course will be
identifiable only by its functional role. Then, in principle, one could trace the
causal links between this representation and behavior, just as the biochemist can
in principle trace the mechanism by which a gene affects the phenotype, (my
emphasis, Block 1986, p. 669),
What does Block mean when he writes that "the hope is that there will be some stable
representation [of CAT] which. . . will be identifiable only by its finctional role," That
is, how is this statement consistent with Block's previous statement that "a functionally
individuated entity can, in principle, be identified by independent (usually physicalistic)
means."?
The issue is whether a realization of CAT can be identified as a realization of
CAT via independent means; the circularity problem is not solved by our being able to
point at sormething in the head of a subject who happens to be thinking of cats. That is,
the conceptual role theorist has not solved the circularity problem if he knows that a
particular clump of neurons, which he can point to and thereby identify, is a realization of
CAT only because of its causal consequences. But if we can identify the neuron clump
as a realization of CAT and do so via independent physicalistic means, then "the hope ...
that there will be some stable representation [of CAT] which ... will be identifiable [as a
realization of CAT] only by its functional role" could not possibly be realized,
Moreover, the gene\DNA analogy hardly serves to support the position Block
seems to be defending: scientists can identify DNA by purely physicalistic, non-
functional, means, and that is why genetics now gives explanations in terms of
physicalist ,, Ily individuated DNA, and not in terms of functionally individuated genes.
15 Frege 1956, p. 57-8.
16 Of course it is rather odd to speak of referring terms as sharing meanings, or being
synonymous, in the first place. Consider the adjectives 'remarkable' and the German
'merkwiirdig'. These non referring terms are, roughly, synonymous. Now consider the
referring terms 'Twain' and 'Clemens'. These terms are coreferential, but it is difficult to
see in what sense they may be said to have the same meaning, or be synonymous.
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Appendix B. Applying DRT to Perry's "Problem of the Essential Indexical," and
Richard's "Phone booth Argument."
In this appendix I will illustrate, again rather informally, how DRT can be
employed to solve Perry's "problem of the essential indexical," and also to debunk
Richard's "phone booth argument," I
Perry's so-called "problem of the essential indexical" is really several problems
rolled into one; it is partly an epistemological or psychological problem concerning how
a subject's behavior is best explained, and it is partly a semantic problem concerning the
truth conditions of occurrences. I will here be concerned with the semantic problem
only. The semantic problem posed by Perry is a variant of a semantic argument from
opacity. Consider the following imaginary situation: We are with Perry at a grocery
store, and from behind a two-way mirror we are watching Oscar who is shopping. Oscar
notices a trail of sugar on the floor, and we surmise from Oscar's behavior that he
believes that somebody has a leaky bag of sugar in their trolley. (Suppose we overhear
Oscar saying to the store attendant, 'Sir, somebody has a leaky bag of sugar in their
trolley.') At this time Perry says to us,
(49) Oscar believes that a person with a leaky bag is making a mess.
We would judge Perry's utterance of (49) to be true.
Suppose now that Oscar sees in a mirror someone who is pushing a trolley
containing a leaky bag of sugar. The person whom Oscar sees in the mirror is actually
Oscar, himself, but he does not realize this; Oscar thinks that the person in the mirror
with the leaky bag is somebody else. Again, it is apparent to we who are watching Oscar
that Oscar does not recognize himself. At this time if Perry were to utter to us
335
(50) Oscar believes that he is making a mess.
(where the occurrence of 'he' is accompanied by a gesture toward the image in the
mirror) our intuitions would again dictate that this utterance is true. Contrary to what is
predicted by the Naive Russellian Theory, however, if Perry had uttered
(51) Oscar believes that he [himself] is making a mess,
instead of (50), our intuitions dictate that his utterance would have been false. (In order
to ensure that occurrences of (50) and (51) present the same Russellian proposition,
suppose that the 'himself appearing in brackets is not voiced by Perry--'himself as it
appears in (51) is merely meant to signify the appropriate interpretation to the reader.
Perry's supposed utterance of (51) would thus be an instance of what is sometimes called
a "de se" belief ascription.") How can DRT account for our intuition that, in the above
described situation, an utterance of (50) would be true, while an utterance of (5 1) would
be false?
Suppose that the initial DRS relative to which Perry utters (49), (50) and (51) is
as follows:
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DRS-8a
Universe: a,
Conditions: 1. a has a leaky bag
2. a is making a mess
3. a is in a belief state which is
characterized by the following sub-DRS:
Universe: b
Conditions: 1. b does not have a leaky bag
2, b is not making a mess
Internal Restriction: a -> b
External Restrictions: 1. R(a) = Oscar
DRS-8a depicts the relevant correspondences between Perry's belief state and our belief
state(s); we mutually believe that Oscar has a leaky bag and is making a mess, and that
Oscar does not believe of himself that he is making a mess.
If Perry now utters an occurrence of
(49) Oscar believes that a person with a leaky bag is making a mess.
relative to DRS-8a, the following DRS would be induced:
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DRS-8b
Universe: a
Conditions: 1. a has a leaky bag
2. a is making a mess
3. a is in a belief state which is
characterized by the following sub-DRS:
Universe: b, c
Conditions: 1, b does not have a leaky bag
2. b is not making a mess
3. c has a leaky bag
4, c is making a mess
Internal Restrictions: 1, a * b
External Restrictions: R(a) = Oscar
The reference marker c, which is introduced by the indefinite NP 'a person with a leaky
bag', is added to the universe of the sub-DRS. As it is an indefinite NP, reference marker
c is not linked to any of the already present reference markers of DRS-8a. The sub-DRS
of DRS-8b determines the following Russellian propositions: that Oscar does not have a
leaky bag; that Oscar is not making a mess; that somebody has a leaky bag; that
somebody is making a mess; and that somebody who has a leaky bag is making a mess.
(This last proposition is expressed by '3y(hr[x has a leaky bag & x is making a mess](y))'.
Also, this is not an exhaustive list of the Russellian propositions determined by the sub-
DRS of DRS-8b, but it will suffice for our purposes.)
Perry's utterance of
(50) Oscar believes that he is making a mess.
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(where the token of 'he' is accompanied by a demonstration toward the image of Oscar in
the mirror) relative to DRS-8b induces
DRS-8c
Universe: a
Conditions: 1. a has a leaky bag
2. a is making a mess
3. a is in a belief state which is
characterized by the following sub-DRS:
Universe: b, c
Conditions: I. b does not have a leaky bag
2. b is not making a mess
3. c has a leaky bag
4. c is making a mess
5. c's image appears in the mirror.
Internal Restrictions: 1. a <- b
2. ac- c
External Restrictions: R(a) = Oscar
Because 'he' is a definite NP, the occurrence of 'he' must correspond with a
reference marker which is linked to a reference marker already present in DRS-8b. It
actually corresponds with a reference marker, viz. c, which is linked to two already
present reference markers, viz. c and a. That the occurrence of 'he' corresponds with
reference marker c indicates that we take Oscar to believe that person whose image
appears in the mirror is the person who has a leaky bag and is making a mess. The
internal restriction linking b with a is ensures that the occurrence of'he' carries a
referential presupposition.
Applying our truth definition, the occurrence of (50) relative to DRS-8c is true if
and only if there is an assignment function f( ) such that f(a) = f(b) = f(c) = Oscar; f(a)
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has a leaky bag; f(a) is making a mess; and the following propositions are in Oscar's
belief set: f(a) does not have a leaky bag; f(a) is not making a mess; f(a) has a leaky
bag; f(a) is making mess; f(a)'s image appears in the mirror, and XL[x has a leaky bag &
x is making a mess & x's image appears in the mirror](Oscar). (Again, this list of
determined propositions is not exhaustive, but it will suffice for our purposes,)
The DRS that would be induced by Perry's utterance of
(51) Oscar believes that lie [himself] is making a mess.
relative to DRS-8b is, however, slightly different from DRS-8c:
DRS-8c'
Universe: a
Conditions: 1. a has a leaky bag
2. a is making a mess
3, a is in a belief state which is
characterized by the following sub-DRS:
Universe: b, c
Conditions: I. b does not have a leaky bag
2. b is not making a mess
3. c has a leaky bag
4. c is making a mess
5, b is making a mess.
Internal Restrictions: 1. a *- b
External Restrictions: R(a) = Oscar
Applying our truth definition to DRS-8c', Perry's utterance of (51) relative to DRS-8b is
true if and only if there is an assignment function f( ) such that f(a) = f(b) = Oscar; f(a)
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has a leaky bag; f(a) is making a mess; and the following propositions are in Oscar's
belief state: f(a) does not have a leaky bag; f(a) is not making a mess; f(a) has a leaky
bag; f(a) is making mess; and Xx[x does not have a leaky bag & x is not making a mess
& x is making a mess](Oscar). (Again, this list of determined propositions is not
exhaustive, but it will suffice for our purposes.)
Thus DRT is able to distinguish the truth conditions of Perry's utterances of (50)
and (51). Perry's utterance of (51) relative to DRS-8b is true only if Oscar holds the
attitude of belief toward the Russellian proposition denoted by 'hX[x does not have a
leaky bag & x is not making a mess & x is making a mess](Oscar)'. The truth of Perry's
utterance of (50) relative to DRS-8b, however, does not require that Oscar hold the
attitude of belief toward such a contradictory proposition. (For the sake of simplicity, I
have slightly altered Perry's example. Perry's original example concerned the differing
truth conditions of occurrences of 'I believe that he is making a mess' and 'I believe that I
am making a mess'.)
I now turn to illustrating how DRT can be employed to debunk Richard's phone
booth argument. Richard initially employed his argument to support something akin to
Salmon's Russellian Theory, though he has since come to reject both that theory, and his
argument in support of it. Richard's argument is designed to show that even if, as the
Fregean theorists suggest, one does not permit "substitution within opaque contexts," the
semantic problems associated with the phenomenon of opacity will still arise. That is,
even if "substitution within opaque contexts" is banned, there will still be nomologically
possible situations in which occu-nences of sentences of the form, rN believes that E(aV
and rN believes that X(p13 (where a and P are coreferential, directly referring, terms) are
trite, even though the subject referred to by N is disposed to assent to an occurrence of
.(o), yet is disposed to dissent from an occurrence of E(1). One such nomologically
possible situation is as follows: Mark is wearing a disguise, and is in his room, which
contains a phone, and overlooks the street outside. Outside, across the street, there is a
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phone booth which Mark can see from his window. The phone in Mark's room rings.
Mark answers it and recognizes the voice of his old friend, Odile, and while talking to
Odile, Mark looks outside and sees a woman whom he does not recognize at the phone
booth. The woman at the phone booth is Odile, but because she is also wearing a
disguise, Mark does not recognize her. Thus Mark does not realize that the person to
whom he is speaking (Odile) is the same person whom he is watching. Suddenly Mark
sees a steamroller heading toward the phone booth, and Mark thinks to himself
(something like) "Gosh! The woman in the phone booth is in danger!" Our intuitions
dictate that if Mark (for some reason) were to utter
(52) I believe that you are in danger,
into the phone, this utterance would be false. If, however, Mark were to utter
(53) I believe that she is in danger.
into the phone (where the occurrence of 'she' is accompanied by a gesture toward the
woman in the phone booth), our intuitions dictate that Mark's utterance would be true.
(Thus Richard would dissent from an occurrence of 'you are in danger' uttered into the
phone, though he would assent to an occurrence of 'she is in danger', accompanied by a
gesture toward the woman outside the window.) Richard's argument is designed to show
that, despite our intuitions concerning the truth conditions of these occurrences, if Mark's
utterance of (53) were true, then his utterance of (52) would also be true.
Suppose Mark tells Odile, over the phone, that he sees a woman at a phone booth,
and that there is a steamroller heading toward this poor person. After describing what he
sees to Odile, Mark utters an occurrence of,
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(53) I believe that she is in danger.
into the phone. Our untutored intuitions dictate that this utterance is true. While telling
Odile of the poor woman's plight, Mark waves his hands at the poor woman in an attempt
to alert her of her danger. Odile sees Mark, whom she does not recognize, waving
frantically and this leads Odile to tell Mark, over the phone, that there is a man who is
waving frantically at her. She surmises--ironically enough--that the waving man believes
that she is in danger. In telling Mark of this man who is waving at her and what she
makes of it, Odile utters
(54) He believes that I am in danger,
into the phone (where the intended referent of 'He' is the man who is waving). After
thinking about Odile's assessment of the waving man's behavior, Mark decides that Odile
is correct. (Mark does not realize that the waving man is himself.) This leads Mark to
voice his agreement, and thus he utters
(55) He believes that you are in danger.
into the phone (where again 'He' refers to the waving man). But notice that the only
difference between (55) and (52) is that (55) has 'He' were (52) has 'I', and furthermore
the rt!evant occurrences of these terms are coreferential, and they also appear outside of
that-clauses--they appear in "transparent" positions. Hence, if Mark's utterance of (55) is
true, then, despite our intuitions and despite the Fregean theorists ban of "substitution
within opaque contexts," Mark's utterance of (52) must also be true. (Note the implicit
appeal to the Principle of Propositional Truth!) The argument concludes that, since
banning "substitution" does not succeed in preserving the veracity of our untutored
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intuitions, we might as well abandon our intuitions and espouse some version of the
Naive Russellian Theory. 2
If Richard's argument is sound, then the veracity of our untutored intuitions must
be rejected. I have claimed, however, that a Russellian theory can be made to accord
with our untutored intuitions, and thus I must be able to show that Richard's argument is
unsound. My objection to Richard's argument, in brief, is that it assumes the Principle of
Propositional Truth; Richard's phone booth argument is unsound because it assumes the
Principle of Propositional Truth, and this principle is false. Moreover, once the Principle
of Propositional Truth is rejected, the above sketched machinery of DRT can be invoked
to account for, and validate, our untutored intuitions concerning the truth conditions of
occurrences of (52)-(55) in the above described situation.
Unlike other attempts to debunk Richard's phone booth argument, the DRT
analysis of the truth conditions of the utterances of (52)-(55) crucially depends upon
what other sentences are uttered in the discourse. Hence, before a DRT analysis can be
provided, a more detailed description of Odile and Mark's discourse must be given. I
assume that the following will suffice:
Mark: There's a woman across the street, and (53) I believe that she is in
danger.
Odile: That the darndest thing, because there's a man in a window, and he's
waving frantically. (54) He believes that I am in danger.
Mark: Mmm. Yes. (55) He believes that you are in danger.
Let us assume that the DRS relative to which Mark's first string of utterances is produced
is as follows:
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DRS-9a
Universe: a, b
Conditions: 1. a is named 'Mark'
2. b is named 'Odile'
3. a and b are speaking with each other on the phone.
As the first sentence of Mark's utterance contains the indefinite NP, 'a woman', a new
reference marker must be introduced into DRS-9a, The DRS which results from Mark's
initial string of utterances, relative to DRS-9a is thus
DRS-9b
Universe: a, b, c
Conditions: 1. a is named 'Mark'
2. b is named 'Odile'
3. a and b are speaking with each other on the phone
4. c is across the street
5. c is a woman
6. a is in a belief state which is characterized by the
following sub-DRS:
Universe: d
Conditions: 1. d is in danger
Internal Restrictions: 1. c <- d
External Restrictions: 1, R(a) = Mark
2. R(d) = Odile
Note that the DRS is constructed in two steps: In the first step, the reference marker c,
and conditions 3 and 4 are introduced into the primary DRS, and in the second step
condition 5 is introduced, as well as internal restriction 1. And finally, as 'she' is--even
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when it appears inside a that-clause--a directly referential term, the external restriction 2
is added. (As usual, I have suppressed any details which are not directly relevant,)
Odile's response(s) to Mark's initial string of utterances brings about the
following DRS:
DRS-9c
Universe: a, b, c, e
Conditions: 1. a is named 'Mark'
2. b is named 'Odile'
3. a and b are speaking with each other on the phone
4. c is across the street
5 c is a woman
6. a is in a belief state which is
characterized by the following sub-DRS:
7.
8.
9.
Universe: d
Conditions: 1. d is in danger
e is at a window, waving frantically
e is a man
e is in a belief state which is
characterized by the following sub-DRS:
Universe: f
Conditions: 1. f is in danger
Internal Restrictions: 1.
2.
External Restrictions:
2.
3.
4.
c <-> df, 
ftb
1. R(a)= Mark
R(d) = Odile
R(e) = Mark
R(f) = Odile
Again, DRS-9c is brought about in two steps: First, the indefinite NP 'a man in a
window' introduces a new reference marker, viz. e, into the universe, and it also
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introduces conditions 7 and 8. Second, the ascription uttered in Odile's response(s) adds
condition 9, and the internal restriction,f-> b. Also, as 'I is a directly referential term,
the external restriction R(f) = Odile is added to the DRS.
Mark's last string of utterances merely reiterates the information conveyed by
Odile's previous utterance, and thus it induces no significant changes in DRS-9c,
Our intuition dictate that in the described situation all of utterances (53)-(55) are
true. Though I will not go through the details, the above sketched DRT analysis
preserves these intuitions. But what about (52)? What would be the truth value of
Mark's utterance of
(52) I believe that you are in danger,
relative to DRS-9c? I suggest that this occurrence would induce the following DRS:
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DRS-9d
Universe: a, b, c, e
Conditions: 1.
2.
3,
4,
5.
6.
a is named 'Mark'
b is named 'Odile'
a and b are speaking with each other on the phone
c is across the street
c is a woman
a is in a belief state which is
characterized by the following sub-DRS:
Universe: d, g, h
Conditions: 1, d is in danger
2. g is in danger
3. g is named 'Odile'
4. h and g are speaking with each other
on the phone
5. g is the referent of Mark's utterance
of 'you'
7.
8,
9.
e is at a window, waving frantically
e is a man
e is in a belief state which is
characterized by the following sub-DRS:
Universe: f
Conditions: 1, f is in danger
Internal Restrictions: 1. c <-> d
2. f-> b
3. g-> b
4. hI<->a
External Restrictions:
2.
3.
4.
5.
1. R(a) = Mark
R(d) = Odile
R(e) = Mark
R(f) = Odile
R(g) = Odile
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Mark's utterance of (52) contains an occurrence of the definite NP 'you' and this
definite NP must correspond with a reference marker which is linked to a reference
marker already present in DRS-9d. The only plausible candidate is reference marker b,
Hence the reference marker corresponding with the occurrence of 'you' in Mark's
utterance of (52), viz, reference marker g, is linked via internal restriction 3 to reference
marker b. But why are conditions 3-5 added to the sub-DRS of condition 6? Mark's
utterance of (52) is a self-ascription; thus the subject of the ascription, Mark, is also a
participant of the discourse. Hence if Mark were to utter an occurrence of (52), he
would understand the NPs of the discourse as standing in the coreferring relationships
represented by the internal restrictions of DRS-9d, and thus if Mark were to sincerely
utter (52), he would assume that the token of 'you' appearing in his utterance of (52)
refers to a person named 'Odile' with whom he is talking on the phone. This is
represented in DRT as follows: the sub-DRS in condition 6 characterizes Mark's belief
state, yet DRS-9d itself--which contains the internal restriction g -> b--also characterizes
Mark's belief state. Therefore Mark's utterance of the self-ascription (52) would have the
effect of copying the conditions in DRS-9c which govern reference marker b into the
sub-DRS of condition 6. (Though these copied conditions govern reference markers g
and h, instead of internally linked reference markers a and b.) Thus conditions 2-3 from
DRS-9c are copied as conditions 3 and 4 to the sub-DRS of condition 6 in DRS-9d. I
assume that conditions 2 and 5 of the sub-DRS in condition 6 require no explanation. 3
The above DRT analysis of Mark's supposed utterance of (52) explains a rather
odd feature of Richard's argument: Richard's argument asks us to consider what the truth
conditions of Mark's utterance of (52) would be, though the details of the described
situation make it clear that Mark would not sincerely utter (52); Mark would judge his
own utterance of (52) to be false. A proper analysis of Mark's possible utterance of (52)
ought to explain why Mark would not sincerely utter (52), and the above DRT analysis
provides such an explanation: Mark would not sincerely utter (52) because, relative to
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DRS-9c, an occurrence of (52) uttered by Mark communicates that he believes that the
person he is speaking with on the phone--the referent of his utterance of 'you'--is in
danger, and Mark believes this to be false information.
What about truth conditions? Richard's argument in support of the Naive
Russellian theory goes through only if it follows from the truth of Mark's utterance of
(55) that Mark's subsequent utterance of (52) is also true. That is, Richard's argument
goes through only if it cannot be that Mark's utterance of (55) relative to DRS-9c is true,
while Mark's supposed utterance of (52) relative to DRS-9c is false. Under our definition
of truth for an occurrence, however, it is possible for the former utterance to be true, and
the latter false. Under our definition for truth for an occurrence, Mark's utterance of (52)
relative to DRS-9c is true only if Mark holds the attitude of belief toward, among other
things, the Russellian proposition that Xx[ky[x is in danger & x is named 'Odile' & y and x
are speaking with each other on the phone](Mark)](Odile). The truth of Mark's utterance
of (54), however, does require that Mark hold the attitude of belief toward this
proposition. Thus the truth conditions of the occurrences differ, and Richard's argument
in support of the Naive Russellian Theory is debunked.
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Appendix B Notes
I Perry presents his problem in Perry 1979, and Richard presents his phone booth
argument in Richard 1983, In Asher 1986, a version of DRT is utilized in order to
debunk Richard's argument, though the analysis presented here differs from Asher's in
several respects.
2 In Soames 1987a, Soames argues that Richard's argument applies in similar situations
which involve occurrences of proper names instead of indexicals.
3 It appears as if condition 5 of the sub-DRS of condition 6 contains a kind of use-
mention confusion. This condition states
5. g is the referent of Mark's utterance of 'you'
but 'g' refers to a reference marker and not to Odile. Recall, however, that for the sake of
simplicity the predicates appearing the conditions of DRSs serve "double duty"; the
predicate 'is a dog' appearing in a condition does not, strictly speaking, designate the
property being a dog, but instead designates a mental representation type, tokens of
which are the mental representation tokens which allow the participants of the relevant
discourse to seemingly speak and think about the same property, the property being a
dog. Thus, strictly speaking, the predicate appearing in condition 5 designates a certain
mental representation type, tokens of which allow Mark and Odile to speak and think
about the same property, the property of being the referent of Mark's utterance of 'you'.
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